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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to explore which laws and institutions are essential for a
strong, well-developed and efficient securities market in Saudi Arabia. In connection
with understanding the significance of the subject matter, this dissertation seeks to
explore the development of the modern securities market, assess the recent efforts to
create new rules and institutions that could modernise the market, and offer
suggestions for reforms that could stimulate further market development. This
addresses the issues of coherence in regulatory and supervisory rules and norms at
national level. The Saudi market is not as competitive as other regional markets. It is
a bank-dominated system in which several large institutions exert significant
influence on the pattern and structure of market activities. The absence of non-bank
intermediaries within the financial system has meant that the Saudi market is
structurally less well developed. Indeed, the lack of competition in the market, due to
the absence of market makers, has led to acute problems in the area of finance, where
the lack of competition in the market has resulted in higher prices and a lower level
of liquidity. At the same time, there are serious regulatory problems associated with a
bank-dominated system. Recent work on these markets has shown that they are
characterised by insufficient transparency, wide bid-ask spreads insider self-dealing
and market manipulation. This thesis examines the transformations taking place in
the regulation of the Saudi stock market and considers them against the backdrop of
increased competition from other national exchanges in the Gulf region. This work
also investigates the pressure to remove protectionism regulation put on the national
supervisor by large investors seeking more accurate and timely information and the
limitation of insider trading by structural insiders. This thesis will seek to show that
the introduction of regulatory reforms could yield significant benefits for investors.
The prospect of greater transparency and public disclosure of information about
companies could enhance the relative liquidity of the Saudi Arabian exchange and
lower the cost of transactions.
XIII
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1. Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to explore which laws and institutions are essential for a
strong, well-developed and efficient securities market in Saudi Arabia. In
connection with understanding the significance of the subject matter, this
dissertation seeks to explore the development of the modern securities market,
assess the recent efforts to create new rules and institutions that could modernise
the market, and offer suggestions for reforms that could stimulate further market
development. In the main, the thesis provides an assessment of the quality and
effectiveness of the operational and regulatory infrastructure of the securities
market in Saudi Arabia.
The Kingdom's securities market is well established and its growth has
been impressive. In 1999, market capitalisation was SR 200 billion. This level of
total market capitalisation makes it the largest securities market in the Arabic
region. Banks play a central role in the Kingdom's systems of finance for
investment. The financial sector is said to possess the same basic characteristics
of those in continental Europe, which are regarded as 'bank-based' systems.' The
supposedly strong involvement of Saudi banks in the development of the stock
market is widely regarded as having made an important contribution to the
successful growth and evolution of the market. Whilst most research has focused
For a description of the continental approach, particularly Germany, see J. Edwards and K.
Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1994.
2traditionally on the relationship between banks and economic growth, recent work
has pointed to the link between financial intermediation, long-term economic
growth and the emergence of useful financial information.
A successful national equity market, which functions well in terms of size,
liquidity and integration with the world capital markets, requires strong securities
laws and institutions. 2 Information is essential for efficient markets, and markets
will be well-informed only if all market participants are able to obtain
information at reasonable costs. Whilst there are various impediments to non-
bank financial intermediaries and institutions in developing countries, 3
 the
absence of disclosure of accurate financial information about companies is
without doubt the most serious. Thus, if a national securities market is to develop,
policymakers need to establish adequate disclosure and transparency standards.4
Even with good public disclosure, such as exists in the USA, there will be
limits to the degree to which market discipline can create an overall climate of
stability in the securities market. As securities markets in developing countries
continue to mature, institutions will need to bear a great part of the responsibility
for maintaining and sustaining active securities markets. Regulators will have to
adapt their legal and institutional frameworks to suit them to the changed
circumstances in the market. This suggests that developing countries will need to
2 See, e.g., R. Levine and S. Zervos, 'Capital Control Liberalization and Stock Market
Development', 26 World Development 1169, 1179-89, 1998; J. Coffee, Jr., 'Privatization and
Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure', Columbia University Law
School Working Paper, October 1999; W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, 'Comparative
Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross-Reference', in
McCahery et al., Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Systems and Capital
Markets, Oxford: Clarendon Press, forthcoming.
A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 'Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries:
Stylized Facts', 10 World Bank Economic Review, 1996, pp.291-332.
F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University Press, 1989, Ch. 11.
3undertake a number of developments simultaneously in order to create a
consistent and unified framework. If such a strategy is to succeed in strengthening
the stock market, it will need to protect investors from being poorly informed, aid
in the promotion of the efficient allocation of capital, and assist generally in
managerial agency cost reduction.5
Certainly, diverse jurisdictions have securities law regimes that differ in
the relative burden of information disclosure, regulation of financial
intermediaries, surveillance of trading systems, enforcement of the rights of
investors, and control of capital balances percentages of firms over their
investments. 6 The new comparative research on securities markets has shown that
some legal systems give investors more protection against fraud and
expropriation than others and has suggested that controlling information
asymmetry is an essential precondition for building a strong capital market. 7
 For
example, differences in the level and scope of the regulation of financial
intermediaries could be far more useful to investors in ensuring market
transparency. The premise of this new research is that the relative importance of
the higher priority accorded to protecting minority investors against appropriation
correlates positively with the strength of a country's capital market. 8 Given the
S. Choi and A. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital
Market', 65 Fordhain L. Rev. 1885, 1894 (1997).
See, generally, R. Karmel, 'The Case for a European Securities Commission', 38 Colum. J.
Trans. Law, 1999, pp. 9-43.
See, generally, B. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets: The Non-triviality of Securities Law', working paper 1999; J. McCahery and L.
Renneboog, 'Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance and Securities Regimes', in J.
McCahery and L. Renneboog (eds.), Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Law and Securities
Regimes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, csp. Ch. 1; R. Levine, 'Law, Finance, and Economic
Growth', 8 J. Fin. mt. 8, 1999, pp. 13-15.
8 j • Coffee, 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure', working paper 1999; B. Black, 'Information, Asymmetry, The Internet, and Securities
Offerings', Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, Vol.2, 1998, pp. 91-98.
4positive relationship between the quality of the legal environment and the
development of the financial market, 9 the critical question becomes: What are the
essential laws, standards and institutions that are critical for the establishment of
capital market development positively associated with long-term economic
0
This thesis addresses three main issues. First, it seeks to understand the
ways in which regulatory and economic domains are interdependent in the Saudi
financial markets. Regulatory authorities interact with market actors in the
establishment of an institutional regime which forms a regulatory framework for
the national financial market. There is a clear linkage between particularistic
economic interests, working through but not confined to the commercial activities
of banks and other financial market participants, and the policy processes which
regulate and supervise the national securities market. The rules of the securities
market are contestable, even though the financial regulators in Saudi Arabia have
very little control over the ways in which banks and other players respond to the
institutional framework that is already in place. Understanding these linkages and
the role of the changing relations among financial actors in the market calls for a
socio-legal approach to the subject matter, so as to understand not just the
patterns of institutions and rules themselves, but also the very mainsprings of
their emergence and transformation.
' R. Levine, 'The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth', 30 J. Money,
Credit, and Banking 596, 1998, pp. 603-605.
0 See K. Pistor, 'Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The Experience of
Transition Economies', working paper 1999.
5Second, this research raises the question of the interaction of competing
national regulatory strategies in the context of a global market economy, which
poses problems for regulator cooperation. Government tends to respond to largely
domestic constituencies. Despite the emergence of a global capital market, the
interests of policy communities operating in contrasting domestic regulatory and
market systems may well conflict, leading to tension and competition, rendering
cooperation difficult. Nevertheless, the capacity of national regulators to resolve
policy problems regarding their securities market is in no doubt. The role of
private sector actors is again crucial, since transnational corporate actors have led
to increasing economic interdependence in a system of competitive regulatory
regimes. This dissertation will aim at improving our understanding of the
regulatory strategies within Saudi Arabia that seek to improve market
opportunities for national constituencies and to enhance the attractiveness of the
Saudi Arabian market to foreign investors. In this regard, it seeks to ascertain
whether the stepped-up competition in global securities markets and regulatory
regimes have been responsible for the innovations in the institutional patterns of
regulation and supervision at national level. This approach brings a unique view
on the possible extent to which patterns of securities regulation are affected by
competing regulatory and domestic market changes.
Third, this study addresses the issues of coherence in regulatory and
supervisory rules and norms at national level. The Saudi market is not as
competitive as other regional markets. It is a bank-dominated system in which
several large institutions exert significant influence on the pattern and structure of
6market activities. The absence of non-bank intermediaries within the financial
system has meant that the Saudi market is structurally less well developed.'1
Indeed, the lack of competition in the market, due to the absence of market
makers, has led to acute problems in the area of finance, where the lack of
competition in the market has resulted in higher prices and a lower level of
liquidity. At the same time, there are serious regulatory problems associated with
a bank-dominated system. Recent work on these markets has shown that they are
characterised by insufficient transparency, wide bid-ask spreads, insider self-
dealing and market manipulation.' 2 This thesis examines the transformations
taking place in the regulation of the Saudi stock market and considers them
against the backdrop of increased competition from other national exchanges in
the Gulf region. This work also investigates the pressure to remove protectionist
regulation put on the national supervisor by large investors seeking more accurate
and timely information and the limitation of insider trading by structural insiders.
This thesis will seek to show that the introduction of regulatory reforms could
yield significant benefits for investors. The prospect of greater transparency and
public disclosure of information about companies could enhance the relative
liquidity of the Saudi Arabian exchange and lower the cost of transactions.
Attempts at reforms along these lines have been- problematic in the past. This
dissertation will seek to understand the patterns of conflict within the regulatory
field against the background of national-based financial interest which currently
dominate the system of control towards the reform of regulatory policies.
See, gcnerally, R. Levine, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth', 8 J. Fin. Int, 1999, pp. 12-22.
2 jc Coffee, 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure', working paper, 1999, esp. pp. 30-45.
72. The Importance of this Research
As noted earlier, the financial system plays a major role in economic
development, mainly by linking up capital providers and capital users. Several
economic writers, such as Cameron, Gurley and Shaw, and more recently Levine,
have suggested the existence of a strong relationship between financial
development and economic growth.' 3 Gurley and Shaw have argued that the
relationship between the financial system and economic growth is due to the
significant benefits accruing to the economy from the institutionalisation of
savings and investments that diversify channels for the flow of loanable funds and
multiplies varieties of financial claims.' 4 The absence of a developed financial
system tends to limit the efficiency with which savings can be used. Since there is
no way to transfer funds from savers to investors, the only way an individual can
invest is to rely on personal savings, or an investment scheme that directly links
savers with users. The problem with such direct investment is that there is no
mechanism for reconciling the savings needs of savers with the investments needs
of users, which makes it difficult for savers to find users whose needs match their
requirements with respect to highest yields, lowest risks and maximum
liquidity.' 5 Patrick has shown how the financial system could solve these
problems by creating a wide variety of financial claims that would serve as assets
For the theory of the relationship between financial growth and economic development, see R.
Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969; D.R.
Khatkhate, 'National and International Aspects of Financial Policies', in L.D.Cs: A Prologue,
World Development, Vol. 10, no. 9, 1982; and R.I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic
Development, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1973.
4 J.G. Gurley, & E.S. Shawn, 'Financial Aspects of Social Scicntists', in American Econo,nic
Review, Vol. 45, no. 4, 1955.
' 0. Dufey, & I. Giddy, The International Money Market, New York, 1978, p. 14. See also G.
Scagliarine, 'Pooling For Funds and the New Financial intermediation in the United States',
Journal of International Business Law, no. 9, 1994, p. 362.
8for savers, with claims being differentiated in terms of liquidity, yield, maturity,
divisibility, risk of default or change in value, and other services. 16 In that way,
via the bridge that financial intermediaries provide, capital providers would be
encouraged to save and reinvest their income in line with their requirements,
while capital users, on the other hand, would find the capital they need for their
investment. In fact, the real economic benefit of a well-developed financial
system lies in the fact that it helps to accelerate savings, to improve funds
allocation by channelling them to the most productive investments, and to reduce
the cost of transferring savings. A developed financial system also tends to help
in channelling funds towards the most productive investments.'7
Recently, economists have argued that a strong securities market can
facilitate economic growth in that it becomes easier for companies to raise
capital.' 8 In this regard, securities markets, in contrast to markets dependent on
banks, offer companies greater flexibility and allow them to grow more rapidly.'9
Of course, creating a strong capital market is difficult and requires strong
institutions and effective rules. The shortcomings of bank finance and securities
regimes run by conglomerate banks were, in part at least, responsible for many of
the recent problems in Asia.2°
Only limited prior work has been done on the legal prerequisites for strong
securities markets. Black advanced a theoretical argument that a country whose
IS See H.T. Patrick, 'Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped
Countries', Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. XIV, no.2, January 1966, p. 182.
Ii JO. Gurley, & E.S. Shawn, Financial Structure and Economic Development, Economic
Development and Culture Change, vol. 54, no. 3, April 1967.
A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth:
An Overview', 10 The World Bank Economic Review, 1996, pp. 223, 230.
See Bencivenga, V, Smith, B.& Starr, R. Equity Market, Transaction Cost, and Capital
Accumulation: An Illustration, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 10, no. 2, 1996.
20 L. Lauridsen, 'The Financial Crisis in Thailand: Causes, Conduct and Consequences?', World
Development,vol.26,no.8, 1998, pp.1575-1591.
9laws and institutions protect minority shareholders and provide good
information to investors will tend to support the development of a strong national
securities market. 2 ' La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny produced
evidence that legal protection of minority investors tends to correlate with the
strength of a country's capital market. 22 La Porta et al. show that the level and
development of legal protection of a securities market depends on the nature and
origins of the country's legal system. More recently, Coffee has argued that
securities laws that protect minority investors are valuable to investors. He
observed that investors from countries with weak legal protection are able to
solve this problem by listing their shares in markets of developed countries with
high-quality legal protection.23
This is the first work of its kind that provides extensive socio-legal evidence
regarding the effectiveness of certain reforms in the laws and institutions of a
developing country's securities regime. Unlike earlier work, this thesis
acknowledges that promoting an adequate legal foundation is necessary for the
development of a broader and deeper securities market but accepts as inevitable
that reforms can proceed only as quickly as the incumbent groups themselves
benefit from changing the rules. 24
 Creating new institutions is, after all, difficult
in developing countries whose legal traditions aré at best weak in enforcement
and in financial intermediary development.25
21 B. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The Non-
triviality of Securities Laws', working paper 1999.
22 R. LaPorta, F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, 'Law and Finance', 106 J. Pol.
Econ., 1998, pp. 1113-1155.
23 
j Coffee, 'The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications', Northwestern Univ. Law Review 93, 1999, pp. 641-707.
24 See, generally, L. Bebchuk and M. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate
Ownership and Governance', Stanford Law Review (forthcoming).
25 R. Levine, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth', p. 22.
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3. The Importance of the Securities Market to Saudi Arabia
The evolution of a country's financial system cannot be analysed in isolation from
the state of that country's general economy. The maturity of the financial system
determines the efficiency of the allocation of savings and investments in the
economy, and sustainable economic growth. It is hard to imagine a country being
able to have, at the same, a sophisticated financial system and an underdeveloped
economic system. Usually, economic development goes hand in hand with,
innovations in the financial system. Although governments may initially attempt
to compensate for the imperfections of the financial system by acting as the
leading investor, in the longer run they have to adapt the financial system to the
level of economic development. In particular, for liberalisation of the trade and
capital account, adjustment of the regulatory system is required. A study of
innovation in a country's financial system must therefore be accompanied by an
analysis of its economic development. The next section (3.1) will present an
analysis of the Saudi economy, showing the need for the development of a
sophisticated stock market.
3.1 The Saudi economy
Economic growth in Saudi Arabia since 1945 has been closely tied to the level of
oil production and the movement of oil prices. 26 Following its discovery in 1938,
oil quickly became the main source of revenue. 27 Although the Kingdom's oil
production and income was initially modest (around 11,000 barrels a day), this
- See R. Wilson, The Economies of the Middle East, London, Macmillan Press, 1979.
27 Prior to the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the Saudi economy revolved around pilgrimage in the
western region together with subsistence farming and pearling in the eastern region.
11
early oil income did stimulate the government to finance major infrastructure
works and modernise its economy. 28 In the 1960s, as a result of the stable 'posted
prices' and given the growing oil production, oil income could only increase. The
oil production of both Saudi Arabia and Iran outpaced the growth in world
production, while other major producing countries underperformed as a result of
the market management policy of their major oil-producing companies. 29 In 1960,
Venezuela, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia attempted to create a stronger
negotiating position with the international oil companies in order to be able to
protect themselves against the stick-and-carrot policy that oil companies had
hitherto applied in their dealings with individual governments. The tug of war
over price and production levels with the international oil companies changed
pace in the early I 970s, when price increases were negotiated in the Teheran and
Tripoli agreements. 3° The First Five Year Plan dates back to this period.
However, massive investments to stimulate economic development and the
rnodernise the economy only became possible after the price increase of 1973-
1974, when oil prices rose by 400%.'
Initially, investments were predominantly geared towards developing the
physical infrastructure. The lack of roads, ports, airports and a telecommunication
system were major impediments to modernising the economy. 32 However, it
Seems that the high, easily earned revenues resulting from oil price levels during
28 S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1993,
p. 13.
29 See C. van der Linde, Dynamic International Oil Markets, Oil Market Developments and
Structure 1860-1990, DordrechtlBoston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, P. 121.
30 Ibid.
31 D. Wells, 'The Effects of Saudi Industrialization on Employment', Jou,-nal of Energy and
Development, 1986, pp. 273-275.
32 S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, pp. 14-15.
12
this period meant that there was less inducement for the government to pursue
any serious policy of diversifying the economy away from its reliance on oil. u
The result was that the infrastructure for the oil industry served this one industry
only, and did not serve the wider economy. The Saudi economy was very much a
two-track affair, with a modern sector functioning in isolation from the traditional
34
rural economy.
The halcyon days of the oil boom quickly came to an end in the mid-
l980s when oil prices fell sharply, reducing the Kingdom's revenues and bringing
the phase of generous spending on infrastructure to an abrupt halt. Fortunately, by
that time, the government had almost completed its infrastructure programme.
The sharp decline in world oil prices left the Saudi budget in deficit. 35 The first
serious deficit, of SR 23.8 billion, appeared in 1983, the first year of several in a
row in which the budget was in deficit. 36 As a result, the government was forced
to reduce its expenditure, a move which led to an economic slowdown. This sharp
cut in government expenditure led the private sector to look for sources of profit
other than government contracts. Surprisingly, the Saudi economy had bounced
Wilson, The Economies of the Middle East, p. 40.
" The Kingdom's OPEC quotas restrain its current production to only 8 million barrels.
According to the International Energy Agency (lEA) estimation, Saudi Arabia's total production
capacity is 10.25 million barrels per day, making it by far-the largest producer in the world.
Furthermore, the Kingdom has in the order of 260 billion barrels of proven recoverable crude oil
reserves, representing more than 25% of the world's total crude oil reserves. At the current rate of
production, Saudi reserves would last for approximately 100 years.The Kingdom's gas reserves
were l9Otcf (trillion cubic feet) at the end of 1995, representing 3.8% of global gas reserves,
putting Saudi Arabia in third place behind Russia. Finally, recent studies have shown that the
Kingdom has the largest mineral deposits in the Arabian Peninsula, including deposits of gold ore,
copper and phosphates. N.A. Rashid and E.I. Shaheen, Saudi Arabia and Gulf War, International
Institute of Technology, 1992 and A. Johany, M. Borne & Mixon Jr.,The Saudi Arabian Economy,
Croom Helm, London, 1986.
A. Al-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', Gulf Financial Markets, Gulf
International Bank, Bahrain, January 1988, p. 5.
36 Ibid. Al-Dukhiel states that the first deficit after the oil boom years appeared in 1977 with an
amount of SR 7.5 billion; that amount rose in the following year to SR 16.5 billion. These deficits
were financed by drawing on government reserves, and no adverse effect was felt on the economy.
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back by the end of the 1980s. During this time, the government managed to
reduce its budget deficit from SR 69.7 billion in 1987 to SR 34.9 billion in
l989.
Unfortunately, this upturn in the Saudi economy was briefly disrupted by
the Gulf War. The fiscal impact of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent
Gulf War was great and added to the budgetary deficit. For 1990 and 1991,
budget data show total expenditures of SR 476.5 billion, with a deficit of SR
160.1 billion. 38 The impact of the expenditure on the war was so far-reaching that
it resulted in work on urgently needed programmes and projects in the Kingdom
being delayed. However, from 1993 through to 1995, the government took tough
measures to curb the deficit. The government's budgeted expenditure was
reduced by approximately 24%, from approximately SR 195 billion to SR 150
billion. At budgeted production levels, Saudi Arabia crude oil prices needed to
average some US$ 14 per barrel in order to meet 1996 budget plan revenue
objectives and to bring the fiscal deficit down to somewhere in the region of only
SR 15 billion. Oil prices in 1996 were higher than assumed in the annual budget
statement, as was actual expenditure, but the actual deficit turned out to be lower
than planned.
The Saudi economy showed strong growth during 1996, with GDP
growing by 8.6% in current prices. At the end of 1996, GDP was SR 510 billion,
Ibid.
38 The substantial costs of the Gulf War and the enormous outflow of related payments, the Saudi
balance of payments went deeply into deficit during 1991-1992. During 1993-1994, the balance of
payment deficits was reduced, despite the oil exports decline by 1.2%. Non-oil exports, however,
rose sharply by 18.6 percent. However, the Kingdom benefited from oil price rises in 1995 and
1996. The balance of payments showed a remarkable improvement during 1996, with the current
account showing a surplus. Preliminary estimates indicate that oil exports increased by 15.4%.
During this year, Saudi Arabia posted a small surplus on its current account for the first time in 13
years. See SAMA Thirty-Third Annual Report, Riyadh, 1997.
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compared to SR 469 billion in l995. The private sector's contribution to
economic activities continued to grow. Private sector GDP grew by 3.5% in 1996,
making up 35% of total GDP in current prices. This increase is notable
considering that both the oil sector and the government sector also grew in
l996.° The favourable economic conditions in 1996 continued into 1997. During
1997, GDP grew by 7.1% in current prices, which meant that positive growth was
recorded for the fourth consecutive year. At the end of 1997, GDP was SR 547
billion, compared to SR 510 billion in 1996. The private sector also recorded a
growth of 4.1% in 1997.
As noted earlier, the Kingdom's economy is highly dependent on public
sector spending, which in turn is dominated by oil revenues. Consequently, when,
in 1998, oil prices fell to a 25-year low and Brent crude fetched as little as $1 1 a
barrel (40% less than it had done on 31 December 1997), the Kingdom's
economic growth was seriously affected. The 1998 budget statement said that
government income amounted to SR 143 billion in 1998, 23% less than in 1997.
Unlike previous years, when government expenditure had consistently exceeded
the amount budgeted, actual expenditure in 1998 fell by 3.6% of the original
appropriation. 4 ' Although, following the reduction of the deficit in 1997 to only
SR 6 billion, the government was hoping to balance its budget in 1998, the fall in
oil prices during the year pushed the deficit up to SR 46 billion, postponing the
hope of balancing the budget to the next decade.
Statement by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy on the National Budget for 1996,
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Riyadh, January 1997.
40 Ibid.
S. Al-Shaikh, 'The Saudi Arabian Economic Outlook', NCB Econo,nist, Economic and
Financial Publication of NCB, vol. 9, No.1, January 1999, p. 3.
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According to the 1998 budget statement, the Kingdom's real GDP is
estimated to have grown by 1.6%, while the nominal GDP dropped sharply by
10.8% to SR 487.5 billion. The large gap between the real and the nominal
growth is attributed to the decline in oil and petrochemical prices. 42
 The sharp
drop in oil prices in 1998 is estimated to have led to a 34.8% contraction in the
nominal oil-sector GDP in 1998. The performance of the non-oil sector is
estimated to have been stable. The private sector grew by 2.2%, contributing
nearly 39% of nominal GDP in 1998. The Kingdom's non-oil exports are
expected to have fallen by approximately 10% to SR 24.9 billion, which is mainly
attributed to the decline of petrochemical and cement prices.43
The sharp decline in oil prices in 1998 and its huge impact on the
Kingdom's economy show that no lessons were learned from the experience of
the decline in oil prices in the early 1980s. All incentive to implement serious
measures to reform and diversify the Kingdom's economy soon disappeared when
oil prices improved again. Today, history is repeating itself, and the Kingdom's
economy is still dominated by the petroleum sector, which for the past two
decades has contributed an average of nearly 40% of GDP, 75% of government
revenues and more than 90% of export receipts. Furthermore, the Kingdom has
42 Ibid., p. 4.
' Over the past two decades, the Kingdom has managed successfully to control inflation. In 1990-
1991, inflation rose to about 5% because of the rapid expansion of domestic demand in the
aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, which presented the government with a real challenge. In
1992, inflation levels fell to a small negative percentage, and in 1993-1994 it was around 1%. In
1995, the government decided to reduce some of the subsidies in gasoline prices and electricity
and telephone rates. Inflation again rose to about 5% for a short time, reflecting these one-off
measures. In 1996 and 1997, inflation returned to its very low rate. In 1998, inflation is estimated
to fall by 0.2%. See SAMA Thirty -Fourth Annual Report, Riyadh, 1998.
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had a budget deficit every year since 1983; and the private sector is still playing a
negligible role, lagging behind the public sector.44
3.2 A new era and the role of the stock market
In face of the current weak economic situation, the Saudi government has
announced a set of initiatives that represent a wide range of economic reforms for
the coming five years. First, the government has embarked on a comprehensive
privatisation programme,45 which it has started by announcing the transfer of the
Saudi Telecommunications and Postal Services agency to a joint-stock company
called Saudi Telecommunication Corporation. 46 Recently it has also been
announced that certain services and utilities will be sold to the private sector,
including Saudi Airlines, local newspapers, and most of the utilities (i.e., water,
" The Sixth Five Year Development Plan 1995-2000 states that "the longer-term development of
the Saudi economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the ability and willingness of the
private sector - with appropriate government support - to recognize and grasp emerging
opportunities to engage in new and more complex economic activities whose returns on
investment may be longer and may carry more risk than earlier 'safe' investments in real estate
and trading activities."
' The Sixth Five Year Development Plan 1995-2000 set forth the main objectives of the
privatisation programme. It stated that the first stage should concentrate on the mobilisation of
private sector funds for investment in new and ongoing public-sector projects which, due to
budgetary constraints, are experiencing financing difficulties. Second, it called for the granting of
more opportunities to the private sector to manage and operate public-sector projects. Third, it
recommended the gradual sale to the private sector of government shares in joint-stock companies,
to be implemented following in-depth studies of each individual case, so that the social and
economic costs and benefits can be properly evaluated and timing determined when appropriate
conditions prevail. Finally, it called for the promotion of a favourable climate for private
investment through extending and increasing the effectiveness of the market mechanism.
46 See Council of Ministers' resolution of 15 December, 1997. Minister of Post, Telephone and
Telegraph stated that the company will begin operations as a joint-stock company within six
months of the date of the resolution. However, during the first two years, the government will
retain 100% ownership and only subsequently begin to sell its equity to private investors iii
tranches. The government believes that in this way it can ensure that the commercial structure of
the governmental agency will be fully in place and the agency will be able to operate properly in
the private sector.
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transport and power). 47 It is anticipated that bringing these concerns to market
will yield the government proceeds exceeding $100 billion.
The second major initiative is the liberalisation of the country's economy.
The government has recently announced that reforms of the tax code and other
rules that discriminate against foreign investors are now under review. The Sixth
Five Year Development Plan calls for serious study and evaluation of which rules
and regulations are needed to attract more funds to the domestic market both from
Saudi and foreign investors. The Kingdom's commitment to extensive
liberalisation of the Kingdom's economy has been prompted by its ongoing
efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Membership of the WTO
should result in freer access to world markets for Saudi oil and petrochemicals
exports. It may also entail further reforms to the country's trade regime. Saudi
Arabia is seeking to join the organisation as a developing nation, a status which
would grant it a period of grace of 5 to 10 years within which to adapt its
legislation and trading practices.48
The Kingdom is also committed to altering the ownership structure of
firms which are dominated almost exclusively by unlisted family-owned
companies. A recent statistic published by the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce
revealed that more than 200 well-established Companies with an average of $100
The Minister of Industry & Electricity has announced the unification of the four regional
Scesscos (Consolidated Electricity Companies) into one company which will be sold entirely to
the public by the year 2000. The new company will require an investment of SR 48 billion by
2000 and a staggering SR 438 billion by 2020, which is clearly beyond the means of the
government alone.
48 See The World Bank Factbook. Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa, Saudi Arabia
Profile, 1998.
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million capital are willing to go public. 49 As in Europe, it seems that, if reforms
are implemented successfully, the family-based system of ownership will shortly
come to an end. Most of the founders of such companies have reached retirement
age, and it is doubtful whether their successors (assuming they decide not to
liquidate) are in fact capable of running the companies successfully. Hence, the
only option for these companies if they wish to remain strong in the market is for
the family to sell some of their shares to the public. This will ensure the
continuation of the company in a market-based rather than a family-based
context.
For the Kingdom to enter a new stage of economic development, it must
develop new institutions to guide the legal reform of the stock market. An
efficient and well-regulated stock market will help the government in its plans to
diversify the economy. It will allow the greater foreign participation in the stock
market that will be required to make the privatisation programme a success,
which, in turn, enhancing as it does the role of the private sector in the economy,
is a prerequisite for the Kingdom to gain membership of the World Trade
Organization.
" The Chamber of Commerce Study of Private Sector Activities, Riyadh, 1997. The study reveals
that the adoption of free-market principles, low-rental factories, low utility costs, an exchange rate
fixed against the US dollar for over ten years and free capital mobility has promoted the growth of
the private sector in the last decade. During this period, there were a total of 2,637 factories, an
increase of over 100%. The number of operating companies increased from 1,473 companies with
a total capital of SR 7 billion in 1975 to 7,743 companies with a total capital of SR 120.7 billion
in 1996. Over the last two decades, the contribution of the private sector to GDP has risen from
21% to about 45%, increasing its contribution of the Kingdom's non-oil GDP to 72%.
Furthermore, there was an increase in the private sector share of fixed capital formation: this rose
from 34% in 1975 to 67% in 1994. Finally, jobs in the private sector increased from about 1.4
million in 1970 to more than 6 million by the end of 1996, with the result that in that year 88% of
the Kingdom's 6.9 million workers were employed in the private sector.
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4. Methodology
The aim of this dissertation has been to assess the genesis and development of the
regulatory structure of the market. To achieve this, we have employed socio-legal
fieldwork techniques in order to find appropriate explanations to the questions
addressed. Due to the fact that the Saudi stock market is relatively new, there was
little in the way of secondary literature on the subject matter. This lack of
academic sources also meant that fieldwork was an essential source of
information. Furthermore, conducting interviews with market participants
provided us the opportunity to get to know the views of insiders concerning the
current situation of the Saudi market. The research relied on two essential
research tools: documentary research and field work. The field work consisted of
two aspects, namely semi-structured interviews and field observation.
4.1 Documentary research
In terms of documentary research, official papers, statistics, position
papers/consultative documents of associations and institutions, newspapers and
secondary work in the financial press, and scholarly journals were the main
sources. Beside computer documentary research in collecting our primary and
secondary sources, we consulted the libraries and research centre of the following
institutions: Universities of Warwick, Oxford and Cambridge; Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies; University of Birmingham; King Saud University;
Institute of Public Administration; Institute of Banking; Ministry of Commerce;
Ministry of Finance; SAMA; Riyadh Chamber of Commerce; American embassy
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in Riyadh; Riyadh Bank; Bakheet Advisors; Consulting Centre for Finance and
Investment; King Fand Public Library; GCC Centre; and the Middle East Centre
in London.
4.2 Field work
The questions asked in the interviews naturally reflect the main concerns of this
thesis. After consulting a number of experts, I worked on acquiring further
technical knowledge of social scientific fieldwork methods. This led to a deeper
understanding of the complexities of obtaining good-quality information
regarding the effectiveness of the legal regime of the Saudi stock market.
The research itself took place in two stages. To start with, our research
project required substantial preparation. The relevant associations and institutions
had to be identified, contacts had to be made with the most appropriate
individuals and the atmosphere at the place of the field work had to be tasted.
The initial stage was therefore organised as a pilot project to clarify the
vague environment of the field work and to test the suitability of our field work
techniques. It also clarified which areas I should concentrate on and where there
was general consensus.
The second stage of the research was the actual field work, which
involved more in-depth study and avoided the mistakes and errors that happened
during the pilot project. This stage was started on 1 November 1997 and ended on
11 February 1998.
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4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews
For the semi-structured interviews, a broad range of industry officials and high-
level government policymakers were contacted. This required substantial
preparation and the first few months of the project were devoted to this work.
Face-to-face interview questions were then drawn up to collect more
information from government officials and other stock market participants.
Although we had arranged to interview a large number of people, the limitation of
travel distance and time forced me to reduce the number of the interviewees to 27
and limit the area to only those people who lived in Riyadh City. Despite the
limitation of the number of our interviewees, the group we worked with still
represented an almost ideal sample because we made sure that the interviewees
covered most of the major market players. They came from both the government
and the private sector. We therefore divided our interviewees into two groups:
government and private sector. While governmental interviewees were less happy
to be taped, private sector interviewees had no problem with that. And although
the private-sector employees accepted the structured and semi-structured
approach to interviewing, some of the governmental interviewees were unhappy
with it and only wished to answer the general questions.
First, we interviewed members of the government agencies involved in
the Saudi stock market. In particular, the focus was on a number of specific
institutions:
1. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (S AMA), the main governmental body
responsible for the regulation and supervision of trading on the Saudi stock
market. Given the considerable involvement of banking firms in the Saudi
stock market, it was necessary to investigate the Banking Control Department
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within SAMA as the body responsible for regulating and supervising banks
and investigating complaints and disputes involving banks. Our interview
focused on regulatory practices developed in the Share Control Division of
within SAMA. Special attention was given to assessing the effectiveness of
the design of regulatory policy concerning the collection of trading
information by market participants.
2. The Ministry of Commerce, a governmental body responsible for the
supervision of companies and the regulation of the issuance of securities.
Importantly, we had to determine whether there was pressure from private
interest to influence the government regarding attempts to establish regulation
according to the international standards.
3. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the main financial and
economic policymaking body within the Kingdom.
Two to three weeks were spent in each agency. We interviewed certain
players who were responsible for developing policy and rules of the Saudi
financial markets. The interviewees included the Minister of Commerce and
member of the Ministerial Committee, Mr. Osama Faqih; the Governor of SAMA
and member of the Ministerial Committee, Mr. Hamad Al-Sayari; the Vice
Governor of SAMA, Dr. Mohammed Al-Jassr; the Deputy Governor of SAMA
and member of the Supervisory Committee, Mr. Jammaz Al-Suhaimi; the Deputy
Minister of Finance and member of the Supervisory Committee, Mr. Mansoor Al-
Mayman; the General Director of Companies in the Ministry of Commerce, Mr.
Au Al-Ottiby; and the Assistant Director of the Companies Department, Mr.
Sulernan Al-Mohammed. From the Securities Control Department, we spoke with
Mr. Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, General Director of the Securities Control
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Department, Maurice Gorman, Ayash, Al-Ayed, Al-Qarnni, Al-Amree and Al-
Sobai. The interviews were conducted in the offices of the interviewee. Only four
of them were recorded on tape. I was permitted to take hand-written notes.
In order to obtain a balanced view of the effectiveness of Saudi securities
regulations and their implementation, it was necessary to talk to market
participants who have been the most affected by such rules, and who had no role
in drawing them up. In order to avoid a one-sided view of the market regulations,
interviewees from the private sector were selected from various backgrounds and
groups, such as banks, consulting agencies, investment agencies, companies,
large traders and small traders. In order to get a good number of interviews from
each sector, we tried to reach as wide a group of interviewees as possible. We
were able to talk to many people from the private sector, including:
Mr. Yousef Al-Mobarak, Secretary General of the Saudi Organisation for
Certified Pubic Accountants; Mr. Basher Bakheet, General Director of Bakheet
Financial Advisors; Mr. Radi Haddad, Assistant Senior Manager of the
Investment Service Department at Riyadh Bank; Fahad Al-Mobarak, General
Director of Rana Investment Company; Mr. Nasser Al-Tewajiri, Manager of
Brokerage & Custody Services at Arab National Bank; Al-Qamdi, Central
Trading Unit Manager at the National Cofnmercial Bank; Abdul Aziz Al-
Dukhiel, President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment;
Abdullah Al-Qahtani, Operation Manager of the Saudi Registration Company
SSRC; Abdulaziz Al-Gudai the Manager of Equity Services for Local Shares in
The Saudi British Bank; Bandar Al-Muhareb, Central Trading Unit Manager of
the Investment Group at Saudi Hollandi Bank; Khalid Al-Bassam, Investment,
Sales and Marketing Department Manager of Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi;
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Ahmad Al-Routea, investor; Hesham Al-Mossa, investor; Sami Al-Souage,
investor; and Saud Al-Qahtani, investor.
Interviews with private-sector players offered a balanced view of the operation of
the market. As noted earlier, we found easier to address question to private sector
interviewees. All the interviews were carried out on the interviewees offices. All
interviews were tape recorded and then transcribed.
4.2.2 Field observation
Field observation has been one of the most important sources of information. As
noted earlier there is a little secondary literature on the Saudi stock market.
Therefore, we had to use observation as one of our tools to gather information.
This tool was mainly applied for the collection of information about the
functioning of the SCD and the ESIS trading system. I spent ten days working
closely with each division of the SCD. On the market side, I spent six days
working with the Central Trading Unit at the National Commercial Bank and the
Central Trading Unit at the Saudi Hollandi Bank.
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5. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis can be divided into three main parts and is structured as follows. Part I
(i.e., Chapters 1-3) is mainly concerned with providing a framework for and
putting into context the matters to be discussed in Parts II and Ill.
Chapter 2 describes the growth of the Saudi stock market. Its evolution
over three decades is divided into four distinct stages of development.
Chapter 3 deals with the current legal and judicial system in the Kingdom.
The focus is on analysing the legal regime that governs the stock market. Salient
features of the recently introduced legislative reforms are discussed and analysed
here. This chapter also introduces the system of agency regulation and explains
how the financial is currently controlled.
Part II (i.e., Chapters 4, 5 and 6) of this work deals with the main aspects
of the Kingdom's infrastructure and regulatory structure.
Chapter 4 assessed the Kingdom's existing regulatory arrangements for
the primary and secondary markets.
In Chapter 5, the characteristics of the supply-side of the Saudi market are
discussed. Here, the benefits of institutional shareholding are discussed in the
context of the dynamics of the current market. The chapter describes the recent
stock market development, showing that it is characterised by an operating
environment that is currently unable to fulfil the role in the economy that it
should. In particular, the absence of key market intermediaries and foreign
investors means that it is unable to raise the amount of new capital that it must to
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adequately support private sector growth. In assessing the current level and form
of institutional participation in the market, various reform issues are identified
and discussed.
Chapter 6 examines the development of the Kingdom's electronic trading
platform and clearing system, and emphasises the importance of these structures
for the development of an efficient market. This chapter also examines the legal
rules which structure day-to-day trading in the market.
Part ifi of the thesis (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) looks at the possibility of
developing of an enforcement regime and eamines the needs of participants in
the market.
Chapter 7 is a crucial chapter in that it deals with the functioning of the
disclosure regime in the Kingdom. In particular, it raises questions about whether
the government requires too little disclosure and allows too much room for issuer
discretion. Institutional and small investors are beginning to demand more
information from companies. Thus, it is argued that without positive changes in
the regulation of disclosure, the relative opportunities for development of the
market will be constrained.
Chapter 8 investigates the rules regulating insider trading. The analysis of
the Disclosure Rules shows that the regime needs to be further developed as an
important part of the reform of the Kingdom's policy on securities enforcement.
Chapter 9 is concerned with the development of a single regulatory agency
that would, in the broadest sense, play the role of a securities market regulator in
the Kingdom. The consolidation of regulatory authority in a single agency would
bring benefits in terms of developing a unified approach to market regulation and
enforcement.
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Chapter 10 provides, by way of conclusion, an evaluation of the overall direction
of the market and the regulatory reforms that Kingdom policymakers could
undertake in order to enhance the structure of the market.
28
Chapter 2
Evolution of the Saudi Stock Market
1. Introduction
Despite its relatively short history, the growth of the Saudi stock market has been
impressive. In less than 15 years, the Saudi equity market evolved from an
underdeveloped market into the largest market in the Arabic world, due to the
presence of well-developed banks and advances in telecommunications and
computer technology. The development of the Saudi stock market, like many
other markets, started with its first activities in the primary market in the mid
1930s. Since then, the Saudi stock market has passed many intermediate stages of
development to reach its current level of functioning and market size. Each stage
of the development has had its impact on the structure, shape and regulations of
the stock market. This chapter documents the development of the Saudi Stock
Exchange, analysing the four formative stages in the growth of the market. The
analysis of the growth in the market provides a basis for systematically assessing
the current situation and prospects for reforms.
This chapter explores the importance of policies affecting the
development of the stock market in the Kingdom. It further gives a broad
institutional account of this development to outline the general characteristics of
the four stages of development of the Kingdom's equity market. This approach
complements the research on the relationship between stock market development
and policy reform.' Based on the results of this research, it is observed that there
See A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An
Overview', in World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No.2, January 1996, p.224.
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are four stages in the development. The formative phase (1935-1964) covers the
early establishment of joint-stock companies that offered shares to the public by
way of a simple charter granted by the Saudi government and without any
licensing or disclosure requirements. The second phase (1965-1984) spans the
period following the enactment of the Companies Act which introduced the first
disclosure and securities regulations in the country. The third phase (1984-1989)
includes the formation of the Saudi stock market and the enactment of the
Executive Rules to regulate dealings in stocks and shares in the Kingdom. The
fourth phase covers the period from the introduction of the electronic trading
system in 1990 until the end of 1999.
This chapter is built up as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
initial stage of development of the Saudi market. Section 3 presents the second
stage of growth of the market. Section 4 investigates the reforms that define the
third phase of the equity market evolution. Section 5 covers the last period of
stock market reform.
2. The First Stage (1935-1964)
This section introduces the analysis of the earjy development of the Saudi stock
market. The evolution of the Saudi stock market can be traced back to the mid
1930s, when the first joint-stock company was established. 2 During this period,
the Kingdom was in the process of building a new country, and as a result, central
2 The Arabian Automobile, quickly liquidated, was the first joint-stock company established in the
Kingdom in 1935 with a capital of SR 12 million divided into 26,300 shares.
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development elements were mostly missing. Some government agencies had only
just been founded and there was a lack of regulations and rules governing the
operations of the commercial sector. 3
 The government also faced socio-economic
challenges. The lack of financial resources at that time handicapped and slowed
down the economic development of the Kingdom. 4
 The discovery of oil in 1938
provided the country with annual income. However, the oil income was not
sufficient to support the government's development plans. 5
 The financial
difficulties the government faced in this decade affected growth in economic
sectors as well as the primary market. The primary market continued a slow pace
of development for the next two decades.6
The early 1950s witnessed many serious policy steps taken by the
government in order to transform the Kingdom from a subsistence economy into
a modern one. In the 1950s the government began its programmes to build the
country's physical infrastructure. 7
 The plan commenced with the completion of
government agencies and other major institutional structures the country still
lacked at that time. The basic changes in the structure of the government
influenced the activities of the private sector. 8
 The changes brought about by the
introduction of institutions and rules were manifested by the increased economic
D. Wells, 'The Effects of Saudi Industrialization on Employment', in Journal of Energy and
Development, 1986, pp. 273-275.
' Q. Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tihama Publication, Saudi
Arabia, 1986, p. 79.
The Kingdom's production of oil in the early years was too modest (approx. 11,000 barrels a
day) to enable the government to involve in major advance infrastructure reforms and
modernisation of its economy. The early oil income helped the government to take the basic steps
toward that goal. See S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, 1993, pp. 13-14.
6 See Y. Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, Daar Al-Mannaheg Press, Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, 1997, p. 10.
' S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1993,
pp. 13-14.
8 See R. Wilson, The Econo,nies of the Middle East, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979.
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activity that occurred in the early 1950s when the relative lull in market activity
was broken. For example, three electricity companies went public, followed in
1954 by the establishment of the Arabian Cement Company. These joint-stock
companies were formed in the 1950s by a charter granted by the Council of
Ministers.' 0 As such, no disclosure or other process was required for a company
to offer its shares to the public.
The period from 1955 to 1964 saw the establishment of 11 new public
companies with a capital of SR 2,012 million and 19.6 million shares. It also saw
the establishment of the first joint-stock company in the financial sector. Riyadh
Bank was founded in 1957 with an initial capital of SR 50 million divided into
50,000 shares with a par value per share of SR 1,000." This period also
witnessed the establishment of joint-venture companies such as ABSCO
company, which was incorporated in 1960, with a capital of SR 6 million. It can
be seen that most of the companies established in this period were in the cement
and electrical power sectors or provided other basic facilities needed to meet the
requirements for these services and facilities in the country.'2
In this ten-year period there was little active share trading and the
secondary market was nearly dead. There were many reasons for this. First, joint-
stock companies were still new in Saudi society, as result of which share trading
was largely unknown and was limited to a few people. Second, the lack of
regulation of joint-stock companies reduced public confidence in investment.'3
Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 79.
'° M. Al Jabber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fand National Library Press, 1996, p. 19.
' Filmban, Share Invest,nent in the Saudi Arabia, p. 80.
12 See M. Al Ajmi, 'Gulf Equity Markets: Comparison of the Structure and Performance', thesis
submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Industry and Business, University of
Warwick October 1994, p. 43.
' Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 9.
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Third, the few people who were actively investing in joint-stock companies were
long-term investors. Finally, the available number of shares for trading was
limited, due to the small number of issued shares) 4 Due to the absence of new
initiatives with respect to regulatory institutions on the part of the government, it
is doubtful whether any material change could have been introduced.
3. The Second Stage (1965-1984)
The next decades saw the establishment of the Saudi stock market. The
transformation of the market was influenced by three major events. By the early
1960s, it had become clear that, in order to facilitate economic growth, the
government would need to enact company law legislation.' 5 It was the enactment
of the Companies Act in the mid 1960s which first organised the primary market
and regulated and supervised all the companies that wished to go public. The
Companies Act introduced disclosure requirements, which provided investors
with necessary information about the incorporated companies.' 6 Furthermore, the
rapid increase in oil prices in the 1970s provided the country with massive
revenue. Finally, there was the establishment of the government's Five-Year-
Development Plans, which had as their main objective to achieve high growth
rates in all sectors of the economy and to increase the role of the non-oil sectors
of the economy to create the conditions for the country's eventual reduction of its
dependence on oil revenues. 17 In order to avoid the problem of the 'Dutch
" See R. Haddad, 'The Effective Factors on the Return of the Shares of Saudi Joint Stock
Companies', thesis submitted to King Abdulaziz University for the degree of Master of Economy,
School of Economy, Jeddah, 1988, p. 24.
' Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of SaudiArabia, p. 99.
6 The Companies Act was issued under Royal Decree No. M/6, 1965 and amended under Royal
Decree Nos. M/5 in 1967; M/23 in 1982; M/46 in 1985; and M/22 in 1992.
' J. Persicy, A Guide to the SaudiArabian Economy, Martin's Press, New York, 1984, p.51.
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disease', the government developed a plan that was designed to stimulate the
Saudi private sector, starting with the 'Saudisation' of some of the foreign firms,
especially banks.'8
Between 1965 and 1975, 37 new joint-stock companies were established.
By the end of 1974, there were more than 54 joint-stock companies with a total
capital of SR 6,509 million, divided into 44.8 million shares.' 9 Despite the large
number of new companies that subscribed, the shares of only 14 companies were
traded in the secondary market. The establishment of many new companies had
little effect on the increasing liquidity in the secondary market. 2° By 1975 it had
become clear that an active interest in trading and in the local stock market was
emerging. Table 2.1 shows that, during the period 1975-1980, there was a
substantial increase in the number of joint-stock companies in the Kingdom.
More than 43 new companies were established in different sectors.
The nucleus for growth was supported by a number of factors. The first
and most important factor was the injection of private liquidity generated from
the government's spending on the development of the infrastructure and the
distribution of oil revenues directly or indirectly to the Saudi public. 2 ' The
revenues from the oil boom mainly supported the government's spending on
infrastructure projects, costing approximately SR 658 billion, an increase of more
than 800% compared to the first plan.22
18 See H. Askari, Saudi Arabian Economy: Oil and Search for Economic Development, A J I
Press mc, London, 1990, p. 23.
Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 81.
20 Ibid.
2! Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, p. 173.
22 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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Second, the economic transformation of the secondary market benefited
from the conversion of foreign banks into joint-stock companies. 23 One event that
significantly affected the activities on the Saudi stock market was the Saudisation
of foreign banks, which began in 1976. Nine foreign banks were converted into
joint-stock companies with a total capital of SR 1,750 million and more than 17
million shares. 24 Saudisation was a strategy of the government to deepen the
integration of the national financial services sector. According to this strategy, all
banks operating in the Kingdom were required to have a minimum participation
of 60% by Saudi nationals within a period of one year. 25 In 1975, the National
Bank of Pakistan was Saudisised and renamed Al Jazirah bank with a capital of
SR 10 million. The Saudi Investment Bank was established in 1976 with a capital
of SR 30 million, with the Commerzbank and Chase Manhattan Bank both
having substantial equity stakes in the bank. A year later, the Saudi French Bank
was established with a capital of SR 200 million. In 1979, the British Bank was
established, with a capital of SR 100 million. In the same year, the Saudi Cairo
Bank and Arab National bank were established. All of these banks are joint-
venture banks with a maximum of 40% foreign ownership.26
Third, the local stock market benefited from the partial offering of certain
government holdings, especially in the electricity and industrial sectors.
Significant mergers in the electricity sector had the further effect of stimulating
local market activity. 27 Continuing its support of the industrial sectors, the
Ibid., p. 42.
24 See A. Abdeen & D. Shook, The Saudi Arabian Financial System in the Context of Western and
Islamic Finance, Jone Wiley and Sons, New York, 1984, p. 60.
25 Ibid., p. 61.
26 Ibid.
27 Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 82.
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government created the largest joint-stock company in the country, the Saudi
Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), which was established with a
capital of SR 10,000 million divided into 10 million shares. 28 A significant
development occurred in the transportation sector when two shipping and
transport companies were founded. In 1978, the Saudi National Shipping Co. was
established, with a capital of SR 500 million, and the Saudi Pub. Transp. Co.
(SAPTCO), with a capital of SR 1,000 million. In response to the demand to meet
the simulation of growth, three new cement companies were established. 29
 The
development of these sectors was due to the strengthening of the domestic
economic system, which required the implementation of Saudi company law and
the efficient allocation of resources. It is important to realise that the success of
this plan can be seen by reference to the proliferation of joint-stock companies in
new sectors, such as construction materials, food processing, tourism and
agriculture.30
Table 2.1 The development of Saudi joint-stock companies
Year	 Number of Number of shares Capital in Saudi Riyal
companies	 (million)	 (million)
	
1935-1954	 6	 9.3	 943
	
1955-1964	 11	 19.6	 2,012
	
1965-1974	 37	 15.9	 3,554
	1975-1979	 43	 141.8	 27,124.6
	
1980-1984	 13	 52	 1,113.7
	
1984-1989	 9	 37.2	 2,862
	
1990-1997	 12	 51.22	 4,509.5
Source: Companies Department, Ministry of Commerce
28 SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation) was established in 1976 in order to add value to
the Kingdom's hydrocarbon reserves by developing petrochemicals, fertilisers and other
industries. SABIC is now the third largest producer in the world of chemicals, petrochemicals and
plastics, and accounts for 5% of global output. Only 30% of SABIC's equity was sold to the
public.
29 Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, pp. 83-84.
30 Ibid.
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The period 1975-1980 is also regarded as the moment of the foundation of
the whole Saudi economy. It is very clear that this was also the case for the
secondary market. 3 ' The economic events described above had a significant effect
on the pattern of market trading in both the primary and the secondary market.
This is due to the changed attitude of Saudis, who, during the 1970s, began to
understand that stock market investment offered both short-term and long-term
investment opportunities. 32 The change of attitude of investors was supported by
a rapid increase in the number of joint-stock companies, which resulted in an
increasing number of secondary market participants. The increase in stock market
activity led to the creation of financial intermediaries who specialise in the selling
and buying of stock to investors. 33 Typically, this new class of intermediary
operated by buying shares as dealers and then reselling them for a profit. Their
offices were also licensed to engage in business activities other than the selling
and buying of shares.34
In our view, the large number of shares that were offered to the public at
that time increased the number of shares in the hands of investors. As a result, the
fact that more shares were available for trading stimulated a greater number of
investors to participate in selling and buying shares, which explains the creation
of the informal market. The initial stage of sfiare trading in the Kingdom was
characterised by personal relationships among businessmen or relatives. 35 Due to
31 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
32 Haddad, 'The Effective Factors on the Return of the Shares of Saudi Joint Stock Companies', p.
49.
Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 10.
Ibid.
A. Desuqi, Al muasherat Al ala,niaa Le alasehuni ma Enshaa Muasher khaas bet asehum at
saudia, ('The International shares indexes and the Saudi shares Index), King Saudi University
Press, 1989, p. 75.
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the fact that this manner of trading does not give the seller or buyer many choices,
reducing investors' options of obtaining a better price and quantities of shares,
thousands elected to place adverts in one or more of the daily papers. 36 There is
much anecdotal evidence that suggests that traders continued to do this
throughout the period to solve difficulties in locating the right offers or the bids
that matched their requirements. First, simply arranging a meeting between the
seller and the buyer was sometimes very hard. Second, the prices and quantities
of shares were difficult to match. Third, the assessment of share prices was
complex, due to a lack of information about the volume of trading in the
market. 37 In any event, it is for these reasons that the demand for a market place
where buyers could meet sellers emerged. It was the lack of an organised place
for selling and buying shares that gave real estate and other agencies a significant
role in share trading. These brokers provided investors with a place to meet other
investors and offered a degree of transparency through the provision of better
communication with other offices, giving investors more accurate information
about market prices.38
During the period 1980-1984, a major share offering was made to the
public. Two new commercial banks were established, the Saudi American Bank
in 1981, with a capital of SR 300 million, arid the Saudi Commercial Bank in
1983, with a capital of SR 250 million. 39 This period also witnessed the
establishment of five agriculture companies with a total capital of SR 1,500
million and 15 million shares. In addition, new cement companies were
36 Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 75-76.
38 See A. A1-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', in Gulf Financial Markets,
Gulf International Bank, Bahrain, January 1988, p. 45.
Filmban, Share investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, pp. 84-86.
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established, with a total capital of SR 1,200 million. The early 1980s saw a
significant increase in the capital of most of the older companies in the market.
For example, the Arab Cement Co. increased its capital from SR 25 million to SR
1,050 million in less than 15 years, and almost all the other companies increased
their capital by similar margins. At the same time, the largest joint-stock
company, SABIC, sold 30% of its shares to the public in l983.° For most IPOs
in this period, the government insisted that the offering of the new shares had to
be at a par value, which was far below the actual value of these shares.4'
The period from 1980-1984 also witnessed a high demand for trade in
securities. The increasing number of participants led to more and more
transactions, reaching 150,000 transactions in one month in 1981.42 In our view,
there are many reasons for the huge stock market activity during this period. First,
there had been a substantial increase in individuals' savings during the years of
economic growth. Second, over-investment in real estate had led to an over-
bought market, as a result of which investors fled from the fixed property
investment sector and went for equities instead. Third, there were other
investments that required significant capital outlay that could not be satisfied by
smaller financial seller institutions. Finally, the fact that most companies, even
though they were making only a little profit, 'ere paying out good dividends to
their shareholders also enhanced the rapid development of the stock market.43
Although the Companies Act was enacted in 1965 to regulate and
supervise the activities of companies, including joint-stock companies, share
40 Ibid.
41 Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, p. 173.
42A1-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', p. 45.
Ibid.
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trading in the secondary market was not covered by the Companies Act. Thus,
trading in the secondary market continued its operation without regulation until
1984. Until then, share transactions continued to be conducted by personal
relationships or by third parties that were not legally permitted to do such
business.44 The lack of regulation governing the secondary market encouraged the
creation of an informal stock market among various business agencies such as
real estate agencies and exchange offices, which stepped into the market gap by
playing the role of a broker.45
The lack of rules governing stockbrokers' activities, supervision, capital,
or of any conditions for these offices to operate, along with the lack of investor
awareness on both sides, created a suitable environment for the appearance of
opportunistic and illegal practices. 46 In an interview, Basher Bakheet, General
Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisor, argued that:
"It is virtually impossible to assess the effect of the absence of
securities regulation on the process of stock market activity.
Nevertheless, it is reasonably certain that many investors suffred
loss from fraud, manipulation, false trading, omission, dishonesty
and rumours which were spread by unsavory brokers to
manipulate investors in order to make their profits. The failure on
the part of the government to regulate led to higher costs for
investors. "
Despite the prevalence of illegal activities that appeared in the market at
that time, stock offices played a highly influential role in the development of the
' Ibid., p. 47.
' See Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 10.
46 Filmban, Share Investment in the Kingdom of SaudiArabia, p. 101.
See interview with Mr. Basher Bakheet, General Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisor,
Riyadh, 12 December 1997; Mr. Bakheet went on to say:
.the experience of the lack of market regulation created unstable market conditions. The market
was subject to volatile swings in prices, rising sharply with no apparent reason that reflected the
real situation of the companies in the market, then falling sharply also without apparent reason. To
be sure certain, some agencies joined to prevent the deleterious effects of stock market by
increasing investors' awareness. Some newspaper even started to publish activities prices weekly.
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Saudi stock market. First, they offered investors with an organised place to trade,
which was missing due to the lack of formal market. Second, these offices also
'made' the market because most of them bought and sold for their own account,
which provided the market with much needed liquidity. Finally, they supplied
investors with brokerage services, which facilitated trading in the market.48
It was the Kuwaiti Souk Al-Manakh crash in September 1982 that
stimulated the Saudi government to consider and evaluate the current situation in
its own, informal market. 49 An intensive study of the Saudi stock market
conducted by the Ministry of Finance & National Economy showed that (1) there
was a lack of investing awareness between market participants caused by the lack
of experience in conducting such business, (2) the market suffered from illegal
practices due to the lack of regulation and supervision, (3) the market was
fragmented among many offices and brokers, without sufficient links to provide
investors with the necessary information, (4) there was a huge increase in the
number of unlicensed brokers, (5) the stockbrokers operated without a licence or
any operation requirements, (6) due to the lack of governing law, most of these
offices only operated for a short time and disappeared as soon as they failed
without being caught by the law, and (7) some of the illegal activities conducted
by brokers was against the interests of the market participants and put the market
in danger of collapse. 5° The Saudi government's strategy for strengthening the
stock market was designed in the wake of the Kuwaiti crisis. The Saudi
Yet even this form of assistance was of little assistance, since papers depended on the informal
brokers to obtain their information."
' Al Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', pp. 56-5 8.
' S. Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', dissertation submitted to Michigan State University for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, 1990, p. 16.
50A1 Ajmi, 'Gulf Equity Markets: Comparison of the Structure and Performance', pp. 50-54
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authorities recognised that some initiative was necessary to build the financial
architecture necessary to insulate the economy from the negative repercussions of
a stock market crisis. The next section assesses the reforms introduced by the
Saudi government in that period.
4. The Third Stage (1984-1989)
From the perspective of the Kingdom's policy makers, the crash of Souk Al-
Manakh in 1982 had a strong effect on the Saudi market and other regional
markets in the Arabic region. 5 ' In light of the subsequent volatility and instability,
the Saudi government attempted to provide a regulatory response to the collapse
of the Kuwaiti market. The government designed a set of stringent measures to
restrict the explosive effects of concentrated capital flows on its small market in
order to prevent destructive volatility and liquidity constrictions in the market.52
Government officials determined there were various reasons that could likely
have been responsible for the collapse of the Kuwaiti market. 53 First, the Kuwaiti
market had lacked a strong settlement system. Generally, the banks and the
market together provided the settlement infrastructure. The Kuwaiti market was
operating mainly on the basis of credits, including forward deals of 6, 12, and 24
months in the form of postal cheques. 54 In the Kuwaiti bourse, one would rarely
hear about immediate settlements. Brokers were simply selling shares they did
not own to buyers who did not have the money to buy them. Second, the illegal
See, e.g., J. Al-Mudhaf, 'Kuwait Stock Market: Its Efficiency', thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 1983.
52 Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behavior and its Policy
Implications', p. 16.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 10.
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activities of brokers and other market participants was due to the lack of
regulations and adequate supervision. 55 For example, some brokers were selling
shares of non-existing companies. Third, there was evidence of highly speculative
and aggressive activities, which increased share prices of companies in often
perverse ways. Some companies that were performing badly and were actually
earning very little, still saw their share prices rise by 500% during 1981.56
The Saudi stock market remained informal until 1983, when the Saudi
government formed a Ministerial Committee consisting of representatives of the
Ministry of Finance & National Economy, the Ministry of Commerce, and the
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) in order to improve regulation and the
development of share trading within the Kingdom. 57 In mid-1984, The Ministerial
Committee enacted, within its authority to legislate market development, what is
called "The Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealing in Company Shares
Through Commercial Banks". 58 These Executive Rules not only regulated the
market, but also established the Saudi stock market. Unlike other stock markets in
the area, the Saudi government decided to emulate the German and Swiss market
models, which left trading in the hands of the Saudi Banks. 59 Furthermore, the
new Rules required that all transactions made through the market be paid in cash.
Forward trading was prohibited. The prohibition against forward trading and
margin trading reflected the conservative policy of Saudi authorities in building
Ibid.
56 Ibid.
The Ministerial Committee was created by the Royal Decree No. 1230/8 dated 11/07/1403,
April 1983.
58 Executive Rules To Regulate Share Dealing In Company Shares Through Commercial Banks,
SAMA's circular to all banks, The General Banking Control Department, Saudi Arabia, December
1984.
59 Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, p. 177.
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up their stock market. 6° The Executive Rules formalised the Saudi stock market
by providing share investors with a regulated market place, bringing together
purchasers and sellers of shares within the Kingdom. The Rules also restricted the
duty of buying and selling shares of Saudi joint-stock to Saudi commercial
banks.6'
In answer to question concerning the main reasons for choosing the
current trading system in Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel, President of The
Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, explained:
Choosing banks to constitute the Saudi exchange and the only
brokers in the market at the same time is in my view related to an
extension of the financial policy of the country. The financial policy
in Saudi Arabia is built on centralization. Everything related to
financial policy comes under the control of the Ministry of Finance
& National Economy. And SAMA is a part of the Ministry of
Finance, and therefore it was chosen to be the agency in charge of
the market. Therefore, our market follows from an extension of this
policy, putting everything in the hands of banks and eliminating all
other market players. ,,62
The new Rules reflected the government's concern to give safety priority
over profit. This also explains why share trading became limited to banks.63
Under the new rules, only banks can perform the role of mediator on behalf of
clients directly and share dealings can only take place through their mediation.64
Hence, the purpose of restricting all but banks from being mediators was
60 Drafting the Executive Rules directly through the Ministerial Committee and not by Royal
Decree as a main law within the country was justified by the idea that the stock market was new,
and its structure and shape had not reached its final stage. As a result, issuing its rules by royal
decree would not have been appropriate for the nature of the stock market, which requires fast and
easy procedures for rules, initiatives and amendments.
6! Executive Rules 1984, Article 1, p. 15.
62 See Transcript of Interview with Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel, President of The Consulting
Centre for Finance and Investment. 12 December 1997.
63 See Royal Decree No. 1230/8 Dated 11/7/1403, April 1983.
' Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1, p. 15.
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obviously to eliminate informal stockbrokers and other intermediaries from
conducting trade in the market. The double role created by the government for
commercial banks was successful in soon causing most other intermediaries to
exit the market. 65 Abdulrahman Al-Rashid, Manager of Securities Control
Department, noted that:
"Although law prohibits anyone other than the commercial banks
to act as mediator or broker in shares transactions, the
government did not rush to close other informal brokers' offices.
Instead it encouraged banks to provide better services and let the
clients feel the difference. ,,66
In December 1984, the formal market commenced operations with the
expectation that the new market would satisfy the interests of the government as
well as the market participants. The Ministerial Committee had made
considerable resources available to guarantee the success of the market. In
anticipation of the market's opening, private banks established 11 CTUs in
Riyadh city to handle the transactions. 67 Shortly after its inception, the market had
achieved 51 listings with a market capitalisation of SR 52 billion. In February
1985, the National Centre for Financial and Economic Information inaugurated
the (NCFEI) market index at 100 points.68
Despite the considerable effort that was put into establishing the market
on a good footing, market operations did not satisfy expectations. In retrospect,
the market clearly failed to build on its initial success and manoeuvre
Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 11.
66 Interview with Mr. A. Al-Rashid, Manager of the Securities Control Department, Riyadh, 17
August 1997.
67 See A. Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', in Al-Majalla Alarabia, Vol. 12, No.
3, Summer 1988, p. 122.
68 The National Centre for Financial & Economic Information index (The NCFEI) is an overall
price index developed by the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment along lines similar to
that of the Standard and Poor's Index in the United States.
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accordingly. Indeed, the following two-year period between 1985 and 1987 saw a
sharp drop in share prices and the number of transactions overall. 69
 The NCFEI
share index continued to decline to a level of 63 points in September 1986, the
lowest level of the index in its history. There were many reasons for the market's
difficulties. First, it was highly fragmented among 11 different banks, which
operated without any efficient intercommunication or shared trading system. Each
bank handled transactions on its own, without any coordination with other
banks. 7° In essence,
the execution of any transaction depended on the bank's own employee's
efforts to match selling orders with buying orders within the same Unit. This
meant that it was possible to have as many as ten different prices for the same
share. If a trader recommended matching the order outside the Unit, it had to be
sent to another bank's Unit to be matched.7t All these complications meant that
transactions could only be handled manually, which resulted in delays in trading
and registration. As a result, the average time that one transaction might take was
two to three weeks. 72
 And if this was not enough, there was evidence of illegal
activities being carried out by bank employees at several branches and in CTUs.
The major information gap enabled the bank employees to take advantage of the
trading system and exploit their positions for personal gain.73
Ironically, to the extent that the system failed to operate as intended, the
position of the informal brokers was actually strengthened. While the founders
See A1-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', p. 57.
° Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', p. 124.
' Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', p. 122.
72 Ibid., p. 123.
See The Chamber of Commerce & Industry Report, 'The Saudi Stock Market', Eastern
Province, 1995, pp. 6-7.
46
had intended that the Executive Rules 1984 would restrict the brokerage activities
to banks, the rules were not followed precisely. Therefore, it does not come as a
surprise that, despite the government's prohibition, informal brokers were still
carrying out brokerage activities without a licence. 74 By the end of 1985, more
than 30% of the transactions and more than 47% of the trading volume was
conducted through the informal stockbrokers. 75 Most of these transactions were
executed through informal brokers. The primary beneficiaries of this system were
the sellers and buyers, who paid lower commissions.76
In order to provide market investors with a more efficient trading system,
the government opened a trading floor on 11 May 1987. The long-awaited Central
Trading Hall was opened with the wish to resolve the problems associated with
the earlier efforts to establish a formal exchange. SAMA was authorised to
regulate the floor operations of the exchange. For the first time, the establishment
of the trading system offered Saudi brokers the opportunity to trade face to face.
Yet, the government, which opened the new floor relatively quickly, failed to
alter or reform the market rules. 77 Hence, the government's plan to modernise
trading was frustrated. The restrictive policy favoured banks over informal
brokers, who used to control 30% of the market, resulting in less-than-ideal
trading circumstances. For example, trading wa still handled manually and no
effort was made to make use of new technologies. Each bank had to send two
Former brokers continued to operate under the cover of Article 19b, which permitted face-to-
face transactions for the transfer of ownership from the companies' registration offices without the
mediation of banks. In the meantime, informal brokers had established strong relationships with
company registration departments, giving them strategic advantage over banks, which resulted in
their clients obtaining faster registration and transfer of ownership. See Al-Maydani, 'Financial
Markets in Saudi Arabia', p. 121.
AI-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', p. 57.
76 Ibid.
Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, p. 178.
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representatives with the selling and buying orders collected from its branches and
the matching was done in an auction base with the other banks' orders. Although
the 1987 trading floor system was intended to eliminate the problems of the old
system78 , it failed to do so.
Upon the opening of the trading floor, the number of shares traded fell
from the average of more than 200,000 units a day to just 102,304 with a decline
in value of around SR 30 million.79 This decline, as noted above, was due to the
slowness in the execution and registration of transactions. At the same time, due
to their lack of staffing and expertise, banks were unable to meet the daily trading
requirements of the market. In response, SAMA attempted to install an electronic
trading system, which, for technical reasons, failed to function properly. It was
the decline in the traditional floor operations that led the government to prefer to
revert to the old system.8°
The reversion to the old system was partly responsible for the recovery of
the market. Indeed, by mid-1988, the market recovered and the index rose by
22%. Transactions increased by 115% and the number of shares traded increased
by 128% compared to the previous year's performance. 8 ' Two years after the
closure of the trading floor, SAMA introduced an automated clearing and
settlement system. This new system certainly contributed to the record increase in
transactions that followed. 82 At the same time, there were a number of new IPOs
78 Ibid.
The Financial Tunes, 'Riyadh Exchange Closed' s Wednesday 10 June 1987, P. 34.
80 The new trading floor was closed indefinitely by the market authorities because of reported
technical and procedural difficulties. However, The Financial Times reported that some sort of
jurisdictional disagreement over the market and the trading hall had also arisen between the
Ministry of Finance, under which SAMA falls, and the Ministry of Commerce.
81 In this year, more than 12,012,324 shares were traded with a total trading value of SR
1,685,517,397, a 103% increase compared to the year before.
82 The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1990.
48
coming to the market. In this regard, Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Co. was
established in 1987 with a capital of SR 1,500 million, Taibah Investment & Real
Estate Co. was established in 1988 with a capital of SR 3,000 million, and
Makkah Constr. & Development Co. went public in 1989 with a capital of SR
1,448 million. At the end of 1989, the NCFEI index rose by 20%, breaking the
psychological barrier of 100 for the first time since the establishment of the
formal market.83
The 1984-1989 period produced major changes in the market. Table 2.2
shows how the modernisation drive led to increases in almost all market
activities. For example, market capitalisation rose from SR 67 to SR 107 billion,
breaching the psychological barrier of SR 100 billion for the first time in the
history of the market. Moreover, the number of transactions increased from 7,842
to 110,030. Finally, there was a significant rise in the market's turnover by 400%.
From 1984 to 1989, a total of 15,271,853 shares were traded with a total value of
SR 3,363,686,168 million.84
Table 2.2	 Saudi stock market statistics 1985-1989
Year	 Transactions Shares Traded	 Market	 Share Value	 All
Cap(mm)	 (SR)	 Share
________ ____________ _____________ ___________ _____________ Index
1985	 7,842	 3,936,338	 67,000	 759,976,565	 69.09
1986	 10,833	 5,263,001	 63,400	 830,748,970	 64.6
1987	 23,267	 12,012,324	 72,8Q0	 1,785,517,397	 78.06
1988	 41,951	 14,641,327	 85,900	 2,036,786,694	 89.2
1989	 110,030	 15,271,853	 107,300	 3,353,686,168	 108.68
Source: SAMA, SCD
This stage was easily the most traumatic period in the history of the Saudi
stock market. As we have seen, Saudi authorities established a new trading floor
in the wake of the Kuwaiti market collapse. The attempt to protect the market
Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, p. 174.
84 The market turnover rose by 400% compared to the year 1984, a total of 15,271,853 shares
were traded with a value of SR 3,363,383,168 million.
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from a crash by limiting trading to banks and licensed brokers provided both a
technical and market failure. Despite the attempt to modernise the market, SAMA
was forced to revert to the old system of trading.
We can see that this market was primitive and fragmented, with an
average of two weeks' trading time and a 14% average variation in prices of the
same share. 85 The market was also undeveloped. For example, although the
Companies Act permitted firms to issue bonds and other types of securities, only
common stock was traded in the market. 86 There was little liquidity in the market.
Indeed, the number of companies listed was small, according to international
standards. While there were 52 listed companies in the market, only ten
companies were trading, and this was done on an infrequent basis. 87 Overall, the
market was thin and shallow. Less than 2% of the total number of shares issued
were traded. This was due to the high concentration of ownership of shares in the
Saudi market, most being held by government institutions and other major
investors.88
Interestingly, the market during this period showed no reaction to
international economic events. Events that shocked the world financial markets
had no significant impact on the Saudi stock market. 89 For example, in 1987,
there was a crash in most of the world's stock markets and a massive decline in
the interest rate for the US dollar. In contrast, share prices in the Saudi market
85A1-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', p. 122.
Ibid.
87 Ibid., pp. 122-124.
88 Al-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market'. Al-Dukhiel states that more than
60% of the total shares are held by government institutions and foreign partners, and only 38% of
the total shares are held by the private sector. Even these latter shares are controlled by a few
major investors whose main interest is not in trading but in holding a strong position in the shares
of certain joint-stock companies.
89 E. Al-Guhni, Share Investment in Saudi Stock Market, Al-Shareef Press, Riyadh, 1989, pp. 101-
102.
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were rising. The market in this period can be described as a seasonal market.9°
Most market participants were individual investors and not institutional investors.
Hence, the market did not maintain the same level of trading during the entire
year. In this system, there are certain times of year when trading drops sharply,
especially during the summer vacation, when most businessmen travel abroad.9'
The relatively unsophisticated nature of the market was also reflected in the
information given by the financial services industry. As a result, investors were
forced to rely on imperfect information published by non-professional advisors.
5. The Fourth Stage (1990-1999)
The present stage of development is marked by a rise in the technical level of the
market's infrastructure and the need to make regulatory improvements. After the
termination of the traditional floor system, the SAMA introduced a modern,
electronic trading system. The electronic trading system was first developed in the
back office, and the settlement and clearing system was introduced to the market
1989.92 In mid-1990, an electronic trading system was introduced to the market,
making the Saudi market the first electronic market in the region. The new
electronic system, known as the Electronic Securities Information System
(ESIS) 93 , was introduced to eliminate the problems of fragmentation, widely
90 Ibid.
91 The Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990), Ministry of Planning, Riyadh, 1985, described the
stock market and the stock exchange mechanism as rather slow and very complicated, as the
processing of a stock issue could take up to two years. Individual stock transactions required
between one week and two months to complete and, more often than not, the buyer had to reach
the seller by his own means. Thus, blocks of shares could not be broken up to match the needs of
buyers. These obstacles resulted in significant gaps between bid and asking prices, thus indicating
that the price mechanism was not working efficiently.
92 See Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, p. 179.
The Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS) was built and developed by SAMA in
cooperation with the American company Arthur Anderson in 1989.
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differing prices, delays in trading and registration, weak transparency, efficiency
and liquidity. The new system concentrates all local equity trading into a single
electronic market by using central computers within SAMA and terminal
workstations within the banks, providing a floorless, continuous, order-driven
market, with up-to-the-minute information about price, volume and company
dissemination. The automated system matches the placed order bid or offer with
the best available bids or offers according to price/time priority.94
To improve the new trading system, SAMA issued what were called the
Instructions to Central Trading Unites to govern all market operations. 95 The
Instructions to CTUs describe in detail the regulations and procedures to be
followed by banks in order to complete securities transactions through ESIS.
Unfortunately, the introduction of the new electronic trading system was shortly
followed by the Gulf Crisis, which meant people did not have enough time to
experience and judge the new system. During the Gulf Crisis the market index
fell sharply. 96 The NCFEI index recorded 159 points just before the crisis, then
sharply dropped to 117 points in July, and subsequently dropped sharply again to
just 95 points in September 1990, recording a decrease in the index of more than
19%. There was also a sharp decrease in the number of transactions and market
turnover in general.97
See Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 40.
Electronic Securities Information System Instructions to Central Trading Units, SAMA,
Securities Control Department, Riyadh, 1990. The Instructions are mixed of explanations of how
does the electronic system works and some rules which have to be followed by banks. The
Instructions to CTUs have amended many times to meet the need of any new release or changes in
ESIS.
96 R. Haddad, The Saudi Stock Market Riyadh Bank, Investment Department, Riyadh, 1993, p. 2.
Ibid.
52
By the end of the Gulf war, the market had started to recover again. In
fact, it picked up dramatically, recording a sharp rise in share prices and trading
volume. 98 By the end of 1991, the ICFEI index rose by 80%, indicating the return
of confidence to the Saudi stock market. The number of shares traded rose by
82% and the value of the shares rose by 94% to reach SR 8,527,306,505 million.
Despite the impact of the Gulf war, the year 1991 witnessed a great improvement
in most companies' performance due to their participation in the war operations.
As a result, more than 58 companies made a profit that year, with total net profits
of SR 8,700 million; 49 companies distributed dividends. Sectors that recorded an
abnormal increase in profits included the services sector, which rose by 223%,
and the petroleum industry, which rose by 1 14%.
The market continued to recover sharply and increased to breach the level
of 200 points, reaching an historical high of 233.82 points in April 1992. The new
electronic trading system recorded a significant jump in the market index, making
for a historical record. The number of transactions rose by 200% to reach 272,075
for the first time. Also there was an increase in the number of shares traded to
reach 35,199,907, (with a value of SR 13,698,831,745 million) for the first time.
The capitalisation of the market reached an historical SR 238,800 million ($ 60
billion).'00
Despite the success of the market, there was still a significant shortage of
market professionals and financial advisors who could provide investors with the
much-valued information needed to make investment decisions. 10 ' This situation
Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, p. 174.
The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1992.
'°° Ibid.
'°' Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 38.
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was particularly acute for small investors, who did not have time or experience to
invest in the market. Partially to overcome this information and risk asymmetry,
SAMA, in mid-1992, permitted local banks to establish mutual funds for
investing in the local market for the first time. These mutual funds were to be
regulated and supervised by SAMA.'°2
This period also witnessed a significant number of shares being offered to
the public. More than 10 joint-stock companies offered shares to the public, either
for the first time or to increase their capital)° 3 These public offerings were
oversubscribed. For example, Mubarrad, a relatively unknown company, issued
shares worth SR 180 million that were oversubscribed by more than 300%.
Savola was oversubscribed more than 13 times.104
There are many reasons for the abnormal activities in the stock market
during the period 1991-1992. As we noted earlier, this period was marked by
significant upward movement in share prices. First, the unexpected shock of the
Gulf War operations suffered by Saudi companies stimulated the share activities
of many listed Saudi companies.'° 5 Second, the wartime operations and the
government led to a significant increase in the flow of capital to the market. The
money supply rose from SR 176 billion in 1990 to SR 204 billion by the end of
1991. Correspondingly, the increase in oil prices during the 1991-1993 period
added to the transfer of funds to the region. Moreover, return of funds to the
102 Rules and Procedures for the Establishment and Regulation of Saudi Mutual Funds, Minister of
Finance Decision No. 2052 dated 24/7/1413, SAMA, Securities Control Department, Riyadh,
1992.
103 The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Saudi Arabia,
1994.
'° Bariafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, p. 174.
105 See Chamber of Commerce & Industry Report, The Saudi Stock Market, Eastern Province,
1995, pp. 5-8.
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region was high during this time (i.e., SR 50 billion returned from abroad).106
Third, Saudi Banks allowed certain clients to receive loans, guaranteed by up to
50% to 80% of the market prices of their shares as collateral. Finally, the central
bank loosened monetary policy as evidenced by the decrease in the Saudi Riyal
interest rate, which slid from 8.7% in 1988 to 4.5% in 1993.'°
The abnormal increase in market prices through mid 1992 introduced fear
of a market collapse due to a perception by market analysts that share price levels
were not justified economically. In order to prevent a significant correction in the
market, the government undertook action to limit further increase in share price
levels. For example, the government permitted many companies to go public in a
short period of time to absorb some of the outstanding capital remaining in the
hands of investors. For its part, SAMA set a collateral ceiling at 50% of the
market share prices in order to reduce liquidity arising from the banks' flexible
lending policy to market investors. 108 Finally, the government increased the
interest rate on short-term loans in order to pressure banks to reverse their loose
lending policy, which had stimulated investment in the stock market (see Figure
2.1). The government's coordinated policy of tightening credit led to a
contraction in the market for loans. The success of the policy was reflected in the
market index, which dropped to 188.87 by the errd of 1992.'°
106 Ibid.
107 R. Haddad, 'Impact of Interest Rate on the Saudi Stocks', in Tejarat A1-Riyadh, Vol. 383,
Riyadh, August 1994, PP
.
 22-24.
08 See M. Al- Shortage, 'Saudi Stock....Collapse Now or Bank to the Norm', in Tegarat Al-
Riyadh, Vol. 364, January 1993, pp. 16-22.
09 Haddad, 'Impact of Interest Rate on the Saudi Stocks', pp. 22-24.
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The tightening of credit available from banks occurred at the same time
when the government revealed the full fiscal impact of the Gulf War, which had
led to a significant deficit in the government's budget. For the aggregate fiscal
years of 1990 and 1991, total government expenditure was $127 billion, with a
two-year deficit of $42
	
'° The policy of fiscal expansion was supported by
the drop in oil prices. Figure 2.1 shows that the market was especially sensitive to
the drop in oil prices and to the interest rate level. Both factors affected market
prices. By the end of 1993, the NCFEI fell to 179.33. Despite the decrease in
share prices, there was ironically an increase in the number of shares traded,
which reached 60 million with a total value of SR 17,500 billion."
110 See Al-Dukhiel, 'The development of the Saudi stock market', pp. 3-5.
Ill The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, SAMA, Securities Control Department, December
1994, pp. 1-2.
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l'he market index continued its downward trend in 1994 with a sharp drop
in share prices of most listed companies. By the end of 1994, the NCFEI index
fell to 127.52, recording an almost SR 100 billion drop in market
capitalisation." 2 The decrease in market prices was a response to the earlier sharp
increase in share value, which had attracted significant amounts of money in the
market. In retrospect, these inflows were not justified on any grounds, economic
or otherwise. Naturally, the sharp correction in share value led to a reduction in
some companies' share prices, well below book value for certain companies. The
market too confirmed record increases in the number of transactions, and turnover
also increased (i.e., by 152% in the number of shares traded and 43% of the value
of these shares).' 13
112 See Bakheet Financial Advisors, The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Riyadh, 1997, pp. 1-
3.
" Ibid.
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At the beginning of 1995, there had been no change in the direction of the
market. This became evident when the index reached 115 in May, recording the
lowest point since the Gulf Crisis, and a 50% decrease in market prices since
1992. However, in June 1995, the index revised the earlier trend, rising 13% over
the month before. The NCFEI continued in a positive direction and ended the
year at 136.7 points, a 7% increase over the 1994 closing."4
The transition into a bull market continued in 1996. This was partially
explained by the superior performance of Saudi companies coupled with a budget
announcement for the fiscal year 1997, which also indicated that the budget
deficit was decreasing." 5 Figures from the National Statistics offices showed that
the GDP for 1996 was up by 8.6% versus 4.3% for 1995. Furthermore, the
inflation rate was well contained. Finally, the government's payment of a total of
SR 22,000 million to the agriculture and contracting sectors served to introduce
much needed liquidity to the market. The money supply (M2) was also up by
10.5% compared to January 1995 figures, which reflected an improvement in the
liquidity of the market. Positive profit developments also added to the rise of the
Saudi market." 6 Fiscal policy and corporate earnings encouraged the market
significantly. Indeed, the market increased by 23.9% in the second half alone,
contributing to a healthy year and general recovery for the whole market index, as
shown in Figure 23"
" 
The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report 1996, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh
1996.
Ibid.
Bakheet Financial Advisors, The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Riyadh, 1997, pp. 1-3
Ibid.
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In general terms, 1996 was a turning point for the market in that it
recorded an increase in all the market indexes, as shown in Table 2.3. As for
turnover, more than 137.8 million shares were traded, 18.2% more than the
previous year, with a total value of SR 25.4 billion, 9% more than the year before.
Large banks dominated trading in the market. In fact, more than SR 10.4 billion
worth of bank shares were traded, representing 41 % of the market trading value.
In this regard, the services sector dominated turnover in the market. For example,
in terms of number of shares traded, services sector firms traded 48 million
shares, representing more than 35% of the total shares traded in 1996.h18
Naturally, the massive increase in total turnover was reflected in stock market
prices. In this regard, compared to the previous year, the NCFEI index rose by
12% more.119
118 The Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1996,
pp. 1-2.
119 The maturation of the market also depends on the development of the financial services section
and professionals and analysts, who support its operations. Today, there are more than 30
specialised offices and agencies carrying out analyses and providing investors in the market with
the necessary information and investment opportunities within the Kingdom, whether directly or
indirectly, by publishing their monthly, quarterly and annual reports and documents containing
detailed analyses of operations of the stock market and related subjects. Furthermore, there are
two daily papers which specialise in the economic events in the Kingdom, including a daily report
of all market events.
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Table 2.3	 Saudi stock market statistics 1990-1998
Year	 Transaction Shares	 Market	 Value of Shares All
s	 Traded	 Cap.(m)	 Share
________ ____________ _____________ ___________ ________________ Index
1990	 85,298	 16,938,386	 97,300	 4,403,235,482	 97.98
1991	 90,559	 30,758,077	 180,800	 8,527,306,505	 178.77
1992	 272,075	 35,199,907	 206,100	 13,698,831,745	 188.87
1993	 319,582	 60,307,628	 197,900	 17,360,034,465	 179.33
1994	 357,180	 152,088,434	 144,892	 24,871,067,453	 128.2
1995	 291,742	 116,617,939	 153,390	 23,226,589,738	 136.76
1996	 283,759	 137,832,560	 171,982	 25,397,329,810	 153.1
1997	 460,056	 313,975,338	 222,698	 62,060,355,885	 195.78
1998	 376,617	 294,637,204	 159,907	 51,509,159,079	 141.31
Source: SAfV1A, SUL)
If 1996 was a significant change of direction for the market, the following
year was a watershed year in the Saudi market history. A new sort of event
occurred, which influenced the shape and direction of the market. In the
regulatory sphere, the government, through the Ministerial Committee,
announced regulations regarding market disclosure and insider trading.' 2° The
new rules, which were enacted to protect individual investors and to ensure the
free and efficient operation of the market, were designed to facilitate the flow of
information to the market, and provide investors with equal access to necessary
market information.' 2 ' Concerning the insider trading rules, the government,
following the dominant policy in western jurisdictions, prohibited public trade in
securities based on improperly obtained information which is not presently
accessible to the market. The new rules went onto prohibit the manipulation or
the creation of false markets, or any action which would be likely to mislead or
distract the market.'22
120 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, No. 2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417, Ministry of
Commerce, 1997.
121 The new disclosure rules were intended to ensure that managers of listed companies could at
least be held partially responsible for regulating the firm, by placing on them the obligation to
announce to the market any major events or information that could reasonably be expected to
affect share prices.
122 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4.
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Another significant change has been the enactment of the new rules
regarding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), governing citizens' rights of
owning and trading shares of public corporations in other GCC countries. 123
 At
the same time, the government enacted new rules regarding the conversion of
companies into joint-stock companies. In order to meet the policy drawn up by
the government to enhance stock market operations, the Ministry of Commerce,
as the agency responsible for the primary market, issued new regulations
establishing the procedures and requirements that should be followed by any
company that wishes to convert into a joint-stock company.' 24 The main purpose
of the enactment of the new conversion rule is to facilitate and simplify the
process of conversion. It is anticipated that this new regulation will increase the
number of listed companies in the market.
Perhaps one of the most significant developments has been the opening up
of the market for foreign investment. In 1997, the Saudi Arabian Investment Fund
(SAW) was launched by the Saudi American Bank, giving foreigners the
opportunity to invest in the Saudi stock market for the first time. 125 Opening the
market for foreign investment, initially through a country fund reinforces the
liberal orientation of the national economy. The new SAW was an instant success.
123 The Council of Ministers resolution no. 16, dated 20/1/1418. This resolution approves the
resolution of the GCC 15th meeting regarding GCC citizens' right to own shares of public
corporations in 0CC countries and trade shares in accordance with the amended rules attached to
the resolution, 1997.
124 See The Guidelines for the Conversion of Companies to Joint Stock Companies, Issued by the
Ministry of Commerce via circular 495, dated 25/3/1418. (29/7/1997).
125 See the consent of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency for the establishment of the Saudi
Arabian Investment Fund (SAIF). Pursuant to SAMA Circular No. MA 1274 of 3/12/1413 H,
covering the rules and regulations relating to all Collective Investment Schemes issued pursuant to
Ministerial Decision No. 3/2052, dated 24/7/l413H.
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It attracted $250 million, which makes it the largest closed-end, single-country
offshore fund launched in recent years.'26
The great performance of the Saudi market during 1997 was soon
influenced by the turmoil in the Asian markets and the sharp fall in oil prices.
First, the turmoil hit emerging markets, especially the Asian markets in 1997, and
the uncertainty over the Russian and Brazilian economy shocked the whole
world, spreading its impact to the Saudi market.' 27 Second, and most importantly,
was the sharp decline in oil prices to its lowest level in 25 years. 1998 saw the
decline of the spot price of Brent crude by 33.3%, averaging $12.71 a barrel
compared to $19.06 a barrel in 1997.128 Figure 2.2 shows that the Saudi stock
market index closed at 141.3 points in December 1998, recording a decline of
more than 28% in the market and showing one of the worst performances since
the establishment of the market in 1984. The total value of shares traded during
1998 reached SR 52 billion, recording a decrease of 17% compared to the same
period in 1997. The average daily value traded declined by 18%, recording only
SR 171.70 million. 129 Although the Saudi market recorded a poor performance
during 1998, the market has still offered positive returns to long-term investors
during the past decade. From 1988-1998, the Saudi market index rose at an
126 
'Trailblazing Fund off to Good Start', in Personal Finance-Middle East, Issue 15, September
1997, p. 7.
127 See S. A1-Shaikh, 'The Saudi Arabian Economic Outlook', in The NCB Economist, Economic
and Financial Publication of NCB, Vol. 9, No.1, January 1999, pp. 2-10.
128 The effect of the drop in oil prices was expected to be severe on the Saudi stock market mainly
due to the fact that the Saudi economy is still relying heavily on public sector spending, which is
in turn directly tied to the movement of oil prices and government revenues from oil sales.
29 During 1998, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Ministry of Finance and
National Economy jointly announced the creation of the IFC Global Saudi Index and inclusion of
65-75% of the total valuation of the Saudi stock market in the IFC's Global Index.
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annual average rate of 5.8% and gained a yearly average cash dividend of
130
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6. Summary
In this chapter we have examined the main aspects of the Kingdom's stock
market history. Clearly, the market has managed to develop significantly over the
past three decades. There have been significant increases in liquidity,
capitalisation and institutional development. Between 1985 and 1998, the number
of transactions, volume and value of trading increased more than 32-fold. Market
capitalisation has increased by more than 160%, making the Saudi market by far
the largest market in the region. Despite the relative success of the Saudi market,
its development, while notable, is still considered modest in comparison with
other emerging markets in developing countries. Despite the technical growth, the
0-!-
IC)
CO
0)
130 Al-Shaikh, 'The Saudi Arabian Economic Outlook', p. 9.
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Saudi market has played an unimportant role in the development of the
Kingdom's economy. Less restrictive barriers to international capital flows
should create rapid improvement in the market. It is also clear that there is ample
reason to believe that improvement in the regulatory regime will enhance stock
market activity.
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Chapter 3
Legal Framework of the Saudi Stock Market
1. Introduction
A primary indicator of stock market development in general is the degree of
regulation imposed on the market and its participants.' A growing body of
literature pertaining to market theory describes the relevance of institutional
structures and legal rules and development of the stock market. 2 Recognising the
importance of this relationship, between 1980 and 1990 SAMA, and the
Kingdom's policy makers, began devoting increased effort towards creating
policies intended to enhance the framework for trading.
During the last three decades, the Saudi government has embarked on a
well-organised modernisation campaign of its legal system. 3 The central
achievement in the initial period was the successful enactment of the Companies
Act in 1 965. Nearly two decades later, in 1984, promulgation of the Executive
Rules for Share Dealings provided much-needed reform of the stock exchange.
See R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, 'Corporate Ownership Around
the World', 54 J. Fin. 471, 1999; R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, 'Law
and Finance', 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1998; R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R.
Vishny, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1997. For a critical
assessment, see M. Pagano and P. Volpin, 'The Political Economy of Corporate Governance',
Harvard University working paper, October 1999.
2 A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Market and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts', In the World
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1996), p. 299; J.C. Coffee, Jr., 'Privatization and
Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure', Columbia University Law
School Working Paper, October 1999; See, generally, B. S. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional
Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The Non-triviality of Securities Law', available from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Library at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf
abstract id=182169.
G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', in The International Journal of Comparative
Law, A Quarterly, Vol. 36, 1988, p.729. George Sfeir wrote "the modernisation of the Kingdom's
legal system is reflected in enactments which today regulate such fields of activity as trade and
commerce, business and banking, labour and social security, customs and taxation, and the
settlement of commercial disputes and arbitration-fields that, until recently, were the exclusive
preserve of traditional Islamic law".
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Recently, the government, under pressure to liberalise its securities market,
introduced measures against insider trading and market manipulation. The
government has endeavoured to design a modern stock market supported by a
clear system of rules. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the legal framework of
regulations that govern the Saudi stock market. As a precursor, it is essential to
introduce the main features of the Saudi legal system and briefly survey its unique
aspects in order to provide an accurate understanding of the current system of
stock market regulation. This chapter is divided into four sections: first, the legal
and judicial system in Saudi Arabia will be discussed. Secondly, the Companies
Act will be surveyed, particularly legislation covering joint-stock companies and
the primary market. Thirdly, there will be an analysis of the Executive Rules,
which are the regulations governing the market. The ESIS Instructions, which are
the rules which govern daily trading in the Saudi stock market, will then be
examined, followed, in the last section, by an assessment of the new Disclosure
Rules introduced in the market in 1997.
2. The Saudi Legal System
Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and guardian of that religion's two holiest
cities, Makkah and Madinah. The Kingdom is the, spiritual home to more than
1,200 million Muslims throughout the world and plays host to more than one and
a half million pilgrims each year. 4 As the protector of the Holy Places, the
Kingdom performs its responsibilities in serving, protecting and caring for the
two Holy Mosques, thereby fulfilling its vital and unique duty to Islam and
"F. Al-Farsy, SaudiArabia: A case Study in Development, KPI limited, London, 1986, pp. 21-36
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Muslims throughout the world. Islam is, in fact, the true strength of the Kingdom
and influences and forms key aspects of government policy. 5 As the leading
Islamic nation, Saudi Arabia has always provided a strong and inspiring example
by strictly adhering to Islamic principles through a governmental system based on
the Holy Quran and Sunnah as the constitution of the country.6
The influential role of Islam is reflected in all aspects of life in the
Kingdom. Since its foundation, the Kingdom has based all its political, economic
and social development efforts on the principles and faith of the Islamic religion
and has followed the Shariah law as its governing code. 7 Therefore, the
fundamental source of law in Saudi Arabia is the Shariah, as the divine law of
God. 8 The Islamic Shariah is the national law of Saudi Arabia and the basis of the
legal system of the country. 9 The Shariah is derived from three main sources, the
Holy Quran, Sunnah and Ijma.'° The Quran is the Muslim Holy book, which
consists of 6,237 verses, which are God's ordinances to the people as received by
the Prophet Muhammad 1,400 years ago. The Sunnah consists of proverbs,
teachings and actions of the Prophet. Ijma is the consensus of Islamic scholars
and authorities.11
J. Sherman, 'Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic Law',
in The International Lawyer, 1984, pp. 32 1-337.
6 C. Ruis, 'Legal Practice Shaped by Loyalty to Tradition: Case of Saudi Arabia', in The Michigan
Yearbook of International Legal Studies, Vol. 7. 1985, pp. 104-106.
Ibid., p. 105.
8 See A. Al-Kannas, 'Islamic Influence in Saudi Company Law in Regulation to Corporate
Finance and in Comparison with British Company Law', a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of L.L.M. in International Law, Univcrsity of Hull,
1992, p. 4.
G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 730. Sfeir wrote: "Historically, the Shariah
developed as a composite of religious rites and legal duties, a distinction between otherwise
equally normative categories, the core of which was the revealed word of God contained in the
Holy Quran, supplemented by the spoken word of the Prophet, the Sunnah".
See M. Barrister, 'Law in the Modern Arabic World: A Personal View', in International
Business Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1987, pp. 45-47.
J. Brand, 'Aspects of Saudi Arabia Law and Practice', in The Boston College of International
and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 1, 1986, p. 9.
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Although the Islamic Shariah is the law of God and as such is sufficient to
cope with events and matters at all times and in all places, the Shariah rules are
not comprehensive in covering all of life's events which pertain to people. The
Shariah does not address all those aspects that impact the welfare and well-being
of the people. 12 Therefore, the Islamic Shariah also recognises Al-Massaleh Al-
Mursalah as one of the sources of Islamic legislation. Al-Massaleh Al-Mursalah
allows the authorities in any Islamic country to enact new regulations to meet the
needs of the people.' 3 In Saudi Arabia, the King is the head of the Kingdom, and
he has the power to enact, or to order the enactment of, new regulations which
reflect changes within the society, and which meet the needs of the people. Any
such regulations, however, must be compatible with Shariah law, and not in
conflict with it. 14 As a result of this duality, legislative enactments govern a great
deal of the activities in the Kingdom today.
The Kingdom's legislative enactments go back to 1931 when the first
major piece of legislation was promulgated by King Abdul Aziz.' 5 The
Commercial Court Regulation was enacted in 1931 and consisted of 633
provisions separated into four chapters. The provisions covered land and
maritime commerce, bills of exchange and a commercial tribunal.' 6 Since then,
the Saudi Government has introduced many regulations to meet the ever-
changing economic conditions, especially the expansion of business relations. In
12 P. Homosy, 'Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Saudi Arabia', in The International Lawyer,
Vol. 16, No. 1, 1982, p.51.
' M. Omran et al., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Fand Public
Library, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1997, pp. 90-92.
14 G. Sfeir ('The Saudi Approach to Law Reform') wrote "not only did the statutory enactments
steer clear of any provision which might conflict with the Shariah, they often made it a point to
state in their explanatory memoranda that the modern concept introduced by the statute was in
conformity with the Shariah".
M. Al-Jebber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fand Public Library, Riyadh, 1996, p. 19.
Ibid., pp. 20-25.
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Saudi Arabia, statutory law regulates many fields and activities, such as trade and
commerce, business and banking, labour and social security, custom and
taxation. 17
 Statutory enactment has succeeded in supplementing a substantial
segment of the traditional legal structure without compromising any of the
requirements of the provision of the Islamic Shariah.'8
Until recently, the Saudi Council of Ministers, presided over by the King,
held both legislative and executive powers in the Kingdom. As there was no
written constitution in Saudi Arabia, the Council of Ministers' regulation had
served as the constitution of the country, by providing the basic system necessary
to rule the Kingdom.' 9 Referring to the term legislation as the 'Nizam', the
Council of Ministers' regulation defined the term of Nizam as any regulation
issued by Royal Decree and approved by the Council of Ministers. 20 The Council
has passed many regulations since its foundation, including the Commercial
Papers Regulation, Regulations for Companies (Companies Act), Foreign Capital
Investment Law, Commercial Agencies Regulation, The Banking Control
Regulation and the labour law.2'
There was no written constitution in the Kingdom until 1992, when King
Fand announced a series of constitutional reforms that have had a significant
effect on the political and legal system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 22 Firstly,
the government announced the Al-Nizam Al-A ssasy, or Basic System of Ruling,
' Ibid., p. 26.
18 See G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 729.
19 R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', The International
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 42, April 1993, p. 310.
20 The Council of Ministers was established by the Royal Order No. 5/19/1/4288, dated 1/2/1373.
Then it was reorganised by Royal Decree No. 38, dated 22/10/1377, which set up the Council of
Ministers regulation as the basic rules governing the country.
21 R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', pp. 309-310.
22 Ibid.
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which was the first written constitution in the Kingdom's history. The Basic
System of Ruling is composed of 83 articles setting out the ruling system of the
Kingdom, including rules governing the succession to the throne and other
powers within the country.23 Furthermore, it calls for the establishment of Nizam
Al-Mu qata 'at, or provincial government, to decentralise the power of the
government and to enable the leadership of the provincial population to take a
more active role in the development of their province. 24 Finally, the constitutional
reforms called for the establishment of Ma/us Al-Shura, 'the Consultative
Council', as the first independent legislative body in the Kingdom. 25 The
announcement of the first written constitution and the establishment of the
Consultative Council as the first independent legislative body were considered
major shifts in the structure of the legal system of the Kingdom. 26 With the
Shariah as the basis of the legal system, and which continues to exercise a
restraining influence over the content and validity of the new laws, Saudi
legislators have enacted statutory laws that regulate and govern trade and
commerce, business and banking, labour and social security, customs and
taxation 27
Although the Consultative Council has been established as the Kingdom's
legislative body, it has, as yet, not exercised its legislative authority. The Council
23 The Basic System of Ruling, issued under Royal Order No. A/90 dated 27/8/1412 AH, 1992.
24 Okaz Gazette, Vol. 9354, Saudi Arabia, 2 March 1992.
25 Since its establishment in 1993, the Consultative Council has not functioned as a traditional
legislative body, rather it has focused on playing a major role in building up political consensus in
the Kingdom.
26 R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', p. 299. Aba-Namay
argues that several factors have led to these recent constitutional developments, the most
important of which was the economic growth as a result of the oil boom, now in its twentieth year.
This has transformed a highly illiterate traditional society into a wealthy, urbanised and educated
one, and effectively incorporated the masses into political society.
27 G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 729.
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of Ministers continues to hold both legislative and executive powers. The
enactment of new legislation in Saudi Arabia varies based on its type or function.
In general, there are three types of statutory legislation in the Kingdom.
Foremost is the Supreme or Royal Order legislation. This type of
legislation is issued as a royal decree directly from the King and does not require
the approval of the Council of Ministers. 28 Legislation such as Al-Nizam Al-
Assasy, 'the Constitution', which deals with the form and function of
government, as well as separation of its powers, is usually issued by Royal Order
from the King, without requiring prior approval from any legislative or executive
bodies. Such decrees are effective as of their published date. 29 The Royal Order is
a written decision by the King only and never passes through the Council of
Ministers. The Royal Order is reserved to enact the most important legislation
necessary within the Kingdom. 3° This form of legislation has precedence over any
other laws, rules and regulations.3'
The second type of legislation are statutes, which are the basic regulations
and rules issued by the Council of Ministers and cover all types of economic,
social, commercial and labour activities within the country. 32
The third type of legislation are the normal, or subsidiary, acts, which are
usually enacted by the executive body directly, utilising power delegated from the
Council of Ministers.33
28 E. Al-Gohni, The Saudi Council of Ministers, Al Majd Commercial Press, Riyadh, 1984, pp.
99-102.
29 M. Omran et al., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 103.
30 E. Al-Gohni, The Saudi Council of Ministers, p. 104.
Ibid.
32 M. Omran et at., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 104.
B Ibid.
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2.1 The process of the enactment of new regulations
With the notable exception of the Royal Orders, all major legislation is issued by
the Council of Ministers. The 'Council of Ministers Regulation' establishes the
procedures which must be followed prior to the enactment of a new piece of
legislation within the Kingdom.34 The first stage in the legislative process is
known as the 'motion stage' or 'proposal stage'. Article 22 of the Council of
Ministers Regulation provides that any Minister has the right to propose new
regulations dealing with matters that come under the Ministry's jurisdiction to the
Council of Ministers. The Minister also has the right to propose regulations for
the general welfare of the public to the Council. These ministerial suggestions are
usually limited to matters within their powers and jurisdiction.35
The new regulations are usually drafted by the legal department of the
Ministry. Subsequently, the Minister will propose the new regulations to the
Council of Ministers. After the new regulations have been presented to the
Council of Ministers, the Council will transfer the new regulations to the
Consultative Department. 36 The Consultative Department is the highest legal
body in the country, under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. The
Consultative Department consists of a number of legal experts and advisers,
charged with the study and evaluation of the proposed regulations, following
" R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', p. 309. Aba-Namay
wrote that "the absence of a distinct and separate legislative body in the Kingdom in the past may
be because the concept of legislation, or Tashri'a, is not accepted by many Muslims, including
Saudis. Tashri'a is considered to be alien to Islam: it is perceived as inconsistent with a Shariah
based legal system, since Shariah is regarded as the highest law. Only God is the supreme
legislature. Human beings can only interpret God's law, not make their own. This view has been
followed in Saudi Arabia. Throughout its existence, the government has never claimed the right to
legislate, only to 'regulate' in order to supplement, though not contradict, the Shariah.
E. Al-Gohni, The Saudi Council of Ministers, p. 99.
36 Ibid., p. 120.
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which a final draft of the regulations is prepared and a report on the new
regulation submitted to the Council. These experts also periodically evaluate
previous legislation and draft new amendments as required.37
Following presentation of the Consultative Department's report to the
Council, the second stage of the legislative process begins. As a legislative body,
the Council of Ministers will review the final draft of the report, making
suggestions on the proposed regulation. When this process is complete, the
Council will vote on the proposed set of regulations. 38 if a proposed regulation is
rejected by the Council of Ministers, it cannot be reconsidered until the requested
amendments have been made, unless the Council requests otherwise. 39 However,
if the Council of Ministers vote in favour of the proposed regulation, the project
will be transferred to the Royal Bureau for the approval of His Majesty the King,
and for the issuance of a Royal Decree.4°
Most statutory enactments provide broad rules for particular areas, such as
taxes, banking, commerce and labour relations, and are issued by a Royal Decree
approved by the Council of Ministers and promulgated by the King. 4 ' The
approval of the Council of Ministers is not sufficient to officially pass the
legislation as law without the approval of the King. If the new project is approved
by the King, it will then be issued as new legislation by Royal Decree. 42 The third
stage is called the Issuance Stage. The issuing of the new regulation is done by
37 Ibid., p. 123.
The Council of Ministers Regulation, Art. 21.
M. Omran et al., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 106.
40 Ibid., p. 106. The King has the right to reject the project within one month, giving the reason for
the rejection.
' M. Sadiq, The Development of the Authority and Administration in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Institute of Public Administration Press, Riyadh, 1965.
42 The Royal Decree is the King's decision of issuing the new rules after the approval of the
Council of Ministers.
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order of the president of the Council of Ministers. As head of all governmental
agencies, he has the power to enforce new regulations. As noted above, all new
regulations at this level are issued by Royal Decree. 43
 The final stage is the
publication of the Decree in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom. The new
regulations must be published in the official gazette, Umm Al-Qura, and are
effective as of the date of publication.44
Other regulations, known as Subsidiary regulations, are often issued by
government agencies, and serve to elaborate on the Statutes and provide more
specific details to existing legislation. This type of regulation is enacted directly
utilising powers delegated by the Council of Ministers to one or more of the
Council members.45 This level of legislation does not need royal approval, nor
does it require approval of the Council of Ministers. This type of regulation
allows government agencies to issue rules that are necessary to effectively
perform their duties and allow them to conduct business in a more streamlined
fashion, without requiring them to consult the legislative bodies over these
matters. 46 Since the Subsidiary regulation is the lowest form of rule on the Saudi
legislative ladder, any such rule must be consistent with higher legislation which
already exists, and must not amend, nullify or contradict this higher legislation.
Subsidiary legislation is usually issued by the Council of Ministers, the Minister
concerned, or any person who is authorised to enact new rules within the
agencies.47
M. Ornran et al., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 106.
' The Council of Ministers Regulation, Art. 24.
"5 M. Omran et al., Introduction to Regulation in the Kingdom of SaudiArahia, p. 107.
46 Ibid.
" See the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 746, dated 1389.
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As noted earlier, Shariah is the national law governing all aspects of life
for Muslims in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, Shariah covers the
unchanging, or constant, aspects of people's lives and leaves those aspects which
are subject to change to be governed by rules enacted by the people themselves.
This legislation, therefore, plays a major role in the legal system of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia today. 48 As noted, the Supreme legislation in Saudi Arabia is law
that is issued by Royal Order. These serve as the fundamental rules of
government, establishing the governmental structure and allocating power among
the different governmental levels. This form of legislation is issued directly by the
King, without passing through other judiciary channels or requiring additional
approval. All other laws in Saudi Arabia are subordinate to Supreme legislation.
Statutes other than Supreme legislation are issued by Royal Decree. This
legislation must pass through the legislative body, consisting of the Council of
Ministers and the Consultative Council, before being passed to the King for his
approval. The lowest level of legislation in the Kingdom is Subsidiary legislation,
which is a body of rules and decisions issued by the Council of Ministers, or any
Minister acting as the head of a governmental agency, for the welfare of the
general public within the jurisdiction of that Ministry and consistent with
previously passed legislation (as outlined above).
The growth of statutory amendments and regulations governing such
activities as trade, commerce, business, banking, labour, customs and taxation,
has required the establishment of special tribunals to settle disputes arising from
this legislation. This has had significant effect on the judicial system and
48 See S. Omar, 'Islamic and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shariah to
Regulate Development', in The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1980,
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organisation of the courts of the Kingdom, as will be explained in the next
section.
3. The Saudi Judicial System
The Saudi judicial system consists of general courts and specialised tribunals.49
The Shariah court system, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, are the
Kingdom's general courts, with jurisdiction over all disputes unless the law
specifies otherwise. The Civil Tribunals under the jurisdiction of the Board of
Grievances and other agencies have the exclusive power to decide upon disputes
concerning government contracts, commercial, labour, taxation and banking
issues.
3.1 The Shariah court system
Due to the fact that the Saudi legal system is based on Shariah law, the Shariah
court system, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, serves as the
country's general courts, and Shariah judges preside over any dispute arising
within the Kingdom unless these disputes are excluded by law. 5 ' The first
organisation of a Shariah court system goes back to 1927 when King Abdul Aziz
pp. 413-417.
'° The establishment of a number of civil tribunals outside the Shariah court system was justified
by the Fourth Development Plan 1985-1990, which states that "As numbers of economic
transactions have increased, the need for a formal and permanent procedure for the settlement of
commercial disputes has also increased. In the past, the private sectors hesitated to utilise judicial
service due to different practices and attitudes, and time delays. New precedents are being
established as cases become more complex. Judicial services will have to engage in an appropriate
pattern of response and procedures. See, The Fourth Development Plan 1985-1990, Ministry of
Planning, Riyadh, 1985, p. 364.
° G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', pp. 742-743.
Saudi judicial regulation, issued under the Royal Decree No. 64, dated 14/7/1397, Art. 26 states
that Shariah courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes except matters that are
excluded by Rules.
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issued a Royal Decree unifying the judicial system in the country. 52 The first
organisation of the court system classified courts into three categories:
Expeditious Courts, Shariah Courts, and the Commission for Judicial
Supervision. This system has remained the main basis for the judicial system in
the Kingdom.53 At present, the Shariah court system consists of the Higher
Judicial Council, the Courts of Appeal, the Shariah Courts and the Courts of
Expedition.
3.1.1 The Higher Judicial Council
The Higher Judicial Council is the Kingdom's highest judicial tribunal, consisting
of ten members appointed by Royal Order.54 The Council has two principal
missions, administrative and judicial. The Council's first mission is
administrative and concerns supervision of the work of the courts, including the
appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges. The second mission is judicial
review. The Council's judicial functions include the review of matters requiring
determination of general Shariah principles at the request of the Minister of
Justice and reviews conducted at the request of the King. These generally concern
serious matters for which it is deemed necessary that the Council express an
opinion, reviews of judgements imposing the death sentence or other severe
sentencing, those conducted at the request of the Minister of Justice, and those
matters requiring preparation of opinions pertaining to the judiciary.55
52 See S. Al-Sulaim, The Saudi Judicial System, The Institute of Public Administration press,
1971.
A. Al-Qasem, The Islamic Judicial System, p. 607.
Ibid.
G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 746.
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3.1.2 The Courts of Appeal (Tam'yees Court)
The second level of the Shariah court system is the Tam 'yees Court or the Court
of Appeal. The Saudi government has established two Courts of Appeal in the
Kingdom, one in Riyadh and one in Makkah. The Court of Appeal has the general
mandate to hear all appeals from the Shariah Courts and Expeditious Courts and
review decisions related to cases of trust and wills. 56 The Court of Appeal usually
hears cases with three judges, except those concerning severe sentencing, which
must be heard by five judges. All judges are appointed by the Minister of Justice,
upon consultation with the Higher Council of Justice.57
3.1.3 The Shariah Courts
The Shariah Courts are the general trial courts in the Shariah court system. Most
cases therefore begin in the Shariah Court, since this general court has
jurisdiction over all subject matters, with the exception of those matters which are
excluded by the law. 58 A Shariah Court consists of one or more judges who are
appointed by the Minister of Justice, and who hear all serious crime cases which
are punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or by death.59
56 The Saudi Judicial Regulation 1977, Article 8.
The Saudi Judicial Regulation 1977, Articles 11 and 13.
58 The Saudi Judicial Regulation 1977, Article 26, states that the Shariah Courts are the general
courts in the kingdom and they have general jurisdiction over all matters except matters excluded
by the law.
E. Al-Najjar, The Gene,-al Prosecution and the Criminal Judiciary in The Kingdom of Sauth
Arabia, the Institute of Public Administration, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1997, p. 210.
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3.1.4 The Courts of Expedition
The Courts of Expedition constitute the lowest tribunal within the Shariah court
system. 6° Each court at this level is composed of one judge, appointed by the
Minister of Justice. The Court of Expedition decides on the least serious criminal
and civil matters. It also has jurisdiction over some special cases, such as those
involving nomads.6'
3.2 The Civil Tribunal System
Besides the Shariah court system, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Justice, the Saudi government has established a number of civil
tribunals. 62 These tribunals, which fall under a different jurisdiction, have the
exclusive power to decide disputes in matters other than those covered by the
Shariah court system. 63 Although Shariah is the basis of the legal system in Saudi
Arabia, developments in the national economy, trade and commerce and the
complex relationship with the international world have placed significant pressure
on the Saudi Government to modernise its legal system. There has also been a
growing need for more specific regulations to govern foreign and domestic
investments and other commercial activities. 64 In order to maintain the pace of
international and internal development, the Saudi government has pursued a
modernisation strategy for its legal system which has resulted in the enactment of
significant levels of new legislation and the adoption of a statutory law regulating
60 Ibid., p. 205.
' Ibid.
62
63 
G. Sfeir, The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 737.
R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', p. 318.64 Ibid., pp. 3 19-320.
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the majority of civil and commercial activities. 65 The Saudi Development Plans
show that there is a great deal of demand for the enactment of regulations
concerning business enterprises and the adjudication of commercial disputes.
These regulations were required to meet the demands of changing economic
conditions and modern business issues. The modernisation of the Saudi legal
system further reveals the need for changes in the judicial system to keep pace
with the new regulations.66
To cope with the adoption of the Commercial Court Regulation, the
Commercial Court in Jeddah was established in 1931.67 In 1960 a Royal Decree
was issued empowering the Ministry of Commerce to assume jurisdiction over
the Commercial Court and assigning the Ministry responsibility for application of
the Commercial Court Regulation and all other commercial legislation. 68 The
Minister of Commerce and Industry subsequently issued a decision establishing
the Commission for Resolution of Commercial Disputes, replacing the
Commercial Court. 69 The enactment of the Companies Act 1965 provided for a
commission for the settlement of commercial disputes arising from the
application of the Companies Act's provisions. As this resulted in two
commissions with the same duties, the two commissions were merged into the
Commission for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, which is now the
predominant tribunal with jurisdiction over these matters.70
65 Ibid.
66 G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 732.
The Commercial Court Regulation covered maritime commerce, bills of exchange and
commercial tribunals. The provisions of the Commercial Court Regulation were derived from the
Ottoman Commercial Law 1850.
68 See Royal Decree No. 228, 2/6/1380.
69 Ministry of Commerce Resolution No. 27, 25/12/1382.
70 U. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 743.
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The Commission for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes was not the
only civil tribunal within the country at that time. The Customs Regulation
established the Customs Committee to deal with cases involving smuggling.
Another commission outside the Shariah court system is the Commission for
Settlement of Banking Disputes. This commission was established under the
jurisdiction of SAMA in 1986 to settle disputes between banks and their
customers. Local banks were largely responsible for the introduction of this
commission, as they were becoming increasingly concerned about the non-
payment of loans in full, due to their difficulty in enforcing interest claims under
the Shariah rules. 71 In addition to the commissions mentioned above, there are
others, including the Commission on Forgery, the Commission on Bribery, the
Commission for the Impeachment of Ministers, and the Commission on Labour
Disputes.72
The Board of Grievances, or Diwan Al-Mazalem, is the most important
tribunal outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. 73 The Board of
Grievances was established in 1955 to review various administrative decisions,
71 The anti-interest payment in the Shariah legal environment had resulted in many banks bearing
the scars of heavy losses during the 1970s and the early 1980s due to their inability to enforce
their claims on borrowers. The process of obtaining a court judgement and actually collecting
under loan agreements used to take years, during which interest was not paid, heavy recovery
costs were incurred and only partial recovery was ultimately obtained. Stung by such experience,
bankers responded with greater demands for the establishment of a special court, which resulted in
the establishment of the Commission for the Settlement of Banking Disputes in 1986, as the only
court within the Kingdom with the power to hear and decide the banking dispute cases. See, P.W.
Wilson, Question Interest, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, Oxford, 1991.
71 Al-Najjar, The General Prosecution and the Criminal Judiciary in The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, pp. 32-40.
72 Ibid.
See S. Shamma, The Board of Grievances, Institute of Public Administration Press, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 1967.
'' The Board of Grievances was established by Royal Decree No. 2/13/8759, dated 1374. By
1982, a revised regulation of the Board of Grievances was issued under Royal Decree No. M/S 1,
dated 17/7/1402.
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receive citizen's grievances, investigate complaints submitted to it by disgruntled
civil servants and the public at large, and report on its findings to the minister or
the head of the agency concerned. 75 However, its jurisdiction has expanded and
grown to reach many fields far beyond its original mandate. This has given it far
greater judicial powers than was originally foreseen. The power of the Board of
Grievances led to the Board gaining one of the most important roles in the Saudi
Judicial system, presently serving as the equivalent to the French Conseil
d'Etat. 76 The Board of Grievances now has jurisdiction over many cases and
many of the other Commissions fall under its jurisdiction, such as the
Commission of Labour Disputes, the Commission for the Settlement of
Commercial Disputes, and the execution of foreign judgements. It also has
jurisdiction over certain criminal offences, such as forgery and bribery cases.77
4. Stock Market Regulation
In order to understand the current status of the market regulations, it is essential
to review how they have been developed in response to market events and other
influences. Since the foundation of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, the enactment
of legislative law has become the primary source of new laws and social change
in the commercial and financial sectors in the country. As was explained
previously in this chapter, Shariah law is the national law of Saudi Arabia, yet
increasingly emphasis has been placed on the enactment of legislative or statutory
0. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 745.
76 For more details of the Saudi civil tribunals, see S. Al-Fraih, 'The Settlement of Commercial
Disputes in Saudi Arabia', a dissertation submitted for the degree of L.L.M., Law School,
University of Exeter, 1989.
Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 745. Sfeir notes that some of the matters were
clearly falling within the province of criminal law, and as such should be dealt with by the Shariah
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laws, thereby satisfying the need in Saudi Arabia for social and economic
changes.78 While Shariah rules cover most of the unchanging aspects of society,
such as criminal law, property law, wills and trusts and family law, commercial
and financial control is largely statutory, and judges have to rely heavily on these
regulations as the primary sources of settling disputes arising in these areas. 79 No
exception to this is the Saudi stock market, which has been governed exclusively
by legislatively enacted laws.
Unlike other areas of jurisprudence, Saudi authorities did not enact only
one article of legislation to govern their stock market. 8° Instead, four different
rules and acts govern trading securities today. The Saudi Companies Act, the
Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealing through Commercial Banks, the
Instructions to Banks Central Trading Units and the Disclosure Rules constitute
the principle legislation that regulates share trading in the Kingdom. Importantly,
each law has been enacted by a different agency and for a different purpose.
4.1 Primary Market Rules
This section identifies the rules and processes governing the initial public offering
(IPO) of equity securities in Saudi Arabia. The initial sale of securities from the
courts, their identification with the statutory enactment favoured their inclusion among judicial
responsibilities of the Board.
78 R. Aba-Namay, 'The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia', pp. 309-3 10.
' See A. Berbery, The Regulation of Commercial Transactions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
The Institute of Public Administration Press, 1982, pp. 205-207.
In this regard, most emerging markets have enacted one law to deal with all securities market
activities. For example, in Oman, a new draft capital markets law was formulated in 1996,
detailing the authority of the market regulatory agency and the newly privatised exchanges. The
law sets out the functions of the market authorities, which include protection for small investors
and regulations of all securities market activities, including the initial flotation of shares taking
place in the primary market and mutual funds activities. See H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab
Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul
International, London, 1997, pp. 169-171.
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issuing corporation, or other body, to the public is called a primary distribution.8'
In many jurisdictions, companies are obliged to give adequate and factually
correct information about the securities which are being offered for sale to the
public. 82 In Saudi Arabia, securities being offered to the public are governed by
the Companies Act 1965. The Companies Act, administered by the Ministry of
Commerce, is a crucial piece of legislation in the Kingdom's securities market.
Any company wishing to go public, whether for the first time or to increase its
capital, must therefore comply with Companies Act requirements.83
The Companies Act has its origins in the Commercial Court Regulation.
The Commercial Court Regulation, which was promulgated by King Abdul Aziz
in 1931, was the first major piece of legislative law in the Kingdom to address the
increased need for the uniformity and codification of commercial law. 84 The
Commercial Court Regulation was drawn on the Ottoman Code of 1850, which
was itself drawn on the French Commercial Code of 1807.85 It was a composite
of 633 articles governing regulations on company activities. Most of the
provisions were primitive and inadequate to cope with all matters relating to
companies, their incorporation or, dissolution and liquidation, or the manner in
SI R. Teweles & E. Bradley, The Stock Market, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 7th Edition,
1998, PP
.
 3-4.
82 H. Houtte, The Future for the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 75.
83 Companies Act was issued under Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 23/3/13 85 (1965).
Amended under Royal Decree Nos. M/05 on 12/2/1387, M/23 on 28/6/1402, M/46 on 04/1405,
M/63 on 26/11/1407, M/22 or' 30/7/1412, and 1417.
' Commercial Court Regulation was issued under Royal Decree No. 32, dated 15/1350.
85 A. Al-Kannas, 'Islamic Influence in Saudi Company Law in Regulation to Corporate Finance
and in Comparison with British Company Law', pp. 10-11. Al-Kannas suggests that Saudi Arabia
did not adopt British law, in view of Britain's influence in the Gulf region in that time, because the
common law came too late to influence the Islamic system. Furthermore, the idea of law being
revealed through a series of cases seemed strange to people who were accustomed to using
treaties. Finally, the major western commercial influence in the region, Britain, made the task
more difficult by never translating the common law into Arabic.
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which they conducted their businesses. 86 The Commercial Court provisions were
certainly inadequate to cope with the development and growth of companies in
Saudi Arabia.87
The deficiencies of the Commercial Court Regulation in covering the
activities of companies revealed the need for a comprehensive set of regulations
designed to set forth exact provisions governing the activities of Saudi
companies. Hence, the Saudi Companies Act was enacted, containing 233
articles, which applied to all types of companies. 88 The rules covered all aspects
of corporate law, including incorporation, dissolution and liquidation. The Act
also determined the extent of the powers of the Ministry of Commerce, outlining
the Ministry's control and supervision in order to safeguard public interest and
protect private funds invested, and prescribing penalties for violation of such
provisions.89
The Companies Act provides for the establishment of new joint-stock
companies and the initial distribution of shares, which led to the Act becoming a
cornerstone in the legislative framework of the Saudi Stock market. 9° All
provisions governing joint-stock companies are set forth in Articles 48 to 148 of
the Saudi Companies Act. These articles deal primarily with offerings to potential
investors, exclusive power over joint-stock companies, regulated disclosure
requirements, general meetings, tender offers, mergers, accounting rules,
86 See The Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft of the Companies Act, Ministry of Commerce,
Riyadh, 1992, P. 6.
87 G. Sfeir, 'The Saudi Approach to Law Reform', p. 732.
88 See Al-Bogomi, 'Sharekat Elmosahamah fe Alnedaam Al Saudi, Joint-stock Companies in the
Saudi law', Comparative Study with the Islamic Law, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah, 1986, p.
259.
89 See M. Al-Jabber, The Saudi Commercial Law, King Fand National Library Press, 1996, p. 25.
° Ibid.
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shareholders' rights, all material information and protection of companies from
misuse by directors and officers. The Companies Act extends beyond the issuance
of new securities to cover all activities of joint-stock companies and their
directors, officers and shareholders •91
4.1.1 Going public
In order to be able to offer its shares to the public, a firm must be established as,
or converted into, a joint-stock company pursuant to the terms prescribed by the
Companies Act. 92 The Companies Act defines a joint-stock company as a
company with capital divided into negotiable shares of equal value, with the
members thereof responsible only to the extent of the value of their shares, with
their members not less than five. 93 The Act also sets out the joint-stock
company's principal attributes. Firstly, it is a legal entity with separate rights and
liabilities that are distinct from those of the shareholders. Secondly, the company
is a legal entity and is therefore liable for payment of debts from its own assets,
with company shareholders only having pro-rata liability. Thirdly, the shares of a
joint-stock company may be freely transferred by sale, gift or pledge. Fourthly,
the joint-stock company has perpetual existence and does not terminate upon the
death, withdrawal or addition of a shareholder, director or officer. Finally, the
91 See S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
1993, P. 180.
92 Companies Act 1965, Art. 64, states that if the joint-stock company is not incorporated in the
manner prescribed in the Companies Act, the subscribers may recover the amounts paid or
contributions in kind made by them, and that the founders shall be jointly responsible for
fulfilment of this obligation and for the damages, if necessary. The responsible (founder) shall also
bear all the (preliminary) expenses incurred for the organisation of the company, and shall be
jointly responsible to third parties for all acts performed by them during the period of
organisation.
° Companies Act, Art. 48 & 49.
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joint-stock company is considered a legal 'person' and therefore has citizenship
and can sue and be sued.94
The incorporation of a joint-stock company begins with the filing of an
application, signed by at least five founding members, submitted to the
Department of Companies (DoC) at the Ministry of Commerce, requesting that
body's authorisation to establish a joint-stock company. 95
 The law prohibits any
offer or invitation for subscription in the company shares, or transfer or trade in
the company's shares prior to the decision of the Minister of Commerce
authorising the company's incorporation. 96 The purpose of this prohibition is to
provide investors with adequate and accurate disclosure of financial and other
information.
Companies may be incorporated under the Companies Act in two ways.
Firstly, by virtue of an authorisation issued in a Royal Decree based on the
approval of the Council of Ministers and by the recommendation of the Minister
of Commerce for the following joint-stock companies:
1. Concessionaire Companies;
2. Companies managing a public utility;
3. Companies receiving subsidy from the Government;
Companies Act, Art. 12, 13, 48 & 64.
In situations where an existing company wishes to convert into a joint-stock company, the
company must meet the requirements of the Guidelines for Conversion to Joint-stock Companies
issued by the Ministry of Commerce Reference No. 495, dated 25/3/1418 (29/7/1997).
96 See Legal Memorandum (no. 1238/11, dated 6/5/1410, no. 1470/11, dated 11/6/1411, no.
1551/11, dated 18/6/1410) and The Explanatory Memorandum for the Regulations of Companies,
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, 1994, p. 76.
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4. Companies in which the Government or any other public legal entity
participates, with the exception of the General Organisation of Social
Insurance and the Retirement Pension Fund97;
5. Companies engaged in banking activities.
Other corporations may be incorporated only by authorisation issued by the
Minister of Commerce and published in the Official Gazette.98
There is a minimum IPO capital requirement for corporations to offer
stock to the public, which should not be less than SR 10 million. 99
 The capital
required to be paid in upon the incorporation of the company shall not be less
than one-half of the prescribed minimum, and the par value of each share shall
not be more than SR 50 and not less than SR 10.100 The founders of a company
wishing to offer its shares to the public must offer the shares for which they did
not subscribe for public subscription within thirty days of the date of publication
of the Royal Decree or Minister of Commerce's decision authorising the
incorporation of the company.'°1
The incorporation of a company shall be in a manner prescribed by the
Companies Act, otherwise the founders are jointly responsible for monies paid by
subscribers, including damages and they are also jointly responsible to third
Article 52 of the Companies Act was amended by Royal Decree no. M/22, dated 30/7/1412,
permitting the General Organisation of Social Insurance and the Retirement Pension Fund, both
government-owned public corporations, to incorporate and own shares in joint-stock companies
without special approval from the King.
Companies Act, Art. 52, paragraph 2.
° Companies Act, Art. 49. Although the minimum capital is SR 10 million, the Ministry of
Commerce usually did not look at any application unless the capital was at least SR 50 million.
'°° The minimum bar value used to be SR 50 which is considered high by international standards.
Therefore, this article was amended to allow companies to issue stock with a value of SR 10 as a
minimum in order to simplify the trading and increase the trading volume.
101 Companies Act, Art. 54. If necessary, the period of subscription may be extended by a decision
from the Minister of Commerce, but not for more than ninety days.
88
parties for all acts performed by them during the period of organisation.'° 2 The
subscription by the public must be effected through local banks designated by the
Minister of Commerce. Founders must provide banks with sufficient numbers of
copies of the prospectus and the company's bylaws.'°3
The Companies Act sets out the disclosure requirements with which
companies must comply before they go public. Therefore, founders are required
to include important relevant company information in the invitation for public
subscription. The invitation must be set out in a prospectus, which contains the
important data as set forth in the application for authorisation. The prospectus
contains important information such as the founders' names, addresses,
occupations and nationalities, the company's name, objectives and head office,
the company's capital, the classification of stock, stock value, and particulars
concerning the contributions in kind and the rights attached thereof.'°4
The Companies Act requires that the prospectus be published in a daily
newspaper distributed in the locality of the company's head office for five days
before the opening of the subscription.' 05 The Act states that the subscription
shall be open for not less than ten days and not more than ninety days'° 6 and shall
be final and unconditional.' 07 If the subscription demand exceeds the total
number of shares offered for subscription, the shares will be allotted to
subscribers in proportion to their individual subscriptions.' 08 As noted above, the
Act does not require the use of an underwriter when issuing securities. In most
102 Companies Act, Art. 64.
103 Ibid., Art. 55.
'° Ibid., Art. 55, paragraph 3.
105 Ibid., Art. 55, paragraph 4.
106 Ibid., Art. 56.
07 Ibid., Art. 57.
108 Ibid., Art. 59.
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countries, underwriters play a major role in the distribution of securities to the
public, especially in certifying the issuing company's share price.' 09 In this
regard, the Ministry of Commerce, in direct negotiation with the promoters and
after reviewing feasibility studies containing financial projections for the future
performance of the company, will decide the company's share price and issues
related to the offering."0
The Saudi Companies Act does not stipulate that there are any
requirements for trading the stock after the public subscription. Subscribers other
than the founders are allowed to trade their shares immediately after the issuance
of their share warrants. However, the founders of the company are not allowed to
trade cash shares subscribed or shares for contributions in kind, as well as
founders' shares, before the publication of the balance sheet and the profit-and-
loss statement for two complete financial years."
The Companies Act's jurisdiction Over joint-stock companies is not
limited to the primary market. Indeed it extends to companies even after they are
listed in the stock market. With the exception of banks, all Saudi joint-stock
109 An underwriter is defined generally as a person who helps a company to sell its shares to the
public through arranging the offering prices, number of shares to be offered and changes in
existing company structure. This function is usually accomplihed in one of three ways: in "the
firm commitment" underwriters purchase the securities as principal from the issuer and resell them
to dealers for retail sale to the public. In "standby underwriting" a company directly offers its
existing security holders the right to purchase additional securities at a given price, and
underwriters agree to purchase from the company any securities that arc offered to the securities
holders but not purchased by them. In a "best-efforts" underwriters simply agree to try to sell as
many securities as they can, receiving a commission from the issuer for the securities sold. See, for
instance, Booth & Smith, 'Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification of Hypothesis',
Journal of Financial Economics, 1986, Vol. 15, p.261.
110 
'The Explanatory Memorandum for the Regulations of Companies', Riyadh Chamber of
Commerce, 1994, Sections 4-12, p. 77.
Companies Act, Art. 100. Nevertheless, shares owned by founders can be transferred during
the suspension period from one founder to another.
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companies must adhere to the Companies Act." 2 The Companies Act sets out in
detail the regulations that govern all aspects related to joint-stock companies.
Firstly, the Companies Act elaborates upon the provisions that govern the
shareholders. In theory, shareholders have significant powers over joint-stock
companies. They are permitted to elect directors, approve certain extraordinary
matters, approve corporate transactions that invalid unless ratified, and bring suits
to enforce these rights." 3
 In this regard, a shareholder who holds twenty shares or
more in any Saudi joint-stock company is entitled to attend general meetings,
discuss and vote on the matters listed in the agenda of the meeting, and address
questions to the directors and auditor in respect to them.114
4.2 Secondary Market Rules
This section offers a brief overview of the secondary market rules of the stock
market. The secondary market is the market in which stocks are traded after they
have been issued in a primary market." Prior to 1983, trading in the Saudi
secondary market was not regulated. People traded their shares through an
informal stock market that consisted of 35 unlicensed stockbrokers who were not
covered by capital or credential requirements." 6 In April 1983, a Saudi Royal
Decree was issued, establishing the Ministerial Committee, consisting of the
112 Due to the speciality of banks and their importance to the national financial system, they have
to comply with requirements of SAMA and the Regulation of the Banking Control Law in addition
to the Companies Act requirements.
113 See F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, 'Voting in Corporate Law', Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. 26, 1983, p. 395.
114 Companies Act, Art. 83, 84, 93 and 94.
115 R. Teweles & E. Bradley, The Stock Market, p. 4.
See A. Al-Batel, 'The Roles of Financial Institutions in Economic Development; Saving,
Investment, and Income Growth. The case of Saudi Arabia 1965-1989', dissertation submitted to
the Graduate School for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University,
December 1992, pp. 25 1-254.
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Minister of Commerce, the Minister of Finance and National Economy, and the
Governor of SAMA, with the power to regulate and develop share trading in the
Kingdom." 7
 In December 1984, the Ministerial Committee enacted the Executive
Rules to Regulate Share Dealings as the first stock market law in Saudi Arabia.'18
In 1990, SAMA introduced the Instructions to CTUs as the regulations to govern
trading through the ESIS. Finally, the Ministerial Committee enacted the
Disclosure Rules in 1997.
4.2.1 Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealings
The Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealing reflect the conservative bias of
Saudi policy makers in the design of the Kingdom's exchange, which focuses
more on preventing stock market collapse rather than establishing the means for a
sophisticated market to develop in the national economy. As a result, Saudi
authorities focused on different measures limiting the role of market players
whilst building up a very strong settlement and clearing system."9
To achieve their goals of building up a safe and sound market, the
authorities decided to model their market upon those of European countries that
have built up their stock exchange within the banking system. Instead of
developing a traditional stock exchange like those of other countries in the region,
the Executive Rules determined that the local commercial banks would, by
restricting trading of shares in the Kingdom to only 11 licensed banks, constitute
Il/ Royal Decree No. 1230/8, dated 11/7/1403 (April 1983).
118 Executive Rules to Regulated Share Trading in Company Shares through Commercial Banks,
Circular No. 123219/mJa276, December 1984, General Banking Control Department, SAMA,
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
119 See A. Al-Dukhiel,' Gulf Securities Markets: Review of Structure and Operations', paper
submitted to Georgetown University for the Gulf Economic Conference: Gulf Economies in the
21 st
 Century, September 1996, pp. 8-9.
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the marketplace.' 2° Furthermore, the Executive Rules restricted the role of broker
activities, allowing no other parties to perform the role of mediator on behalf of
clients except the banks.' 2 ' Banks are the only brokers in the market and no share
trading is allowed to take place without their mediation. The brokerage
commission for banks was fixed at 1% of the value of shares traded. To conduct
their brokerage activities, each bank was required to designate a separate Central
Trading Unit (CTU) in Riyadh City, supported by Saudi employees, to receive
requests from branches and complete share transactions with other banks.'22
However, banks were not allowed to take positions in the market unless they
received permission from the Ministerial Committee.
Secondly, instead of having an independent body supervising the market,
the Ministry of Commerce remains the main body in charge of joint-stock
companies and the primary market. SAMA is responsible for the day-to-day
supervision and regulation of stock market operations through the Securities
Control Department (SCD), which was established within SAMA.'23
Furthermore, the Executive Rules, which established the Supervisory Committee,
ensured that banks would comply with the regulations and instructions formed by
the Ministerial Committee and provide SAMA with much-needed support in its
mission.
Finally, it was decided that trading in the market would be restricted to
Saudi citizens, and that transactions should be paid in cash. As a means of
120 Ibid. Al-Dukhiel states that building up the securities market under the umbrella of the banking
system will ensure the full control by Ministry of Finance and SAMA of the management and
operation of the Saudi stock market.
121 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1.
122 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 3.
123 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2 f.
124 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2.
93
avoiding speculation and insider trading, advance trading and the acceptance of
post-dated cheques was strictly prohibited. Restricting settlement to cash only
reflects the significant effect that the Kuwaiti stock market collapse has had on
the regulation of the Saudi market.' 25
 To complete its plan to enhance the back
office and the settlement and clearing mechanism, the market authorities
supported the establishment of the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC) to
provide the market with central registration facilities for joint-stock companies,
settling and clearing all equity transactions.126
The Executive Rules set forth that trading may occur only through banks.
The Executive Rules further impose that only Saudi joint-stock companies can be
listed in the market. Each company has to publish quarterly information on the
financial position of the company and its operating activities in the two daily
papers.' 27 Banks rely on fast communication methods, such as telex and facsimile
between the branches of a bank and the Central Unit, as well as between the
Central Units of all banks, to meet the daily trading requirements.' 28 According to
the Executive Rules, clients wishing to either buy or sell shares are required to
approach designated bank branches to place their orders. A trader takes the order
and sends it to traders in the Central Trading Unit (CTU) in order for it to be
matched with other orders the CTU may have received from their branches, or
125 
• Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', dissertation submitted to Michigan State University for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, 1990, p. 17.
126 Saudi Share Registration Company is a limited liability partnership company formed jointly by
11 Saudi banks with SR 11 million.
' Executive Rules 1984, Art. 19 Section D.
128 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 9.
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from the CTUs of other banks. Related documents are exchanged through a
dealing room created specially for that purpose at SAMA.'29
4.2.2 Instructions to Central Trading Units
The Instructions to Central Trading Units (Instructions to CTU5) form the third
cornerstone of the Saudi stock market.' 3° In 1990 SAMA introduced the
Instructions to organise and govern share trading through the Electronic
Securities Information System (ESIS). The purpose of the Instructions is to assist
banks in handling the operation of the new electronic system. As the main market
regulator, SAMA introduced the Instructions to ensure that market operation was
consistent with the Executive Rules and the policies established earlier by the
Ministerial Committee. The Instructions were issued to banks, even though
companies are also members of the stock market. Hence, companies are not
bound by the terms of the Instructions.' 3 ' The central purpose of the Instructions
is to set forth the procedures for trading through the ESIS. In particular, the
Instructions establish the steps to be followed by bank employees when
conducting a securities transaction. The Instructions have been amended many
times to meet the changes in the electronic trading system (ESIS).
129 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 10, 11, 12 and 13.
° Instructions to CTUs, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1990. The instructions
were first issued for the internal use of banks and were not published.
131 The main purpose of the Instructions was to give guidance to banks while executing
transactions through ESIS. The Instructions have therefore been amended many times to fit every
new release or changes in ESIS.
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4.2.3 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules
The fourth major piece of legislation dealing with the Saudi stock market is the
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules.' 32 As indicated previously, neither the
Executive Rules nor the Instructions to CTUs mandate disclosure requirements.
As a result, the market and the government were relying heavily on requirements
set out in the Companies Act. The lack of clear and strong disclosure regulations
in the stock market resulted in certain market investors and company authorities
supplying false and potentially misleading information to the public to disguise
dubious dealings within the company, or to mislead the public for their own
personal gain. In response, the Ministerial Committee introduced another layer of
regulations to provide market participants with more protection. The Ministerial
Committee enacted the Disclosure Rules in 1997 to strengthen the Saudi
disclosure regime.
In contrast to the earlier regime, the Disclosure Rules place more
responsibility on the chairman or managing directors to announce any major
events or information that could reasonably affect share prices directly or
indirectly, and to publicise decisions that could possibly affect share prices. The
company must release this information immediately to the Securities Control
Department of SAMA for dissemination via ESIS, and to the mass media.' 33
 The
enactment of the new disclosure rules came as a response to demands from a wide
majority of market participants to increase the quality and the flow of information
to the market.
132 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/ 9/3340, dated 8/1 1/1417.
133 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Art. 2.
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The new legislation was designed to serve the primary purpose of any
stock market regulations, which is to protect market participants and foster public
confidence in the stock market through enhanced disclosure. The Rules state that
should a company make an announcement, the announcement must include any
important information necessary for investors to get a clear picture of the issuer's
financial position, as well as include any major developments affecting the issuer,
which could lead to major changes in the assets or liabilities, or in the financial
situation of the issuer. Furthermore, the Disclosure Rules require the board of
directors, managers and executive employees not to make statements or
comments or offer information to the public unless the statement or comments or
information truly reflect the current state of affairs of the company.'34
The Disclosure Rules promote fairness in the market by prohibiting the
misuse of inside information. Firstly, the rules prohibit short-swing trading by
insiders.' 35 Managers and executive employees are not allowed to trade in the
shares of their companies in the short term for speculative purposes, nor are they
allowed to trade before, or within one day after, any announcement of a major
event that is likely to affect the price of shares. Secondly, the Disclosure Rules
contain the long-awaited insider-trading provisions which prohibit trading in the
market, based on the use of advanced proprietary information. The Disclosure
Rules prohibit any person from trading based on inside information that is not
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2-b.
' Short-swing trading is understood as the purchase and sale of equity securities of publicly held
companies by insiders over short periods using information not available to the public. Short-
swing provision tends to minimise the unfair use of inside information that makes the market
unpredictable and is damaging to those who do not have that strategic information.
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published and freely available to the public, whether this information is received
directly of indirectly.'36
5. Summary
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the development of securities
regulations in Saudi Arabia. The first two sections examined the Kingdom's legal
and judicial system. It has been shown that the Saudi legal system is a relatively
unique system that relies heavily on Islamic Shariah and legislative law as its
legal basis. There have been substantial changes in the regulatory environment in
the past two decades in order to meet the demand of changing economic
conditions and expanding business relations. This has resulted in a surge of
legislation that has been enacted covering aspects of the commercial and financial
sectors.
In section 3 the stock market rules were reviewed. The Saudi stock market
is governed by a range of rules, that are often complex. Four different types of
legislation regulate its operation. Each rule has a different purpose and, in most
cases, a separate governmental agency is responsible for its implementation. In
fact, it is probably more accurate to say that these rules have been enacted to
regulate the activities of the market players, rather than the actual stock market
itself.
The governance of the market, utilising different types of laws and
numerous overlapping regulatory agencies, might have suited the market and the
goals of its regulators in the past. However, the protection of market investors and
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a.
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the potential major role that the market could play in the Saudi economy
necessitates the enactment of a single set of coherent and consistent regulations
that addresses all issues pertaining to the stock market. Besides the fact that the
current regulations contain basic, conceptual shortcomings, their fragmentation
tends to reduce market efficiency and increase the potential of fraud and
manipulation.
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Chapter 4
Saudi Stock Market Authorities
1. Introduction
Regulatory and supervisory agencies can play an important role in the development
of any stock market.' By providing market investors with a transparent structure to
obtain price information, and with protection from manipulation and other market
abuses, regulatory authorities can foster investor confidence, while promoting the
government's principal policy objectives. 2 Many commentators have argued that the
stock markets in Continental Europe are less attractive to ordinary investors than in
Anglo-Saxon countries, because regulators are less resolute in repressing insider
trading and offering protection to minority shareholders. 3 As a rule, the number of
participants in the market is a direct measure of the degree of security felt by
investors in a particular trading environment: the more safeguards provided to protect
assets, and the more liquid the market, the greater the number of traders. 4 Unlike
'A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An Overview', in
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1996, p. 299. Kunt & Levine, argued that
Regulatory and institutional factors may influence the functioning of stock markets. See also LaPorta,
R. Lopez-de-Silanos, F. Shleifer, A & Vishny, R 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', 52 J. Fin.
1131, 1997; F. Modigliani and E. Ferotti, Security versus Bank Finance: the Imporanfce of a Proper
Enforcement of Legal Rules, Working Paper,1999; LaPorta, R. Lopez-de-Silanos, F. Shleifer, A &
Vishny, R. 'Law and Finance', 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1998.
2 See P. Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', International Monetary Fund,
November, 1995, pp. 22-23.
M. Pagano, 'The Flotation of Companies on the Stock Market: A coordination failure model', in
European Economic Review, Vol. 37, 1101-1125, 1993, p. 1102; see also J. Coffee, The Future As
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications,
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 93, 641, 1999.
' Ibid. Pagano states that this insight has been elaborated upon in several models of asset markets
where participation externalities give rise to coordination failures. In these models, market
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many other countries, the Kingdom's stock market does not have an independent
regulatory body in charge of its operation. 5 Direct regulatory responsibility for the
securities market is divided mainly between two government agencies, the Saudi
Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the Ministry of Commerce. The primary
market is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce whilst the secondary market is
regulated and operated by SAMA. The Ministerial Committee, an executive
committee, and its subcommittee, the Supervisory Committee, provide the
mechanism for coordinating the activities of the two agencies.
The authorisation for the regulation of the primary market was promulgated
in 1965 through the Companies Act. 6 The Act has subsequently been amended to
reflect changes in the market. To regulate the secondary market, in 1984 the
Ministerial Committee as the highest regulatory committee issued a regulation based
primarily on the Executive Rules to Regulate Dealings in Company Shares through
Commercial Banks. 7 As noted previously in Chapter 3, the Kingdom does not have
one single regulation with respect to the licensing and supervision of financial
intermediaries and market professionals who participate in the market. These
activities, therefore, which include banking, corporate finance and other securities
participation moderates the risk of the security [Chatterjee (1988), AlIen and Gale (1991)1 or the
sensitivity of prices order flow [Pagano (1989a)] or both [Pagano (1989b)].
Most Arabic stock markets have an independent single regulator for their securities market activities
For example, Oman, Jordan and Kuwait have established an independent body entrusted to regulate
the stock market and to act as the Securities Exchange Commission. See H. Azzam, The Emerging
Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul
International, London, 1997, pp. 159-195.
The Companies Act issued under Royal Decree No. M/6 dated 23/3/1385 (1965), amended under
Royal Decree Nos. M/05 on 12/2/1387, M/23 on 28/6/1402, M/46 on 04/1405, M/63 on 26/11/1407,
M/22 on 30/7/14 12, and 1417.
Executive Rules to Regulated Share Dealings in Company Shares through Commercial Banks,
Circular No 123219/m/a276 in December 1984, the General Banking Control Department, SAMA.
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market transactions, are diverse and would be shared by a number of regulators,
including SAMA, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Finance.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the regulatory structure, institutional
framework and legal rules that have affected stock market development in the
Kingdom. This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section, the focus will be
on the role of the Ministerial Committee as the supreme power in the market. In the
second section, the emphasis will be on the role of the Supervisory Committee in
coordinating the activities of the agencies. The third section will focus on the role of
the Ministry of Commerce. Section four will study the role of SAMA. The last
section will evaluate the current situation of the market authorities, examining
possible gaps and weaknesses in the regulatory structure and evaluating the demands
for new regulators in light of changes in the market. The main issues addressed
concern whether, because of divided regulatory responsibility, a new unified
structure is required, or whether the structure of the agencies concerned should be
reformed and amendments made to account for changes in market structure. This
would be done without altering the fundamental division of regulatory control over
the market and its participants.
2. Regulatory Structure of the Saudi Market
Presently, the regulatory responsibility in the Kingdom for the securities market is
divided between two main agencies: the Ministry of Commerce, which regulates the
formation of companies, the public offer of securities and the operation of financial
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institutions (excluding banks); and SAMA, which regulates the secondary market
and the subsequent buying and selling of shares. A joint Ministerial Committee
and a Supervisory Committee, with delegates from the Ministry of Commerce and
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, as well as SAMA, were formed to
provide a mechanism for coordinating the activities of the two agencies. Figure 4.1
shows the present supervisory arrangement for the Saudi stock market.
We first turn to examine the high-level Ministerial Committee that is
responsible for coordinating the respective agencies.
Figure 4.1 Present Supervisory Arrangement
The Ministerial Committee
An executive committee consisting of:
Minister of Finance & National Economy
Minister o' Commerce,
and Governor of SAMA
With the overall mission of regulating and
developing the Saudi stock market.
The Supervisory Committee
Consisting of officials lower ranking than the
upper Ministers from Ministry of Finance &
National Economy, Ministry of Commerce and
SAMA.
With mission to link up SAMA and Ministry of
Commerce with the Ministerial Committee
The Ministry of Commerce
The agency in charge of trade and commerce
activities in the Kingdom
With the full responsibility to regulate and
supervise all type of companies including joint
stock companies and their publicly offerings
'-The Saudi Monetary Agency
SAMA
The Kingdom Central Bank with the main
mission to regulate and supervise trading in the
secondary market through the Securities Control
Department
Listed
Companies	 SSRC	 Banks
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2.1 The Ministerial Committee
This section examines the role of the Ministerial Committee in monitoring and
coordinating the activities of the Kingdom's regulatory activities. The regulatory
structure of the Kingdom has been developed over a 25-year period. 8 In the early
1980s, in the wake of the Kuwait crisis, the Council of Ministers formed an internal
committee consisting of the Minister of Finance and National Economy, the Minister
of Commerce and the Governor of SAMA to review the informal stock market
situation and recommend ways to improve its structure and regulation. 9 The selection
of these three members was not surprising, as their agencies had been originally
responsible for the regulation and supervision of financial and trade activities.
The Ministry of Commerce is the government agency responsible for the
supervision of all commercial activities within the Kingdom, including all types of
companies. Through the Companies Act, the Ministry of Commerce is empowered to
regulate and supervise the establishment of joint-stock companies and govern the
approval of initial public share offerings to the public. 10 SAMA is the Kingdom's
Central Bank charged with the main task of controlling the financial institutions and
designing the monetary policy within the Kingdom. 1 ' It is the Banking Control Law
that authorised SAMA to regulate, supervise and set up all the processes and
requirements for the establishment and operation of banks within the Kingdom.'2
8 M. Al-Ajmi, 'Gulf Equity Markets: Comparison of the Structure and Performance', thesis submitted
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Industry and Business, University of Warwick, 1994, p. 43.
S.A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1993, p.77.
'° Companies Act 1965, Article 2.
The Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established as the Kingdom's Central Bank under
Royal Decree on Rajab 1371.
12 Banking Control Law, issued under the Royal Decree No. 23, dated 23/5/1377.
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The third agency involved in this special committee is the Ministry of
Finance and National Economy. The Ministry of Finance is the government agency
responsible for the overall economic and financial affairs within the Kingdom.' 3 For
a long time, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy was considered one of
the most powerful government agencies within Saudi Arabia.' 4 The Ministry of
Finance is responsible, at a more general level, for a wide range of high-level macro-
economic tasks and in particular, is charged with developing the economic policies
for the Kingdom.15
Previously there were no regulatory controls over market activities. The
government, in developing the complex structures necessary to control the wide
range of market activities, designed a regulatory approach with protection for
investors and financial market stability as the major policy goals.' 6 In order to
establish a regulatory framework based on the involvement of these agencies, the
Council of Ministers, following an assessment of the internal market and the
characteristics of the market participants, developed a trading structure and a
coherent regulatory mechanism that benefits a wide range of businesses in the
market.' 7
 The study of the market was conducted by the Ministry of Finance and
served as the basis for a meeting of the Committee in March 1983, in which it was
13 The Ministry of Finance and National Economy was created in 1932 under the name of the General
Finance Agency to handle fiscal and monetary matters. See S.S. Huyette, Political Adaptation in
Saudi Arabia - A Study of the Council of Ministers, Westview, Boulder, Oxford, 1985.
' See, A. Al-Dukhiel, The Banking System and its Performance in Saudi Arabia, Saqi Books,
London, 1995, p. 29.
15 Ibid.
16 See H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul International, London, 1997, p. 142.
17 Ibid.
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decided that more specific arrangements were needed for the regulation of the
market.' 8
 Hence in April 1983, a Saudi Royal Decree was issued to approve the
recommendation of three ministers and to establish a Ministerial Committee
consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the
Ministry of Commerce and SAMA, as the highest committee of the stock market to
deal with the task of regulating and developing the Saudi stock market.' 9 The Royal
Decree of 1983 announced that the main reason for the establishment of the
Ministerial Committee was that "the government wished to establish a committee
comprising the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and SAMA to execute
rules to allow banks to provide this service [the buying and selling of shares] and the
Committee should work on developing these arrangements in order to achieve the
desired goals, including distribution of information and statistics in order to make the
citizens continually aware of the situation of the companies."20
Pursuant to its rulemaking power, the Ministerial Committee developed the
Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealings, which was the first securities market
law enacted within the Kingdom. 2 ' The Executive Rules are designed to organise the
regulatory bodies and their supervisory powers. 22 In order to ensure adequate
IS Al-Ajmi, 'Gulf Equity Markets: Comparison of the Structure and Performance', p. 50. The study of
the market showed that prior to 1984 the market suffered from illegal practices due to the lack of
regulation and supervision; the market is fragmented between many offices and brokers without
sufficient connection linked to provide investors with the necessary information; the stockbrokers
operate without licence or any operation requirements.
19 Royal Decree No. 12308, dated 11/7/1403.
20 Ibid.
21 Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealings in Companies Shares through Commercial Banks,
SAMA's Circular in December 1984, The General Control Department, SAMA, Saudi Arabia.
22 M. Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and
Integration', thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Duke University, Durham,
North Carolina, 1994, p. 11.
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supervision of the market and provide specific rules, as well as to develop an
enforcement structure, the Ministerial Committee provided the institutional basis for
the development of best practices rules. Generally, the Ministerial Committee is the
most appropriate institution to ensure that the market regulators carry out their
tasks.23 In particular, the Committee ensures agency compliance with the Executive
Rules and determines whether agencies require additional support, and reallocates
functions and supervisory responsibilities. The Ministerial Committee operates as a
Board of Directors, which monitors and approves the proposals of SAMA and the
Ministry of Commerce. The Ministerial Committee naturally retains final authority to
approve legislative initiatives and amendments •24
Whilst the Ministerial Committee is the supreme regulatory power in the
Saudi financial market, it does not function as a regulatory body in the same way as
the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) in the UK or the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the US, which are fully devoted to the regulation and
development of stock market activities. 25 In this respect, Osama Faqih, Minister of
Commerce & Member of Ministerial Committee, explained that:
"Rather, the work, undertaken by the Ministerial Committee is to co-
ordinate particularly complex activities of the differently placed
market regulators, while assessing, from the Government's
23Ibid. p. 12.
24 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2-e, require other regulators to present a quarterly report on their
activities to the Ministerial Committee and the approval of the Ministerial Committee for any changes
in the regulation of share dealings.
25 The US Securities and Exchange Commission's mission is to administer the distribution of
securities, the activities of brokers and dealers, the operations of stock exchanges and numerous other
activities related to the operation of the securities markets. In the UK, the FSA stated that any
investment business conducted had to be authorised and that the supervision of this investment
business was to be placed in the hands of the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). See F. Oditah,
The Future of the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1996, pp. 157-183.
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perspectives, the effectiveness of these institutions in delivering on
their policy objectives."26
Given the executive nature of the Ministerial Committee, there is no
permanent building or professional staff to house and guide their activities. The
Committee's main task is to supervise the performance of the different regulatory
organisations, and the this supervisory function is exercised at least once a year in a
general meeting in which members undertake to review performance and approve
new rules.27
The Ministerial Committee consists of three members, with each member
serving as the head of the agency he is representing. Membership of the Ministerial
Committee is automatic28 , with the ministers holding their positions as long as they
are heading their Ministries. For example, when a number of new ministers were
announced in 1995, the two new ministers of Commerce and Finance were appointed
to the Committee to replace the ministers who left. 29 The new members of the
Ministerial Committee continued to carry the mission of the earlier Committee by
working with market authorities on developing new regulations designed to ensure
the protection of market participants. In this regard, the Ministerial Committee
announced in 1997 new regulations regarding disclosure and insider trading. 3° The
26 See interview with Osama Faqih, Minister of Commerce and Member of Ministerial Committee,
Riyadh, 28 July 1997.
27 Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-c, provide that the Ministerial Committee retains final authority to
approve stopping any dealings in the market in the event this should last longer than one week.
28 Royal Decree No. 12308, dated 11/7/1403.
29 In 1995, King Fand announced the appointment of new government in order to facilitate the growth
in the national economy and to carry on the old development plan. The change in the Government
members resulted in replacing the Minister of Commerce and Minister of Finance.
° See Ministerial Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No. 2222/221/9/3340,
dated 8/11/1417.
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Committee also reviewed the foreign investment rules and decided subsequently to
allow foreign investors to invest in the Saudi market for the first time, through
country funds. 3 ' The Ministerial Committee has also worked to provide investors
with better services and better protection, while increasing market efficiency and
liquidity by moving towards liberalising the market and opening it to Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens and other foreigners.32
The Governor of SAMA and member of the Ministerial Committee, Hamad
Al-Sayari, stated in an interview at the time:
"There are a number of objectives which the Ministerial Committee
seeks to promote, including: sustaining confidence in the Saudi
financial sector (working on an agreed basis with the SAMA and
Ministry of Commerce to set the framework for co-operation in this
area); protecting investors and other consumers by ensuring that
banks are financially sound and can assure their customers of their
integrity; promoting improvements in investors, understanding of
risks and benefits offinancial products and securities; monitoring and
supervising the authorities in detection and prevention of financial
crime; ensuring that these policy goals can be realised in an efficient
manner that facilitates innovation and that takes account of the
diverse financial interests within the market."33
The Ministerial Committee recognises that to improve the regulatory
processes further, it is essential to build upon the existing regulatory arrangement
while augmenting the rules to take account of changes in the market structure.34
31 
'Trailblazing Fund off to Good Start', in Personal Finance - Middle East, issued 15 September
1997, P. 7.
32 Trading by 0CC Citizens Rules, Ministry of Commerce Reference No. 222/427/9572. Dated
5/2/1418 (1997).
Interview with Mr. Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of SAMA and Member of the Ministerial
Committee, Riyadh, 4 September 1997.
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2.2 The Supervisory Committee
This section describes the work of the Supervisory Committee, which is the second
regulatory body involved with supervision of the Saudi stock market. The
Ministerial Committee, which is responsible for coordinating and prioritising the
government's goals, supports the work of the Supervisory Committee on a day-to-
day basis. 35
 The Supervisory Committee, established by the Executive Rules to
ensure compliance with market regulations, provides infrastructure support of the
regulatory groups and assists the Ministerial Committee in coordinating the
regulators' dealings with banks and other regulated firms and agencies. 36 The
Supervisory Committee consists of representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Commerce and SAMA. The membership includes officers holding a
lower rank than members of the Ministerial Committee.37
The Supervisory Committee was established to fill the gap between market
operations and the Ministerial Committee. In answer to a question concerning the
Supervisory Committee's main function, Jammas Al-Suhaimi, Deputy Governor of
SAMA and Member of the Supervisory Committee, noted that:
"The Supervisory Committee plays an active role in enhancing
regulatory functions, by operating as an intermediary between the
Ibid.
Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2, state that a permanent committee is formed to supervise share
dealings (which is called the Supervisory Committee) which is made up of representatives of the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and SAMA.
Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-a, provide that the Supervisory Committee's main task is to supervise
share dealings and ensure that the regulations and instructions from the Ministerial Committee are
carried out.
Each member of the Supervisory Committee is holding a position as deputy minister in the agency
that he represents. For example, SAMA's representative is the Deputy Governor and General Manager
of the General Banking Control Department.
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regulator of the secondary market operations and the regulator of the
primary market, and the Ministerial Committee."38
Members on the Supervisory Committee remain until they step down or are
removed by the agency which they represent. 39 Members of the body are from
regulatory agencies only, although some observers believe that liaison with private
sector representatives could assist the government in continuing the development of
its work in promoting the exchange of information and expertise.4°
As with many government agencies of this type, the present members,
representing the various ministries, have limited time and opportunity to devote to
the task of regulating the stock market. The Supervisory Committee meets only once
a month and accordingly has limited scope in handling many of the complex matters
and enforcement concerns that confront the respective regulatory bodies. 4 ' Despite
these limitations, the Committee plays an important role in legitimising the
Kingdom's regulation of the stock market, and serves as a buffer to help the various
agencies face the complex problems they encounter in performing their tasks. The
Executive Rules state that the main purpose of establishing the Committee was to
offer the market adequate supervision and ensure compliance with the Rules by
38 Interview with Mr. Jammas Al-Suhaimi, Deputy Governor of SAMA and Member of the
Supervisory Committee, Riyadh, 24 September 197.
The Supervisory Committee members are like the Ministerial Committee's members in that no
member devotes 100% of their time to their membership because they have their main jobs beside the
membership of the Committee. For example, the representative of MoC is both Deputy Minister of
Commerce and General Director of the DoC.
° See, for example, Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its
Policy Implications', p. 138. Malaikah noted that a committee that supervises the Saudi stock market
should be composed of key members from the Ministerial Committee and Supervisory Committee. In
addition, it should include members selected from both the academic and professional fields in the
areas of investment and finance.
" Although Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2-d, provide that the Committee holds at least a monthly
meeting, meetings can be called at the request of any member. Normally, the Committee does not meet
every month due to the fact that members are too busy in their main jobs.
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banks and other market participants. 42 A secondary function assigned to the
Supervisory Committee is the production of a quarterly report on market activities
and operations to the Ministerial Committee. 43 In order to assist the Committee in
performing its functions, the Ministerial Committee has delegated some of its power
to the Supervisory Committee. For example, the Supervisory Committee has the right
to review rules and regulations relating to the organisation of share dealings, with the
purpose of developing and increasing their effectiveness. Any changes in the
Executive Rules or additional regulations, however, must receive the approval of the
Ministerial Committee.44 To enable the Supervisory committee to perform its duties,
it is also provided for in the Executive Rules that the Committee has the right to
request all financial information relating to dealings from commercial banks and
private firms. 45 Furthermore, the Executive Rules empower the Supervisory
Committee to halt dealings in shares of a company or to put a maximum limit on
share offers or trading whenever necessary. 46 This suspension, however, cannot
exceed more that one week. Any suspension of trading activity lasting more than one
week must be done with permission from the Ministerial Committee.47
42 Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-a.
" Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-e.
" Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-e.
' Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-b, state that the Supervisory Committee has the right to request all
financial information relating to dealings from commercial banks or companies. The Commercial
banks and companies are obliged to provide all the information that the Committee requests about
share dealings.
46 Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-c.
Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-c, state that the Supervisory Committee has the right to stop dealings in
shares of a company or to put a maximum limit on dealing in its shares if the general welfare so
requires, on a temporary basis that does not exceed one week. Also the Committee has the right to halt
stock dealings in the market altogether after obtaining the Ministerial Committee's approval.
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Although the Supervisory Committee is very capable of handling the
supervision and other cooperative activities that take place between the Ministry of
Commerce and SAMA, it is not the appropriate administrative body to deal with the
daily supervision of the regulated institutions.
2.3 The Ministry of Commerce
This section examines the regulatory role of the Ministry of Commerce. Since the
adoption of the Commercial Court Regulation in 1931, the Ministry of Commerce
has remained the main government agency in charge of all trade and commercial
activities within the Kingdom. 48
 Prior to 1984, the supervision of the informal
market was the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce. Although the
Companies Act did not specifically allocate power over share trading in the Kingdom
to the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry derives its power in this instance from its
role as the government agency with responsibility for the regulation of all companies,
including joint-stock companies.49
The Companies Act of 1965 allocated to the Ministry of Commerce full and
exclusive power and jurisdiction over the primary market and all joint-stock
companies, and all their activities. 50
 As we noteft previously, the primary market is
regulated by the Ministry of Commerce pursuant to the Companies Act, particularly
' For extensive surveys of the development of Saudi company law, see S. Yahya, The Saudi
Co,n,nercial Law, Almctabah Almasriah Alhadeethah, Egypt, 1976.
' A1-Ajmi, 'Gulf Equity Markets: Comparison of the Structure and Performance', p. 46.
° Companies Act 1965, Article 52, states that all joint-stock companies may be established only by
virtue of an authorisation issued in a royal decree based on the approval of the Council of Ministcrs
and the recommendation of the Minister of Commerce or they may be established direct by
authorisation issued by the Minister of Commerce.
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Articles 48-148, and the guidelines relating to the conversion of company status from
private to open joint-stock company, and to the offering of shares in such companies
to the public. 51 The Companies Act regulations simply provide a basic structure to
process the conversion and offerings to the market. As noted in Chapter 3, because
the rules governing IPOs are lacking in detail, the Ministry of Commerce exercises
considerable discretion in processing applications, assessing valuations of share
issues, and determining whether the prospective offerings are ultimately fair and non-
discriminate in their effect on the market participants.52
The broad discretion provided to the Ministry of Commerce in its supervision
of conversions and proposed offerings could be justified in the early stages by the
development of the Saudi stock market. 53 In the 1980s there were few retail investors
and the provision of securities services was restricted to under-capitalised financial
intermediaries and banks. 54 However, the expansion of the market, which was
generally welcomed by the government, brought with it potentially greater risks to
retail investors, who were given little incentive to obtain information about risk and
return and who cannot be shielded by the information provided to the market by
experienced, professional intermediaries. In this context, the Ministry of Commerce,
51 
'Guidelines for the Conversion of Companies to Joint Stock Companies', issued by Ministry of
Commerce via Circular 495, dated 25/3/1418 (29/7/1997).
52 For example, The Guidelines for the Conversion of Companies to Joint Stock Companies 1997, Art.
2.4, states that in situations of converting a company into a joint-stock company and increasing its
capital through public subscription or maintaining its capital and offering part of the capital for public
subscription, departments of companies shall appoint one (or more) expert(s) with the objective of
ascertaining the value of the company and specifying the rate of share prices of the proposed joint-
stock company in accordance with the provisions of Articles 60 and 6lof the Companies Act
according to common applicable accounting standards.
See, Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 153-163.
Ibid., pp. 141-142.
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worried about the level of risk in the market, continued on its course of conservative
management of market risk, anticipating that any difficulties could be controlled
completely by its restrictive and, ultimately, costly intervention.
The evolution of the market in the later part of the 1980s, however,
introduced new complexities for the Ministry of Commerce. The micro-structure of
the market changed fundamentally with the introduction in the market of a new class
of sophisticated investors generally familiar with the level of risk, volatility and rated
return. 55 Moreover, the government policy of stimulating private sector growth,
derived from its five-year plans and intended to gradually diversify the economy
from its traditional resource base in industrialisation, was successful in adding many
new public companies to the Saudi share exchange. 56 The emergence of a nascent
TPO market thus contrasts sharply with the earlier stages of market development in
which there were few companies sufficiently capitalised to bring new issues to the
market. Hence, with the increasing maturity of the Kingdom's market, there was a
correspondent introduction of a sophisticated infrastructure of financial
intermediaries armed with information about securities, as well as the development
of a financial advisory industry.
Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed
Markets, p. 154. At present, there are more than 300,000 Saudi shareholders, 40 financial advisor
offices, 11 mutual funds, and more than 50 unlicensed agencies.
For example, The Kingdom's Fifth Development Plan 1990-1995 stated that one of its primary
objectives is to increase private sector investment in the national economy through selling selected
government-owned enterprises to the private sector, selling shares in selected government-owned
enterprises to the private sector, and encouraging the private sector to compete with certain
government monopolies. The Sixth Development Plan 1995-2000 states that one of the plan's
objectives is to study the feasibility of privatising some of the state enterprises with a commercial
nature and to expand the use of private sector capital in financing some government projects.
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The new market conditions contrast with the earlier environment in which the
regulatory mission of the Ministry of Commerce was defined. It was assigned a
highly interventionist role with as premise the fear that financial instability (due in
part to the Kuwaiti market collapse and its resultant effect on the Saudi market)
would place constraints on the growth and development of the market's capacity for
new issues.
In light of the newly emerging market conditions, it can be seen that the
conservative approach to new issues of the Ministry of Commerce is one of the main
factors restricting market growth. 58 Typically, the review process of the Ministry of
Commerce, which may take several months to complete, leads to uncertainty and
ultimately to an unattractive offering price. It may be that the Ministry of Commerce
procedures require revision in order to limit the costs and delays associated with the
review process. 59
In this regard, the Kingdom's policymakers could eliminate the imperfections
in the system by introducing a legal framework for new offerings that is based on the
concept of regulation by disclosure rather than on the merit review approach, the
details of which are discussed in Chapter 7. The benefits from such changes include
See Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', p. 16.
58 Bakheet Financial Advisors, 1998 Annual Report, p. 4. The report shows that only 74 companies are
traded on the Saudi stock market, which is very deficient when compared to an average of 350
companies in other emerging markets. The report states that the reason for this small number of
companies is the stringent listing requirements imposed by Ministry of Commerce which have mainly
encouraged the listing of large well-established companies. During the last decade only 15 companies
have offered their shares to the public.
See Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, p. 153. Azzam states that scrutiny of companies that apply for listing is time
consuming and the criteria for acceptance are not transparent. In most cases, it takes as long as two
years for a company's application to be approved. By that time, everything may have changed,
including the company's financials, rendering the original application obsolete.
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lower costs, ensures that only the regulator is concerned with determining the price
of the issue, and also determines whether the information disclosed is relevant to
assessing the security on offer. The result is that the move to a new disclosure-based
regime would mean that the regulators themselves must ensure that all valuations,
financial and otherwise, made in the offering have a sound basis and are fully
transparent. This scheme relies on the promoters and financial intermediaries to
guarantee that the disclosures made are fair and sound. Penalties and other incentives
will ensure that the parties take all necessary steps to meet compliance standards.
This approach will fundamentally change the responsibility of the private sector
and its intermediaries. Such a change in approach may dictate a different role of the
Ministry of Commerce.
Surprisingly, the 1984 Executive Rules did not unify the supervision and
regulation of the primary market and the secondary market under a single regulatory
agency. Instead an exchange was created within the local banks, restricting share
trading activity to the banks and establishing SAMA as the authority in charge of its
operation. The Ministry of Commerce and SAMA together share the main
responsibilities of regulating the Saudi securities market. We now turn to discuss the
position of SAMA in its regulation of the secondary market.
2.4 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
The aim of this section is to analyse the supervisory function and policy role of the
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). SAMA was established in 1952 as the
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Kingdom's Central Bank. 6° It not only issues the Kingdom's currency but is also
responsible for macro-economic policy, regulating the banking affairs of the
government (fiscal agency services), regulating activities of commercial banks and
exchange dealers, and managing the country's official foreign exchange reserves.61
SAIVIA was also given the authority to regulate the stock market. This was a
reasonable move, given that SAMA already regulated commercial banks, who were
the primary players in the operation of the stock market.62
The decision to grant SAMA an exclusive regulatory mandate created initial
difficulties for the agency when dealing with stock market activities. For example,
the absence of a formal listing agreement between issuers and SAMA, acting as
secondary market regulator, meant that the source of regulatory control lay with the
Ministry of Commerce, by virtue of its position as primary market regulator, and not
with SAMA. 63 In this regard, Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel, former Deputy Minister of
Finance and President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, reported
in an interview:
60 SAMA was established by Royal Decree No. 30.4.1.1047, dated 20 April 1952.
Royal Decree No. 23. on 23/5/1377 (1957) defined SAIvIA's powers as follows:
(1) to issue and strengthen the Saudi currency and to stabilise its internal and external value,
(2) to deal with the banking affairs of the Government,
(3) to regulate commercial banks and exchanges dealers,
(4) to manage the country's official foreign exchange reserves
62 See A. Al-Batel, 'The Roles of Financial Institutions in Economic Development; Saving,
Investment, and Income Growth. The Case of Saudi Arabia 1965-1989', dissertation submitted to the
Graduate School for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, December
1992, p. 254.
63 In this regard, Malaikah 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its
Policy Implications', p. 19, wrote that the SCD issued a circular which specified that corporations
should report their quarterly financial statements within two months of the end of each quarter. The
circular states that the Ministerial Committee has the right to suspend share trading for companies that
do not comply with the quarterly disclosure requirements and are subject to penalties specified under
the Companies Act. Some companies have complied with the quarterly reporting while the majority
have not. Penalties have never been enforced on companies that do not comply.
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"SAMA 'sformal control of market activities was limited to its role as
the main regulator for banks and their activities within the market.
This awkward and cumbersome relationship, fuelled by turf battles
between administrations, contributed, in the initial period, to limited
coordination between the bodies, prompting firms to question which
body was the main regulator for the market for securities."64
The initial division of regulatory authority between the two bodies was
reasonable given the development of the Kingdom's market. 65 Until 1984, trading
was conducted on an informal basis without comprehensive control by the
government. Indeed, at that time, there were few companies being traded in the
market and investors were relatively unsophisticated in understanding market risks.66
With the growth of the market, SAMA introduced an electronic trading platform and
operational infrastructure. These developments served as the basis for SAvIA
assuming more responsibility for supervision over the market. Gradually, SAMA's
authority increased as the market itself evolved and expanded into a significant
regional exchange.
2.4.1 Securities Control Department (SCD)
This section discusses the monitoring and control of trading activity which SAMA
undertakes for the equity market. A provision in the Executive Rules provided for the
creation of the Securities Control Department (SCD) within SAMA. The SCD is
See interview with Abdul Aziz AI-Dukhiel, former Deputy Minister of Finance and President of the
Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, Riyadh, 12 December 1997.
65 Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed
Markets, pp. 142-144.
66 Y. Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, Daar Al-Mannaheg Press, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, 1997, pp. 9-11.
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responsible for the daily oversight and control of the securities market. 67 The SCD
was established as a division of the Banking Control Department which provided it
with a direct connection to, and power over, the commercial banks. 68 Another
interpretation is that, rather than creating regulatory competition between divisions
within the bank, SAMA placed the SCD under the authority and control of the
Banking Control Department. This decision somehow made sense in light of the fact
that, after 1984, non-bank intermediates were effectively eliminated as market
players.69
Securities market activity is regulated by SAMA under the Executive Rules,
particularly Articles 2-1 1, which relate to the daily trading in shares by investors. The
Executive Rules set forth the condition for the role of the banks in share dealings in
the market,70 leaving SAMA with considerable discretionary authority to fulfil its
supervisory role in the market. More specifically, the Executive Rules provide that
the SCD perform the following functions:
• define the working hours of dealings in the stock market;
• analyse the daily dealings which are returned from the bank's Central Units;
• supervise the appointment of employees in the trading units of banks;
• review complaints from market participants and determine solutions or
appropriate administrative procedures;
Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2-f, state that to be able to complete the daily supervisory role, the
banking control department at SAMA has to establish a permanent control division which will be
called the Securities Control Department.
68 Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and Integration',
p. 13.
69 Executive Rules 1984, Art 1, state that the duty of buying and selling shares of joint-stock Saudi
companies are restricted to Saudi banks which are licensed to do so.
70 Executive Rules 1984, Art 1.
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advertise the prices of shares in the local papers and convey to the banks and the
companies instructions issued by the Ministerial Committee and the Supervisory
Committee about share dealing;
• issue informative publications and notes on share dealings; and
• provide the necessary secretarial work for the Supervisory Committee.7'
The SCD commenced its activities in early 1985 with only a few employees,
limited resources and facilities and with the mandate of establishing the new market
within the banking system. 72 Early activity was therefore focused on assisting banks
in facilitating trade on the market, and providing market investors with information
about transactions, quantities and prices through CTUs and local papers. 73 As we
noted earlier, the SCD and SAMA's power over the stock market was precarious
until 1990, when SAMA introduced the Electronic Securities Information System
(ESIS). ESIS is a market trading system which is regulated by the Instructions to
Central Trading Units. 74 Prior to the introduction of ESIS, SAMA was less
committed to the task of market regulation over the stock market operation. Whilst it
was clear that the Kingdom enacted the Executive Rules to create an opportunity for
SAMA to fill the regulatory gap by providing a basis for developing a legal and
technical infrastructure, SAIvIA was forced to change its scope of reference in order
7! Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-f.
72 See, A. Al-Maddani, 'The Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', in Al-Majalla Alarabia, Vol. 12, No.
3, Summer 1988, PP. 121-124.
' Ibid.
Instructions to CTUs, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1990.
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to regulate these new types of activities, requiring specific knowledge, administrative
skills and strong understanding of diverse financial market players.75
Two events clarified and strengthened the power of S AMA, and subsequently
the SCD, over the secondary market. Firstly, the automated matching system made
the mission of the SCD easier and gave it a better chance to apply its supervisory
powers over the market. The fact that SAMA designed and developed the system
gave the SCD the exclusive authority to develop and solve all system-related
problems.76 Furthermore, the new system, as noted earlier, links CTUs from all
banks to the main computer at SAMA, which provides the SCD with access to all the
market operations. Secondly, the Instruction to CTUs makes this supervisory
authority more effective by making use of a central computer within SAMA which is
linked to all other CTUs to observe the daily trading operations.77
In order to increase the SCD's supervisory power, SAMA promulgated the
Instructions to the CTUs. The CTU rules established an infrastructure process to send
buy and sell orders for the market electronically through local banks. At the same
time, a mechanism was thus established to monitor activities by CTU traders
centrally. The Instructions to CTUs also gave the SCD the authority to levy penalties
and pursue action against banks who violate the rules or in some other way affect the
welfare of investors. For example, the SCD has the right to suspend any CTU or
Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', pp. 16-17.
Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and Integration',
p. 16.
Instructions to CTUs 1990, Article 2.4.3, authorised the SCD to suspend certain CTUs from trading
in case of serious violations. Further, Article 2.4.4 empowers the SCD to suspend a particular trader
from trading. Article 2.4.5 authorises the SCD to withdraw its authorisation to a particular CTU for
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individual broker in case of a serious violation of the market rules. 78 Furthermore, a
CTU is entitled to cancel any transaction if it contravenes the trading regulations.79
These suspension and cancellation powers were new elements to facilitate the SCD's
mission as the primary agency in charge of stock market operations. In addition to
several changes in the rules governing market regulations, the Instructions have, to a
considerable degree, provided SAMA with the means to establish further authority
over the market.8°
At present there are more than 50 local employees working closely with
expert foreign consultants comprising the main department which is responsible for
the regulation of the Saudi stock market. The SCD is divided into six different
divisions that work under the management of SAMA. The Management Division,
which is responsible for all SCD operations, coordinates the activities of the other
five divisions and provides the line administrators with the procedures needed to
successfully carry out their duties. 8 ' The Statistics Division, which is one of the
oldest divisions within SCD, is responsible for the collection of information about
prices, turnover, dividends and other company-related data. The department updates
own account trading in one or more securities. Finally, Article 2.4.5 authorises the SCD to withdraw
authorisation for investors of certain nationalities to trade in particular securities.
78 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art 8.
In addition to the authorisation of suspension provided by the Instruction to CTUs 1990, Art. 2.10
of Version 7 of the Instructions 1994, authorises the SCD to cancel the transaction, at the discretion of
SAMA, for regulatory reasons, including if the transaction is a serious infringement of trading
regulations, the intends to create a false market, is based on insider trading, or any other reason which
in the view of SAMA justifies cancellation of the transaction.
80 Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and Integration',
p. 15.
8! The Management Division is provided with expert Saudi employees and other consultants for the
United Kingdom with the main mission of reviewing and drafting the new regulations and
recommendations before they are sent to the Supervisory Committee to be approved and signed.
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and displays this information through ESIS. 82 It was through ESIS, which is owned
and operated by SAMA, that the Statistics Division assumed a more prominent role
within SAMA. The division's employees are responsible for supplying trading
information, within minutes of the closing of the market, to the local papers and
other media. Furthermore, the division is in charge of preparing reports on all market
83data.
The third division, the Companies Information Division, is responsible for the
collection of all information concerning the listed companies in order to make such
information available through ESIS. Real-time market and company information is
disseminated to all designated branches, as well as information regarding publicly
listed companies, such as quarterly reports, annual general meetings and other events
which might be of importance to investors and affect their investment decisions. 84 In
answer to questions concerning the cooperation of listed companies with the
Companies Information Division, Abdulrahman Al-Rashid, Manager of the
Securities Control Department, noted that:
"Due to the fact that the division has less power over non-bank joint-
stock companies, because they are under the jurisdiction of Ministry
of Commerce, the division faces dfficulties getting all the available
information from the Ministry of Commerce or sometimes from the
82 Before the introduction of ESIS, the Statistics Division faced many difficulties collecting and
publishing stock market statistics and trading information. The information was collected manually
and it took weeks before it was sent to the local papers to be published.
83 In addition to the daily publishing of all the market information, the Statistics Division is in charge
of publishing weekly, monthly and annual reports including all the market trading information and
other market activities, data and statistics.
84 Although under Art 19-d of the Executive Rules corporations are required to publish quarterly
information on the financial position of the company and its operating activities in two daily papers
within two months of the end of the quarter, surprisingly, violations of this Article are said to be
handled by the Ministry of Commerce using the punishment mentioned in the Companies Act.
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company itself and entering the information into ESIS and sending it
to the local papers to be published."85
The Systems Technology Division is responsible for the supervision and
development of the ESIS system. The central mission of this division is to program
and configure the bank's computer system and its information systems. It is also
responsible for solving any technical problems that may occur. The closed electronic
system was developed within the Technology Division long before it was introduced
to the market in 1990.86 This division's employees are responsible for the design of
the system that interfaces with the CTUs, providing the system with links to the main
computer of SAMA. ESIS PC was established to enable market investors to trade in
one unified market between the 12 CTUs. 87 In the first instance, ESIS PC services
were limited to Riyadh city. It is expected that the ESIS PC system, given the advent
of the Internet, will be extended to provide on-line investment opportunities for all
potential investors across the Kingdom. In this regard, SAMA introduced ESIS Line
to provide investors with more electronic services by linking the system to more than
80% of all bank branches instead of only to the 12 CTUs. 88 Introducing ESIS Line
assisted those investors who live in other parts of the country to participate in the
Interview with Mr. A. Al-Rashid, Manager of the Securities Control Department. Riyadh, 17 August
1997.
86 Since 1990 SAMA has introduced more than 8 new releases in order to improve stock market
trading technology.
The release of ESIS PC in 1990 linked all the CTUs and the market place with each other and all
are linked to a central computer at SAMA. ESIS PC provides investors in all CTUs with all the
information as one electronic market. The limitation of this release was that ESIS PC is limited to the
12 CTUs that are located in Riyadh City, and is not linked to any other cities. That deprives investors
from other cities from being linked to the market.
88 Interview with Mr. Al-Ayed, System Technology Division, Riyadh, 7 September 1997.
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market through branches which had previously been restricted to Riyadh city. 89
 In
1992 the division introduced ESIS Net, which links some other branches directly to
the central computers at SAMA, providing exactly the same services as the CTUs.90
The Surveillance Division is responsible for the supervision of daily trading
activities within the market. The ESIS system is linked to the this division, allowing
employees within the division to obtain all relevant information about trading
activities. More specifically, the agents are charged with the task of watching share
movements, share quantities and market volatility. 9 ' The system is designed to
enable surveillance agents to be in immediate contact with all traders within CTUs
and their designated branches. The surveillance agents are the only employees that
have access to this sensitive information. SAIVIA restricts access to information about
which CTUs or ESIS Net sites are posting request and bid orders, and it also
withholds information about the identity of traders, shares sold, prices and the time
of trades.
Together these regulatory structures are designed to ensure that the market
transactions through ESIS are conducted in a fair and legal manner. The technical
infrastructure allows the Surveillance Division to intervene immediately if there are
The ESIS Line service is linked directly to almost all bank branches throughout the country.
However, ESIS Line is not linked directly to the central computer at SAMA, and therefore it is slower
than ESIS PC, because it is not live and direct, and only provides investors with prices and quantities,
and not all the information.
° SAMA is currently working on a new release called Real Time. The new release will reduce the
time of a complete transaction to a few seconds, which will enable market investors to buy and sell in
the same minute. This makes it one of the most advanced trading systems in world. However, the main
question remains whether the Saudi system can continue working properly with the introduction of
new services and the high increase in the number of daily transactions.
91 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art 5. Version 7.0, 1994.
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abnormal activities or suspected violations of the market rules. 92 The Surveillance
Division has been further delegated the function of monitoring mandatory fluctuation
limits, ensuring that fluctuation does not exceed the 10% limit set forth by law.93
Furthermore, the division monitors traders in the CTUs, ensuring that they
understand how to use the system, rules and instructions governing the stock
market.94
To supplement the surveillance and supervisory function of the SCD, an
Investigation Division was established in 1988. This unit is charged with the task of
investigating any suspicious events occurring in the market. Managers from SAMA
believed that the Investigation Division could work best if it coordinated its efforts
with agents within the Surveillance Division. If suspect activities were detected in
the market, the Surveillance Division would report to the Investigation Division
before undertaking its own inquiries into the events. The powers of the Investigation
Division are limited, however, to those transactions conducted through ESIS. Its
mandate does not extend to fraud, manipulation and other illegal practices conducted
by non-bank participants. 95The Investigation Division is also responsible for
92 In case of violations, the Surveillance Division is the division in charge of implementing suspension,
whether for certain shares or a certain CTU.
Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art 2.5.3. Version 7.0,1994.
Interview with Mr. Al-Rashid, Manager of SCD, Riyadh, 17 August 1997.
See interview with, A. Al-Qarnni, responsible for the Surveillance Division within the SCD, Riyadh,
12 August 1997. Mr. Al-Qarnni states that the SCD has full power over transactions through ESIS,
however, the Investigation Division still might have the right to intervene in the event that there is a
complaint from a bank or from one of the investors about the bank, or if the division feels that abuse,
manipulation or suspicion are actively present within the market.
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responding to any complaints related to trading through ESIS. 96 A1-Amree, Manager
of the Investigation Division explained that:
"The procedure for the hearing of disputes and complaints arising
from trading through ESIS is triggered when an investor or market
participant files a complaint to the Manager of the Securities Control
Department or the General Director of the Banking Control
Department (Deputy Governor and member of the Supervisory
Committee). Upon receipt of the complaint, the manager of the SCD
will pass it on to the Investigation division in order to begin an
investigation. Inspectors in the division, upon instruction, will
commence their work of collecting information about the matter and
dispatching employees to the site so as to interview witnesses and
complete the investigation. The division attempts to resolve and settle
the matter amicably. If the matter can be sett[ecf a full report with
recommendations will be sent to the SAMA 's Deputy Governor, for
action. The Deputy, based on the report, may determine the proper
cause of action. This can include sending the matter to court or
releasing it to other agencies with jurisdiction over the matter.
3. Single vs. Dual Agency Regulation of the Market
This section analyses the Kingdom's regulatory arrangements of the equity market
and the constraints to such regulations in the face of changing market conditions.
Presently, the two main regulatory agencies are under increasing pressure by
institutional investors due to demands being put upon them for developing new rules
to suit present market conditions. 98 As we have argued earlier, regulatory
Although Executive Rules 1984, Art 2-f, empower the SCD to register complaints of participants,
provide solutions and undertake orderly procedures, the SCD has not yet set up a clear procedure for
solving share transaction disputes.
' Interview with Mr. A1-Amree, Manager of the Investigation Division within the SCD. Riyadh, 18
August 1997.
For example, at a recent conference held by the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, the majority of
speakers claimed that the market regulation needs to be reformed in order to suit the new role of the
market in the growth of the Saudi economy. See, Riyadh Chapter of Commerce, Development of the
Saudi stock market conference, November 1998.
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competencies in the Kingdom are divided between SAMA, the Ministry of
Commerce and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy.
The existing regulatory arrangements have evolved over the past fifteen years
in response to the government's policy initiatives undertaken to institute its control
over the share market. The design of regulatory procedures by the Ministry of
Commerce and SAMA, and subsequent amendments to the rules regulating their
participation in the market, may in some part be dependent on the influence of
groups that have an incentive to impose changes and ensure that the existing legal
structure is tailored to their preferences. 99 Legal and economic theorists have argued
that regulatory structures are often designed to satisfy the short-term requirements of
the market interests that support the position of the policymakers. Utilising this
approach, interest groups and political decision-makers enter into a relationship that
is mutually beneficial.'°° In some circumstances, it is possible to explain the various
regulatory structures with reference to the optional strategy of interest groups.
From the outset it has been clear that the powerful position of stock regulators
is consistent with the creation of a market regulator with broad control over the
groups over which it has authority. The government, in order to endow SAMA with
the necessary independence to pursue its objectives, provided it with the Executive
Rules as a powerful device to impose regulatory control. The Kingdom also
delegated authority to the Ministry of Commerce to regulate companies desiring to be
See generally, L. Bebchuk, & M. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance', Stanford Law Review 52, 1999, pp. 3-4.
100 See S. Peltzman, 'Toward a more General Theory of Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics,
1976, pp.21 1-214.
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listed on the exchange. The Ministry of Commerce is the traditional regulator of the
companies themselves, whereas SAMA's expertise is dominated by representatives
of the financial services industry. The government could have avoided this division
of regulatory authority by combining authority over securities and new issues into a
single agency, as is done in many other emerging markets.'°' The government chose
not to follow this action, however, and its decision to do so cannot be viewed as
random.'°2
It appears the Kingdom's policy makers may have anticipated that such a gap,
and the subsequent confusion, would occur within the market regulatory structure.103
The government created a structural strategy for dealing with agency competition and
coordination. Fahad Al-Mobarak, General Manager of RANA Investment Company,
noted that:
"The Ministerial Committee and the Supervisory Committee were
established to provide a link between the two agencies and authority
to reduce the gap and avoid any conflict between the SAMA and the
Ministry of Commerce. However, I think that the ability of the
Ministerial Committee and the Supervisory Committees to
simultaneously control both agencies is limited by their own manner
of dealing with the agencies and the resources devoted to altering the
method of regulator behaviour which is lacking." 104
SAMA's role as the agency charged with regulating the operations of the
stock market, but having limited power, has produced many side effects. Firstly, the
Kingdom, by excluding SAMA from administrative power over the IPO process has
'°' See Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 153-228.
102 A1-Dukhiel, The Banking System and its Performance in Saudi Arabia, pp. 59-60.
103 Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', pp. 18-19.
104 Interview with Fahad Al-Mobarak, General Manager of RANA Investment Company, Riyadh, 2
October 1997.
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created a situation in which the two agencies deal with the same companies
from different points of view. Given the importance of legal rules to protect all
interests, and since these affect the subsequent choices and advantages of these
groups, it is crucial to explain why the regulatory structure persists. The isolation of
SAMA from primary market operations has handicapped the growth of the market
and reduced the number of companies wishing to raise money through the stock
market.'°5
Secondly, the current dual-regulatory structure creates some level of
uncertainty for companies regarding the location of regulatory control. SAMA, for
example, does not have complete control over the secondary market process and
must rely on the Ministry of Commerce to supply information on matters involving
non-bank listed companies.'° 6 The restriction of SAMA's regulation of market
participants means in practice that market investors, including those who are at the
heart of the market, are not directly under the regulatory control of SAMA. More
importantly, SAIVIA has no formalised power over the activities of individual
investors. This means that SAMA can intervene only if one of the parties involved is
a bank. This can also be seen from the penalties that may be imposed by SAMA,
which are limited mainly to suspension and cancellation of transactions.'° 7 The
os Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed
Markets, p. 153.
106 The SCD faces difficulty collecting information from listed companies, which forces the
department to rely on the help of the Ministry of Commerce to issue a circular to listed companies to
provide the department with the information needed, including the quarterly reports of listed
companies. In this regard, Malaikah ('Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour
and its Policy Implications', p. 19) states that the stock market disclosure rules are handled by the
Ministry of Commerce.
107 See Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and
Integration', pp. 45-46. Al-Sheaebi writes that the only penalty SAMA may impose is suspension of
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limitation of SAMA's regulatory power over the market permits many firms to
operate without being supervised by SAMA. Many offices and companies that
provide financial services and market information or invest directly or on behalf of
clients are not being regulated by the market authorities. The effect of the re-
emergence of unlicensed financial intermediaries has created risk both for firms and
investors, who are subject to potential frauds, and the market, which is left
unprotected for potential risk through their activities. In this regard, Jammas Al
Suhaimi, Deputy Governor of SAMA and member of the Supervisory Committee
states that:
"The public should not deal with unlicensed entities offering
investment products and services. We are aware that a number of
unlicensed entities operate within the Kingdom and we are, in
conjunction with other government agencies, actively working to
curtail their activities. ,,b08
Fourthly, the absence of an integrated stock market regulatory body reduces
the effectiveness of stock market rules and their enforcement. The current situation
limits SAMA's power to enforce market rules. In fact, the rules fail even to define
SAMA's power over fraud and manipulation and the violation of stock market
rules.'°9 The problem of enforcement and credible commitment will be explained in
Chapter 9. In contrast, the Companies Act provides the Ministry of Commerce with a
strict set of rules regarding the litigation process supported by civil, administration
the CTU. What about the criminal and civil responsibilities? Can the injured person of this violation
claim compensation?
108 See interview with Mr. Jammas Al Suhaimi, Deputy Governor of SAMA, in Personal Finance-
Middle East, September 1997, pp. 72-73.
109 Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', p. 19.
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and criminal sanctions. Correspondingly, the stock market rules offer no guidance
regarding the process and procedures for the dispute of cases rising from stock
market activities.110
Finally, SAMA's restricted role has led the Kingdom's policymakers to
pursue a conservative course of action, reducing the number of market participants to
those who are under the direct supervision of SAMA, in order to guarantee the safety
of the market." Since its establishment, the Kingdom's authorities have limited the
members of the market to the government, banks and individuals. Tn fact, the
Executive Rules restrict brokerage activities to only 11 licensed 	 12 Agencies
other than banks are not allowed to take up position in the market as brokers. The
Executive Rules also restrict the trading of mutual funds to banks, and no other
agencies are permitted to provide the services provided by banks. Accordingly, banks
are the only bodies which can take a position in the market, resulting in a liquidity-
constrained market."3
An independent stock market regulatory and supervisory body, with primary
and full responsibility to regulate and supervise the stock market, including the
responsibility of the IPOs, is perhaps the single reasonable option which could
eliminate the problems outlined above and offer coherence to market regulations.
Although the market has prospered from SAMA, particularly in respect to the
110 Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations, Problems and
Integration', p.46.
" Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, p. 78. Banafe noted that stock brokering by banks was
meant to eliminate the informal stock brokers in order to curb speculation and reduce price volatility.
112 Executive Rules 1984, Article 1.
"3 See Al-Dukhiel, The Banking System and its Perfornance in Saudi Arabia, p. 59.
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development of its trading and settlement system, its truncated regulatory position
has restricted the amount of trading in the market. It may be that the stock market,
facing divided regulatory involvement which restricts its growth, could look to the
private sector and encourage its participation in its regulation. Until recently there
has been no participation from the private sector in the stock market.
4. Policy Reforms to the Market Regulatory Arrangements
This section discusses an important issue for the Kingdom's policymakers: to what
extent is it necessary, in order to achieve the proper level of regulatory action, to
introduce changes to the regulatory structure in order to improve the effectiveness of
the means of achieving the policy goals of the Kingdom. In this respect, Osama
Faqih, Minister of Commerce and Member of Ministerial Committee, noted that:
"The regulatory structure of the Kingdom is shaped by the following
regulatory objectives: the support for an honest and competent
financial services industry; creation of appropriate measures for
investor protection; the control and monitoring of systemic risk,
supervision of risk management in relegated firms, the prevention of
fraud, and insider trading, the (maintenance) of efficient markets, the
assurance of consistency of regulations with international standards,
and to support the Kingdom's competitive position in the financial
markets.
Whilst these policy objectives have not always formed part of the Kingdom's
regulatory structure, government policymakers are intent on establishing a modern,
unified framework for delivering an effective and efficient securities market regime.
114 See interview with Osama Faqih, Minister of Commerce and member of the Ministerial Committee,
Riyadh, 28 July 1997
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From the perspective of these government policymakers, the present
regulatory arrangement, which consists of a complex structure involving a
number of overlapping administrative functions, may not be the most effective means
of delivering the various policy objectives. 115 Central management of the diverse
structures could be achieved from a strengthened Supervisory Committee. The
benefits from this arrangement would be the increased monitoring and control of the
Ministry of Commerce and SAMA, particularly with respect to their individual
regulatory functions. Centralisation of market regulation may be desirable not only
because it assists higher policy makers and politicians in monitoring the action of
government agencies, but also in increasing the visibility of their actions, and making
private information more available. 116
The question remains whether it is necessary to take significant steps towards
centralised coordination without institutionalising regulatory power into a single
institution. Separate assessment and monitoring by individual functional regulators is
likely to be artificial and repetitive." 7 Moreover, the ability of interest groups to
manipulate and influence these arrangements increases when the agencies'
constituencies are willing to support the agency. Correspondingly, an agency's ability
to meet the needs and welfare of its own constituency is crucial to its ability to
prosper." 8 It may be that the Kingdom can avoid jurisdictional disputes between
Ibid.
116 See J. Macey, 'Organisational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies', Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1992, pp. 99-101.
" Ibid. pp. 96-97
118 Ibid. p. 105.
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agencies by combining regulatory authority over the stock market into a single super
agency.
In general, then, the idea of unification in this area should be especially
welcome and important for the following reasons: creating a unified agency structure
may tend to build a process of regulatory decision-making that responds to changes
in the market while limiting politicians from intervening in the policymaking
process." 9 The Ministerial and Supervisory Committees would be in a position to
control and monitor the performance of the agency by reliance on notification
procedures. This supervisory role could be supplemented by a set of procedural rules
that place constraints on the decision-making abilities of the agency, allowing the
Ministerial and Supervisory Committees to utilise opportunities to intervene in the
bureaucratic decision-making process. Furthermore, the Committees could create
procedural rules for the agency that causes the agency's administrators to produce
policy decisions that can be reviewed by the Ministerial Committee.
In light of the above analysis, it is not surprising that a modest re-design of
the existing agencies, their structures and procedures would give the Kingdom's
policymakers the opportunity of replacing a cumbersome arrangement with a
regulatory structure that is responsive to technological and multiple industry
interests, while minimising the diffuse interests of administrators. The re-design of
agency structures and practices would also enable the Kingdom to create a
mechanism for creating a regulatory apparatus which would put into effect its
regulatory goals for the market while giving the ministers greater control over the
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decisions generated by the agency. This ability to affect outcome would allow the
Kingdom to increase the probability that the overall securities regulator will be able
to give the market the best choice of market rules.
4.1 Designing regulatory solutions: losses and benefits
For the reasons outlined above, a single agency responsible for legislating and
regulating the securities market will enable the Kingdom to extend its sphere of
influence in pursuing its policy objectives for the market, while limiting the
possibility of unexpected situations that presently create problems for the
government. When pursuing its reform agenda, the Kingdom, at the most general
level, must select the best institutional arrangement by choosing from those presently
available, if this is to happen, SAMA would be the most suitable agency, due to its
experience with the operation of the secondary market and its power over
commercial banks. 12° In fact, SAMA is the agency with the best developed
organisational structure and one that can most easily be adopted to deal with new
regulatory and administrative functions. It is also worth pointing out that SAMA is
the best developed regulator for creating new mechanisms and rules to legislate,
monitor and control the activities of banks and firnxncial instruments.'2'
119 H. Murray, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Individual Choice in the Public
Sector, Cambridge, CUP, 1995, p. 66.
120 At present, Singapore has such a structure where the Central Bank plays the main securities market
regulatory role. See L. Leigh, 'Financial Development and Economic Growth: An Econometric
Analysis for Singapore', International Monetary Fund, WP/96/15, Washington D.C.
21 For some time economists and policymakers have argued that a control bank should pursue a single
objective-making policy. To the extent that a control bank pursues this objective effectively, it is
presumed that all other objectives must be secondary goals. See, generally, R. Cranston, Principles of
Banking Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 125-127.
137
It is likely that adding additional functions will also affect SAMA on a
practical level. Regulatory staffing and quality are important factors in providing
effective monitoring in the market. The launch of a new agency within SAMA could
stretch the limits of the market for qualified staff, adding a degree of risk. In the
higher levels of management, this shortage of qualified staff could easily result in
problems when these regulators must be provided with a realistic understanding of
market activities, possible constraints, and what must be done to overcome these
obstacles. In addition, to the extent that SAMA's overall policy mission would have
implications for the responsibilities of securities market regulators, care will be
needed in developing an approach to regulation and enforcement which provides
protection against different regulatory practices.
4.2 New securities market agency
In many areas of jurisdiction, policymakers have found it more effective to create an
independent agency with administrative and regulatory responsibility for the
securities markets.' 22 Typically, such agencies have jurisdiction over primary and
secondary securities markets, and other financial instruments. 123 The Kingdom may
122 See generally, M. Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The UK, US and
Japan, London, 1991.
123 Not only mature markets, but also many emerging markets have created an independent agency
with jurisdiction over all matters related to stock market activities. However, most emerging stock
market regulators still have to report to the Minister of Finance. For example, in Malaysia, the
Securities Commission (SC) was established in 1993 as a watchdog organisation to centralise powers
governing the regulation and supervision of the securities industry within one authority from the
previously fragmented system of several regulatory agencies. The Malay SC has full responsibility
over all securities market activities, including regulating the issue of securities, regulating designation
of future contracts, regulating take-overs and mergers, supervising and monitoring the activities of any
exchange, clearing house and central depository, and taking all responsible measures to safeguard the
interest of persons dealing in securities or trading in future contracts. See, M. Abdullah, 'Behaviour of
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want to consider this alternative since it is well known that the creation of an
independent agency is a strong indication that policy makers are confident that
industry groups will have the capacity to provide the agency with self-regulatory
support, which is crucial to the aims and objectives of the agency.'24
Naturally, there would be several advantages to pursuing this course of policy
change. Firstly, it would provide a clear and effective signal to industry groups that
the Kingdom is likely to prioritise its concerns by arranging for the formation of an
independent agency responsible for the creation and implementation of effective
policy. Secondly, the commitment of time and resources would allow for the creation
of a modern agency which could be pre-programmed to respond to the policy
objectives. 125 Naturally, this will require higher salaries so as to attract professionals
who are well-informed, in order to develop a functional securities industry that is
vital to the public interests of the Kingdom.
There are certain political problems associated with creating a new agency.
Firstly, it should be noted that the creation of a new pattern of regulation will be
potentially disruptive to the interests of many ministries who have set expectations
about the approach and cost of securities market regulation. Whenever a new agency
is created, private sector actors will be forced to adjust to new actors and policies,
which in return will cause considerable uncertainty and re-adjustment costs.' 26 It is
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange: Some Comparative, Descriptive and Inferential Analyses', thesis
submitted to the School of Industrial and Business Studies in fulfilment of the requirement for the
degree of Ph.D., the University of Warwick, June 1996.
124 Black, J. Rules and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 77-80.
125 Ibid. pp. 58-6 1.
126 R. McCubbins, M. Noll, & B. Weingost, 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control', Journal of Law and Econo,nist Organization (3), 1987, pp. 243-277.
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also likely that other parties concerned, sympathetic to the earlier regulatory regime,
will attempt to influence the new administrators, to make them sympathetic to their
practices.' 27 At least in the beginning, professional associates and other industry
professionals will be forced to expend considerable resources on establishing a
relationship with the new agency as well as simultaneously developing a set of
internal strategies within their own organisations to address the problems resulting
from the new policies and enforcement strategies emanating from the agency.
Similarly, it seems plausible that subtle factors, such as changes in the
personal style of key regulators, can introduce uncertainty to industry groups and
banks. As is well known, the effectiveness of agencies can be traced to their ability to
develop a reputation for commitment to a course of regulatory action. 128 Thus, at the
outset it will be difficult to ascertain if the agency has sufficient expertise, as well as
power and influence, to fulfil its administrative mandate. Whilst a perfectly well-
designed agency can provide the basis for implementing effective policy, this
expertise alone may not be sufficient to ensure that well-meaning regulators will be
able to articulate and implement their decisions. Against this concern, it must also be
noted that the introduction of a new regulatory process, if it is properly researched
and staffed, could be effective in implementing government policy.' 29 This
productivity could be the basis for making changes in other agencies in order to
127 Ibid.
128 See J. Laffort, & J. Tirole, Commitment and Political Accountability in a Theory of Incentives in
Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, pp. 620-621.
129 R. Lee, What is an Exchange: the Automation Management and Regulation of Financial Markets,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 302-305.
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allow more private sector involvement within the sphere of regulatory decision
making.'3°
To ensure the proper level of expertise and management sophistication,
particular attention will be needed in locating individuals from industry or
government to reinforce these priorities. The reason an administrative agency is most
likely to establish a reputation for high-quality delivery of regulation, especially from
the perspective of the industry being regulated, is due to the quality of the agency's
front-line staff. Perhaps more than anything else, experts drawn from the public
sector must have the ability to conduct the agency's business in accordance with the
expectations of the director and without being influenced by dominant industry
representatives. It is not always possible to locate such people quickly, and therefore
the government may initially have to rely on foreign experts who themselves can
train groups of staff from the Kingdom. It would be expected that a new culture
would develop, leading, as a result, to a highly professional group, headed and
staffed by nationals. The approach recommended here obviously aims to limit the
problems associated with a functionally divided regulatory policy. The implications
of the approach for market integrity is significant since a unified strategy is thought
to be central in delivering the regulatory goals of the Kingdom. It must be pointed
out that this approach to market regulation assumes the presence of high-level
incentives for regulators as it is essential for the delivery of efficient policy and
compliance.
130 See for a general approach, L. Flarcher, 'Regulatory Space', in L. Harcher & Muran (eds.).
Capitalism, Culture and Regulation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.
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4. Summary
This chapter has assessed the Kingdom's existing regulatory arrangements and
infrastructure as it has evolved over the past fifteen years. The first section focused
on the division of regulatory authority between the Ministry of Commerce and
SAMA. Control over the securities market follows now familiar differences in rules
affecting corporate players; the primary market is regulated by the Ministry of
Commerce, while the subsequent buying and selling of shares is regulated by SAMA.
The government's ability to coordinate policy and determine the content of agency
regulation is largely achieved by Ministerial and Supervisory Committees. Control
over the division of agency compliance, while effective in earlier stages of market
evolution, may no longer be effective in closely controlling the market's complex
and evolving structure. If there were no financial intermediaries, SAMA could
control the banks through legislation designed for these purposes (e.g., banking
control). The opaque system of disclosure could also regulate IPOs, as long as the
market does not expect significant amounts of capital to be passed though market
offerings. With the inclusion of non-regulated, non-bank intermediaries in the
provision of securities market services not covered under existing regulators, the
viability of the regime has been called into question.
Thus, the changes in structure and operation of the securities market requires
changes made to the regulatory structure. In an attempt to ameliorate the
inconsistencies in regulation and limit the weaknesses of the current agency
structure, it is essential that the Kingdom's policymakers introduce new legislation
creating an independent agency which is ultimately controlled by SAMA. This
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agency should have sufficient funding and resources to effectively modernise the
rule-making process, subjecting it to greater industry-wide control. It is anticipated
that a single agency will avoid jurisdictional disputes which have caused agencies to
increase their jurisdictional authority without modernising the rules in light of
changes in the market. The point of regulatory reform is to capture the benefits of
improved agency output, achieved through the design of structures and processes that
will more closely follow the needs of the Kingdom.
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Chapter 5
Saudi Stock Market Investors
1. Introduction
This chapter has a two-fold purpose. On one level, it attempts to provide a detailed
explanation of the sell-side of the Saudi securities market because, very simply, that
experience has been a success story. But this chapter also has a second objective. For
those interested in the role of institutional investors contributing to the creation of a
broad and deep securities market, the Kingdom has been slow in creating the
beneficial conditions for their operation.' What happens when the expansion of new
offerings and the pattern of trading is such that they operate as potential constraints
on the growth of institutional investors in the Kingdom? Or are there insufficient
incentives to develop a new supply of securities for the market?
Answers to these questions would transcend the Saudi context. The role of
institutional investors in stimulating the development of the supply-side of the
market has been the subject of academic debate. 2
 On the one hand, commentators
have argued that institutional investors simply concentrate on constructing a portfolio
of stocks that are designed to keep their specific risk low, and have few incentives to
There are, as professor Bernard Black has noted, many different types of institutions, including
corporate pension plans, public pension plans, open- and closed-end mutual funds, insurance
companies, conirnercial banks, investment banks, management trusts, foundations and endowments.
See B. Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice', 39 UCLA Law
Review, 811, 1992, p. 815.2 See J. Coffee, 'Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitor',
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, 1991, pp. 1277-1329; T. Baums, R. Buxbaum & K. Hopt,
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1994; R.
Gilson & R. Kraakman, 'Reinvesting the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors',
Stanford Law Review, Vol.43, April 1991, pp. 863-905.
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become more actively involved in corporate governance issues or, in effect, to
improve the market for other investors. 3
 On the other hand, another group of critics
argues that institutional investors, if deregulated, would become more active
monitors, attempting to reduce the problems stemming from separation of ownership
and control, and seeking to influence policymakers to alter market rules so as to
increase institutional influence. 4
 More effective institutional investors' involvement
would, according to this view, lead to greater liquidity and transparency in the
market.5
Against this background, the Saudi experience is particularly interesting,
because the trade-off between liquidity and control does not appear to play a role
within the Saudi system. The stock market is thin, lacking in both liquidity and
transparency. As a result, the Kingdom's institutional investors, notably the General
Organisation for Social Insurance, the Retirement Pension Fund and the National
Cooperative Company for Insurance, are marginally located in the market, and have
few opportunities to become involved in making improvements in corporate
E. Rock, 'The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Shareholder Activism', Georgetown Law
Journal, Vol. 79, No. 1, October 1990, PP. 445-556. Rock noted that both money managers and
outsider directors lack significant positive economic incentives to protect shareholder's interest, and
that both even face significant disincentives. This suggests that the hope of discovering a shareholder
champion with the ability to discipline management effectively, and an economic interest aligned with
those of the shareholders, may be unachievable, at least in our economy.
" B. Black, 'Shareholder Passively Re-examined', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 89, 1990-1991, pp.
520-608. Black argues that some monitoring is needed, because corporate mangers need to be watched
by someone. He provided it is enough here to raise the possibility that shareholder monitoring might
work and might become an important part of the large web of legal and market constraints on
corporate managers, if legal rules permit.
A. B hide, 'The Hidden Cost of the Stock Market Liquidity', Journal of Financial Economy, Vol. 34,
1993, p. 43. Bhide states that US institutions do, however, derive considerable benefit from, and
contribute to, market liquidity. Institutions' rate of trading has grown even faster than their share of
stockholding. Trading by institutions, which accounted for 17-28% of the total NYSE volume in the
post-war period through 1963, rose to 52% by 1969 and 70% by 1988. The stocks of firms like Digital
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governance. In this regard, institutional investors are in a relatively poor position in a
market that turns out to be a highly concentrated one. The task for reform-minded
policymakers is to create sufficient incentives for institutional investors to invest in
monitoring in the face of a concentrated market, while stimulating the supply of new
issues, so as to encourage institutional investors, both old and new, to become more
active in the market.6
The Kingdom's institutional environment is relatively similar to those iii
markets such as Germany and the Netherlands, in which universal banks have played
a role in corporate governance. 7
 There is a major difference, however, between the
large western European main banks and the nature of Saudi banks' involvement in
the market, in that Saudi banks hold less than 3% of the outstanding shares in the
market, and the mutual funds controlled by respective banks control less than 2% of
the outstanding shares. 8
 The Kingdom's pattern of bank influence in the market
without significant ownership can create problems with respect to providing
incentives for banks and institutions to become active participants in the market. The
key financial intermediaries, which have the potential to inject greater liquidity and
diversity to the Kingdom's equity markets, have maintained a low level of
involvement in developing new instruments which could lead to a gradual change
Equipment Corporation therefore enjoy deep and continuous markets as they pass from venture capital
to institutional portfolios.
6 See Aggarwal, & Rao, 'Institutional Ownership and Distribution of Equity Returns', 25 Financial
Review, p.211.
P. Mulbert, Banking Equity Holdings in Non-Financial Firms and c'orporate Governance: The Case
of German Universal Banks; K. Hopt & H. Kanda, Corporative Corporate Governance, The State of
the Art and Emerging Research, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. 445-497.8 Saudi Registration Company, Annual Report, Riyadh, 1997, p. 12.
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in the market. This policy is due to the low priority given to them by banks that
derive most of their returns from attractive spreads on non-interest-bearing accounts.9
Recently, banks have been prompted by SAMA to create mutual funds, which have
diverted monies away from the banks' traditional non-interest-bearing accounts.10
The pace of change to the Kingdom's capital markets has been relatively
slow, but two important developments could potentially usher in a change in the
financial landscape; a privatisation programme (which began in 1998 with the Saudi
Telecommunication Company, followed by Saudi Airlines and other utilities, and
which is motivated in large measure by a desire to reduce the government's budget
deficit)," and a change in the Ministry of Finance's policy governing foreign
investors' participation, designed to encourage the creation of closed-end mutual
funds that provide a vehicle for foreign investors to participate in the market. These
initiatives seek to provide more liquidity than can presently be provided by the
concentrated system of ownership under which the government and leading
NOMURA Equity Research, 'Arab Banking Markets: Accelerating Changes Driving Strategic
Differentiation', January 1999, PP. 71-74. Nomura provides that the economics of banking in Saudi
Arabia are dominated by the profitability of the sizeable non-interest-bearing deposit base and
outsized capital ratios (double the non-interest breading deposit minimum). During the past ten years,
mutual funds have attracted more than SR 12 billion which Saudi banks believe was mostly transferred
from the non-interest-bearing deposit.
'°Although banks in many countries may feel that the stocic market will steal business, evidence points
to the contrary. See A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth:
An Overview', World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1996, p. 224. Kunt states that
countries with better developed stock market also have better developed banks and non-bank financial
intermediaries. Thus, stock market development goes hand in hand with other aspects of financial
development.
Saudi Telecommunication Company has recently entered into a $4.1 billion contract with AT&T for
the expansion of the Kingdom's telecommunication capacity. STC is expected to be the largest
telecommunications company in the Middle East. However, selling its shares to the public will not
take place until 2000 when the project is completed. See H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital
Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul International,
London, 1997, p. 121.
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individuals indirectly hold substantial control of most of the large companies that are
listed on the exchange.
The government-stimulated system of closed-end funds for foreigners to
invest in the market has contributed little to raising liquidity. In this regard, a
privatisation programme that relies on closed-end funds will do little to alter the
condition of the market. This can be seen from the Czech Republic's experience with
a privatisation programme that relied substantially on closed ends to trade shares of
the privatised companies.' 2
 Hence, significant involvement by non-bank financial
intermediaries may be necessary to stimulate financial innovation and to increase
liquidity. We should note that major privatisation programmes across Europe
prompted the development of a new phenomenon in the form of attracting large
institutional investors to the market. For example, the major privatisation programme
begun in Italy in 1993, led to a rise in the capitalisation of the Italian Stock Exchaiige
of Italian GDP from 19.39% to 31.3%.' In this regard, it is expected that the
Kingdom's experiment in privatising its main industries, once implemented, will
predictably have the effect of changing or altering the composition of the securities
markets. At the same time, an aggressive privatisation programme will require
allowing increased participation of both national and foreign intermediaries to enter
the market in order to market and manage the sale of the newly privatised firms.!4
12 j Coffee, 'Institutional Investors in Transitional Economies, Lessons from the Czech Experience',
in Frydman and others, Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol. 1, Clarendon,
Central Europe and University Press, 1993, p. 148.
13 j Coffee, 'The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications', 2olumbia University Law Economic, working paper no. 144, 1998, p. 48.
' The Sixth Development Plan 1995-2000. Issued under Royal Decree No. 29, dated 5/2/1416.
Ministry of Planning, Riyadh, 1995, pp. 158-162. The Sixth Plan states that the Government's
privatisation policy will concentrate on privatising selected government-owned commercial activities,
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This extensive introduction is meant to show that there are regulatory issues
involving the government's policy regarding financial intermediaries that contrast
with the Kingdom's policymakers in connection with the restructuring of its financial
market. A model for achieving greater development of the market which mirrors the
transformations seen in other markets entails a move towards (1) the introduction of
new financial entities that would be legally authorised to engage as underwriters,
investment managers, traders and other activities, and (2) the introduction of new
financial instruments that will more fully meet the needs of investors across the
market.
This chapter starts by providing some background information on the profile
of the Saudi stock market investors. Section 1 examines the link between liquidity
and concentration of government ownership. Section 2 looks at the role of banks as
financial intermediaries and some of their recent contribution in creating new
financial instruments, such as mutual funds. In Section 3, the participation of
individual investors in the market is evaluated. As noted earlier, institutional
investors play an important role in equity markets. In Section 4, there is a discussion
of the position of institutional investors in the Saudi stock market. The process of
opening the Kingdom's equity market to foreign investors, which may eventually
yield increases in liquidity, is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 summarises the main
points and draws some policy implications.
such as telecommunication and SAUDIA and other utilities, which will be seeking up to SR 100
billion new capital over the next five years provided that such privatisation will be of real benefit to
the national economy.
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2. The Saudi Stock Market Investors
What forces shape the characteristics of the Saudi stock market? For the past decade
or so this question has gone unasked as both scholars and practitioners accepted the
answer that large investors determine the character of the market.' 5
 Yet it is clear that
ownership is more diverse than is usually assumed.' 6
 This chapter looks at market
investors and their characteristics in order to obtain a better understanding of the
effect that regulation has upon their actions. This analysis takes as its starting point
the standpoint that the policy and structure imposed by the Saudi authorities upon the
establishment of the Saudi stock market had a significant impact on the type of
investors that are involved in the market. In principle, the initial policy of the
government had considerable impact by prioritising certain investors over others in
the market.
It is commonplace to assume that investors are the backbone of the equity
markets. The argument, given by Demsetz and Reilly, suggests that markets tend to
function better when more investors enter it, since they ensure greater market depth
and liquidity.' 7
 In contrast, a shortage of influential market players tends to limit a
market due to lower trading volume and higher risks of trades execution. 18
 In this
regard, the main aim of policymakers is to design regulations that tend to attract more
' A. Al-Dukhiel, 'Saudi Stock Market Between Government Control and the Monopoly of the Few',
Al-Sharq Al-A wsat, London, 6 December 1992, pp. 28-29.6 The breakdown of shareholders as of 31 December, 1996 based on the type of holder recorded with
the Saudi Share Registration Company was as follows: Individuals 48%, Government 33%, Banks 5%,
Foreign 8%, Other Institutions 6%.
See H. Demsetz, 'The Cost of Transactions', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82, 1968, pp.
33-53; F. Reilly, Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, Dryden Press, New York, 1985.
8 D. Seppi, 'Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information', The Journal of Finance. Vol.
XLV, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 75-77.
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investors to the market, and to eliminate barriers and distractions that might affect
their participation. A policy regime that increases the confidence of investors will
tend to enable significant investment opportunities, while promoting growth
opportunities for banking and securities industries.
From their subscription on the first joint-stock company in the early 1930s to
the creation of the largest stock market in the Middle East in the 1990s, the role of
the Saudi investors has been significant. To be sure, macroeconomics considerations
explain the development of the demand for equities and the participation of
companies in the market. The massive growth of the Saudi economy in the early
1 970s proved vital to the transformation of the equity market. The significant growth
in national economy led to higher salaries and savings, which provided a natural
basis for the growth of the sector. 19
 Share trading, in particular, was attractive
because of its potential for a higher rate of return for investors, particularly when
deposit interest was not attractive to most investors for religious or other reasons.2°
Indeed, the early establishment of the informal market in Saudi Arabia was necessary
to meet the already developing demand from individuals to trade shares. The
Executive Rules 1984 further established the stock market within the network of
commercial banks, and empowered SAMA as the regulator for the stock market.2'
In the meantime, the Executive Rules, which restricted brokerage activities to
See R. Wilson, The Economies of the Middle East, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1979, P. 44.
20 A. Al-Dukhiel, Gulf Securities Markets: Review of Structure and Operations, Paper submitted to
Georgetown University For the Gulf Economic Conference: Gulf Economies in the 21 Century,
September 1996, pp. 6-12.
2! The Executive Rules To Regulate Share Dealings Through Commercial Banks, The General
Banking Control Department, Riyadh, 1984.
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commercial banks, had the effect of eliminating informal brokers from the market,
reducing the liquidity of the market. 22 Further, the Executive Rules restricted trading
in the market to Saudi government institutions, licensed firms and individuals only.23
The upshot of this conservative policy has led to highly limited participation,
consisting mostly of a few government-backed institutions, 11 banks, and individual
investors. (See Table 5.1).
Table 5.1	 Current breakdown of shareholders
Type of holder	 Market Capitalisation Shares outstanding
______	 %	 %
Individuals	 51	 48
Government	 33	 40
Banks	 9	 5
Others	 7	 7
Source: SSRC
2.1 The government
The Saudi government plays a crucial role in the national economy. Typically, the
government provides funding for many of the projects initiated by the private sector.
The Saudi stock market also enjoys the support and funding of the government. In
fact, the Saudi government is the largest shareholder in the Saudi stock market
today. 24
 The involvement of the governmenr was thought necessary in the early
stages so as to encourage the establishment of new business and projects and to
22 H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, p. 156.
23 The Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1, state that the duty of buying and selling shares is restricted to
Saudi banks, which are licensed to do so. The banks perform the role of mediator on behalf of clients
(directly) and no share dealings can take place without their mediation.
24 See 'Development of GCC Financial Markets', in Bakheet Annual Stock Market Review, p.4.
152
guarantee the success of some of the larger projects, especially in the industrial
sector. 25
 Given the relatively underdeveloped state of the private sectors, the
government sought to establish an organised stock market in order to stimulate
economic growth. Upon the establishment of the Saudi market, more than half the
market capitalisation was attributable to the government.26
Today, the government still owns more than 40% of the total shares of
companies listed on the Saudi stock market. Most of its shares are concentrated in the
industrial and electricity sectors. For example, 70% of the Saudi Basic Industries
Corporation (SABIC) is controlled by the government. To appreciate the size of the
government's involvement in the market, SABIC is presently the largest listed
company in the Saudi stock market, with SR 47 billion market capitalisation
representing more than 20% of total market capitalisation. 27
 Although SABIC was
initially wholly state-owned, the government floated a 30% block in 1984.28 Given
the extent of privatisation, it is no surprise that the government also controls the main
petroleum-supplying corporations in the Kingdom. 29
 The other major government
25 A. Al-Bate!, 'The Roles of Financial Institutions in Economic Development; Saving, Investment,
and Income Growth. The Case of Saudi Arabia 1965-1989', dissertation submitted to the Graduate
School for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, December 1992, p. 162.26 A. Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', in Al-Majalla Alarabia, Vol. 12, No. 3,
Summer 1988, p. 123.	 -
27 Saudi Share Registration Company, Annual Report, Riyadh, 1992, pp. 40-41. SABIC was
established in 1976 to add value to the Kingdom's hydrocarbon reserves development, petrochemicals,
fertiliser, and other industries. Today, SABIC is the third largest producer in the world of chemicals,
petrochemicals and plastics, and accounts for 5% of the global output. Since its establishment, SABIC
has undertaken the majority of downstream activities in the petrochemical industry either directly or in
joint ventures with third parties. Downstream activities include ethanol, ethylene, MTBE, fertiliscrs,
industrial chemicals, iron and steel.
28 SABIC has 19 subsidiaries and four sister companies, some of them large listed companies, such as
the Saudi Arabian Fertilisers CO " Safco" (4 1%), Sadaf (50%), Kemya (50%), Gulf Petrochemical
Industries Co. (33%), and Aluminium Bahrain (20%). See SSRC Annual Report, 1992.
29	 Filmban, Share Invest,nent in the SaudiArahia, Tihama Publication, Saudi Arabia, 1986, pp. 87-
89.
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holding is in the electricity corporation; the government owns more than 70% of the
total shares issued in this sector. 30
 However, the Kingdom is planning a
comprehensive reorganisation of the power sector, leading to the elimination of four
regional Saudi Consolidated Electricity companies, and the increase of private sector
participation in future utilities for power generation and distribution. 3 ' In addition to
its holding in the industrial sector, the government controls more than 40% of the
services sector.
The Saudi government is a major investor in many of the listed companies on
the Saudi exchange. Typically, the government will invest directly or through its own
funds. 32 In this regard, the General Investment Fund (GIF), the General Organisation
for Social Insurance (GOSI), the Pension Fund (PF), and the Public Investment Fund
(PIE) are the main quasi-governmental investment vehicles involved in the stock
market. Whilst the market could benefit from the government and its institutions
providing the market with more liquidity, these institutions tend to acquire securities
and maintain a long-hold position, which deprives the market from increased
liquidity. 33
 For example, GOSI has a very large asset portfolio, but tends to pursue a
30 There are nine electricity corporations listed in the Saudi stock market. However, they are among
the less-traded companies in the market. Although the stake held by the government is the main
reason, the large dividend paid (guarantee of 7%) has ncouragcd other shareholders to hold on to
their shares as well. See SSRC Annual Report, 1995, pp. 126-132.
The Sixth Development Plan 1995-2000. Issued under Royal Decree No. 29, dated 5/2/1416,
Ministry of Planning, Riyadh, 1995, pp. 158-162.
32 Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', p. 123.
For example, the Chilean pension reform and rising investment needs of such funds, the instruments
thereby created, and the competitive set-up of the privately managed pension funds made the financial
market deeper, more liquid, and more competitive. See R. Holzmann, 'Pension Reform, Financial
Market Development, and Economic Growth: Preliminary Evidence from Chile', International
Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, Vol.44, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 156-161.
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hold strategy and hardly ever sells in the market. 34
 Apart from the institutional funds,
the government's market role is also passive, meaning that its investments are linked
to indexes. Given its preference for diversification and the general characteristics of
the market, it is unlikely that the government-controlled funds will be inclined to
undertake to become more active investors in the market.
2.2 Banks
Commercial banks have traditionally dominated the financial sectors of developing
countries. 35
 The dominance of debt finance arose chiefly because of microeconomics
and regulatory policies that did not foster an economic environment in which the
private sector was encouraged to play an active role in the economy. 36
 Atje &
Jovanovic wrote that "We have found a large effect of stock markets on subsequent
development. We have failed to find a similar effect of bank lending. That this
differential effect should exist is, in itself, surprising. But if it is true, then it is even
more surprising that more countries are not developing their stock markets as quickly
as they can as a means of speeding up their economic development."37
Since 1984, the reliance on banks and debt finance has curtailed the
development of the Saudi stock market. Perhaps due to the near-monopoly control
GOSI alone invested more than SR 19 billion in 46 different companies listed in the Saudi stock
market. Most of this investment (46%) was concentrated in banking and real-estate companies, 28% in
industrial companies. See SAMA 34th Annual Report, Riyadh, 1998, pp. 125-132.
See P. Cashin & C. Mcdermott, 'Informational Efficiency in Developing Equity Markets', Research
Department and Middle Eastern Department, International Monetary Fund, June 1995, p. 2.36 Ibid.
' R. Atje & B. Jovanovic, 'Stock Market and Development', European Economic Review, Vol. 37,
1993, pp. 632-640.
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exercised by the banks over the financial system, the government policymakers
granted local banks a monopoly over the brokerage activities in the market. Despite
their role as intermediaries for the system, banks ironically were not allowed to take
positions as investors in the market until 1990.38 The government's policy restricting
brokerage activities to only banks, and excluding market-maker dealers, and
institutional investors from brokerage activities, was designed by the government
planners to bring stability to the share market. In an interview, Osama Faqih,
Minister of Commerce and Member of the Ministerial Committee, noted that:
"The policy drawn by the government upon the establishment of the
stock market was to serve three main issues: the financial soundness
and prudential suppression of intermediaries; the efficiency and
security of secondary market trading and clearance and settlement
systems; and the soundness and attractiveness of companies offered
on the primary market."
Yet, despite the public policy objective underlying the legislation, it has
become apparent that banks alone cannot provide the market with innovation,
liquidity and long-term stability. 40
 Even though SAMA has allowed licensed banks to
take positions in the market and trade directly for their own account, there has been
little change in the market liquidity. Indeed, banks hold directly only 3% of shares
Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1, state that banks are forbidden from buying and selling shares on their
own behalf except with the Ministerial Committee's permission.
See interview with Mr. Osama Faqih, Saudi Minister of Commerce and Member of the Ministerial
Committee, Riyadh, 28 July 1997.
40 See generally M. Heliwig, 'Banking, Financial Intermediation and Corporate Finance', in A.
Giovanni & C. Mayer (eds.), European Financial Integration, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1993, pp. 3 1-63.
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outstanding, which is a very disappointing ratio given their liquidity and monopoly
role as intermediaries in the market.4'
2.2.1 Mutual funds
In the 1990s, the advantages of securities ownership through the purchase of
packaged investment has turned millions of households into holders of financial
assets, and has poured trillions of dollars into the market. 42
 Such vehicles provide
professional management for investment, which enables investors to benefit through
the ownership of the underlying securities, plus the potential to reduce risk through
diversification that would be difficult to achieve on their own. 43
 There are several
types of institutions that perform a pooling function for savers. Aside from traditional
financial products offered by banks (short-term and demand deposits), there are
several types of pooled funds available from a variety of institutions. 44
 A mutual fund
is a general investment type of institution that pools the investment funds of
hundreds of investors, thereby enabling the investors both to diversify and to buy the
investment expertise of the fund's managers. 45
 Such a fund is typically structured as
" Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 7, provide that a bank, through its CTU, may be authorised as a
dealer by SAMA to buy on behalf of the bank. However, the CTU must obtain approval from SAMA
to act as a dealer in particular securities.	 -
42 See G. Scagliarini, 'Pooling For Funds and the New Financial Intermediation in the United States',
Journal of International Business Law, No. 9, 1994, p. 362.
" R. Teweles & E. Bradley, The Stock Market, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 7th edition, 1998,
p. 411.
' By the end of 1997, the total mutual assets in the United States had reached $ 3.9 trillion in more
than 4,000 funds, with over half that amount in stock mutual funds. The $2 trillion in stock funds in
May 1997 was double the amount dedicated to these funds just two years earlier. Bond funds posted $
925 billion in assets, and money marker fund assets also topped $1 trillion. See R. Teweles & E.
Bradley, The Stock Market, pp. 418-419.
' M. Roe, 'A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance', Colu,nbia Law Review, Vol. 91,
No.1, January 1991, p. 19.
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a corporation whose business is the re-investment of the money of its shareholders.
The fund's shares are purchased for a price by savers who wish to participate in the
fund. The fund re-invests the capital used by the savers to purchase the shares.46
In response to the liquidity issue, SAv1A authorised the establishment of
open-ended mutual funds for investment in Saudi listed companies in 1992. An
open-ended mutual fund is a joint investment account offering investors access to a
specific financial market which is open for unit purchases at any time. These funds
are a highly flexible form of investment, since investors can select the fund that
matches their preferences for risk and reward. 48
 SAMA authorised banks to offer
mutual fund investment in Saudi listed companies. The government's decision to
restrict mutual funds investment to banks is best viewed as a continuance of its
earlier policy allowing only banks to provide investment services to clients, which
began with the launch of the first, domestic open-ended fund in 1979 - the National
Commercial Bank's Short-term Dollar Fund.49
The decision to allow commercial banks to launch mutual funds for local
shares in the first half of 1992 was necessary to close the gap in the market created
In theory, then, the fund is owned by the shareholders, who govern it through an elected Board of
Directors. As a result of this structure, the investment risk is borne by savers. While this is
advantageous to the fund itself, it must also offer the shareholders some protection through
diversification of investment. See, for example, U.S. Investment Company Act 1940, Section 5b-1, 15
U.S.C., section 80a-15.
' See Rules and Procedures for the Establishment and Regulation of Saudi Royal Mutual Funds',
Securities Control Department, SAMA, 1992.
48 R. Teweles & E. Bradley, The Stock Market, pp. 415-416. Teweles noted that as investors purchase
mutual fund shares, the fund's transfer agent issues new shares at net asset value, plus a sales charge
(if any). When shares are tendered for redemption, the transfer agent cancels these shares and pays
their net asset value in cash to the shareholder. Thus, if investors buy more shares than they redeem,
the number of shares outstanding rises. Conversely, if redemption exceed purchases, the number of
outstanding shares contracts.
' Y. Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, Daar Al-Mannaheg Press, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, 1997, p. 11.
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by the marked absence of institutional participation in the market. Initially, these
funds attracted more investors to the market, particularly small investors. 50
 The funds
provided investors with new, less risky access to the stock market. Risk is controlled
through portfolio diversification and by professional managers who have the high-
powered incentives necessary to enhance performance in the market. Corresponding
with the introduction of the funds, it was hoped that they would bring more
stabilisation to the market prices. Yet, during the first two years of operation, the
funds failed to achieve their launch projections. Shortly thereafter, the funds
experienced a sharp decline in the market price, which has persisted for the past three
years. (See Table 5.2)
Table 5.2	 Saudi mutual funds performance(1994-1998)	 _________
	
1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998
Fund	 CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE
%	 %	 %	 %	 %
	
Riyadh Equity 1	 -9.49	 12.7	 20.1	 27.3	 -17.1
Al-Musahim	 -21.02	 12.8	 19.3	 29.8	 -21.2
NCB Equity	 -29.42	 5.6	 13.5	 24.4	 -19.8
	
BSFlstithmar	 -27.65	 3.1	 2.3	 29.6	 -23.5
	Al-Arabi Equity	 -19.47	 12.9	 14.8	 22.2	 -6.2
	
SABB Equity 1
	 -33.03	 8.6	 14.7	 34.1	 -17.3
	
SABB Equity 2	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 -22.8
	
ArabiEquity2	 -10.50	 8.7	 23.6	 11.6	 -3.7
	
Arabic Equity	 -18.27	 -1.1	 4.1	 11.7	 -27.2
	
SHB Murabaha	 NA	 NA	 14.8	 17.7	 -13.5
	Riyadh Equity 2	 NA	 NA	 NA	 19.2	 -13.7
Source: SAMA
° Since 1979 the Saudi banks have launched more than 100 funds offering investors a variety of
options for their investment. However, only ten of the total funds are investing in the local stock
market.
159
Currently there are 11 mutual funds operating with total assets of
approximately SR 500 million under the management of eight banks and the
supervision of SAMA. 5 ' There are approximately 3,500 members participating in
these funds. These funds were launched by banks that specialise in the local stock
market, but are considered small in comparison with other mutual funds that have
been launched by the same banks. Although the funds that are active in Saudi stock
market have made good returns in recent years, the total assets traded in the local
market represents only 3.27% of the total assets of the total funds managed by banks.
Furthermore, the number of people investing in local funds represents only 7.7% of
the total number of investors that are involved in all the funds introduced by banks.52
Despite the fact that banks and their mutual funds are the only official institutional
investors that are regulated and licensed by the market authorities to operate and
provide services in the market, their participation to date has been exceptionally poor
and has not contributed to the potential liquidity or expertise that could be brought to
the market.
One of the most important issues that emerges when talking about bank
participation in the Saudi stock market is the potential for conflict of interest to arise.
This issue is particularly important when considering the monopoly position of banks
in the market.53 There were several factors that influenced policymakers in only
authorising banks to introduce mutual funds investment. In terms of market
Rules and Procedures for Establishment of Saudi Mutual Funds 1992, Art 1., state that in order for a
bank to obtain a licence to establish a mutual fund, SAMA must approve the Terms and Conditions,
Prospectus and Management and staff authorised to operate the Fund.
52 The Saudi Mutual Funds Annual Report, the Banking Control Department, SAMA, 1997, pp. 3-4.
See 'Case Study: the Saudi Stock Market', Bakheet FinancialAdvisors, Riyadh, 1998, p.5.
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capitalisation, banks represent the largest sector in the domestic stock market, and
the largest sector in the market in terms of most active trading. 54 In addition to these
features, commercial banks are the main lenders to the Saudi listed companies as
well as the exchange investors. Accordingly, their position in the market provides
them with unique access to privileged financial and business information, which is
not available for the rest of market participants. So, for example, their access to
priority information may place them in a better position than other market investors,
especially if they are going to trade for their account. In this respect, Basher Bakheet,
the General Director of Bakheet Financial Advisors, noted that:
"I think there is a clear conflict of interest for banks operating as the
only brokers on the one hand and as traders on the other. Banks have
access to most important information about trading activities, who is
trading and other information which is not available to other investors.
It is sometimes difficult to determine when banks are trading directly for
their own account or for their mutual funds. Finally, banks play a
crucial role in the market as the biggest creditor to market participants.
Given all the roles that banks have, there seems to be clear proof that
there is a conflict of interestfor banks in the market. "
The segregation of the banks from trading for their own account is designed to limit
the manipulation of their own shares. More importantly, the segregation of orders, in
terms of time, also provides for a transparent mechanism to control insider trading by
banks. 56 Despite the latter controls, banks have been able to successfully piggyback
Currently, there are 11 listed banks on the Saudi stock exchange. These banks represent 39% of the
total market capitalisation, making it the biggest sector in the domestic stock market. Furthermore,
bank shares are the most traded shares among all other sectors. SR 30 billion worth of shares were
traded in the banking sector, representing 47 % of total market turnover.
Interview with Basher Bakheet, the General Director of Bakheet Financial Advisors, Riyadh, 12
December 1997.
Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 7-1, regulate the conflicts of interest that might appear when banks
trade for their own account. Art. 7 provides that the CTU shall enter all orders to the system in their
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or bunch trades to their own advantage. 57
 Whether an electronic trading system is
immune from such manipulation is an empirical question, and cannot be addressed in
this thesis.
The introduction of mutual funds by banks, as a new alternative for savings,
was intended to provide an instrument for investors that offered a range of maturates
and risk profiles. The initial take-up of these funds appeared promising, but
expansion has been subsequently limited by under-performance of funds and certain
significant losses occurring across funds in a recent down-market. 58
 In order to
encourage more transparency in the trading of mutual funds, the Kingdom's
policymakers, through SAMA's SCD, should be encouraged to introduce new rules
that could inhibit unfair practices. More specifically, SAMA should publish detailed
rules prohibiting the fraud, manipulation and insider trading in securities traded by
mutual funds managers.59
 At the same time, the importance of attracting more
investors requires that SAMA tightly regulate commission of mutual funds, while
phasing in non-bank participation in the market in order to stimulate competition in
price and quality services.
receiving order. The CTU's own account shall not be given any preferential treatment. The CTU must
also record the transactions in the accounts separate from those for client transactions. Finally, CTUs
shall not take a position in the shares of its parent bank, or any associated company.
See A. Al-Badrah, 'Calling for the Termination of ESIS and the Establishment of Traditional Floor',
A1-SharqAl-Awsat, Vol.5837,21 November 1994, p. 13.
58 Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 16.
Rules and Procedures for the Establishment and Regulation of Saudi Riyal Mutual Funds, Securities
Control Department, SAMA, 1992.
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2.3 Individual investors
The exclusion of institutional investors in the Saudi market led the market to be
dominated by individuals. As we have seen, the Kingdom's policy, through the
Executive Rules 1984, has been to limit brokerage activities and other investment
activities to the banking system. Presently, individual investors account for more
than 90% of the transactions in the market, with the residual being accounted for by
the institutional investors. 60 The dominance of individual investors of the Saudi stock
market can be seen also in the shareholders' ratio. Recent statistics reveal that 48%
of the market's outstanding shares are held by 1.67 million individual shareholders in
the Kingdom, approximately 12% of the adult population. 6 ' Although the percentage
of the individual shareholders indicates a relatively high rate in comparison to the
total population, the number of shareholders who are frequent traders is very modest.
It appears that most of the shareholders are concentrated in the primary market, with
very few participating in secondary market trading.
There are many reasons for the sharp decline of individual investors' activity
in the secondary market. First, the Kingdom's old policy of insisting that shares
should be offered at only par value, guaranteeing subscribers a quick return just after
the end of the subscription, naturally depressed the market. 62 Furthermore, trading in
the primary market does not demand the same cost, experience and effort required
for trading in the secondary market, and most individuals dispose of their share
° M. Gorman, 'The Efficiency of the Saudi Arabian Equity Market', unpublished paper, Securities
Control Department, SAMA, 1997, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 3.
62 Ibid., p. 16.
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immediately after subscription. Finally, many of the wealthy individual investors
pursue a buy-and-hold strategy in blue chip companies, which has resulted in the
concentration of a majority of shares in a few hands. 63 It should be pointed out that
the domination of the Saudi market by individual investors representing the interests
of institutional investors, could further depress the market. Also, many studies show
that markets dominated by individuals show less trading volume and less liquidity
than those dominated by institutional investors.64 Finally, individual investors, in
general, fail to take into account the market fundamentals while they are trang,
which tends to reduce market stability and efficiency. 65 Accordingly, there is a need
to increase the level of institutional investor involvement in order to increase
liquidity and stability in the Saudi market.
2.4 Institutional investors
In this day and age, the benefit that any stock market can obtain from increasing the
number of institutional investors in the market cannot be ignored. 66 Large asset
portfolios and professional management allow institutional investors to provide the
Al-Dukhiel, 'Saudi Stock Market Between Government Control and the Monopoly of the Few', p.
10. In his study of the concentration of share ownership applied to four banks in the Saudi market
from 1981-1986, the author observes that the number of-shareholders dropped sharply between 60%
(highest) and 33% (lowest).
64 See P. Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', International Monetary Fund,
November, 1995, pp. 17-19.
65 See J. Macey & G. Miller, Banking Law and Regulations, Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
1992, pp. 37-39.
66 Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, & Varma, 'Institutional Ownership and the Liquidity of Common Stock
Offerings', 27 Financial Review 211, 1992, pp. 211-214. The authors state that institutional investors
have a positive effect on stock market activities. First, because institutional investors have great
resources they typically trade more frequently than individuals, which increases the liquidity of the
market. Secondly, because of their large investment, institutional investors have greater incentives to
monitor the activities of companies than individuals. Finally, because of their economy of scale and
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market with the liquidity and stability it needs. 67 However, the Saudi policymakers
have not made efforts to encourage the participation of such institutions in the Saudi
market. Instead, the stock market rules prohibit anyone except licensed banks from
providing any service related to the stock market. At the same time, the Rules do not
authorise the issuance of licences to any persons or institutions to act as dealers or
fund managers outside the banking sector. 68
 Moreover, the rules do not allow any
person or institution to act as a market maker. In other words, the exclusion of a
significant group of investors who could provide stability and liquidity for the market
has, to be sure, had an impact on the nature of trading and the liquidity of the
market.69 For example, models by Grossman and Miller (1988) and by Glosten
(1989) show that market makers can enhance liquidity when trading volume is low or
when adverse selection problems are large.7° The policymakers' early trade-off,
favouring stability at the expense of liquidity, must now be modified in light of new
economic conditions in order to increase market depth and financial market
performance.
professional expertise, institutional investors acquire low-cost and higher-quality information than
those acquired by individuals.
R. Schwartz, 'Equity Trading III: Institutional Investors Trading Practices and Preferences', in Benn
Steil (ed.), The European Equity Markets, The State of the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, pp. 8 1-82.
68 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1, state that the buying and selling of shares is restricted to Saudi banks
which are licensed to do so. The banks perform the role of mediator on behalf of clients (directly) and
no share dealings can take place without their mediation.
See W. Silber & K. Garbade, 'Structural Organisation of Secondary Markets: Clearing Frequency,
Dealer Activity and Liquidity', Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3., June 1979, pp. 577-591.
Silber & Garbade argue that dealer participation in market trading reduces liquidity risk and increases
the optimal frequency of clearing.
° See S. Grossman & M. Miller, 'Liquidity and Market Structure', Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, July
1998, pp. 617-633; L. Glosten, 'Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of Monopolist Specialist',
Journal of Business, Vol. 62, No. 1, April 1989, pp. 211-236.
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The restriction created more problems than it was intended to eliminate. First,
prohibiting trading by institutions has deprived the market from much liquidity
and stimulus to further developing the structure of the market. Studies have shown
that markets dominated by individuals are more speculative, less efficient and less
liquid than those dominated by institutional investors. 71 In contrast, institutional
investors offer professional management, diversification and liquidity to investors.72
These institutions usually offer better information capabilities, to which individual
investors would not otherwise have access. Further, they offer a wide variety of
investment vehicles which individuals might not have otherwise learned about.
Finally, institutional investors are usually able to take advantage of economies of
scale, which are usually out of the normal investors' reach. Consequently, allowing
institutional investment, which is more efficient than individual investment, may
mark a turning point in the evolution of the market.73
In the past five years, the Saudi market has witnessed the appearance of new
investment firms outside the banking sector. Whilst the stock market rules prohibit
any person from taking a position in the market as dealer, broker or market maker
unless he is a licensed bank, a number of unauthorised non-banks are engaged in
securities market activities. 74 Although there is no precise account of the private
agencies that are operating in the securities market as brokers, dealers and advisors,
71 M. Day & P. Harris, Unit Trusts, Oyez Publishing, London, 1974, pp. 8-10.
72 G. Scagliarini, 'Pooling For Funds and the New Financial Intermediation in the United States',
Journal of International Business Law, No. 9, 1994, pp. 362-364.
D. Silver, The Securities Regulatory Environment and Growth of Institutional Investors: A
Preliminary Overview, Boston University, 1993, pp. 8-9.
H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 155-156.
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their numbers are not insignificant. This means that a large portion of the market
today is operating without regulatory supervision, hence exposing investors to a
certain level of legal risk. In an interview, Suleman Al-Mohameed, Assistant
Director of the Department of Companies at the Ministry of Commerce, noted that:
"A common strategy to avoid the government's prohibition is when
financial intermediaries open investment advisory offices. In this
context, the Ministry of Commerce will grant a licence to serve as a
general financial and investment advisor. It is estimated that over the
last five years, most of these offices have provided securities market
services in the Saudi stock market operations, whether as advisors or
direct investors
Many of these offices have been established by expert bankers and
professional investment managers, which has allowed them to play a major role in
the market by providing the market with detailed monthly reports analysing the
performance of the Saudi market. 76 Those offices are often directly involved in
widespread stock market activities, either through the publication of in-depth
analyses of the Saudi stock market, giving advice to market investors, or through
acting as an advisor for large investors' portfolios. Because these activities are not
authorised by SAMA, investors and foreign residents are unprotected against fraud,
incompetence, manipulation and other unprofessional conduct.
Another common type of unlicensed agencies that are involved in the stock
market is constituted by the funds established by large companies. The government's
policy prompted companies with large asset portfolios to establish their own funds
Interview with Mr Suleman Al-Mohameed, Assistant Director of the Companies Department,
Ministry of Commerce, Riyadh, 3 November 1997.
76 See Consulting Centre For Finance and Investment, Bakheet Financial Advisors, and Al-Zughaibi &
Al Kabbani Co.
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within the investment department of the parent company. 77 Furthermore, over the
past five years, the market has witnessed the intervention of some of the largest
companies who are licensed by the Ministry of Commerce in the market. These
investment companies tend to operate across markets, involving real estate, industrial
and other commercial projects. Some of these companies have clearly begun to
concentrate their operations in the lock-stock market. 78 Typically, these firms offer
highly reputable services and products. The rate of returns in many of these
companies is high in comparison with domestic financial services sectors. In this
respect, Fahad Al-Mobarak, General Manager of RANA Investment Company, noted
that:
"RANA Investment Company is the first company to be licensed by
the Ministry of Commerce as a limited liability company to provide
services in the stock market such as private placement opportunities,
evaluation and review of investments, domestic and international
investment, asset allocation, management advisory, mergers and
acquisitions management, project screening, evaluation of feasibility
studies and banks and government debt financing.
The fact that non-banks are engaged in offering widespread securities
activities without regulation points to the rationale of their involvement in the
market. If handled prudently, allowing the entry of domestic, incorporated non-bank
intermediaries to all areas of the market could bring substantial benefits to the market
and the Kingdom's economy. By introducing a number of new financial products,
See the Investment of National Cooperative Company for Insurance, Dollah Group, Zamil Group,
and Olayan Investment Co.
78 RANA Investment Company, established as a limited liability company, has 37 shareholders that arc
prominent Saudi businessmen with varied backgrounds and interests in banking, finance and other
industries. Most of its shareholders and clients are members in boards of directors in major banks and
large corporations in the Gulf and worldwide.
See interview with Fahad Al-Mobarak, General Manager of RANA Investment Company, Riyadh, 2
October 1997.
168
non-bank intermediaries will create a full range of securities services and products
for investors. These instruments would increase liquidity in the market. The
introduction of new products would naturally need to be done in a fashion consistent
with the securities law. Exposing the scope of the market activities could lead to
more competition between providers of financial services, leading to better products
and lower prices for investors. It is anticipated that non-banks might also create new
markets for their products, leading many new investors into it.
Developing greater diversity in the market may require changes in the legal
and regulatory structure of the Kingdom's securities market. This could be achieved
by SAMA licensing specific activities in the market, i.e., underwriting, investment
management, trading on behalf of others, trading as a principal, financial advising
and other activities. SAMA itself could offer explicit guidelines on the regulations
that apply to the licensing, operation, and prudential supervision of non-banks.
It may be that opening the securities market to foreign institutional investors
could bring further efficiency gains by introducing a new layer of competition to the
market. Foreign institutional investors have considerable experience in most areas of
the market and could provide valuable experience for investors and the government,
particularly in the area of asset disposals and privatisation. Whilst there are a number
of high-quality (but unappreciated) domestic intermediaries, the decision to license
foreign firms could be an important signal to investors that the market is moving in a
new, international direction. When considering the issue of introducing foreign
intermediaries, SAMA should publish guidelines regarding the licensing of foreign
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intermediaries, as well as establishing regulations that apply to cooperation between
SAMA and the authorities in foreign jurisdictions.
2.5 Foreign investors
The world financial markets have witnessed in recent years a phenomenon in
emerging markets, where international capital flows have been marked by a sharp
expansion in net and gross capital flows and a substantial increase in the participation
of foreign investors and foreign financial institutions in the financial markets of
several developing countries. 80 Emerging markets are usually understood as "rapidly
growing markets" or "stock markets in newly industrialised countries." 81
 The
worldwide acceptance of the internationalisation, integration and liberalisation of the
capital markets idea has contributed effectively to the inflow of capital to the
developing countries. 82 The attraction of the emerging markets mainly derives from
the outstanding return performance registered by many of these markets in recent
years, which have helped the markets in many developing countries to expand
rapidly. 83 Net international equity flows to emerging markets rose from $3.3 billion
80 See M. Taylor & L. Sarno, 'Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Long- and short-term
determinants', World Bank's Economic Review, Vol.9, No. 1, January 1995, p.451.
81 M. Keppler & M. Lechner, Emerging Markets, Research, Strategies and Benchmarks, IRWIN
Professional Publishing, Chicago, 1997, P. 9. The International Finance Corporation considers all
stock markets in developing countries to be "emerging". The World Bank defines developing
countries as those with GNP per capita of less than $ 7,620 in 1990 (see IFC, Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook, 1992).
82 See S. Claessens, 'The Emergence of Equity Investment in Developing Countries: Overview',
World Bank's Economic Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 1-4.
83 j Mullin, 'Emerging Equity Markets in the Global Economy', Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Quarterly Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 54. Mullin states that between 1976 and 1992,
annualised equity returns exceeded 20% in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, South Korea and Thailand.
Equity returns in Chile and Mexico soared to almost 50% per year during 1990-1992.
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in 1986 to $61 billion in 1993.84 As a result, the combined capitalisation of traded
equities on the 38 emerging stock markets has risen from less than $100 billion at the
end of 1983 to over $2 trillion at the end of 1994.85
The process of the development of the Saudi stock market and its integration
with international capital markets is less advanced than other emerging markets.86
Although there are more than 350 joint-venture projects involving foreign investment
in the Kingdom, the role of foreign investors is restricted to participation that does
not exceed 40% of the capital of the company. 87 Presently, foreign investors own 9%
of the stock market capitalisation through their shares in listed companies. However,
they are not allowed to trade in the stock market. 88
 The Saudi authorities were
pursuing a conservative policy when it restricted foreign participation in the stock
market. 89 Restricting foreign investors from purchasing Saudi equity shares has
deprived the market of numerous important benefits that have been enjoyed by other
emerging markets in recent years. 9° As Ross Levine noted: "Consider the impact of
one particular policy lever: liberalising controls on international capital flows.
84 M. Keppler & M. Lechner, Emerging Markets, Research, Strategies and Benchmarks, pp. 19-23.
85 R. Feldman & M. Kumar, 'Emerging Equity Markets: Growth, Benefits, and Policy Concerns', The
World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 1995, p. 18.
86 See H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markts: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 29-33.
87 Capital Investment Act, issued under Royal Decree No. M/4, dated 2/2/1399.
88 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 8.
89 According to a survey conducted by the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, most Arabic stock market
rules allow foreigners to invest directly in their market, except Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who still
resist foreign direct investment. See 'The Rules Governing Foreign Participation in the Saudi Stock
Market In Comparison with other Arabic Markets', a study conducted by the Chamber of Commerce
Securities Committee, Riyadh, July 1997, pp. 17-2 1.
90 See V. Errunza & Losq, 'Capital Flow Controls, International Asset Pricing, and Investors' Welfare:
A Multi-Country Framework', Journal of Finance, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, September 1989, pp. 1025-
1036.
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Liberalisation may involve easing restrictions on capital inflows or reducing
impediments to repatriating dividends or capital. In either case, reducing barriers to
cross-border capital flows can affect the functioning of emerging stock markets.
First, by enhancing the integration of emerging markets into world capital markets,
thereby bringing the prices of domestic securities into line with those elsewhere, and
second, by forcing domestic firms seeking foreign investment to upgrade their
information disclosure policy and accounting systems. Moreover, the entry of more
foreign investors into emerging markets may lead to pressure to upgrade trading
systems to support more trading, and to the introduction of a greater variety of
financial instruments."91
Until recently, trading in the Saudi stock market was totally restricted to
Saudi nationals, authorised funds and, on a limited basis, to Gulf Cooperation
Council nationals. 92 The Kingdom's policymakers believed that individuals were not
ready to compete with foreign investors, who may have benefited at the expenses of
incompetent Saudi investors. 93
 This concern led the government to limit the
influence of foreign investment within the Saudi stock market.
However, foreign investment raises the level of capital, gives higher rates of
return and increases efficiency. 94
 For these reasons, policymakers have recently taken
steps towards the liberalisation of the stock market. First, the restriction of GCC
9! R. Levine, Stock Markets: 'A Spur to Economic Growth', Finance & Development, Vol. 33, No. 1,
March 1996, pp. 7-10.
92 See Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', pp. 115-116.
Y. Al-Jeffery, 'The Participation of Foreign Investors in The Saudi Market', Al-A qtisadiah, 16 May
1997, p. 28.
' See N. Haque, D. Mathieson, & S. Sharma, 'Causes of Capital Inflows and Policy Responses to
Them', IMF Quarterly Publication, Finance & Development, Vol. 34, No.1, March 1997, pp. 3-6.
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citizens' participation in the Saudi stock market has been reconsidered. A decision
was issued by the Council of Ministers, which approved the resolution of the GCC's
15th meeting in 1997 regarding GCC citizens' rights to own shares of public
corporations in GCC countries and to trade shares. 95 The new rules permit GCC
citizens to establish, or participate in the establishment of, new companies, and to
subscribe for, own, and trade shares of existing public companies that conduct
economic activities allowable for GCC participants, based on the GCC Supreme
Council Resolutions and the provisions of the GCC economic agreement.96
Moreover, GCC individuals are now allowed to own and trade the shares of GCC
joint-stock companies, based on the rules applicable where the company is
established.
The Saudi Council of Ministers' decision permits GCC citizens not only to
trade shares of companies jointly established, but also allows them to trade shares of
other listed companies. Despite these changes, the Kingdom still maintains a certain
limitation in their participation. First, GCC citizens are restricted from trading in the
shares of insurance companies, money exchangers and banks. This means they are
only allowed to trade in 62 of the 74 listed companies in the Saudi stock market.97
' The Council of Ministers decision No. 16, dated 20/1/1418, Ministry of Commerce Reference No.
222/427/9572, dated 5/2/14 18.
SAMA circular 1671, issued on 4 January 1998, implemented the Council of Ministers Resolution
No. 16, dated 26/5/1997. The Resolution and subsequent circular permit GCC citizens and 100%
owned GCC corporations to purchase up to 25% of equity issued by Saudi Arabian joint-stock
companies.
Trading by 0CC Citizens Rules, Ministry of Commerce, Reference No. 222/427/9572, dated
5/2/1418, Art. 3.
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Second, the permission for GCC citizens to trade shares is subject to ownership
limitation.98
The second step towards liberalisation involves opening up stock market
investment to foreigners. Typically, the Kingdom allows foreign investors to
establish a business in Saudi Arabia if they operate through a joint-venture firm. The
Ministry of Industry and Electricity, through the application of the Foreign Capital
Investment Act, is the body in charge of licensing all foreign direct investment in the
Kingdom. 99 The foreign Capital Investment Act established the requirements and
criteria that foreign applicants should comply with.'°°
Until recently, the restrictions on foreign investment in Saudi Arabia limited
the world's portfolio investor community from participating in the equity market.
Limiting market participation to Saudi persons and firms deprived the national
economy of $17 billion transferred to foreign individuals by the six million
foreigners employed in the Kingdom. 10 ' The new policy opening the market to
foreign investment through the country fund will provide foreign investors with
unrestricted access to securities quoted on the Saudi stock market.'° 2 The launch of
the Saudi Arabian (closed-end) Investment Fund (SAIF), incorporated in Guernsey as
Trading by GCC Citizens Rules, Art 2. The Rules state that GCC citizens are allowed to trade in the
companies, the majority of whose shares (51%) should remain in the control of Saudi shareholders.
'°° Foreign Capital Investment Act, Royal Decree M/4 dated 2/2/1399 H(31/12/1978).
98 Ministry of Industry and Electricity is responsible for licensing foreign investment, with the
exception of mineral concessions, which are handled by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources, and banks, which are handled by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy.
101 See H. Azzam, 'New Mutual Funds to Attract Foreign Workers Saving', A1-Sharq Al-A wsat, 16
May 1997, p. 14.
102 Saudi authorities followed in the footsteps of other emerging markets when they first opened their
market through country funds only. See E. Buchberg, 'Emerging Stock Markets and International
Asset Pricing', The World Bank Econo,nic Review, Vol. 9, No.1, January 1995, p. 51.
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limited liability company by the Saudi American Bank, was established in 1997 to
invest all its assets in securities issued by companies and governmental agencies
listed in the Saudi stock market through the fund.'°3 The SAIF's aim upon its
successful launch was to attract $250 million to the fund. Since its inception, the
fund has attracted considerable assets and is now the largest closed-ended single-
country offshore fund launched in recent years.'° 4 Today, SAW shares are traded on
the London Stock Exchange, providing foreign investors with the opportunity to
achieve long-term capital appreciation through a diversified portfolio, principally of
equity securities traded on the Saudi stock market, but also including debt
instruments issued by Saudi governmental agencies and other listed companies.
These relatively recent efforts to offer non-Saudi investors their first
opportunity to participate in the market, albeit indirectly, contributes significantly to
creating favourable market conditions.'° 5
 The Kingdom's liberalisation efforts lag
behind other regional markets in this regard. The smaller, but more liquid, markets in
the region have taken more steps to attract foreign investment to their markets.'°6
This leaves the Saudi market at a competitive disadvantage in relation to these
103 See 'The Consent of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency for the establishment of the Saudi
Arabian Investment Fund', SAMA Circular No. MA 1274, dated 3/12/1413, pursuant to Ministerial
Decision No. 3/2052, dated 24/7/14 13. 	 -
'° The SAIF Fund is a collective investment scheme established by a contract between the SAIF
Limited Company and Saudi American Bank on the basis that the only investor in the SAIF Fund is
the Company. The establishment of SAIF, approved by SAMA, is as a Saudi Arabian investment fund
to be managed by the Investment Department of Saudi American banks, and to operate in accordance
with the fund's
regulations and rules set forth.
105 See R. Levine, 'Stock Markets: A Spur to Economic Growth', p. 10. Levine maintains that the
removal of barriers to foreign investment can improve the market operation of domestic capital
markets. The role of stock market liquidity significantly increased in 12 out of 14 counties that
liberalised controls on international capital flows.
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markets. Other markets in the region, such as the Amman Stock Exchange, foreign
investors like Jordanian citizens, trade directly without any restrictions. 107 In looking
to the next area of development, the task for the Kingdom's policymakers is to attract
foreign investors by allowing them more direct access to the trading, clearing and
settlement system of the market. Given the efficiency and completeness of the
market's infrastructure, combined with certain regulatory changes, the Saudi market
can offer large foreign investors a highly competitive situation for trading securities.
3. Summary
This chapter focused on the supply-side character of the Saudi stock market. The
introduction provided a survey of the benefits of institutional shareholding and
explored strategies to promote liquidity in the market. In the first section, we
surveyed the range of investors presently involved in the market. This analysis
revealed that the Saudi situation is unique in terms of the type of players participating
in the market. Whilst there are no official market makers or dealers in the market, the
large institutional investors and mutual funds participate through a range of largely
passive trading strategies. It was also noted that foreign investors are not allowed to
invest directly in the stock market. A critical element of the Saudi market is that it is
thinly traded. This weakness, perceived by SAMA, has led to foreigners being
106 j • Chauffour, S. Eken, M. El-Erian & S. Fennel!, 'Growth and Financial Stability in the Middle
East and North Africa', Quarterly Publication of IMF and World Bank Finance & Development, Vol.
33, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 46-48.
107 See U.S. Toukan, 'Jordan as an Emerging Market: can the Boom Continue?', presented at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference on Financial Markets in the Middle East, London,
April 1994.
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allowed to invest indirectly through country funds. It is unlikely that such funds
will create more liquidity. The stock market rules restrict the participation in the
market to the government, banks and individual investors. Although the Saudi
market capitalisation is relatively large, it is concentrated in a small number of
companies. The Saudi stock market's annual trading volume and daily average
trading is very low in comparison to other emerging markets. The net impact of the
exclusion of financial intermediaries from the market has been to limit liquidity that
could be supplied by these groups. It was suggested that further liberalisation of
foreign investment, along with change in stock market rules permitting non-bank
participation in the market, could significantly contribute to the completeness,
liquidity and ultimately efficiency of the market.
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Chapter 6
Trading in the Saudi Stock Market
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that efficiently functioning securities markets can
promote economic growth. Research by financial economists reveals a positive
and significant correlation between stock market development and long-term
economic growth.' The outcome of this research suggests that a well-functioning
stock market in terms of size, liquidity and integration with world capital markets
can enhance the growth of saving, efficient allocation of investment resources,
and better utilisation of existing resources. 2 Crucial to the realisation of an
efficient, liquid and deep stock market is the existence of an effective market
infrastructure. 3 Recent empirical work suggests that the provision of a structure
for financial intermediaries and investors for transacting securities markets,
complemented by formal regulations, promotes greater efficiency gains that can
be realised across sectors.4
l See R. Levine & S. Zervos, 'Stock Markets Development and Long-Run Growth', World Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1996.
2 A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporaie Finance, and Economic Growth: An
Overview', World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1996, pp. 223-240. Kunt &
Levine argue that liquid equity markets may affect long-term economic growth. By facilitating
longer-term, more profitable investment, liquid markets improve the allocation of capital and
enhance prospects of long-term economic growth. Further, by making investment less risky and
more profitable, stock market liquidity can also lead to more savings and investment.
The central focus of the market microstructure literature is that the pricing function of the capital
market, which is of critical importance to the allocation of investment, cannot be separated from
the institutional structure of the market itself. See E. Blume & J. Siegel, 'The Theory of Securities
Pricing an Market Structure', Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, July 1992; P.
Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', International Monetary Fund, November
1995.
" See S. Cohen, S. Mair, R. Schwartz & D. Whitcomb, The Microstructure of the Securities
Markets, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1986; L. Glosten & P. Milgrom, 'Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market Heterogeneously Informed Traders', Journal of
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This chapter provides an introduction to the Kingdom's securities market
structure. The main aim is to review the composite elements of the market,
examining the trading system, the role of brokers, liquidity and clearing and
settlement. In particular, the Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS) and
the clearance, settlement and registration system based on the Saudi Share
Registration Company (SSRC) are critically evaluated in relation to the needs of
the securities market. It is argued that the advantages of this electronic network
include (1) economic benefits emanating from a trading system based on a widely
distributed computer network, (2) an order-driven market that ensures immediate
execution, adding to liquidity in the market, and (3) a highly efficient clearance
and settlement system.
Commentators generally agree that the Kingdom possesses several
competitive advantages related to the provision of a trading system that accounts
for the liquidity and depth of its securities market. 5 Yet the Kingdom's
competitive advantages on the operation side is unlikely to form a basis for
competitive advantage in the long run, since other jurisdictions can also easily
develop these systems; in fact, Kuwait and UAE have established a modern
operational infrastructure which delivers similar benefits to private sector users.6
By itself, technical improvement in the operation and management of the
existing trading system alone may not be enough to secure a competitive
Financial Economics. Vol. 14, March 1985, PP. 71-100; H. Stoll & R. Whaley, 'Stock Market
Structure and Volatility', Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990, pp. 37-7 1.
See M. Massimb & B. Phelps, 'Electronic Trading, Market Structure and Liquidity', Financial
Analysts Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, Virginia: Association for Investment Management and Research,
1994, PP. 39-50.
The Kuwaiti Stock Exchange operates a very sophisticated electronic trading system that was
designed and developed in Kuwait with the assistance of outside consultants. UAE has also
recently announced the installation of an electronic trading system similar to ESIS. See
'Establishment of UAE stock market', Al-Hayat Gazette, 24 July 1999, p. 12.
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advantage for the Kingdom's equity market. Certainly, reforms in the market's
architecture, including the introduction of an alternative trading system, may
increase liquidity. 7
 Moreover, innovation in securities design, which could be
stimulated by the introduction of financial intermediaries, is needed to further
enforce the competitive position of the market. According to this view, the
Kingdom could actively use its proficiency in trading, clearance and settlement to
increase its competitive position while responding to the demand for the
introduction of new instruments and intermediaries. If successfully managed, this
could supply the market with greater stability, increase liciuidity and stimulate
increased participation by large investors.8
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main
characteristics of the Kingdom's trading system, noting that its restriction on
foreign investors trading in the market limits its evolution. It then describes the
role of market makers in the market. The discussion goes on to market
capitalisation, trading volume and liquidity, and the number of new firms listed in
the market. Section 3 provides a description of the ESIS. It also evaluates the
advantages of trading through the system. Our discussion then analyses the
advantage of the system of dematerialising shares for the efficient transfer of
J. Macey & M. O'Hara, 'Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and
Economic Perspective', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, January 1999, pp. 17-45.8 See A. AI-Dukhiel,' The development of the Saudi stock market', in Gulf Financial Markets,
Gulf International Bank, Bahrain, January 1988, p. 59. Al-Dukhiel writes that the regulatory
environment for trading has to be further developed. Regulations need to be developed to deal
with issues such as insider trading and the concentration of holdings. See in this regard, H. Azzam,
The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively Underplayed
Markets, Kegan Paul International, London, 1997, p. 155. Azzam states that the Saudi share-
trading system, unlike that in most other countries, currently does not allow market makers, which
would provide two desired characteristics: marketability and liquidity. In order for market making
to be effective, it is important to have a sufficient amount of government regulation. Initially,
Saudi banks that are operating under the present system could be given the market-making role.
Gradually, as the market becomes larger, it will be possible to shift the market-making activities to
separate entities such as brokerage firms, which are specialised in such activities.
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ownership and clearance. It also argues that, because of these systems, the
settlement period exceeds the G30's recommendations on settlement, enhancing
the market's competitive advantage. Section 4 highlights the other forms of
regulations and taxation in share trading. Finally, the chapter examines the
commission rate charged by banks for trading securities. The commissions,
unusually high in comparison with other similarly placed markets, suggest that
there is inadequate competition in the retail sector for the trading of shares. The
introduction of financial intermediaries could stimulate further competition in the
market, prompting more efficient pricing and perhaps, ultimately, the introduction
of a competitive trading system.
2. The Saudi Stock Exchange
Stock exchanges exist for an economic reason, namely to allow investors to
allocate risk, to assist investors to raise capital for their enterprises and to
facilitate both short-and long-term investors to achieve returns on their
investments. 9 The type of market structure and the role of intermediaries in price
discovery, liquidity and price stabilisation increase their importance in the
efficient functioning of any stock market.'° To be sure, there are many market
structures worldwide that offer distinct trading 	 processes and	 clearing
systems." Yet these structures are not solely the result of the Kingdom's
business planning but also represent the respective values of the market's actors.
L. Leigh, 'Stock Market Equilibrium and Macroeconomics Fundamentals', Policy Development
and Review Department, International Monetary Fund, January 1997, p. 5.
10 Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', p. 3.
See M. Pagano & A. Roell, 'Trading Systems in the European Stock Exchange: Current
Performance and Policy Options' Economic Policy, No. 10, April 1990, p. 83.
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To some extent, the government's priorities and values are reflected in its
regulatory arrangements, its commitment to supply credible legal rules, and
expertise in regulation and monitoring. In many respects, the Saudi trading
system also reflects the undercurrents in the market.
Using broad definitions of organised securities exchanges, one may refer
to the Saudi securities market as an over-the-counter market (OTC).' 2 However,
the creation of trading rooms (CTUs), which are spread throughout the Kingdom
and provide investors with excellent market access, enabling them to view real-
time trading data and interact actively with each other and the bank staff, along
with the computerised trading system, has blurred the classification of the Saudi
exchange.
In designing the stock exchange trading, the government, drawing its
inspiration from European sources, chose to develop an order-driven market.'3
Policy-makers in the government, having opted for the order-driven approach,
decided to design electronic share trading through a system of refunded
computers. In order to bring together traders, the government, through the
Executive Rules 1984, delegated to banks the function of acting as stock
brokers. 14 The Saudi Government believed that a bank-based system of brokers
would be most practicable to achieve financial stability.' 5 To this end, the
12 Secondary markets have been divided into two broad classes: the organised securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets. In general terms, a trade either occurs on an exchange floor or it
does not. Those trades that do not take place on an exchange are said to be OTC. See R. Teweles
& E. Bradley, The Stock Market, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 7th Edition, 1998, pp. 4-5.
13 A. Banafe, Saudi Arabia Financial Markets, Ayyoube Printers, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1993, p.
177.
4 
'The Executive Rules To Regulate Share Dealing Through Commercial Banks' 1984, Art. I,
state that the duty of buying and selling shares are restricted to Saudi banks which are licensed to
do so. The banks perform the role of mediator on behalf of clients (directly) and no share dealings
can take place without their mediation.
' Y. Al-Jeffery, investment in the Saudi Stock Market, Daar Al-Mannaheg Press, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, 1997, p. 12.
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Executive Rules require that banks supply a central trading unit at their corporate
headquarters in Riyadh City.' 6 In terms of licensing, banks were already licensed
and supervised by the Banking Control Law and Companies Act, and operated as
stock brokers under the authority of SAMA, one of the most organised agencies
within the Kingdom. It is worth pointing out that the Saudi banks were already
providing for their customers various other financial services, including share
trading. Justifying the establishment of the Saudi stock market within the banking
system, Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and Member of the
Supervisory Committee, said:
"Because there are more than 1000 bank branches across the
Kingdom, it was thought the banks were in the best position to
provide this service to all citizens, even ,f they are in remote
locations. Most importantly, building the stock exchange within
the banking system would provide the market with better
settlement and clearing systems. It was rightly assumed that
situating the stock market within the banking system would
provide the market with the best and less risky settlement. I think
that we have been successful in preventing our market from
collapsing or other financial sha kings which neighbouring
markets are familiar with. j7
By restricting trading in the market through banks only, the Saudi
authorities thought that they could reduce the risk of settlement failure, which
was one of the main reasons behind the collapse of the Kuwaiti market.18
Therefore, the Executive Rules restricted all the transactions in the market to cash
settlement and prohibited banks from accepting any credit deals or transactions
6 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 3, require each CTU to appoint one or more mediators to receive the
orders and complete the transaction. All mediators shall be Saudi citizens of good standing with
no criminal record, suitably educated and with experience in conducting share trading.
17 See interview with Mr. Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and Member of the
Supervisory Committee, Riyadh, 21 November 1997.
18 Royal Decree No. 1230/8, dated 11/7/1403, which established the Saudi stock market, states
that banks will avoid using forward cheques, which was the reason for the Souq Al-Manakh crisis
in Kuwait. This last matter is of the utmost importance.
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based on forward cheques.' 9 Yet the government's decision to locate the Saudi
exchange within the banking system was perceived as insufficient to protect
investors and the financial system from market failures or collapse of the
exchange. As president of a non-bank company, A1-Dukhiel suggested:
"It is better for the stock market growth and development to be
distinct from the banking system. Share trading activity is different
from banking activity, therefore they should be managed by an
independent commission unconnected with banks. I call for
allowing non-bank companies to act as brokers, dealers, and
market makers instead of limiting this role to banks. ,,20
In this regard, policymakers went further by restricting the brokerage role
to only the 11 licensed banks. The Executive Rules granted local banks a virtual
monopoly over all brokerage activities. It was determined that only banks could
perform the role of mediator on behalf of their clients directly, and share trading
should not take place without their mediation. 2 ' The government's decision to
limit brokerage activities to banks inevitably restricted the development of
intermediaries within the financial system.
It is well known that financial intermediaries are essential for reducing
market imperfections and improving the allocation of assets within the financial
system. Typically, intermediaries will (1) facilitate transfers, (2) supply liquidity,
(3) monitor loans and other contracts, and (4) manage portfolios. 22 The Saudi
banking sector, because of the relative underdevelopment of the financial
system, has provided the risk sharing and intermediation activities for the market.
Executive Rules 1984, Art I.
20 See interview with Abdul Aziz A1-Dukhiel, former deputy of the Ministry of Finance and
President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, Riyadh, 12 December 1997.
2! Executive Rules 1984, Art. 1, state that the banks perform the role of mediator on behalf of
clients (directly) and no share dealings can take place without their mediation.
22 X. Vives, 'Banking Competition and European Integration', in A. Giovannini & C. Mayer
(eds.), European Financial Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 9-30.
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As with other bank-oriented systems, in the early stages of the economic
development, bank-based intermediation may have been a relatively efficient way
to provide direct financing for firms and loans to consumers. 23 In the early stages,
banks improve the economic welfare of the economy. However, with the
introduction of a stock market, there are different financial intermediaries, besides
banks, which can offer more competitive packaging on the sale of securities and
other financial products. Naturally, the monopoly position of banks may be
threatened by the competition brought about by financial integration.24
As we have seen, the dominance of the Saudi banking system was
reinforced by the government's decision to limit the entry of other financial
intermediaries into the market. We also noted that the extended network of
branches across the Kingdom operates, in effect, as a barrier to entry. Yet, the
Kingdom's banking sector, which tends to provide largely retail banking and
commercial loans, suffers from under-development in corporate finance and the
market for securities. 25 It is worth emphasising that allowing financial
intermediaries to supply certain financial services (share trading, mutual funds,
etc.), would provide investors with a greater range of financial services and help
eliminate inefficient service, without injecting any new risk into the financial
system. Nevertheless, there are some non-bank intermediaries that are providing
securities or other financial products without the authorisation of SAMA.26
23 Ibid.
24 D. Kunt & V. Maksimovic, Stock Market Development and Finance Choices of Firms, The
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, January, 1996., p. 345.
25 See A. Al-Batel, 'The Roles of Financial Institutions in Economic Development; Saving,
Investment, and Income Growth. The Case of Saudi Arabia 1965-1989', dissertation submitted to
the Graduate School for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University,
December 1992, pp.222-235.
26 Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 154-155. Azzam notes that a large proportion of trading takes place
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Khalid Al-Bassam, Investment Sales and Marketing Department Manager of Al
Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi, said that:
"I think that the market might operate better if the government would
allow other private institutions to operate in the market as brokers
besides banks. This will increase the competition in the market and will
result in better services to market participants. ,,27
In practice, there is an unacceptable level of trading in securities for which
no obligation exists on the part of non-banks to make guarantees about the risk or
completeness of the terms or conditions related to the purchase of such securities.
The upshot is that non-bank distribution of securities may be conducted on less
than the best terms. Hence investors may end up, unless they engage in proper
due diligence and take reasonable precautions, being left without a remedy for
recovery of losses related to unsavoury market practices of non-banks.
2.1 Market brokers
As we have seen, brokers and dealers provide a crucial liquidity function for
markets. 28 Interestingly, Saudi stock market rules limit brokerage activities to
only those commercial banks that are licensed to operate in the Kingdom. Today,
there are 10 banks conducting brokerage activities in the Saudi market: Riyadh
Bank, Bank A1-Jazirah, Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi Hollandi Bank, Al-Bank
directly between buyers and sellers outside ESIS. This loophole has allowed informal brokers to
continue to operate in the market despite an official ban.
27 Interview with Khalid Al-B assam, Investment Sales and Marketing Department Manager of Al
Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi, Riyadh, 29 July 1997.
28 R. Schwartz, Reshaping the Equity Markets, Business One, Irwin, Illinois, 1993, pp. 136-141.
Schwartz argues that dealers provide immediacy in the sense that they enable buyers and sellers to
meet each other in time and space. The quotes that dealers post on the market further help to
stabilise prices and to keep prices in tune with the market's underlying demand propensities.
Furthermore, OTC dealers and exchange specialists enforce various trading rules that bring order
and fairness to the market.
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Al-Saudi Al-Fransi, Saudi British Bank, Arab National Bank, Saudi American
Bank, Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp and National Bank.
Unlike jurisdictions where banking and securities regulators are separated,
the Kingdom regulates securities operations of banks within the unified structure
of SAMA. Given the Kingdom's system of bank intermediation, it makes perfect
sense for SAMA, in competition with the Ministry of Commerce through the
Companies Act, to regulate banks' activities in the market. For the Kingdom,
there are no additional securities regulations that are required once the basic
banking licence has been granted. In practice, banks only need to be licensed
under SAMA's Banking Control regulations and the Executive Rules to operate
as a broker in the Saudi stock market. 29 There are no special rules that govern the
licensing of commercial banks to act as brokers. Ironically, there have been banks
that have not been inclined to provide stock market service for their customers,
and found themselves forced by the government to do so. 30 It is crucial to note
that the absence of clear rules to govern the licensing of brokers has tended to
deprive the market of the great services that might be offered by non-bank
agencies.
In fact, there is a compelling need to enact additional securities rules to
cover the licensing requirements and qualifications for banks in order to
ascertain which Saudi institutions are capable of carrying out these securities
functions in a satisfactory manner. In securities markets, it is not enough for a
bank to only satisfy prudential rules, it must also, when undertaking to become
29 Banking Control Law, Issued By The Royal Decree No. M/5 on 22.2.1386(11.6.1966), Saudi
Arabia Monetary Agency, Banking Control Department, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
30Al-Maydani, 'Financial Markets in Saudi Arabia', p. 121.
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involved in investments, brokering and advising on investments, ensure
authorisation in the form of a licensing regime. 31 In answer to a question
concerning bank securities services, Khalid Al-Gadeai, Manager of Equity
Services for Local Shares in the Saudi British Bank, noted that:
"The Kingdom's experience shows that few banks (four) are active
in supplying securities services and most others are struggling
with supplying these services. I believe that the market is in need
of large investment institutions who can trade for investors and
who do not want to trade directly. This will increase the
competition with banks and will provide investors with better
services. At the same time, it will increase market liquidity"32
It is important to point out that there are a number of problems with this
approach to supplying financial services. Given that banks can incur liability
when investors buy services, the decision to rely on banking regulations to govern
the conduct of banks is problematic. The Executive Rules do not require any
qualification, entry requirements or any other management requirements of banks
other than the provisions that apply to banks under the Banking Control Law.
Certainly, the trading instructions of the Electronic Securities Information System
(ESIS) to CTUs do supply mandatory rules concerning qualification (see Section
2.3.3) and business practices. 33 However, these provisions, which were
designed and implemented by SAMA, are not sufficiently comprehensive to
E. Greene, D. Braverman & J. Schneck, 'Concepts of Regulation - The U.S. Model', The Future
for the Global Securities Market, Oditah, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 167-168. The authors state
that because of the importance of brokers-dealers to the market, regulation of their activities was
another major element of the regulatory reform after the 1929 stock market crash. Key areas
where more rigorous standards were introduced included capital adequacy requirements, limits on
the amount of credit that can be extended for the purchase of securities and supervisory and
record-keeping requirements. To ensure that US investors benefit from these protections, it is a
requirement of the US regulatory system that only brokers-dealers who are registered with the
SEC, and therefore subject to their regulations, can deal with US investors.
32 Interview with Khalid A1-Gadeai, Manager of Equity Services for Local Shares in the Saudi
British Bank, 28 November 1997.
Instructions to Central Trading Units, General Banking Control Department, Riyadh, 1994.
188
regulate all trading activities of banks, and efforts to extend the provisions, with
an emphasis on imposing higher qualification standards, must be considered if
effective securities regulation is to develop in the Kingdom.
The absence of regulation has meant, for example, that banks have not
been forced to distinguish between their role as a bank and stock broker.
Moreover, banks tend to discriminate in favour of their large clients. Basher
Bakheet, General Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisor, expressed the view
that:
"Saudi banks place low priority on their brokerage activities in
the market (and see it) as secondary. The government policy that
excludes non-banks from providing brokerage services, along with
the relatively low level of superiority of banks, is responsible for
the relatively low quality of performance by these institutions. "
In practice, many unregulated non-banks have more qualified personnel
and are more professional in their approach than most local banks in this
respect. 35 Whilst the government's limitation of brokerage activities has stifled
the competition, there is a growing demand by investors for deregulation of the
sector. The high level of consumer dissatisfaction should lead in the near future to
the introduction of a more efficient and responsive system. 36 Clearly, legal and
regulatory changes are required to provide the Kingdom with a more
comprehensive basis for regulating banks with respect to their securities market
activities. Securities regulation is underdeveloped in the Kingdom and the
Interview with Mr Basher Bakheet, General Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisors, Riyadh,
12 December 1997.
See the Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, Bakheet Financial Advisors, RANA
Investment Company, and Zughaibi and Kabbani Co.
36 See A. Allam, 'The Brokerage System in the Arabic Markets', submitted to the Arabic Stock
Market Brokers Second Conference in Damascus, Arabic Brokers Organisation, July 1996, p. 17.
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government should be encouraged to promulgate new regulation concerning the
brokerage, dealing and managing of investments by banks.
2.2 Market capitalisation
The market capitalisation ratio is very important, since analysts frequently use the
ratio as a measure of the stock market size. 37 Over the period 1985-1996, the total
capitalisation of the Saudi market rose by a factor of 156% from SR 67 billion to
almost SR 172 billion, representing more than 40% of the total capitalisation of
all Arabic stock markets. 38 The market capitalisation rose sharply to reach SR
222.7 billion in 1997. On 31 December 1998, Saudi equity prices dropped by
28%, bringing the capitalisation of the market to SR 160 billion, as shown in
Figure 6.1.
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A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Market and Financial Intermediaries: Stylised Facts', World Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1996, P. 294.
38 See Arabic Stock Markets Annual Report, Arabic Monetary Fund, UAE, 1998, p. 62.
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In comparison with other emerging markets, the rise of the Saudi stock
market capitalisation is considered modest. The emerging markets recorded an
average rise in the period of 1985-1996 from $172 billion to $1,929 billion.39
Although the current total market capitalisation of the Saudi market represents
more than 40% of the total Arabic market capitalisation, the Saudi stock
capitalisation is below the average of those of other emerging markets. At $45
billion, it ranks 13th out of 33 other emerging markets. 4° (See Table 6.1 below)
Table 6.1
Saudi stock market characteristics v. Emerging markets
Category	 Saudi Arabia	 Emerging markets
(IFCG, average for 33
_______________________________ _____________________________ exchanges)
Market capitalisation	 US$ 45 billion, rank 13th 	 US$ 53 billion
Annual market turnover	 US$ 14 billion, rank 15th	 US$ 60 billion
Turnover/capitalisation	 20%, rank 20th	 112%
Number of listed	 74 companies, rank 30th	 518 companies
companies
Average company size 	 US$ 608 million, rank 2'
	
US$ 103 million
Source: BFA & IFC
The current market capitalisation is 33% of the Saudi GDP. The size of
the Saudi equity market compared to GDP is extremely modest in comparison to
other emerging markets and, in fact, does not represent the size or growth
potential of the Saudi economy, which is one of the strongest in the emerging
M. Keppler & M. Lechner, Emerging Markets, Research, Strategies and Benchmarks, IRWIN
Professional Publishing, Chicago, 1997, pp. 113-115.
° Bakheet Financial Advisors, Annual Report 1998.
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markets.41 The modest level of market capitalisation is mainly due to the limited
initial public offering activity (IPO) in the market and the restrictions to direct
foreign participation, which are slowly being eased.
2.3 Number of listed companies
At the end of 1998, there were 74 listed companies in the Saudi stock market. The
market is segmented into six sectors, as shown in Figure 6.2. The number of
listed companies in the Saudi market is by all means very modest. Only 13
companies went public during the past 10 years (see Figure 6.3).42 In comparison
to other emerging markets, the number of the companies listed in the Saudi
market is far below the emerging markets average of 350 listed companies. The
low number of listed companies make the Saudi market rank 30th among other
emerging markets in terms of the number of listed companies.43
.[1.UtC U.L
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' See J. Presley, 'The Saudi Economy', Saudi Economic Bulletin, Vol. 2. No. 6, Saudi British
Bank, Riyadh, September 1997, pp. 1-5.
42 R. Haddad, 'Saudi Stock Market', paper presented to the first annual Saudi Investment
Symposium, Riyadh, SAMA, 1998, p. 5.
The Saudi listed companies rank second among the other emerging markets in terms of average
size of listed companies. Hence, the relatively large market capitalisation is concentrated in a
small number of companies. In fact, the ten largest listed companies account for approximately
64% of the total market capitalisation.
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There are many reasons for the dearth of IPO activity in the market. First,
the Government used to provide free financing for most of the products that
reduce the incentives for going public. Second, and most importantly, the
disclosure requirements under the Companies Act, as previously noted in chapter
4, are not sufficiently market-based to provide for mandated information that will
inform investors about the price characteristics of the stock. Successful securities
markets must counter the problem of adverse selection, i.e., the problem in which
high-quality issuers leave the market because they cannot obtain fair value for
their shares, while low-quality issuers remain.45
O.3
New issues (SR Million)
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Successful markets have developed a number of institutions to counter the
adverse selection problems. They include securities laws which are backed by
severe sanctions for false or misleading disclosure, securities regulators with the
staff, skill and budgets to pursue fraudulent players in the market, accounting
rules that limit the opportunity for an issuer to fudge its financial results, an
E. Looney, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the Oil Price Declines
London, JAI Press mc, 1990, p. 163.
' A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An
Overview', pp. 228-229.
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accounting profession with the skill and expertise to expose instances of
attempted fraud and investment bankers whose reputations depend on not selling
fraudulent or overpriced securities to investors. 46 These institutions reduce the
emergence of fraud and the extent of adverse selection. As a result, they attract
honest issuers into the securities market and drive out dishonest issuers.
Moreover, as the average level of disclosure increases, investors will place greater
faith in disclosure, and will pay more for securities. This will lead to more high-
quality issuers entering the market.
2.4 Trading volume and liquidity
Trading volume and turnover ratio are important factors in any stock market
because they measure the market liquidity. 47 Market investors, particularly
institutional investors, are concerned by the level of market liquidity, which may
influence the level of investment they wish to make in the market. 48 The term
liquidity is generally used to refer to the ability to easily buy and sell securities
without disruptive price changes, making investment less risky and facilitating
more profitable, longer-term investments. 49 Hence, in order for the market to be
attractive, the annual trading volume and turnover ratio must reach a level that is
46	 .See M. Pagano, The Flotation of Companies on the Stock Market , European Economic
Review, Vol. 37.No. 1, 1993, pp. 1102-1103.
' The liquidity of the market can be measured in terms of the turnover ratio; the value of shares
traded as percentage of market capitalisation
48 See S. Figlewski, Hedging With Financial Futures for Institutional Investors, Ballinger
Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1986, Pp. 48-49.
' A. Kunt & R. Levine, 'Stock Market and Financial Intermediaries: Stylised Facts', p. 295. Kunt
& Levine state that: Liquidity is an important attribute of stock market development because
theoretically liquid markets improve the allocation of capital and enhance prospects of long-term
economic growth.
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acceptable to a wide range of investors. The higher this is, the more attractive the
market will be.50
The total-value-traded ratio measures the organised trading of equities as a
share of national output, and should therefore positively reflect liquidity on an
economy-wide basis.5 ' Over the period past 15 years, the annual trading volume
in the Saudi market rose from SR 759,972,525 to SR 51,509,159,079 in 1998.
The market annual value of shares traded is about $14 billion, which is 77% less
than other comparable emerging markets. 52 During 1998, 295 million shares
changed hands for a traded value of SR 51.5 billion, about 20% of the total
market capitalisation. Table 6.1 shows that the Kingdom's stock market turnover
ratio (value of shares traded as percentage of the market capitalisation) is low
compared to that of other emerging markets, where the turnover ratio average of
112%.
There is no doubt that the Saudi market, due to the slow increase in annual
trading volume, lags behind other markets in providing sufficient liquidity for
institutional investors. Typically, institutional investors will be unwilling to place
large orders unless there is enough liquidity to limit their exposure to adverse
market changes. 54 Does the Saudi market have efficient liquidity to supply large
institutional investors? While the daily trading volume exceeded the $100 million
mark in nine of the emerging market, the daily trading volume in the Saudi
° Ibid.
Ibid., p. 295.
52 M. Gorman, 'The Saudi Stock Market and Other Emerging Markets', Securities Control
Department, SAMA, 1998, P. 3.
R. Feldman & M. Kumar, 'Emerging Equity Markets: Growth, Benefits, and Policy Concerns',
p. 184. Feldman & Kumar note that the value of shares traded soared from less than $10 billion in
1983 to more than $340 billion in 1993 in Taiwan (China), for example, and increased by about
twenty times in Argentina, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Thailand.
S. Figlewski, Hedging With Financial Futures for Institutional Investors, p. 49.
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market has not exceeded $45 million.55 In the major industrial nations, the
turnover ratio varied from 85% in the U.S.A to 134% in France. Among the
emerging markets, the turnover ratios range from 10% in South Sahara markets to
226% in Turkey. 56 However, a reasonable turnover ratio falls between 40% and
80%, which shows the market is sustainable active. 57 The figures shown above
indicate that the Saudi market has insufficient depth and suffers from shallowness
and thinness.
Typically, order-driven markets such as the Saudi stock exchange (ESIS),
which involve no dealer intermediation, provide less liquidity than dealers
markets.58 Numerous empirical studies point to the fact that liquidity effects
provided by market makers which lessen the volatility in the market are due to
reduction in ask/buy spread.59
Order-driven markets rely on the flow of buy and sell orders from
investors through the agency of a broker to create market liquidity and market
depth, which depend on the random arrival of orders from traders and
speculators. 6° The most serious concern is whether the Saudi stock exchange has
the capability to handle large transactions through an order-driven system and
provide the market with the needed liquidity. Studies reveal that if order flow
is uneven in order-driven markets, the market may become one-sided or
See M. El-Erian, & M. Kumar, 'Emerging Equity Markets in Middle Eastern Countries', World
Bank conference, 1995, pp. 20-29.
C. Kenny & T. Moss, 'Stock Market in Africa: Emerging Lions or White Elephants?', World
Development, Vol. 26, No. 5, 1998, p. 831.
M. Keppler & M. Lecher, Emerging Markets, Research, Strategies and Benchmarks, pp. 22-23.
R. Schwartz, 'Equity Trading II: Integration, Fragmentation and the Quality of Markets', in
Benn Steil (ed.) The European Equity Markets, The State of the Union and an Agenda for the
Millennium, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, p. 69.
See M. Pagano & A. Roell, 'Auction Markets, Dealership Markets, and Execution Risk', V.
Conti & R. Hamaui, (eds.), Financial Market Liberalisation and the Role of Banks, Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', pp. 7-9
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unbalanced. 6 ' In dealer markets, market makers or specialists quote both buy and
sell prices for securities and trade on their own account, which helps to ensure
that there always a quoted market for the shares. 62 The lack of institutional
investors, together with market makers relying solely on driven-order, increases
the risk of the execution price of large-size trades. For example, the Bundesbank
in Germany, on behalf of the government, participates in the market on eight
regional exchanges; buying and selling from time-to-time, as appropriate, to
reduce price volatility and provide continuity and session (call action). 63 In the
Saudi market, this problem can be seen in the increasing use of face-to-face trade
outside the market to execute the large transactions.
Order-driven markets, in response to challenges posed by broker-oriented
markets, have introduced reforms (in terms of lower cost and better execution)
which in the medium term, especially across Europe, led to a rise in liquidity.64
The increases were due to lower transaction costs for small traders, and the
movement of large institutional investors to deal in these markets. 65 This suggests
that the absence of liquidity in the Saudi stock market is not at all surprising,
since the absence of brokers from the market makes it less liquid than it would
otherwise be. The Kingdom obviously has good reasons, for efficiency's sake, to
continue with its electronic, order-driven market, but in order to increase liquidity
levels, it may wish to introduce reforms that stimulate competition in lower
61 Ibid., p. 37.
62 M. Massimb & B. Phelps, 'Electronic Trading, Market Structure and Liquidity', pp. 42-43.
63 Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', p. 34.
64 R. Schwartz, Reshaping the Equity Markets, p. 24.
Ibid.
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transaction costs for traders, and to make it less difficult for foreign
institutional investors to trade in listed securities.
3. The Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS)
There are a variety of securities trading systems in the world today, which cannot
be separated from the pricing function and the market role in the allocation of
investment. 66 Following the international trend toward electronic trading, the
Kingdom opted for an order-driven electronic trading system. 67 The Electronic
Securities Information System (ESIS), which is owned and operated by SAMA,
was introduced in 1990. The legal and technical infrastructure was designed and
implemented by SAMA. The regulations that govern share trading through ESIS
were set forth in the Instructions to Central Trading Units. The instructions for all
CTUs and authorised bank branches are mandatory.68
In taking advantage of the state-of-the-art technology represented in ESIS,
the Saudi Government has developed the way of trading most suitable for social
and geographical needs. The order-driven based electronic system has many
advantages. First, the Kingdom's order-driven trading, in contrast to a periodic
market characterised by trading intervals where buying and selling orders are
66 See E. Blume, E. Marshall & J. Siegel, 'The Theory of Securities Pricing an Market Structure',
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, July 1992.
67 C. Chapman, How the Stock Markets Work, 6th edition, Century Business, 1997, PP. 3 8-42. The
author shows that most of the major stock markets today are no longer trading on a floor. For
example, the US New York stock exchange is a floor auction with electronic order routing, and
US NASDAQ is an electronic quote-driven system, plus limit orders, Japan has a floor auction
and electronic order book, Britain has a mixed electronic order book and quote-driven system,
Germany has a mixed floor auction and electronic order book , and France has an electronic ordcr
book.
68 Instructions to CTUs, Securities Control Department, SAMA, 1990. The Instructions have been
reviewed and amended by SAMA to fit every new release in the ESIS system.
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posted sequentially, offers greater efficiency for small traders. 69 Government
policymakers selected a continuous trading market format where trading takes
place continuously through the trading period and buy and sell orders are posted
for all securities contemporaneously. Accordingly, continuous trading execution
permits more trading than periodic markets. Second, an order-driven market
provides continuous price discovery, because it ensures the speed of price
information into the market. By supplying investors with contemporaneous
information on prices, transactions and market conditions, it is more likely that
prices will clear at the optimal price. 70 Third, an order-driven market may offer
investors trading at lower cost. Evidence from European order-driven markets
reveals that greater quality about order flows leads to greater post-trade
transparency in the market.7 ' For this reason, the Kingdom's decision to invest in
an order-driven market, despite liquidity concerns, was a reasonable and informed
policy choice.
ESIS was developed to provide an integrated electronic trading,
information, settlement and clearing system. Using central computers within
SAMA and terminal workstations within the banks, a high-speed
telecommunications network now links the system, offering security, fault
tolerance, data integrity and a friendly user interface with fast response times.72
S. Cohen, S. Mair, R. Schwartz & D. Whitcomb, The Microstructure of the Securities Markets,
pp. 22-24.
70 See M. Pagano & A. Roell, 'Auction Markets, Dealership Markets, and Execution Risk', pp.
93-95. (?check reference)
B. Steil, The European Equity Markets, The State of the Union and an Agenda for the
Millennium, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, p. 31.
72 ESIS began by linking up the 11 banks' CTUs to the main computer at SAMA through what is
called ESIS PC, which enables market investors to trade in one single market. However, the ESIS
PC service was limited only to Riyadh City. To close this gap, SAMA introduced what is called
ESIS Line, linking up more than 80%of bank branches nation-wide to the CTUs. However, the
ESIS Line service is not linked directly to the central computer at SAMA, hence its service shows
the prices and quantities of the market operation 2-5 minutes later than ESIS PC. Furthermore,
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ESIS was introduced with five main aims in mind. First, as noted above,
ESIS provides the market with transparency through instantaneous dissemination
of the bids/offers, executed quantities and prices to all market participants.
Information terminals are available in more than 400 branches domestically and
abroad.73
 In fact, ESIS has enhanced transparency in the market by allowing the
entire population to trade in the same market and see all the trading data and the
whole process live through the computer network linked to bank branches.
Second, ESIS increases market fairness by providing equal access to the market
for all market participants. ESIS was designed to match the placed order and bid
offer with the best available offer and bid prices. In the execution of orders, the
system first gives priority to prices and then to the time the order is placed in the
system. Third, ESIS tends to narrow price spreads by providing the market with
buy and sell orders priced around market averages and previous results. Finally,
ESIS may lead to increased market efficiency by enabling order entry, execution,
settlement and transfer of ownership to take place within a very short period of
time. The speed and accuracy of settlement far exceeds those specified in
international guidelines. 74 Maurice Gorman, Advisor of SCD, noted that:
"ESIS has increased the market liquidity and transparency. With
instantaneous dissemination of bids/offers, executed quantities and
prices to all market participants, and with information terminals being
available in over 400 branches, I think the current trading system is
transparent. Furthermore, by providing market participants with a
short trading cycle, tends to increase market liquidity: by gathering all
ESIS Line branches cannot enter ESIS directly and place orders; these branches have to send
orders by fax or telephone to the CTUs in Riyadh in order for them to be executed. In order to
solve this problem, SAMA introduced what is called ESIS Net in 1992. ESIS Net links some
branches to the main computer at SAMA, which enables them to provide the same services as
ESIS PC, however, the ESIS Net service is still limited to some branches in Riyadh City and has
not been expanded to the other cities in the Kingdom.
The Electronic Securities Information System Development Report, Securities Control
Department, SAMA, 1994.
Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 13.
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trading in one system nation-wide, the system can serve more investors
all around the country, attracting more investors.
Although ESIS has enhanced the efficiency of the Saudi stock market
since its inception in 1990, there are naturally certain limitations regarding its
operation. With regard to equal execution of orders, order-driven markets
typically will not treat large orders differently. Yet, it would appear that the
execution costs for large traders are less than for small traders, as Nasser Al-
Twaijri, Manager Brokerage & Custody Services for Local Shares, Arab National
Bank, explains:
"Banks will tend to offer lower commission and may get better
bid/ask quotes for large trades, given the importance of these clients
to our business. We cannot deny that the size of the client and his
business with the bank definitely have great impact on the level of
commission and service when purchasing shares." 76
Second, the effect of large traders may have an adverse effect on prices in
the market, leading to higher trading costs for small investors. 77 Third, whilst
ESIS is a remarkable piece of technology, the system is not presently employed
for the entire market. Indeed, only a few branches across the Kingdom are
positioned to execute customer orders directly through ESIS. Most of the cities
within the Kingdom cannot place their order directly in ESIS, because the ESIS
Net service, which links branches directly to the main computer at SAMA, is
limited to a few major cities. 78 As a result, traders located in other cities must fax
or phone with CTU to ensure the placement and execution of any order. For
example, certain banks have linked ESIS Line to only a few of their branches and
Interview with Maurice Gorman, SCD Advisor, Riyadh, 7 August 1997.
Interview with Mr. Nasser Al-Twaijri, Manager Brokerage & Custody Services for Local
Shares, Arab National Bank, Riyadh, 5 September 1997.
J. Macey & M. O'Hara, 'The Law and Economic of Best Execution', Journal of Financial
International, 1997, pp. 203.
78 Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, p. 40.
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the link to ESIS Net is restricted to the major branches in Riyadh City. 79 In this
regard, Mr. Bandar Al-Muhareb Central Trading Unit Manager and Investment
Group in Saudi Holland Bank expressed the view that:
"I think that ESIS has limitations affecting investors ability of
trading. The current trading system does not allow investors to buy
and sell on the same day. Furthermore, the system is concentrated
in Riyadh City, which favours investors in Riyadh, whereas
investors in other cities have slower access and are often faced
with technical mistakes, resulting in some investors' dissatisfaction
with the
Clearly, the ESIS system has great potential for increasing market liquidity and
trading volume through linking the system directly to market participants'
personal computers. Yet, the service presently fails to reach a significant number
of members in the Kingdom.
It is important to point out that Saudi law did not intend to limit trade only
through ESIS. Article 19-b of the Executive Rules allows face-to-face
transactions to be conducted directly through the company registrar without
passing through ESIS. 8 ' In answer to a question concerning Article 19-b and off-
ESIS transactions, Basher Bakheet, General Manager of Bakheet Financial
Advisors, explained:
"Whilst conducting this process has facilitated large traders with
better liquidity and a reduction -of execution risk, it
correspondingly has limited market transparency by depriving the
other investors from obtaining immediate information about the
size and price of transactions conducted outside the market. One
implication of this approach is that numerous informal stock
brokers, who specialise in block trades, have been able to acquire
Although SAMA financed the ESIS system and monitors its development, SAMA has required
banks to finance the links of ESIS Line and ESIS Net to their branches. Because most banks find
it too costly to link all their branches, this limits the service to just a few branches in the major
cities.
80 Interview with Mr. Bandar Al-Muhareb Central Trading Unit Manager and Investment Group in
Saudi Holland Bank, Riyadh, 11 December, 1997.
Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, p. 178.
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large amounts of securities outside the market, rather than buying
it directly through ESIS." 82
But are such off-ESIS transactions the only way to provide the conditions
for institutional investors to achieve competitive trades in a market characterised
by thinness and volatility?
The problem with off-ESIS trading is that the growth of those
arrangements, which are purchased at better bid/ask spreads, provides better
return to unofficial brokers who anange these transactions, while providing lower
execution costs overall to large investors. Perhaps the diversion to off-ESIS
trading would not be problematic were the order flows smaller. The point is that
unless there is a rule ensuring that investors obtain the 'best execution price' for
their orders, it is likely that the divergence between ESIS and off-ESIS orders will
persist, to the detriment of many small- and medium-size investors. We might
wish to look to Omani stock market rules that mandate that listed companies'
shares can be traded only by licensed brokers, prohibiting any share transaction
outside the exchange unless it is expressly permitted by the exchange
management.83
82 Interview with Mr. Basher Bakheet, General Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisors. Riyadh,
12 December 1997. Mr. Bakheet went on to say that: "most large traders prefer to go through the
informal traders to collect large amount of shares rather than doing so through ESIS for the
following reasons. First, these brokers can guarantee the delivery of the amount needed within an
agreed time which banks cannot do. Second, they can provide large traders with the best prices by
collecting the amount of shares needed directly from other traders without going through ESIS,
which could have a great deal of impact on the share prices. Finally, due to the fact that most of
these brokers are working for themselves, they can provide large traders with a very flexible and
much lower charge of commission."
83 Allam, 'The Brokerage System in the Arabic Markets', submitted to the Arabic Stock Market
Brokers, pp. 11-13.
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3.2 Trading procedures
ESIS provides Saudi nationals with one single floorless electronic matching
system linking up the 11 banks licensed to act as stockbrokers to the system's
central computing unit, located at and supervised by SAMA. As noted
earlier, ESIS is a continuous trading market where trading takes place
throughout the trading period and buy and sell orders are posted for all securities
contemporaneously. The ESIS system is designed to match the placed bid and
offer orders with the best available offer and bid prices, according to the time they
come in. Although the ESIS system is available to banks from 08:3Oam to
08:OOpm Saturday through Thursday every day, the actual trading time only lasts
three and a half hours divided between periods in the morning and evening.84
3.2.1 The morning trading period
The morning trading period lasts from 10:15am to 12:00 noon. During the first 15
minutes, all firm bids and offers in the market participate in a collective opening
process. 85 This process ensures that all potential traders from existing bids and
offers in the market are executed at the start of the trading period. Out of this
collective execution process, bids and offers are executed at the equilibrium price.
This price is calculated to be the best one 3ossibIe in order to process the
maximum number of shares available in the market at the start of the opening
Besides the trading period, the ESIS system goes through other different periods during the day.
For example, the order maintenance and report printing in the morning lasts from 7:30 to 10:15.
During this period, only trading takes place, but brokers can add and maintain order bids and
offers and prints of daily reports and Ishaaraat. The same happens after the end of the morning
period and before the start of the evening period.
The Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 2.2.2, Version 7.0, January 1994.
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period. 86 Al-Rashed, the Manager of the SCD noted that:
"Because we do not have official market makers or specialists to
decide the opening prices for each share, we rely on the opening
period to decide daily share prices. However, if there is no bid and
offer in some shares in the opening period, the prices of listed
shares will be decided as the last prices that share was
executed. ,,87
The priority of execution of bids and offers during the opening execution
process is the best price and time, given a particular price. 88 Firm bids and offers
that were not executed in the opening period remain in the market for the trading
period. The morning trading period starts as soon as the opening period ends and
continues until 12:00 noon. During the morning trading period, the system
automatically matches and executes firm bids against the best firm offers
available in the system, provided these offers' prices are equal to or lower than
bid prices. It also automatically matches and executes firm offers against the best
firm bids available in the system, provided these offers' prices are equal to or
higher than offer prices.89
3.2.2 The evening trading period
The evening trading period lasts from 16:l5pm to 18:3Opm, using the same
process followed in the morning period. The first 15 minutes constitute the
opening period, followed by the evening trading period, which continues until
86 Ibid.
87 See interview with Mr. Al-Rashed, Manager of the Securities Control Department, Riyadh, 17
August 1997.
88 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 2.2.2, Version 7.0, Art. 2, 1994, provide that the priority of
execution of bids and offers during the opening execution process is:
Price: Best price (highest bid and lowest offer)
Time: Given a particular price, bid/offers with the earliest release date and time have a higher
priority.
89 Ibid.
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18:30.° As soon as the evening trading period ends, the post-trading period
continues until 19:30. During the first half-hour of this period, brokers are routed
to settlement, and trading statistics are compiled and printed. 9 ' No orders, bids or
offers can be added or maintained during this period. During the last half-hour of
this period, no trading takes place, but brokers can add and maintain order bids
and offers and print daily reports. From the end of this period until the start of the
morning trading period the following day, no user has access to the system.92
3.2.3 ESIS trading cycle
A transaction through ESIS must go through a number of different steps in order
to be completed, as is shown in Figure 6.4 below. First, buying and selling clients
approach designated branches to place their buy and sell orders. The Instructions
to CTUs have adopted the most common kinds of orders, such as Market Orders,
Limit Orders and Stop Orders, which traders and brokers must use when
executing their orders. 93 These orders represent the agreement between the bank
and their clients to execute specific business transactions. The system
automatically validates the availability of the share and client details. Banks must
also ensure that all documents supporting an order are correct and that there are
no restrictions on the order. 94 To enter an investor's order, his personal data must
be either already present in the system or clearly provided with the order form.
Investors that have not yet been registered in the system may be temporarily
° Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art, 2.2.6, Version 7.0, 1994.
' Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art, 2.2.7, Version 7.0, 1994.
92 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art, 2.2.8, Version 7.0, 1994.
'B Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art, 2.5.5, Version 7.0, 1994.
Ibid. Art 2.5 states that orders must be entered in the system as valid for I to 12 days. The
system rejects all orders after the trading session on the last day of their validity period. Further,
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added by the CTUs until they are confirmed by the SSRC. Banks must distinguish
the identity of buyers and sellers and ensure that they are entitled to buy or sell
the shares.95
Second, after orders are placed at the designated branches, such orders are
passed electronically to the Central Trading Unit's (CTU) dealing room at each
bank. Orders received update the CTU electronic order book. 96 The electronic
order book provides CTUs with an effective way of managing and tracking their
orders. Although these orders are stored in the central computer system, they are
only accessible by the CTU who has entered the orders and SAMA's Surveillance
Division. Oniy CTU brokers working in the dealing room can generate bids and
offers from the orders. These bids and offers are then placed in the electronic
market and displayed to all market participants.97
Third, once the order is placed in the electronic market, the computer
system will attempt to match the placed bid/offer with the best available bid/offer
according to price, and then time priority. Sellers and buyers can change or cancel
the placed order as long as the order is still outstanding, i.e., not expired or fully
executed. 98
 During the opening and trading periods, the system attempts to
execute all existing firm bids and offers. Traded bids/offers are executed at their
limit price or at a better price. A potential of a bid and an offer by the same CTU
the system will reject all orders exceeding fluctuation limits. Firm bids and offers of specific
securities must be priced within +1- 10% of the opening price of a given trading period.
To ensure valid identity of selling and buying investors, ESIS supports the Central Investors
Database, which contains the information on individual sellers and buyers necessary to trading,
settlement, share transfer and share registration.
96 The Electronic Securities Information System Report, Securities Control Department, SAMA,
Riyadh, 1997.
Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 6, Version 7.0, 1994. Art. 6 states that branches should advise
investors on the latest trading prices of the shares they are interested in. Where available, ESIS
Line or ESIS PC should be used, otherwise the current Daily Price list should be made available.
98 The Electronic Securities Information System report, Securities Control Department, SAMA,
Riyadh, 1997.
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is delayed by 15 minutes if there are no bids and offers from other CTUs at a
similar or better price. 99 A firm bid or offer can be partially executed. Unmatched
bids and offers are kept in the electronic market until they are either matched by
the system of taken out of the market by the CTU brokers on request of the
00
Figure 6.4
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Fourth, trades are generated from matched bids and offers, and reported
electronically to the settlement system.'°' The settlement system keeps track of all
trades to be settled. Settlement of book-based positions (evidenced by receipt of
If, within a cross delay, another CTU enters a counter-bid or counter-offer, in whole or in part at
a better price, the system shall immediately execute the just released bid/offer with its counterpart
in the cross delay.
'°° Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 7, Version 7.0, 1994.
See the Electronic Securities Information System report, Securities Control Department,
SAMA, Riyadh, 1997.
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ownership called an 'Ishaaraat') occurs in the evening of the Trade date (T) with
payments being moved through the central bank accounts on the morning of T+I
certificate-based trades. Settlement of trades with certificates requires one extra
day.'°2
 For certificate-based trades, the transfer system generates transfer
instructions in the form of reports for each security, listing the individual buyers
and sellers. These reports are sent to the company registrar. The registrar cancels
the certificate and updates the corresponding number of shares in the nominee
central share account of the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC).'°3
Finally, all banks are required to hold clearing accounts with SAMA.
After settlement, net money clearance takes place with net transfer between the
banks' accounts. 104 Settlement, clearing reports and Ishaaraat are electronically
delivered back to the originating CTU or branch. Banks can integrate this
information directly into their own systems, thus allowing support of custodial
services and crediting of client accounts. The banks/branches either credit the
client's bank account or pay the client directly. 105
3.3 ESIS clearing and settlement
In this section, the Kingdom's clearance and settlement system are examined.
Clearance and Settlement systems which are effective are thought to enhance the
liquidity of a market. Because of this, settlement and clearance were given the
highest priority by the government in the establishment of these organisations.
02 See 'Middle East Survey of Securities Clearing and Settlement', a report prepared by the
International Finance Corporation and the Arab Monitory Fund, January 1997, p. 37.
103 The Electronic Securities Information System Trading Report, Securities Control Department,
SAMA, Riyadh, 1997.
104 Ibid.
'° Ibid.
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We have seen that this priority emerged from the belief that failure in clearance
and settlement was the reason for the collapse of other stock markets in the
region. Problems of clearance, settlement and transfer of ownership were serious
problems that had troubled the Saudi market in the past.'°6
In light of this, the Saudi Shares Registration Company (SSRC) was
established in 1984 in order to ameliorate these problems.'° 7 The SSRC was
organised by the commercial banks to provide central registration facilities for
joint-stock companies, and to settle and clear all equity transactions. We have
noted earlier that it was only after 1989, when SAMA introduced the Automated
Clearing and Settlement System, that the clearing and settlement problem was
resolved to investors' satisfaction. Initially, the SSRC's first operations were very
weak. The company recorded losses in the first eight years and relied on SAMA's
financial support to continue operating. Since 1994, the SSRC has shown great
improvement in its operation and has moved into the black, recording net profits
from the levy of 10% on the bank's securities trading commissions.108
The SSRC is authorised pursuant to the Instructions to CTUs, and is
under the supervision of SAMA to prepare instructions to Company Registrars to
effect the share transfer and registration required by trades settled in ESIS.'° 9 This
process is carried out by the Central Share ccounts Division of the SSRC
through electronic linkage with the settlement process. The Central Share
106 Banafe, SaudiArabia Financial Markets, pp. 178-179. The author states that, for example, the
transfer of ownership of traded shares was the mission of the issuing company itself. Trading was
limited to only the share's certificates. The problem was that the process of transfer of ownership
and registration would often take several weeks to be completed. Typically, there were faults in
the delivery of money, and the certificates often led to sustained losses for investors.
107 Saudi Share Registration Company Bylaw. SSRC is a limited liability partnership formed
jointly by the 11 Saudi commercial banks with a capital of SR ilmillion.
108 SSRC Annual Report, SAMA, Riyadh, 1997.
109 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 3, Version 7.0, 1994.
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Account maintains share accounts on behalf of investors. For each investor an
account is automatically established. The shares held in the account are referred
to as being 'dematerialised'. Investors receive notification of ownership in the
form of an Ishaar. The SSRC is authorised to establish and maintain facilities for
issue and transfer of negotiable share documents called Ishaaraat on behalf of
companies listed for trading through ESIS."° ESIS automatically validates
availability of the shares held in the Central Share Account on order entry. As a
result, holding shares in the Central Share Account is the safest option for
investors.' 11
 In fact, the receipt of ownership (Ishaar) is used as the mode of
settlement in more than 95% of transactions in the Saudi market." 2 The transfer
of ownership is delivered automatically by computer book-entry. It should be
noted that certificates may be obtained by investors wishing to have
documentation through withdrawals from the central accounts and the issue of a
certificate by the company registrar."3
The details of all matched trades are passed to the Clearing Division
within the SSRC in the evening of the Trade date (T). The seller's position in the
sold share is cancelled and a new position created for the buyer's Central Share
Account." 4 The old Ishaar will be cancelled. On the morning of T-1, the new
Ishaar for the buyer is printed at the branch ofthe bank where the client entered
110 Ibid.
The Ishaar is supported by an entry in the Ishaar Register of SSRC for an equivalent number of
shares. It confers on the holder beneficial ownership of the shares represented by the Ishaar, and
of all dividends, rights and other distributions and any other privileges arising from the shares. In
addition, Ishaar is recognised in sold and bought transactions in the Nominee Account and is valid
as a negotiable document through the ESIS trading system.
112 Using Ishaar as the ownership document provides investors with faster settlement and transfer
of ownership. Furthermore, if the physical Ishaar is lost or damaged, the investors' holdings are
safe. Replacement Ishaaraat can normally be issued within 24 hours.
113 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 3.11, Version 7.0, 1994.
114 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 3.3, Version 7.0, 1994.
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their order, coinciding with the delivery of the new Ishaar on the morning of
T+l." 5
 Settlement of trades with certificates require one extra day. Payments are
made using net debits or credits between the banks' accounts at SAMA (central
bank funds). Banks then debit or credit their clients' accounts. The clearing of
trades is completed instantaneously in ESIS, the electronic trading system.'16
This sophisticated trading and clearing/settlement system provides the CTUs of
banks with electronic feedback of their trading activities. All aspects of the
clearing and settlement process are supervised by SAMA.'17
The Kingdom's securities clearing and settlement environment is much
admired, since it integrates a number of services in one continuous process.
During the last decade, SAMA, along with the SSRC, have developed their own
modern clearing and settlement system, which meets or exceeds all major
international standards. The short settlement period (T or T+l), the use of central
bank funds and the fact that all brokers are large banks provide for a virtually
risk-free settlement environment. 118
 In contrast, most regional markets have
found it difficult to meet the international standards in clearance and settlement.
For example, the survey shows that nine of the Middle Eastern stock markets
could not cope with the T+3 clearance and settlement standards, combined with a
high risk in their settlement environment. The advanced technology used by the
Saudi market has placed it far ahead of other clearing and settlement systems in
standards set forth by the Group of Thirty."9
" Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 4.4, Version 7.0, 1994.
116 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 3.11, Version 7.0, 1994.
°' Middle East Survey of Securities Clearing and Settlement, Report by the International Finance
Corporation and the Arab Monetary Fund, January 1997, pp. 37-38.
° Ibid.
119 Ibid. The Middle East Survey indicates that where settlement occurs later than 3 days in
countries such as Tunis, Lebanon and Amman, Saudi Arabia is clearly the leader in clearing and
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A Group of Thirty survey shows that the Saudi market's current clearance
and settlement system works as follows:
(a) comparison occurs on the same day as the trade;
(b) trades are settled by secure book-entry transfer of securities against debit or
credit entries on an account held by the intermediaries with SAMA for this
purpose;
(c) settlement occurs on T+l.'2°
Despite the advanced level of integration of the Kingdom's clearing and
settlement system, there are certain limitations that still inhibit its efficiency.
First, the SSRC does not provide central registration facilities for all listed
companies. Al-Qahtani, Assistant Manager of the SSRC noted that:
"Whilst delegating the responsibility of all registration and
shareholders affairs to the SSRC is cheaper and easier for most
companies, there are only 25 of the listed companies presently
working with the SSRC in this regard. The remainder of listed
companies are managing their own registration through their own
shareholders affair departments." 121
Because the computerised trading system was designed for trading by
Saudi citizens, it has been observed that the Saudi electronic trading system with
its short settlement period (T+1) could create difficulties for foreign investors
settlement in the Middle East. The Saudi Arabian Montary Authority (SAMA) has devoted an
impressive array of both financial and human resources to build and continuously improve their
market's clearing and settlement mechanisms. The Saudi clearing and settlement environment
could serve as a model for other markets (both in the Middle East and elsewhere) well worth
emulating.
120 In March 1989, the Group of Thirty released its report entitled 'Clearance and Settlement
Systems'. The Group of Thirty has promulgated widely accepted recommendations for the
development of clearance and settlement systems with the following key points:
1. Comparison of trade details should be complete by T+1 (i.e., one day after the day on which the
trade occurred);
2. All trades should be settled by delivery of securities against payment of 'same day' money
(delivery versus payment or DVP); and
3. Settlement should occur no later than T+3.
121 See Interview with Mr. Al-Qahtani, Assistant Manager of the SSRC, Riyadh, 13 November
1997.
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who must have monies transferred to Saudi Arabia in T+1) 22 Clearly, the
achievement of settlement in one day gives the Kingdom significant competitive
benefits relative to other settlement systems. It is worth noting that the movement
towards greater international participation in the Saudi market would naturally
put pressure on the policymakers towards the international settlement of T+3,
given that cross-border investors would be hard pressed otherwise.
4. Taxation and Commission on Securities
The costs of trading include explicit costs (the bid-ask spread, order handling
charges, commissions, taxes, etc.) and implicit costs (such as adverse price
movements) which have an important influence on the efficiency of the market.'23
It has been argued that when trading costs are high, investors will trade less, as
trading would reduce portfolio returns. In turn, lower trading volume may reduce
the efficiency of determining true price value in the market. 124
 It follows that
investors are more likely to engage in trading when there are lower transaction
costs and better incentives (e.g., competitive tax treatment).'25
4.1 Taxation
A hidden, indirect cost is taxation. 126 Whilst the Kingdom does not tax personal
income, it does apply two types of taxes, one for Saudis and one for non-Saudis.
122 
'Middle East Clearing & Settlement Survey', The International Finance Corporation and the
Arab Monetary Fund, January 1997.
123 Dattels, 'The Microstructure of Government Securities', pp. 4-5.
124 A. Kunt & H. Huizinga, 'Barriers to Portfolio Investment in Emerging Stock Markets', Journal
of Development Economics, Vol.47, 1995, PP. 356-358.
125 V. Bencivenga, B. Smith & R. Starr, 'Equity Market, Transaction Cost, and Capital
Accumulation: An Illustration', World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1996, p. 246.
126 See R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Growth, and Tax Policy', Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 4,
l99l,pp. 1445-1465.
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First, Saudi Arabia has a religious tax, known as Zakat, which applies to Saudi
individuals, wholly owned Saudi companies and Saudi shareholdings in joint-
stock companies. The Zakat tax is calculated at 2.5% of the net worth, less the net
value, of fixed assets after depreciation.' 27 Although Zakat tax applies on a
voluntary basis to individuals, Saudi companies are liable to taxation at the rate of
2.5% of capital employed that is not invested in fixed assets and long-term
investment, adjusted by net results for the year. A company which has both Saudi
and non-Saudi shareholders is required to pay the Zakat tax on the Saudi
shareholdings.'28
The second type of tax applied under the Saudi law is the income tax on
non-Saudi individuals and companies. Any income derived from business
conducted by persons in the Kingdom who are not citizens of Saudi Arabia is
subject to tax on income from capital investment. 129 Individuals are required to
pay tax from the net proceeds or products acquired from any business in which
the taxpayer has invested movable or immovable capital, buying and selling
goods of all kinds and descriptions, products from the land, exchange money, and
renting or leasing any means of transport, machinery or equipment.'3°
Non-Saudi individuals are currently subject to taxation as follows: 5% on
the first SR 16,000, 10% on the next SR 20,000, 20% on the next SR 40,000 and
30% on profits in excess of SR 60,000. Companies which have both Saudi and
non-Saudi shareholders are required to pay income tax at the applicable marginal
127 Zakat is an Islamic principle which levies on capital and earnings therefrom; all proceeds,
profits and gains from business, industry or personal work; and property or monetary acquisitions
of whatever kind of description, including commercial and financial transactions and dividends,
livestock, and crops.
128 The Zakat and Income Tax Law, Issued under Royal Decree, No. 8634, 1951.
129 GCC citizens are treated under the Saudi law as Saudi citizens in respect of taxation treatment.
'° Saudi Tax law issued under Royal Decree No. 17.2.28.576. Dated 14/13/1 376.
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tax rate for corporations on the portion of its earnings which is attributed to non-
Saudi shareholders.' 3 ' The current corporate tax rates are as the follow: 25% on
the first SR 100,000, 35% on the next SR 400,000, 40% on the next SR 500,000
and 45% on profits in excess of SR 1,000,000. As corporate income tax is paid at
company level, Saudi and non-Saudi individuals are remitted to shareholders
without further deductions of tax.'32
Although Saudi citizens are enjoying the low tax regimes, foreign
investors found it difficult to cope with the rate, which led the government to
grant foreign capital the same concessions enjoyed by national capital under the
National Industries Encouragement Act 1962.133 Industrial or agricultural projects
with foreign capital are exempted from income and corporate taxes for ten years,
and other projects for five years, from the start of production, provided that the
project retains a Saudi Arabian equity participation of not less than 25% during
the period of exemption.' 34 For example, the high tax rate on foreign investment
threatened the launch of the SAIF, as the first foreign investors fund in the Saudi
stock market, which led the Ministry of Finance and National Economy to
confirm that the SAIF Fund is not subject to Saudi taxation.' 35 Saudi taxation
policy does not seem to be competitive with other taxation rules in the region at
131 Non-Saudi companies' operations taking place both inside and outside the Kingdom are subject
to tax income related to their business in the Kingdom.
132 Saudi Tax Law, 1956, Art. 10.
' See M. AI-Saleh, 'A Study of the Foreign Investment Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia: Law and Policy', thesis submitted to the University of Warwick School of Law for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1994, pp. 136-147.
134 The Foreign Capital Investment Act Issued under Royal Decree No. M/4, 2/2/1399.
' See 'The Consent of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency for the establishment of the Saudi
Arabian Investment Fund', SAMA Circular No. MA 1274, dated 3/12/1413, pursuant to
Ministerial Decision No. 3/2052, dated 24/7/14 13.
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all.' 36 As can be seen from the above indication, the Saudi tax policy is very
hard on foreign
investors and it is increasing the cost of foreign participation in the Saudi stock
market. The Saudi tax policy therefore would make the market unattractive to
foreign investors. 137
 Obviously, there is a true need for Saudi authorities to
reconsider the tax rate with the main goal of making it more suitable and
attractive for foreign investment.
4.2 Commission
The other cost of the Saudi stock market is the transaction commissions. SAMA
has set forth a maximum brokerage commission charged by banks based on the
value of shares traded. The current brokerage fee is 0.5% for up to SR 10,000;
0.25% for SR 10,001 to 100,000; 0.15% for SR 100,001 to 500,000; and 0.1% for
amounts of SR 500,001 and higher.' 38 There is a minimum commission of SR 25
on any transaction. Payment of commission is divided equally between buyer and
seller. This rate is relatively expensive compared to other markets in the region
and lends further support to the view that the Saudi stock market is not cheap.'39
Moreover, banks are charging a high commission on each transaction has a
negative impact on incentives which attract new investors to the market. Basher
Bakheet, the General Manager of Bakheet Financial Advisors, took the view that:
' See Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 211-243. See also, A. Abisourour, 'The Emerging Arab Capital
Markets: Status, Role and Development Prospects', El-Nagger, June 1994.
R. Stulz, 'On the Effects of Barriers to International Investment', Journal of Financial
Economics 36, 1981, pp. 923-934.
138 Instruction to CTUs 1990, Art. 2.5.4. Version 7.0, January 1994.
M. El-Erian, 'Middle East Financial Markets : Potential for Development and
International isation', The Middle East Executive Report, June 1994. The study shows that most of
the Arabic markets have lower costing rates than those in the Saudi market.
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"In fact, banks have used the commission on share transactions as
incentives to attract more clients to the banks by linking the
discount of the commission to the size of the client, which itself
make the cost of transaction more expensive for the small
investors than the large investors." 140
Initially, the introduction of a high commission was needed to encourage
banks to provide the services and invest in the training and technology required.
Yet the persistence of high commissions, relative to other markets, suggests that
the monopoly enjoyed by banks on the provision of services is a partial reason for
the static quality of service for investors, as well as high prices.
5. Summary
In this chapter we have examined the main aspects of the Kingdom's market
micro-structure. The development of the Kingdom's electronic trading platform
and clearing system has, due to their effectiveness for investors, signalled a major
shift toward the creation of a world-class market. More specifically, the reliance
on advanced technology has been crucial to the Kingdom's ability to mect and
surpass the G-30 international benchmarks in trading execution and settlement.
Yet, to enhance the liquidity level in the market, the existing infrastructure must
be supplemented. In the long run, the most pressing issue in reform will be the
development of a securities regime that allows for the introduction of non-bank
intermediaries to function in the market.
140 Interview with Basher Bakheet, General Manager of Bakhcet Financial Advisors, 12 December
1997.
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Chapter 7
The Saudi Disclosure Regime
1. Introduction
This chapter provides a unified approach to disclosure of information to investors
in the Saudi market. It is now widely appreciated that disclosure of information is
one of the key principles for the effective operation of stock markets.'
Requirements to disclose specific financial information and business facts and
events (with the exception of confidential information) now dominate the system
of disclosure in Europe and the US2 . The obligation of firms to disclose
information is triggered by specific events, first through registration and
subsequently through periodic reporting, which form the foundation of the
mechanics of disclosure. 3 Whilst the level and nature of information disclosed
varies across regimes, the task of disclosure is to provide a feasible and reliable
means to inform investors about information and events which could affect their
expectations about investments in a firm's securities. 4 The aggregate cost of
disclosure will vary depending on the registration system and, among other
things, the difficulty in meeting the demands of the regulators.5
See 3. Coffee Jr., 'Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System',
70Virginia Law Review7l 7, 1984, pp. 719-724.
2 F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, 'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors', Virginia
Law Review 70, 1984, pp. 662-696. In Europe, the legal framework of issuing securities is based
on a minimum standard, which each member state must supplement with their own regulations.
See S. Strudad, D. Reid & A. Balheimer, 'The Legal Framework of Securities Industry in
European Community Under the 1992 Program', 29 Transnat IL, 1991, pp. 103-104.
L. Lowenstein, 'Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You
Measure', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 5, June 1996, pp. 1358-1360.
' S. Baiman & R. Verrecchia, 'The Relation Among Capital Markets, Financial Disclosure,
Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, No. I,
Spring 1996, pp. 2-3.
L. Sealy, 'The 'Disclosure' Philosophy and Company Law Reform', The Company Lawyer, Vol.
2, No.2, 1981, pp. 51-56.
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The disclosure duty in Saudi Arabia can be seen to emerge from three
different sources in the Kingdom's regulatory regime. The first involves
registration. Issuers, whether issuing anew or announcing a new development, are
required to file a public report with the Ministry of Commerce. 6 It is this category
of disclosure requirements, most of which is administrative, which ensures that
firms make adequate information available to the market so as not to mislead
investors. Second, the Companies Act requires publicly listed companies to file
annual reports. 7 The Executive Rules require also that firms submit quarterly
reports. 8 Finally, the Disclosure Rules 1997 require listed companies to carry out
disclosure on a continuous basis.9
The aim of this chapter is to assess the pattern of the disclosure rules in
Saudi Arabia. Until recently there was very little concern about this issue. 10 This
may have simply been due to the fact that firms were not obliged, in order to
avoid misleading investors, to release accurate statements about the state of the
firm's functions and events. 11
 Unlike the US, which has developed a painstaking
regime of continuous disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
requiring firms to file comprehensive sets of periodic reports to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Saudi regime has, like most developing
Companies Act 1965, Art. 52 & 64; See also, 'The Guidelines for the Conversion of Companies
to Joint Stock Companies' issued by the Ministry of Commerce, Circular 495, dated 25/3/1418-
29/7/1997, Art. 2.4.
' Companies Act 1965, Art. 123.
8 The Executive Rules To Regulate Share Dealing In Company Shares Through Commercial
Banks, SAMA Circular to all banks, General Banking Control Department, Saudi Arabia,
December 1984, Art. 19.
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/1 1/14 17, Art. 2-a.
'° See Al-Muihem, 'An Empirical Investigation of the Level of Financial Disclosure by Saudi
Arabian Corporations', thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of
Hull, 1997.
See Al-Jeffery, Investment in the Saudi Stock Market, Daar Al-Mannaheg Press, Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, 1997, p. 32.
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countries, only recently acknowledged the importance of imposing a disclosure
duty on the management of firms. 12 This chapter will, therefore, examine the
current system of disclosure in Saudi Arabia, assessing whether they are adequate
for their intended purpose. We shall question whether, in light of the limitations
of the current approach, a new set of rules is necessary to facilitate the release of
information needed by investors.
Corporations typically generate significant amounts of information that
investors seeking trading profits wish to acquire. Managers are prepared to
disclose some of it voluntarily to satisfy investors but, naturally, not all of it.13
However, international experience teaches us that, unless it is mandatory, hardly
any disclosure is given, especially by smaller companies that tend not to attract
institutional investors.' 4 Disclosure rules establish a general obligation for
publicly traded firms to disclose information pursuant to specific statutes, rules,
regulations, schedules and items.'5
Disclosure refers to the "deliberate public release of financial information,
whether voluntary or required, numbers, words, formal or informal, any time
during the year".' 6 More generally, disclosure can be understood in terms of the
publication of any economic or corporate information relating to a business
12 While it may sometimes seem that the US requires too much disclosure, it would appear that
most other countries require too little and have too much room in their accounting rules for
fudging. See H. Scott & P. Wellons, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation,
Westbury, New York, 1995, pp. 300-311.
13 B. Lev & S. Penman, 'Voluntary Forecast Disclosure, Nondisclosure, and Stock Prices',
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring 1990, p. 50.
14 Coffee, 'Market Failure and The Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System', pp. 739-
743.
15 See H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure, Regulation in Search of a Purpose, Law &
Business, Inc., Harcourt Brace Jovanich, New York, 1979.
16	 .M. Gibbins & J. Waterhouse, The Management of Corporate FinancIal Disclosure:
Opportunism, Ritualism, Policies, and Processes', Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No.
I, Spring 1990, p. 122.
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enterprise, quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the making of economic
decisions.' 7 Despite the seeming simplicity of the concept, few issues in today's
securities market are more contentious than the debate surrounding disclosure.
Does the mechanism of disclosure of company information provide the investor
with the material information needed for trading? Can publicly traded firms
afford to comply with a general disclosure rule that requires continuous periodic
reporting of sensitive information? How can exchanges and regulations guarantee
that the required disclosure is adequate? Is mandated disclosure an achievable
goal, or is it an amorphous concept like market efficiency? These issues represent
some of the problems surrounding disclosure and the difficulties of generating a
coherent and credible vision of what the practice should entail.18
This chapter is organised as follows; in Section 2 we consider the
theoretical aspects of disclosure, with particular attention given to the economic
aspects of enhanced information flow to the market. Section 3 considers the Saudi
approach to disclosure by reviewing the obligations of firms to provide financial
information, such as annual reports, in specific time frames as well as the
obligation to disclose information triggered by events, such as a firm listing its
shares in the Saudi stock exchange. In Section 4 we examine the impact of the
new Disclosure Rules on the practice of company disclosure. The chapter's last
7 S. Choi, 'Financial Disclosure and Entry to the European Capital Market', Journal of
Accounting Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, Autumn 1973, pp. 159-175.
IS Mandatory Disclosure has been subject to a long debate. A number of commentators have
suggested that mandatory disclosure is not necessary. See, for example, G. Stigler, 'Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets', Journal of Business 37, 1964, p. 117; G. Benston,
'Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange', American
Econo,nic Review, Vol. 63, 1973, pp. 132-153. Benston argues that mandatory periodic disclosure
does not benefit investors. However, others have argued that mandatory disclosure is necessary to
overcome 'market failure' associated with the private production of securities information. See,
for example, I. Friend & R. Westerfield, 'Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment',
American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, June 1975; Coffee, 'Market Failure and The
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section provides an analysis of disclosure requirements on firms' managers of
tender offers, and the need to establish provisions that encourage the flow of
accurate information to investors and the market.
2. Theoretical Perspective on Disclosure
The importance of disclosure is best understood in the context of the role and
meaning of information in the economic market.' 9
 The basic question is; what
role does information play in a competitive market? Information plays a vital role
in share prices, and subsequently underlines the importance of providing
investors with as much material information as possible. 2° Securities regulation in
the US and other jurisdictions, by its focus on disclosure, has contributed to
raising such questions and issues as fairness, social welfare, investors' protection,
and market efficiency. Many commentators have argued that the essential purpose
of all securities regulation is to ensure that markets operate freely and fairly.2'
Proponents, such as Brudney, argued that market participants should have equal
access to information regarding companies that are publicly traded. Upon entering
a market they are assumed to receive equal treatment and equal access to
information relevant to the shares they wish to trade. 22
 These commentators insist
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System'; R. Gilson & R. Kraakman, 'The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency', Virginia Law Review 70, 1984, PP. 549-601.
19 G. Jarrell, 'The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Securities
Issues', Journal of Law Economics, Vol. XXIV, No.1, April 1981, pp. 613-615.
20 See S. Grossman, The Informational Role of Prices, The MIT Press, London, 1989. Grossman
states that it is a common theme in most discussions of the competitive price system that prices
convey information. He added "Hayek (1945, p. 527) wrote, 'We must look at the prices system as
a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function.... The
most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or
how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action' ."
21 F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University
Press, 1993, Chapter 1.
22 V. Brudney, 'The Evolving Controversy Over Insider Trading', A,nerican Business Law
Journal, Vol. 24, 1986, P. 344.
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that the unfairness is not just a question of merely possessing more information or
not. It is often the case that certain investors will possess more information than
others.23 In this regard, unfairness is thought to arise when material information is
available to some investors lawfully, when it cannot, lawfully, be acquired by
others. 24
One of the crucial aims of securities regulation worldwide is the
protection of investors. Many countries have used investors' protection as the
basis for requiring full disclosure. 25 Investors may lack resources to request the
information of issuers and analyse it effectively. By regulating the market through
disclosure requirements, securities regulators provide the mechanics of making
information available to investors regarding a particular security. 26 Additionally,
securities regulation may play a role in forcing companies to provide information
truthfully to investors, since without truthful disclosure investors may be unable
to distinguish between fraudulent and honourable companies. 27 In this regard, the
truly uninformed investors who are not able to distinguish between the two types
of companies will inevitably choose to disregard all stock in the market. The
result is that quality issuers will be significantly deterred from issuing securities
and may choose to leave the market. The problem of adverse selection by issuers,
in which high-quality companies cannot obtain fair market value for their
23 Ibid., p. 346.
24 Opponents of the fairness argument suggest that investors can overcome the less informed
investors' problem by relying on information from intermediaries regarding their potential
investment or by investing with different types of intermediaries to invest for them. See, for
example, W.H. Beaver, 'Future Disclosure Requirements May Give Greater Recognition to the
Professional Community', Journal of Accounting Research 44, January 1978.
25 See Gordon, 'The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law' 89 Columbia Law Review 1549,
1989, p. 1558. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, pp.
297-298.
26 Coffee, 'Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System', pp. 740-
743.
27 Easterbrook & Fischel, 'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors', pp. 677-678.
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securities while low-quality companies continue to operate in the market, presents
investors with a 'lemon's problem'.28
Some commentators have argued that the adverse selection problem can
be successfully addressed by introducing institutions that foster full disclosure.29
It is often argued that rules that prompt full (or nearly full) disclosure will
increase the informational efficiency of the stock market through the
enhancement of investors learning the best price, and thereby reducing the
concealment of such information. 30 At the same time, as the quality of
information increases, investors will come to have greater confidence in the
disclosure statements of companies and will therefore pay a higher price for their
securities. 31 At the very least, therefore, higher-quality issuers will be attracted to
the market, since they will be able to distinguish themselves successfully from
low-quality issuers. Investors will benefit as long as it is clear that low-quality
issuers can be mostly kept out of the market. 32
Yet, increased regulation may not lead to an increase in investor welfare.
To be sure, compliance costs in the United States are not trivial. 33 Securities
28 See G. Akerlof, 'The Market For Lemon: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism', 84,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488, 1970.
29 See J. Seligman, 'The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System', Journal
of Corporation Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1983.	 -
30 j • Coffee, 'Market Failure and The Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System', p. 751.
Coffee states that the strongest arguments for a mandatory disclosure system may be efficiency-
based. Empirical data strongly suggests that adoption of a mandatory disclosure system reduces
price dispersion, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency of our capital markets.
3! Informational efficiency is defined as the degree to which stock prices reflect information that is
available about performance of the companies. According to the academic literature, the Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH) is subdivided into weak-form efficiency, semi-strong-form efficiency
and strong-form efficiency. See S. Keane, Stock market Efficiency, Theory, Evidence and
!mplicationsPhilip Allan Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1982.
2 Stigler, 'Economic Foundations of Stock Market Regulation', in Gray Previts (ed.) The
Development of SEC Accounting, Addison Wesley, 1981, pp. 297-315.
B L. Loss & J. Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Little, Brown & Co., Boston,
1988, p. 39. The authors state that the average cost for a company's offering documents to comply
with disclosure requirements is between 1.5% to 2% of the proceeds.
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regulation in the US introduced a number of stringent controls to counter the
problem of adverse selection, supported by monetary sanctions for false or
misleading disclosure. These are enforced by a regulatory body (the SEC), which
has a large staff and budget to pursue firms that dishonestly disclose
information.34 At the same time, the accounting requirements make it less likely
that a publicly traded company will be able to deceive or confuse professionals,
and accounting rules make it less possible for fraud or extreme embellishment to
occur in company reports. 35 Thus, even naive investors may, with the information
provided to them through disclosure, be in a position to make informed
judgements when making a choice about investing in the market.
As noted above, the compliance can be very expensive. Due diligence
investigation is costly too. Yet, without these investigations, the adverse selection
costs will increase. 36 It may be that a cost benefit analysis is required to determine
when regulatory controls become excessive. This implies, at the least, that if the
costs of compliance exceed the benefits to investors, making it (too) costly to
invest, then the regulation should be relaxed so as not to impose higher costs on
them. 37 This approach provides protection to investors, while recognising that
L. Lowenstein, 'Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What Your
Measure', p. 1353. Lowenstein writes that at the SEt, there are 120 accountants just within
CorpFin - one half of its review staff - reading annual reports and other filings. They are an
integral part of what Linda Quinn, until recently director of the Division of Enforcement, liked to
call the Commission's "active oversight" function. Why wait, she argued, until losses have been
suffered? Why let misrepresentations and errors fester until only the Division of Enforcement can
act? Those 120 accountants in CorpFin, who have no counterpart elsewhere, monitor routine
filings and are likely to be the first to see emerging issues. The division then compiles a list of 'hot
issues', so that by a speech here and a discussion there, the staff can alert the business community
as to what is to be expected.
Ibid., p. 1354.
36 S. Phillips & J. Zecher, The SEC and the Public Interest , MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, I 98 I,
pp. 50-5 1.
Coffee, 'Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System'. Coffee
argues that a mandatory disclosure system reduces the costs incurred by market professionals.
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increased regulation does not necessarily lead to the most efficient outcome for
investors.
There are a number of different disclosure regimes. Investors may
gravitate to those securities regimes that provide them with regulations that offer
accurate information that can be relied upon when determining the value of a
security. To function well, lawmakers will design rules that foster clarity and
efficiency in the provision of information to investors.
Against this background, we turn to the analysis of the Saudi disclosure
regime, concentrating on the rules and procedures for the release of company
information to the market.
3. The Saudi Disclosure Regime
The analysis of the previous section suggests that an information asymmetry
between investors and the market is best reduced by a system of truthful
disclosure, where investors can become reasonably informed about the value of a
firm's securities. In this section we begin by looking at the Saudi disclosure
regime, which can be found in the Companies Act 1965, governing public
offerings and incorporations, the Executive Rules 1984, and the Disclosure Rules
1997.
We first turn to the disclosure requirements inaugurated initially in the
Companies Act 1965.38 Since its enactment, the Companies Act has played a
major role in fostering disclosure and providing investors with essential important
information about companies in general, and joint-stock companies in particular.
38 The Companies Act was issued under Royal Decree No. M/6, 1965, and amended under Royal
decrees Nos. M/5 on 1967, M/23 on 1982, M/46 on 1985, M/22 on 1992.
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Since then, all types of companies have been required to comply with the
Companies Act's rules in order to register and operate within the Saudi
jurisdiction. As noted previously, the Act delegates regulatory agency
responsibility to the Ministry of Commerce, which has exclusive power over the
establishment of joint-stock companies, and the issuance of securities by publicly
traded companies. 39
 The Companies Act provides the disclosure requirements for
joint-stock companies in two stages. In Saudi Arabia, the Companies Act was
largely enacted in order to acquire information about companies when making
registrations. The Act requires public companies to file annual reports; the idea is
that Saudi companies have a duty in this context to supp'y material information
about their functions and events that may affect the financial performance of the
firm.
3.1 The registration statement
A duty to disclose arises when a Saudi firm files a registration statement with the
Ministry of Commerce. In this category of disclosure, the firm must supply
information prior to being granted the authorisation to incorporate under Saudi
law.4°
 A company filing with the DoC at the Ministry of Commerce provides
investors with their first chance to examine certain financial facts about the
applicant. The application for registration requires that the company state its main
purpose and function, its structure, the manner of subscription for the company's
Although the Companies Act set up the first disclosure requirements in 1965, the accounting
profession and practices were not founded until 1971. See A. Shinawi & W. F. Crum, W.F. 'The
Emergence of Professional Accounting Education and Research', International Journal of
Accounting Education and Research, 6, 1971.
40 Companies Act 1965, Art. 52, prohibits the incorporation of any companies that are not
authorised and approved by the Ministry of Commerce.
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capital, the number of shares reserved by the founders for themselves, as well as
the amount subscribed by each founder. 4 ' The company must also submit a copy
of the company's memorandum of association and bylaws, which must be signed
by the incorporators and other founders.42
A second category of disclosure occurs under the Companies Act when a
firm files a prospectus prior to the initial public listing of shares. 43 If a company
wishes to offer its shares to the public, it is required to disclose certain
information in its prospectus. 44 The prospectus requires that firms disclose the
following information:
The company's name, objective, and head office;
. The amount of paid-in capital; the classes of stock, their value, number, the
amount offered for public subscription, the amount subscribed for by the
founders, and the restrictions imposed on the negotiability of shares;
The particulars concerning contributions in kind and the rights attached
thereto;
The special privileges granted to the founders or others;
• The method of distribution of profits;
• The estimated amount of the company's preliminary expenses;
• The dates set for opening and closing the subscription and the places and
terms thereof;
41 Companies Act 1965, Art. 52-3.
42 Since the application statement, forms filed to the Ministry of Commerce are the starting point
for the establishment of such companies, the Department of Companies has the right to reject the
application or to call for more information to be disclosed or alterations to he made. If the
application is initially accepted, all its information is open to public search.
' Although the law in most jurisdictions defined the term 'prospectus', the Saudi Companies Act
did not and referred to it as 'an invitation for subscription'.
Companies Act 1965, Art. 55.
229
. The method for the allotment of shares to subscribers, if the number of shares
subscribed for exceeds the number offered for subscription;
• The date of issue of the Royal Decree authorising the incorporation of the
company and the number of the Official Gazette in which it was published.45
The goal of the Saudi prospectus disclosure requirement is that the market
receives sufficient information about the new company issuing shares, so that a
decision to invest in shares can be made with a reasonable amount of confidence.
The Companies Act, in order to ensure compliance with its disclosure
requirements, created joint liability for founders of disclosures that contain untrue
or misleading statements or important omissions.46 The Act provides for both
criminal and civil liabilities for any violation of these rules. Yet, while the
publicly stated objective to protect the capital market is reasonable, and certainly
consistent with regimes in other jurisdictions, a well-functioning market requires
that action be taken against parties that fail to observe these standards. In this
regard, the history of the Ministry of Commerce in enforcing violations suggests
that the disclosure obligation is not a serious requirement.47
As previously noted, the disclosure requirements under the Companies
Act are not sufficiently market-based as to provide for the kind of information
required to inform investors about the price characteristics of the stock. In the US
Companies Act 1965, Art. 55-3
' Companies Act 1965, Art. 55-4, states that the founders shall be jointly responsible for the
correctness of the particulars contained in the prospectus, and for setting forth in it all the
particulars referred to in the third paragraph of Art. 55.
' Companies Act 1965, Art. 229, provides that any founder, manager or director who invites
public subscription for shares of stock or bonds in contravention to the provision of the
Companies Act regulations, or anyone who knowingly signs or distributes such documents, shall
be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than three months and not more than one year
and/or a fine of not less than five thousand and not more than twenty thousand Saudi Riyal.
Despite the existence of such penalties, few cases have been brought in this context yet. See
interview with Soleman Al-Mohemmeed, Department of Companies, Ministry of Commerce,
Riyadh, 3 November 1997.
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regime of mandatory disclosure, the promoters of IPO companies are responsible
for supplying information on valuations, free cash flow, earning projections,
potential risks and contingencies, and significant amounts of other information
that enables investors to make informed decisions regarding the company's share
price and its future movements. 48
 In contrast, the Kingdom's disclosure regime in
respect to iPOs is based on a merit approach, whereby the Ministry of Commerce,
by its authority under the regulation for companies, has the responsibility to
review a company's filings for incorporation, or conversion to joint-stock status.49
The criteria regarding conversion and offerings are designed to allow the Ministry
of Commerce considerable discretion in its review of the proposed primary issue,
which includes analysis of management, issuers' assets and material facts related
to appraisal. Like the early 'Blue Sky' laws in the United States, which also
mandated 'merit review', the Ministry of Commerce evaluates offerings by
reference to whether the sale of securities would harm the interest of investors or
not. 50
 In this regard, the Kingdom's model of new issue regulation evaluates the
application on the basis of whether the sale is conducted on fair grounds and
whether the price of the issue offered is fair. 51 Unsurprisingly, the so-called
merits system of disclosure was rejected early on by the legislative draftsmen of
the US Securities Act as being too crude, in favour of a pure disclosure regime,
48 See generally R. Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation', Yale Law Review, Vol. 107, 1998, pp. 2373-23 82.
' 
'The Guidelines for Conversion to Joint Stock Companies', issued by the Ministry of
Commerce, Circular 495, dated 25/3/1418-29/7/1997, established rules for submission of
applications to the Ministry of Commerce in respect of the conversion to joint-stock companies.
P. Mahoey, 'Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems', University of chicago
Law Review, 1995, pp. 1073-1074.
51 Unlike most mature markets, where the offering price is usually suggested by underwriters on
the basis of market conditions at the offering date, the Ministry of Commerce, through the General
Department, will state the initial offering price after reviewing the company's documents.
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which relies on well-accepted business principles. 52 Based on this analysis, the
Ministry of Commerce's approach to the evaluation of companies' offerings
suffers from a range of problems. In absence of a regime that makes this role a
priority for them, the Kingdom's model must be viewed as largely incomplete. It
is ill-equipped to assist investors in accurately evaluating risks and returns
concerning new issues, both in terms of supplying information about the capital
structure, accounts and earnings, and of mandating that the promoter has a
fiduciary duty to the investors by providing them with specialised information
concerning the profitability of the new issue.
In practice, the Ministry of Commerce requires that each company
applying for conversion to a joint-stock company must have reached a certain,
significant profitability and size in the years preceding the application. 53
 These
conservative standards and strict requirements restrict many potentially high-
growth companies from going public. The argument advanced should not be
construed as a suggestion that the Ministry of Commerce should allow just any
company to go public, but rather that the Kingdom's requirements must be
updated and revised so as to narrow the information gap between issuer and
market investors.
52 Mahoey, 'Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems', 43, p. 1076.
See 'Guidelines for Conversion to Joint Stock Companies', No. 495, dated 25/3/1418, Ministry
of Commerce. The Guidelines state that a company wishing to convert to a joint-stock company
must have been established for at least 10 years, have net assets and shareholders' equity of no
less than SR 75 million and a return on equity of no less than 10% in each of the preceding five
years. In addition, a feasibility study must confirm that the return will not be less than 10% in each
of the five years following conversion.
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3.2 The annual reports
The duty to update information is also required under the Companies Act. The
duty to update is based on the idea that investors, in order to stay informed of the
financial health of the company, require continuous and accurate information
about the firm's assets and liabilities. In this regard, the Act requires that
chairman and directors supply updated information by filing an annual report.
Besides the initial prospectus and other registration documents, a company's
annual report and accounts normally provide more information about the firm's
finances than any other document it publishes. 54 Typically, the annual report
informs the company's shareholders and potential buyers about the company's
financial condition, results of its operations, capital resources, income and
dividends, and provides an estimation of its future earnings potential.
Saudi law is no different in this respect. To better enable investors to
assess the quality of the initial disclosure, the Companies Act requires that a
company file annual reports. Under the Act, the Board of Directors of any joint-
stock company is required every year, at least 60 days prior to the date set for the
Annual General Meeting, to prepare a balance sheet, a profit-and-loss statement, a
report on the company's operations and financial position, and a statement of the
method by which it proposes to distribute net profits. The report must be signed
by the chairman of the Board of Directors, and copies placed at the disposal of the
shareholders and head offices of the company at least 25 days prior to the date set
See T. Pettersen, 'Sending the Message: Getting the Business', Accountancy Age, September
1990, PP. 16-18.
Companies Act 1965, Art. 123, states that at the end of every financial year, the Board of
Directors shall make an inventory of the value of the company's assets and liabilities as of that
date and prepare a balance sheet of the company, a profit-and-loss statement and a report Ofl its
operations and financial position for the expired financial year, setting out the proposed method
for the allocation of net profits.
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for the General Meeting. In order to make the information available to investors,
the chairman of the Board of Directors must publish, in one of the local
newspapers, the company's balance sheet, its profit-and-loss statement, a
comprehensive summary of the Board of Directors' report, and the full text of the
auditor's report. The firm must also dispatch a copy of each of these documents
to the DoC at least 25 days prior to the date set for the General Meeting. 56
 At the
end of every financial year, companies must also take an inventory of the value of
the company's assets and liabilities as of that date and prepare a balance sheet, a
profit-and-loss statement, a report on its operations and financial position for the
past financial year, and an outline of the proposed method for the allocation of net
profits. The Board must deposit the documents with the auditor at least 55 days
prior to the date set for the General Meeting.57
In addition to the annual report, the company's auditor is required to
submit a report to the annual general shareholders' meeting. The report provides
shareholders with information regarding any potential violation of the Companies
Act or of the company's bylaws that have been discovered, and the extent to
which, in the opinion of the auditor, the company's accounts are in conformity
with generally accepted accounting standards. 58
 In addition, the auditor's report
must be read at the General Meeting. The General Meeting may not approve the
Board of Directors' report without hearing the auditor's report. Although the
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act are not as stringent with disclosure
56 Companies Act 1965, Art. 98.
Although many jurisdictions have paid considerable attention to disclosure through proxy
statements (a document signed by a shareholder of a corporation authorising a designated person
to vote his shares of stock at a specified shareholders meeting, which must be filed with the
securities holder), the Saudi Companies Act failed to provide ample rules governing this area,
leaving the organisation of proxy and other matter relating to voting to the company's bylaws.
58 Companies Act 1965, Art. 132.
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obligations as requirements in many other jurisdictions, a great number of Saudi
joint-stock companies have nevertheless found it very difficult to comply with
these rules. 59 In this regard, Radi Haddad, Manager of the Investment Services
Dept., Riyadh Bank, reported in an interview:
"Despite the less than restrictive annual disclosure requirements,
only certain large companies and banks have published sufficiently
comprehensive reports. These firms are motivated either by
concern for their international reputation or a desire to satisfy the
interests of their foreign shareholders. In contrast, domestically
controlled companies have fewer pressures to report accurately to
•	 60investors.
Recent empirical research reveals that the level of financial disclosure
provided in Saudi corporate annual reports is very poor. In a study by Al-
Mulhem, for example, none of the Saudi corporations that he examined complied
fully with the mandatory information rules. 61 Al-Muihem states that "the study
indicated that none of the 40 corporations investigated comply fully with
mandatory requirements. Even those companies that disclose the most, still fail to
meet a considerable number of mandatory regulations." 62 For this and other
reasons, the Ministry of Commerce has been prompted to develop new ways of
strengthening the disclosure requirements, requiring all joint-stock companies to
follow a standard set forth by the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public
Accountants 63
See Saudi Stock Market Annual Report, Bakheet Financial Advisors, Riyadh, 1998, p. 4.
° Interview with Mr. Radi Haddad, Manager of the Investment Services Dept., Riyadh Bank,
Riyadh, 13 December 1997. Mr. Haddad went on to say:
"... with the exception of SABIC and large banks, most listed companies do not comply with the
regulations of time or quality of disclosure set forth by the Ministry of Commerce."
" Al-Mulhem, 'An Empirical Investigation of the Level of Financial Disclosure by Saudi Arabian
Corporations', pp. 280-284.
62 Ibid. Al-Muihem states that the results of these studies provides the regulatory authorities in the
Kingdom with firm evidence that Saudi corporations are not fully complying with the mandatory
rules. Overall disclosure indexes vary between companies, ranging from 38% to 76%.
Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants, issued by Royal Decree No. M/12, dated
13/5/1412, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce.
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In 1997, the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants issued
what is called the General Presentation and Disclosure Standard, which sets forth
the general presentation and disclosure requirements of financial statements,
including consolidated and development-stage company financial statements
The General Presentation and Disclosure Standard prescribes the treatment for
accounting changes and contingencies. More specifically, it prescribes
requirements with respect to the disclosure of the identity of the reporting entity,
the nature of its business, characteristics of its financial statements, its accounting
policies, and reporting of changes, contingencies, commitments and events. 65
 The
Ministry of Commerce responded quickly by adopting the General Presentation
and Disclosure Standard and applied it to all financial statements of business
enterprises, regardless of the legal form of the reporting entity or the nature of its
business activities. 66
 Whilst the standard proposed is a good mechanism to
prompt better disclosure levels, many of the joint-stock companies could not
comply with it, because they found the rules either too difficult to comply with, or
because they felt the rules did not fit their interests. In this respect, Yousef El-
Mobarak, Secretary General of SOCPA, noted that:
"The adoption of the standard was to provide people with better
information. However, some companies have not complied with the
standards for different reasons. For example, banks that have
adopted their own accounting and disHosure requirements which
suit the nature of their own business do not want to change. ,,67
Ibid.
The General Presentation and Disclosure Standard, Saudi Organisation for Certified Public
Accountants, 1997, p. 55.
See Ministry of Commerce Circular to all joint-stock companies, No. 222/400/4783, dated
2/9/ 14 14.
67 See interview with Mr. Yousef El-Mobarak, Secretary General of SOCPA, Riyadh, 27 August
1997. See also SAMA circular to all banks, No. M.A/382, dated 22/7/1415.
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Unfortunately, the Ministry of Commerce's adoption of the General Presentation
and Disclosure Standard, does not improve reporting standards for investors and
shows little influence on whether the company actually satisfies the disclosure
obligation. In order to ensure complete and proper disclosure, the Ministry of
Commerce will certainly have to introduce other requirements.
4. The Stock Market Disclosure Rules
Stock exchanges in most countries require all companies which wish their
securities to be traded on the stock exchange to publish more initial information
than was required by the prospectus requirements of the Companies Acts. 68 As in
most jurisdictions, in Saudi Arabia there are stock market rules that mandate
disclosure. The stock market disclosure rules are governed by the Executive
Rules, Instructions to Central Trading Units, and the Disclosure Rules. The stock
market rules were designed to supplement disclosure requirements set forth by the
Companies Act, which were perceived as insufficient to satisfy the information
requirements of market investors. We now turn to the analysis of the listing
requirements.
4.1 The stock market listing requirements
Listing requirements are major features of the main stock markets today. 69 Stock
exchanges usually require companies seeking listing to enter into a listing
68 A. Alcock, Dealing in UK Equities, Jordan and Sons Ltd., Bristol, 1992, P. 129.
Ibid., pp. 132-134. Alcock states that in the UK, the Council of the London Stock Exchange was
empowered to make and administer the listing rules as subordinated legislation. Section 3 of the
Yellow Book details the contents required for listing both those imposed by the European
Directives, and the additional ones imposed by the Stock Exchange. In the US, exchanges under
the self-regulation system are empowered to make their own listing rules. However, the SEC still
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agreement with the exchange, under which, for the privilege of listing, the
company agrees to publicise more information on a continuous basis, over and
above the limited annual reports and accounts required by law. 7° Whatever the
motives for seeking listing, an issuer today must meet the stricter disclosure and
financial reporting requirements required by stock markets worldwide. 7 ' Clearly,
listing requirements play a larger role than merely acquiring more information
from companies. First, they serve the primary purpose of any stock exchange,
which is to foster public confidence in the market: namely, they ensure that each
applicant for listing is of at least a minimum size, has sufficient history and
provides adequate information in the prospectus to form a reliable basis for a
market evaluation, that all issuers are marketed on a fair and open basis, with
public participation when appropriate, and that the company treats investors with
proper consideration at all times, even when they represent a minority. 72 Second,
and most importantly, listing requirements enhance the power of the market rules
and their enforcement. Any company obtaining listing on the stock exchange
is deemed to have accepted the rules and supervision of the stock market
authorities. 73 This underscores the necessity for them to be one of the essential
requirements, not only in the mature market but also in most of the emerging
exercises great power over the operation of the exchange and their listing rules. See Reed, ' Stock
Exchange Listing Agreements as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance' University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 123, 1981, pp. 1435-1438.
70 Ibid., p. 1429.
71 K. Rayner, Listing Securities in the United States and the United Kingdom, Graham & Trotman,
London, 1991, pp. 1-9.
72 Ibid.
See Reed, 'The Stock Exchange Listing Agreements as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance', p.
1444.
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market as well. This is particularly true for the Middle East markets, especially
the relatively closed market of Saudi Arabia.74
Although listing requirements typically provide market participants with a
mass of detailed information and better control over those companies who seek to
go public, neither the Executive Rules nor the Disclosure Rules have any listing
requirements. Companies granted a licence to operate as a joint-stock company
from the Ministry of Commerce are automatically qualified for listing. According
to the Companies Act, issuers are allowed to float shares as soon as the
subscribers receive the share warrants and register the transfer with the
company.75 This central omission in the Saudi disclosure regime is allegedly
justified by the view that if joint-stock companies are required to comply with the
listing requirement, issuers would also be obliged to provide disclosure in
accordance with the Ministry of Commerce's prospectus requirement. While
listing requirements are viewed as necessary in most jurisdictions because they
provide investors with the relevant financial information immediately, the stock
market regulatory body apparently also holds the view that listing requirements,
as applied to joint-stock companies, could be an unnecessary duplication.76
Presently, the disclosure regime of Saudi Arabia has no specific listing
See M. El-Erian, 'Middle East Financial Markets: Potential for Development and
Internationalization', Middle East Executive Report, June 1994.
Companies Act 1965, Art. 102, states that registered shares shall be transferred by means of an
entry in the stockholders' register kept by the company, containing (1) stockholders' names,
nationalities, residence addresses and occupations, (2) serial numbers of the shares held by them,
and (3) the amounts paid up on such shares. An annotation shall be made on the share warrants to
the effect that such an entry was made. A transfer of title to any registered share shall be effective
as far as the company or third parties are concerned only from the date of its entry in the said
register. Shares to bearer are transferable by mere delivery.
76 See for example S. Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and
its Policy Implications', dissertation submitted to Michigan State University for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, 1990, pp. 17-19.
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requirements for publicly traded companies. Listing rules are designed to provide
information about events that would materially affect the price or value of the
company's securities. Firms are required to release this information as soon as the
company becomes aware of the information.
It is submitted that the Ministerial Committee should enact new listing
requirements, or amend the Disclosure Rules 1997, which require that publicly
traded companies comply with a set of Saudi exchange disclosure rules. The
Ministerial Committee could formulate a set of rules, starting with the general
mandate that joint-stock companies be required to immediately make available
any relevant material or information that a reasonable investor would expect to
affect the value of their share price. This rule would not apply to particular
information. It might further provide that the Ministry of Commerce, or SAMA,
be given the discretion to ensure that disclosure requirements are translated into
rules that ensure fair information to the market generally. This proposed
amendment is consistent with the Ministerial Committee's modern trend of
requiring firms to also report continuously. In this regard, while the Saudi
disclosure regime is bereft of listing rules, it mandates that firms provide periodic
and continuous reporting as set forth in the Disclosure Rules, Article 2. Hence,
the Ministerial Committee can be expected to supplement the regime by offering
a compliance structure that enhances the delivery of important financial
information to the market.
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4.2 The stock market periodic reports
As we have argued, the Executive Rules do not oblige firms to comply with any
listing requirements. The Executive Rules do, however, provide for quarterly
periodic reports. In addition to the annual financial reporting requirement, the
Executive Rules seek to provide investors with more information, by requiring
each company to publish quarterly information of its financial position and its
operating activities.77 The report must be published in two daily papers within a
two-month period from the end of the quarter. Companies that do not comply
with the disclosure requirements will be held liable, usually by being suspended
from share trading in the market, or with punishments available pursuant to the
Companies Act.78 Our interviews with SAMA officials revealed that, despite the
penalties available under the Act, few, if any, companies have been held liable for
disclosure non-compliance.79
The quarterly report is required to contain the company's balance sheet,
profit-and-loss statement, summary of the Board of Directors' report and the full
report of the company's auditor. Unsurprisingly, it is only large companies and
banks, as with the annual report, who have been able to comply with the quarterly
disclosure requirement. 8° It is even less satisfactory that the publication of the
financial figures about some companies did nQt offer a truly clear idea about the
financial position of these companies, since 'bad' news is almost never
'Executive Rules to Regulate Share Dealing in Company Shares through Local Banks', SAMA
circular to all banks, General Banking Control Department, Saudi Arabia, December 1984, Art.
19.
78 Executive Rules 1984, Art. 19-d.
Interview with Al-Rashed, Manger of the Securities Control Department, Riyadh, 17 August
1997.
80 It is clear that banks comply with the quarterly report because they are directly supervised and
regulated by SAMA, under which the SCD falls. However, other joint-stock companies continue
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published. 8 ' Until recently, the release of information was a serious problem in
the Saudi market. Many companies try to hide bad news from investors and only
publish reports concerning predictions of the future success of their operations.
Radi Haddad, Assistant Senior Manager of Investment Services Department of
Riyadh Banks, took the view that:
The Saudi disclosure regime is not satisfactory at all. Indeed, I
think that the disclosure regime is the most serious problem
threatening the market. I believe that the timing and type of
information published by most listed companies has not helped
investors in making their investment decisions. Not only does the
delay of publications fail to meet the required standard, but also
the type of information. Furthermore, due to the lack of listing
requirements as well as other reporting requirements, there is little
to be gained from the disclosure regime"82
There are several explanations of the perceived failure of firms to comply with
quarterly reporting requirements. It may be that the cost of hiring good
accountants is too high for small firms. Yet, beyond a cost explanation, it must be
assumed that since the Ministry of Commerce does not appear to punish violators,
firms have little compulsion, unless they have foreign investors or shareholders,
to accurately report the information to the market.83
publishing the annual report, which goes to the Ministry of Commerce, not the Securities Control
Department, and these companies feel no obligation to report to SAMA.
' See, for example, Mobarrad Annual Report and financial statements 1993-1994, Riyadh
Gazette, Vol. 10319, 24 September 1996. The company published misleading information in its
annual report and financial statement. See also Bakheet Financial Advisors' Annual Report 1998,
P4, which states that Riyadh Bank has consistently refused, for reasons yet to he made public, to
publish many of its quarterly statements for the past few years.
82 Interviw with Radi Haddad, Assistant Senior Manager of Investment Services Department of
Riyadh Bank, Riyand, 13 December 1997.
Al-Muihem, 'An Empirical Investigation of the Level of Financial Disclosure By Saudi Arabian
Corporations', pp. 248-252.
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5. The Disclosure Rules
In response to the demand for more investor protection, Saudi Arabia enacted the
Disclosure Rules in 1997 to strengthen the market's disclosure regime. 84 In effect,
the new rules amount to a continuous disclosure requirement. They require,
through Article 2(a), that any information, decisions or major events which may
affect share prices directly or indirectly must be announced immediately to the
SCD of SAMA for dissemination via ESIS, and to the mass media. 85 As we have
seen, such a requirement was necessary, because the Executive Rules did not
contain listing rules for publicly traded companies or government enforcement of
such rules. The passage of the Disclosure Rules coincided with major personnel
changes at the ministries, including the appointment of a new Minister of
Commerce and a new Minster of Finance and National Economy. 86 In this regard,
the new rules can be seen as an attempt to pursue policy objectives that promote
value for investors by favouring disclosure.
This requirement imposes liability upon the Chairman or Managing
Director. The Ministerial Committee takes the position that if important
information related to the company is generally available, it is either the
Chairman or the Managing Director who will possess it due to their positions.
With respect to disclosure responsibilities it my therefore be said that a company
is liable to disclose any information a person would reasonably expect a director
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Ministry of Commerce Circular, Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417.
85 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2-a.
A new Council of Ministers was appointed in 1995 as the beginning of a new strategy for
economic development that would shift the national economy from one that relied heavily on the
government to one that was led by the private sector. Therefore, the new Council of Ministers
includes new ministers in charge of trade and finance who are highly educated and well-versed in
development economics.
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or chief officer to have come into possession of in the course of the performance
of their duties.87
The Rules also provide that a listed company must disclose such
information through the mass media and to the SCD. The SCD provides that its
staff is responsible for processing the material information confidentially.88
Presumably, the SCD was selected to operate the continuous disclosure system,
because businesses wanted to have a party with which they could negotiate, for
example, about which information must be disclosed.
In contrast, the US continuous disclosure regime has been criticised for
failing to consider the importance of issuer concerns arising from the value of
information in competitive markets. 89 The concern, no doubt, is that a rule
requiring disclosure of all material information, does not consider that firms may
need to keep some information secret. To stem concerns of the loss of business
confidence and litigation, the SEC published a series of announcements to
accommodate the business community's concerns. 90 Turning more specifically to
the obligations of the Saudi disclosure system, the new rules require firms to
announce 'any major events or information'. The continuous disclosure
requirement is unusually broad, lacking any concern for sensitive information.
The extraordinary breadth, however, is revealing. Commentators argue that an
exchange that does not specifically enforce its rules can afford to be imprecise
87 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2.
88 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2-a.
E. Kitch, 'The Theory and Practice of Continuous Disclosure', Brooklyn Law Review, 1995, pp.
763-770.
90 See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 16, 384, 18 SEC Doc het (CCH) 1053, 1070, 29
November 1979, conceding secrecy in the control of a Schedule 14D-9 filing; See also Schedule
14D-9, Item 7(a) instructions, 17C. F.R. & 240, 14d-1, 1998.
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and overly broad in their language, because there is no prospect of effective
enforcement.9'
Despite its extraordinary breadth, the Disclosure Rules provide a list of
major events that a listed company would be expected to disclose. Article 2-a
requires disclosure in the case of the following non-inclusive circumstances:
Any important information which would help shareholders and investors to
understand the company's statutes or about major developments concerning
activities of the company which may lead to major changes in its assets,
liabilities or financial situation;
. Recommendations concerning cash dividends;
. Recommendations concerning the company's increase or decrease of capital;
• Recommendations concerning the distribution of stock dividends through
capitalisation;
• Merger or take-over situations; both companies involved must make an
announcement;
. Any sudden losses suffered by the company that may affect share prices;
• Sale of any part of the company's assets that would materially affect the
company's profit or loss;
• New contracts which may materially affect the company's profitability or
share prices, and;
Any change in ownership which would affect the management or policy of the
company.92
91 See, e.g., D. Oesterle, 'The Inexorable March Toward A Continuous Disclosure Requirement
for Publicly Traded Companies; Are We There Yet?', Cardoso Law Review, 1998, pp. 135-163.
92 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2-a.
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Certainly, the list of major events seems to provide a framework for
satisfying the continuous reporting requirement. 93 While the disclosure rules are
specific to major cash dividends, losses and other corporate events, it must be
assumed that the rules also cover conflict-of-interest transactions and other
similar acts.94 The Disclosure Rules attempt to address the problem of rumours or
unusual market activities by requiring that both companies involved in merger
situations make statements about a pending merger or take-over situation.95
The Disclosure Rules 1997 require, for the first time, disclosure of
information relating to take-overs and changes in corporate control. If
management has knowledge of developments that could result in abnormally
heavy trading and price fluctuation due to mergers or take-over talks, it is obliged
to disclose this. In such a situation, regulators fear that rumours about a potential
transaction could start, and accordingly require a company to make a public
release of it in order to prevent any unfairness or abuse of the information. 96
 Al-
Routea, a trader, expressed that view that:
"I think that the important information is not available for the
rest of the market participants. Valuable information is only
available to those who are close to listed companies and other
The Saudi approach towards disclosure requirements might be reformulated to include relevant
information. Such a standard was adopted by New Zealand in 1993, when it revised the
Companies Act, and the New Zealand Stock Exchange amended its listing rules immediately
thereafter. For example, New Zealand List Rule 10:1.1 obliges the release of all relevant
information to the Exchange, which means that the issuer (in contrast to equity and security
holders) immediately ceases to attach great value to the confidentiality of the information. It shall
no longer be a sufficient reason to withhold relevant information if release of it may adversely
affect the market price of any of the issuer's quoted securities, or its abilities to attract and retain
debt financing on favourable firms.
Pursuant to Art. 2 of the Disclosure Rules, we expect management of some of the listed
companies to announce other new developments, such as those concerning changes in the
companies' managers or auditors, or the establishment of competitive companies.
See, e.g., A. Auerbach, Corporate Take-over: Causes and Consequences, University of Chicago
Press, 1988.
Interview with Abdulaziz Al-Dukhiel, President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and
Investment , Riyadh, 12 December 1997, Al-Dukhiel states that one of the major factors slowing
down IPO's growth is the lack of rules governing take-overs and mergers. Families and owners of
private companies that are going public may lead to hostile take-overs.
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sources of such information, whereas other market participants
have no access to such information whatsoever, which might
explain the sudden movements of some shares without the
announcement of new information."97
The Disclosure Rules also require that anticipated changes in ownership
be reported, although, in Article 2's present wording, it is broad in scope.
Accordingly, the Rules could be revised by first requiring the owner, if triggered
by material probable acquisition, to disclose its change in holdings, enabling the
market authorities to control any sudden and unwelcome take-over and
acquisition by outsiders.98
 The Rules could also be supplemented by specifying
the percentage of control that has to shift in order to be considered a change in
ownership and, therefore, constituting a major event. 99
 Given the sensitive nature
of information, firms should give a clear and precise set of disclosure rules to
ensure effective compliance. It is submitted that the existing disclosure rules
concerning tender offers require a comprehensive policy review and revision.
There are no specific information requirements on acquiring companies or
persons making a bid for shares of a company.
To address this problem, securities regulations will typically include
security market law provisions relating to the methods by which a substantial
shareholding in a publicly traded company may be obtained, and the
disclosure requirements that are triggered when a substantial holding is reached.
Interview with Mr. Ahmad Al-Routea an active trader in the Saudi stock market, Riyadh, 3
December 1997.
In the UK, all dealings by directors have to be reported to the Stock Exchange within five days
of the dealing. This information is published, in full detail, in the Stock Exchange Weekly
Intelligence. Unsurprisingly, dealing by directors has become a popular source of information for
investors.
See GA. O'Connor, 'Guide to Stockpicking, Director's Dealings', Gillian O'Connor, London,
1996, pp. 61-63.
In the US, A substantial holding is defined as more than 5% of a class of stock of a public
company. See, e.g., Dan Riverv. Unitex, 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir.1980).
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In the US, for example, Rule 13(d) "requires any person or group who acquires,
directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any class of equity
securities of an issuer must disclose such acquisition by filling the information
required on Schedule 13D within 10 days of such acquisition."°° This provision,
along with certain SEC rules, requires that a person acquiring this proportion of a
company's shares must immediately disclose their holdings and make further
filings each time holdings are increased or decreased.'°' The purpose of this
regime is to alert existing investors, in the face of tender offers, that a new major
participant exists.
Usually take-over rules require the bidder to disclose to the securities
market regulator specific information relating to the offer, particularly financial
conditions of the acquiring compan y, plans for the target company (e.g.,
disposals) and any agreements.'° 2 The purpose of the disclosure requirements is
to give investors an opportunity to become informed about significant changes for
the company and plans for any changes which may affect their interests.
Arguably, the introduction of supplemental rules to the Disclosure Act would add
considerably to the quality of investor protection in the Kingdom.
Returning to the Disclosure Rules, Article 2-b requires that the Board of
Directors, managers and executive employees must not make statements or
comments or offer information, unless such announcements truly reflect the
100 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d).
101 The principal source of the take-over regulations is the Williams Act 1968. Williams Act
added several new provisions to the 1934 Act. Those directly applicable to take-over bids arc
13(d) and (e) and § 14(d) and (e).
102 For a discussion of the U.S take-over regime, See Coffee, J. Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance,
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 84, 1984, pp. 1145-1216
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current state of affairs of the company. 103 This provision is intended to place
company directors and officers under pressure to tell the truth in any statement or
comment they may make about the company's situation. The law imposes
liability for the announcement of any untrue statements or omission of any
important information about the company. The prohibition was necessary to
restrain the directors of some companies from providing the market with untrue
or misleading information for the purpose of increasing the prices of the
company's shares, or to satisfy company shareholders in the General Meeting.
The duty to disclose information that is not misleading is, in essence, an
anti-fraud rule. There are no official anti-fraud rules in Kingdom's market
regulations. Accordingly, there is very little incentive for companies to inform
investors credibly about their plans. This lacuna can be addressed by adopting a
provision that requires firms' managers to make truthful statements in connection
with tender offers. This is based on the idea that managers should be obliged to
give investors (and the market) fundamentally accurate statements about their
plans and they should be held liable for any misstatements. 104 This suggestion
would build on the basic disclosure regime to increase efficiency and
effectiveness, and would enhance the aims of the Kingdom in developing rules
that encourage the provision of information to the market. In this regard, the
Securities Control Department of SAMA would be in a position to require a firm
to supplement its statement with specific documentation or non-material public
03 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 2-b.
For a discussion of the importance of anti-fraud rules, see I. Ayres, 'Back To Basics:
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market', 77, Virginia Law Review 945 (1991).
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information to show that the firm's statements are not misleading)°5
Undoubtedly, the new Disclosure Rules enacted by the Ministerial Committee
articulate a continuous disclosure obligation that supplements the Companies Act
and the stock market rules. Yet, the unusually broad definition of the disclosure
requirement is a cause for concern, since no regime can afford to require firms to
be subject to rules that doe not allow businesses to keep some information
confidential. In this regard, an articulation that this applies to the disclosure of
relevant information provides a more appropriate standard, acknowledging
justified circumstances of withholding information.
6. Summary
This chapter has examined the pattern of the disclosure rules in Saudi Arabia,
questioning whether the new rules enforce positive disclosure obligations on the
management of firms. In the first section of the chapter, we considered the
theoretical aspects of disclosure, with particular attention given to the economic
aspects of enhanced information flow to the market. We then examined the Saudi
approach to disclosure by reviewing the obligations of listed companies to
disclose information to stock market investors. In this regard, we examined the
specific disclosure rules contained in the Companies Act, the Executive Rules,
and the Disclosure Rules. We found that the reporting requirements set forth in
the Companies Act and the Executive Rules provide the basis for the
release of essential information about companies to the market. Special attention
'° For example, the US context provides investors with confidence by supplying information
necessary to make a statement not misleading. See Rule 105-5(6), 17 C.F.R. & 240, 106-5(b),
1998.
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was given to registration requirements, particularly for new companies, and their
adequacy in informing investors of new information, developments and possible
investment risks. The analysis of annual reports indicated that the requirements
are sufficiently comprehensive as to provide investors with accurate financial
statements of the company in question.
Subsequently, the importance of listing requirements as a major step
towards adequate disclosure was discussed. Our analysis revealed that Saudi law
does not mandate any listing requirements. It was recommended that the
Kingdom introduce listing rules in conformity with the worldwide trend. The last
part of the chapter analysed the Disclosure Rules 1997, which were adopted to
strengthen the flow of information to the market. We have seen that the
Disclosure Rules impose liabilities upon corporate managers to announce any
new major event likely to have impact on share prices of the company. This
chapter has shown that the Kingdom's continuous disclosure requirement is
rather broad and lacks concern for sensitive information or information likely to
have an effect on share prices of listed companies. Suggestions have subsequently
been made to encourage more effective disclosure.
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Chapter 8
Insider Trading
1. Introduction
This chapter analyses the problem of insider trading, identifies an agenda for
research and legal reform in Saudi Arabia, and compares the US and European
approaches to the regulation of insider trading. This chapter draws some lessons
from the main legal and economic models dealing with the enforcement of illegal
trading. It is now widely accepted that trading by an individual, on the basis of
non-public material information in securities of a corporation of which he is an
insider, violates the securities laws in many countries. Corporate insiders are no
longer allowed, under many legal theories, to utilise insider information that they
receive by virtue of their position to gain personal profit at the expense of their
trading partners. Until recently, insider trading was often considered a problem
related to the US markets. 1 This may have been due to the fact that the battle
against insider trading has a very long history there, dating back to the nineteenth
century, when the fiduciary issue was first raised.2 Unlike the US, which has long
been committed to the prohibition of insider trading, many European and most
developing countries, have permitted it. 3 These states have only recently
recognised the shortcomings of their own established practices, and have
Pitt and Harrison, 'Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the International Response to Insider
Trading', in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, No. 4, Autumn 1992, P. 199.
2 H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Markets, New York, The Free Press, 1966, pp. 1-5.
Until 1986, the United Kingdom and France were the only countries in Europe who had
regulations against insider trading. Other European countries have enacted legislation against
insider trading more recently.
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developed specific procedures designed to strengthen the reputations of their
respective capital markets.
A number of factors are responsible for the worldwide proliferation of
insider trading regulation. Many discussions of the phenomenon point to the
globalisation of securities markets, which purportedly has created the situation
whereby securities laws, including insider trading, have increasingly become a
matter of informational concern. 5
 In this view, there are strong domestic and
international pressures on regulators to pursue national regulatory policy, which
enhances and sustains the globalisation and integration of capital markets. Indeed,
the impact of internationally driven changes in the capital markets led the
European Community to adopt the Inside-Dealing Directive. 6 Interestingly, the
introduction of the Directive forced the few countries that had failed to pass
legislation prohibiting insider trading to enact regulations to make such trading
illegal. For example, Germany adopted legislation in 1994, making insider trading
a crime for the first time in German history.7
In many developing countries, the law against insider trading has tended
to converge with US and EC approaches. Yet, there has been reluctance on the
part of national regulators within certain jurisdictions to inaugurate new legal
' See I. Pingel, 'The EC Directive 1989', in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws
of Europe, the United States and Japan, Kiuwer Law Taxation Publishers, Boston, 1992, pp. 5-6.
M. Fox, 'Insider Trading in A Globalising Market: Who Should Regulate What?', Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 55, No. 4, Autumn 1992, p. 263.
6 See the European Council Directive of 13 November 1989, 'Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Dealing' (89/592/EEC).
' Prior to implementation of the Directive, insider trading in Germany was governed by the
Voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines. The Guidelines were voluntary, and adhered to by contract.
Therefore, they do not have the force of law and it is doubtful that they rise to the level of
customary usage of the industry, which might create obligations under the Civil Code. See, G.
Thoma & J. Berck, 'Insider Trading in Germany', in Gaillard (ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws of
Europe, the United States and Japan, pp. 79-80. For the developments of German insider trading,
see D. Standen, 'Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany; Bracing for the Cold Winds of
Change', in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 177-178, and
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prohibitions. Their reluctance to alter the rules of the game is due perhaps to the
distributional implications of insider trading legislation. Indeed, Saudi Arabia
was, until 1997, quite successful in resisting the international pressures to enact
specific regulations prohibiting insider trading.8
The Disclosure Rules 1997 impose liability upon any person who trades
on the basis of non-public information. 9 The absence of a norm and legal rules
against insider trading suggested that there were strong domestic pressures in
favour of the status quo. In this regard, Saudi directors were permitted (without
restriction) to trade the securities of companies in which they were managers
without violating the law. In answer to a question concerning the level of insider
trading in the Saudi stock market, Abdul Aziz A1-Dukhiel, President of the
Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment, expressed the view that:
"While it is difficult to provide a precise measure of the level of
insider trading in the Saudi stock market, I think that with the
current standard of disclosure, trading based on inside
information is the only way to win in the market. And if this
practice is illegal, it would appear that illegal practices take place
on a large scale. I call for the current regulation to be developed
in order to stop trading based on inside
Despite the presence and depth of large-scale insider trading, there have been
growing pressures, mostly from large institutions, to introduce much-needed
reforms in the regulation of the stock market' 1 In its efforts to respond to the
Appel & Weger, 'The EEC Directive on Insider Dealing', 22 Rev. Sec & Corn. Reg. 137, 5 July
1989.
8 Companies Act 1965, Art. 73, prohibits corporate insiders and corporate auditors from releasing
inside information to anyone outside the General Meeting of the company; however, the law did
not prohibit them from trading based on such information themselves.
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Ministry of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417, Art. 4.
'° See interview Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel, President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and
Investment, Riyadh, 12 December 1997.
SAMA was relatively aware of the side-effect of the abuse of inside information by banks and
their employees, which led to the including of insider trading provisions in the new enactment
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demand that the Kingdom's stock market operate fairly and freely, the Ministerial
Committee enacted the 1997 Disclosure Rules. 12 As was the case in Germany, it
was the first time the government directly addressed the problem of insider
trading in Saudi legislation.' 3 Unfortunately, the new provisions were drafted in
an overly technical and restrictive manner. Based on this legislative construction,
it appears that the Kingdom's commitment to pursue this line of reform may not
be fully credible.' 4
 Undoubtedly, the issue of commitment is affected by the
institutional arrangements for administering regulatory policy. The government
could introduce mechanisms that make commitment more likely. One proposal
for introducing good regulatory policy might be the introduction of a new
structural arrangement. For example, the creation of an enforcement agency
charged with regulating fraud and taking actions to curb investors' incentives to
act in an opportunistic way could enhance fairness and efficiency in the market.
This goal could be furthered by the enforcement agency introducing a
surveillance system that is supported by punitive penalties for insider trading.
The issue of commitment and opportunistic behaviour is certainly a key
issue for Saudi Arabia, since presently there are no criminal or civil remedies for
insider trading.' 5 Generating incentives for efficient regulation, therefore, requires
"The Instructions to CTUs" in 1990. However, the Instructions to CTUs limited the insider trading
provision to banks and their employees and did not extend its scope to other market participants.
2 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Ministry of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417.
13 See Standen, 'Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany; Bracing for the Cold Winds of
Change', pp. 177-178.
' See, H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul International, London, 1997, P. 156. Azzam states that insider
trading is illegal in Saudi Arabia, just as in the United States. However, the enforcement
mechanism in Saudi Arabia is poor. The penalty for such trading is not specified in regulations. In
practice, an offender usually receives a warning for a violation and is asked not to do it again.
15 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Ministry of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417. Art. 5, which is devoted to punishment of violations, has not
set forth the available sanctions. In particular, Art. 5 states that the creation of an unfair market
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political entrepreneurs and politicians to actively counter the actions of interest
groups, who profit from the current lax enforcement policy. To the extent that
barring insiders from trading has distributive consequences, we can expect private
interest groups to mount political action directed at policymakers. Naturally, the
incentive for the Kingdom's policy makers to take legislative action stems in part
from the possibility that the policy outcome will result in a more effective
regulatory environment, lowering the transaction costs of securities trading in the
market.
It is, of course, difficult to quantify the reduction of additional trading
costs due to stepped-up regulation against insiders. Recent micro-economic
research shows that the failure to enforce regulations can have adverse
consequences on trading mechanisms. Market friction due to the presence of
informed trading has the effect of increasing the costs for small, uninformed
traders.' 6
 Hence, the average expected trading costs tend to be lower in more
transparent markets.' 7 The efficiency effect of more transparency and the
presence of a norm against insider trading could result generally in greater
liquidity, which will improve the terms of trade for the majority of traders.
Operational and informational efficiency considerations reinforce the priority for
regulatory reform of the capital market in order to enhance liquidity. Clearly, the
case for regulatory reform in the Saudi stock market is based on the benefits that
and/or persons acting on inside information (i.e., information which is not freely available to the
public) is prohibited. Any violation will be punishable according to the regulations within the
Kingdom.
16 N. Seyhun, Investment Intelligence From Insider Trading, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, pp. 28-30. Seyhun argues that if small, uninformed
investors feel that the stock market is stacked against them, they will choose to invest their funds
elsewhere, such as in savings accounts or government bonds. This will decrease the liquidity of
the stock market and thereby increase the cost of raising new funds for firms.
' See J. McCahery, 'Market Regulation and Particularistic Interest', in 0. Underhill (ed.), The
New World Order in international Finance, London, MacMillan, 1997, pp. 53-54.
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can be derived from enhanced liquidity and limiting the costs of the terms of
trade. 18
This chapter studies insider trading both at the theoretical level and at the
level of legal doctrine. It outlines economic discussions of insider trading, which I
will address in this thesis. In this chapter, I attempt to analyse what might be done
to introduce legal reforms to strengthen the performance of the national regulator
in Saudi Arabia. The prohibition of insider trading has been subject to a
considerable amount of discussion during the past two decades. Section 2
discusses theories of insider trading, concentrating on efficiency and fairness
approaches. Section 3 examines the Saudi approach to insider trading and new
rules adopted to deter the practice. Particular attention will be given to the
analysis of the definition of the terms 'insiders' (primary v. secondary), 'tippees'
and 'outsiders'.
2. Theoretical Perspective on Insider Trading
Insider trading is a worldwide phenomenon. In fact, most jurisdictions have by
now enacted regulations prohibiting insider trading. 19 The term 'insider trading'
generally refers to stock transactions made by officers, directors or large
shareholders of the firm in question. 2° Trading by insiders in securities on the
basis of unpublished price-sensitive information has been regulated under
different legal theories. This section examines the fiduciary, efficiency, fairness
18 See, generally, K. Butler & S. Malaikah, 'Efficiency and Inefficacy in Thinly Traded Stock
Markets: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia', Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 1992, PP. 197-210.
Many emerging markets have followed the international trend of prohibiting insider trading.
See, for example, C. Mulholland, 'Insider Trading in New Zealand: Aspects of the Wilson NciII
Case', in Gordon Walker & Brent Fisse (eds.), Securities Regulation in Australia and New
Zealand, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 641.
20 Seyhun, Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, p. 1.
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and liquidity theories, respectively, theories which have been offered as the bases
for prohibiting insider trading.
2.1 Fiduciary duty and insider trading
The theory of fiduciary duty is one of the oldest theories offered as a basis for the
prohibition of insider trading. 2 ' Although insider trading has been described as
one of the most serious offences occurring in financial markets today, arguments
about the morality of corporate insiders trading based on non-public price-
sensitive information was not questioned publicly until 1909.22 At that time,
many American courts had used the fiduciary duty to establish a special
relationship between directors, the corporation and its shareholders, whereby
directors owe fiduciary duties to their corporation and the shareholders thereof.23
The introduction of fiduciary duty as a basis for the prohibition of insider
trading was first developed in the US under the common law. 24 Some states
adopted what is usually described as the 'majority rule'. Under this rule, directors
and offices had no affirmative obligation to disclose the information used as basis
for the transaction as long as the corporation suffered no damage. 25 The majority
rule established that corporate insiders owe a fiduciary duty only to the
corporation, and not to the shareholders. 26 Directors could be involved in selling
21 Manne, insider Trading and the Stock Markets, PP. 1-3.
22 At that time, many American courts had ruled for the first time on some cases that raised the
issue of the fiduciary duty as a reason for prohibiting insiders from using information which they
receive by their positions to gain personal profits. See, for example, Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga 362,
45 S.E. 232 (1903) and Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 43 1(1909).
23 Manne, insider Trading and the Stock Markets, pp. 23-26.
24 L. Loss, & J. Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1995, p. 750.
25 Ibid., pp. 768-769.
26 Ibid.
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and buying shares of the corporation that they manage, without the obligation to
disclose any information. Under the minority rule, the courts simply asserted that
directors and officers were a fiduciary or trustee to existing shareholders.27
Even after the enactment of the securities laws in the US, the reliance on
the fiduciary duty doctrine continued to be the central legal basis for the
prohibition of insider trading. 28 Indeed, the early interpretation of Section lOb and
Rule lO(b)-5 by federal courts established a 'disclose or abstain' requirement with
respect to trading on the basis of non-public price-sensitive information. 29 The
'disclose or abstain' rule required that insiders who are in a fiduciary relationship
to the other party in a transaction either disclose the material information or
abstain from making the transaction.30
The duty of insiders to disclose or abstain was first found in Matter of
Cady Roberts & Co. 31 In this case, the Supreme Court determined that anyone
who was involved in trading for his own account in the securities of a
corporation, and who has "access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone", may not take advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing. 32 In the landmark decision of the Texas
27 Ibid. Under the minority rules, corporate insiders were required to make full disclosure of all
relevant facts before dealing with their beneficiary.
28 j • McLaughin, & M. Macfarlane, 'Insider Trading in the United States of America', in
Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan, pp.
289-293.
29 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b).
30 Yet ironically, insiders normally forgo following the rule since disclosure of the information
will breach fiduciary duty to the corporation and, by disclosing, they will lose the advantage over
their trading partners. See H. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 3rd edition, West
Publishing Co., 1996, p. 838.
31 Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
32 This case is one of special importance in the US's administration of the Federal Securities Act.
It involved a director who leaked impending news about a dividend cut to his broker, who then
sold shares for discretionary accounts (including that of his wife) upon an exchange.
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Gulf,	 the court applied the catchall disclose or abstain rule, which required
anyone possessing material, non-public information to either disclose the
information or abstain from trading.34
Generally, the language of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 does not provide
clear guidelines for deciding which activities are fraudulent and who should be
the relevant target for such inquiry. 35 More importantly, courts have not
interpreted the broad language of the initial regulatory framework uniformly.
Courts still disagree about the proper grounds for the obligation under Rule lOb-
536 Contemporary developments in insider-trading law derive principally from
the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella v. United States, and Dirks v. SEC. In
the much-cited Chiarella v. United States, 37 the Supreme Court held that a trader
violates Rule 10(b)-5 only if he fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction when he is under duty to do so. The duty to
disclose or abstain arises only from a fiduciary duty or other similar relation of
trust and confidence between the parties of the transaction.38
The Supreme Court defined the relationship between breach of fiduciary
duty and tipper-tippee liability in Dirks v. SEC. 39 There, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant who traded on the basis of material non-public information
received from an insider only violates Rule lQb-5 if the insider has breached his
B SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F .2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.s 976
(1969).
This case involved an insider who bought 9,100 shares after the company discovered minerals
before the discovery was announced. See R. Jennings & J. Jennings Jr., Securities Regulations,
Cases and Materials, 7th edition, The Foundation Press, Westbury, New York. 1992, p. 1005.
B K. Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 126.
36 Ibid., p. 127.
B Chiarella v. United States, 445 Us 222 (1980).
38 See B. Aldave, 'Misappropriation: a General Theory of Liability for Trading on Non-public
Information', 13 Hofstra Law Review, 101, 1984, pp. 107-108.
B Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 483 US, 646, 103 S.CT., 1983.
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or her fiduciary duty by disclosing the information for personal gain, and the
recipient knows, or should know, of the breach. 4° The court went on to observe
that in the absence of personal gain, there was no breach of duty to the
shareholders. Since the tippee's duty is derivative of the tipper's duty, there can
be no liability for the tippee if there has been no breach of duty by the insider.4'
Dirks established an additional means by which erstwhile outsiders become
fiduciary of a corporation's shareholders. 42 The effect of this theory is to 'clothe'
an outsider with temporary insider status when the outsider obtains access to
confidential information. As a result, the temporary insider acquires a correlative
fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders.43
The narrow focus on specific fiduciary duties shown in cases like
Chiarella and Dirks limited the number of fiduciary relationships that produce
obligations to disclose. 44 While the Supreme Court's narrow application of the
specific fiduciary theory seems to restrict what will count as insider trading, the
Second, Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuit have adopted the 'misappropriation
theory', which covers wider situations. 45 Under the misappropriation theory, a
person violates Rule 1O(b)-5 when he or she misappropriates material non-public
information in breach of a fiduciary duty or a similar relationship of trust and
confidence, and use that information in a securities transaction. 46 The courts have
40 The Dirks court found the printer of a financial firm who traded based on information regarding
tender offers left at the printer, not to have a sufficiently close relationship of trust and confidence
with the rendered companies and their shareholders to be found liable. Mere possession of non-
public information is thus insufficient to create a duty to disclose or abstain; also that trade on
non-public information is not, in itself, enough to incur liability under Rule lOb-5.
41 Jennings & Jennings Jr., Securities Regulations, Cases and Materials, 29, p. 1006.
42 Ibid.
' See L. Soderquist, Securities Regulation, 3Id edition, Foundation Press, Westbury, New York,
1994, p. 490.
' Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', p. 136.
Ibid., p. 140.
46 Soderquist, Securities Regulation, pp. 49 1-492.
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recently relied upon the theory of misappropriation as interpreting and justifying
Rule lO(b)-5. Under this theory of liability, a duty to disclose or abstain is
imposed on any person who has misappropriated or stolen inside information.
However, the theory has been applied only in the context of employment
relationships.47
The case of Carpenter v. United States48 addressed the theory of
misappropriation inconclusively. 49 While the Second Circuit upheld the
conviction of the defendant, the Supreme Court was equally divided on the 10(b)-
5 claim in this case and affirmed the Second Circuit's majority without an
opinion concerning the misappropriation theory. 5° A number of federal courts
have immediately applied the theory of misappropriation in other cases, too:
Materia v. SEC51 , where a copyholder breached the duty to his printing company;
United States v. Newman52, where an investment banker breached duty to his
firm; and United States v. Willis 53 , which denied a motion to dismiss indictment
of a psychiatrist who traded on the basis of information obtained from a patient as
breach of duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.54
Unlike the traditional fiduciary duty theory, misappropriation theory not
only examines whether a fiduciary relationship exists, but also whether a
'° Ibid.
48 Carpenter v. United States, 484 Us 19 (1987). In this case the court was asked whether Wall
Street Journal's R. Foster Winans, who used information that he collected to write his financial
column for personal gain, was guilty or not.
' Loss & Selgiman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, p. 831.
° Ibid.
Materia v. SEC, 745 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 Us 1053.
52 States v. Newman, 664 F. 2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1981), conviction affirmed without pub. op., 722 F.
2d 729 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 US 1053.
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.NY 1990)
See D.C. Langevoort, 'Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140, 1992, pp. 851-920.
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relationship of trust and confidence exists. 55 Although the misappropriation
theory widens the scope of the law as it applies to some insider-trading cases, it
has been argued that the prohibition of insider trading based on fiduciary duty is
inadequate. First, the theory fails to acknowledge the equitable rules about fraud
that have long been in use in the US. Second, the theory fails to acknowledge the
more complicated and anonymous relationships that now characterise corporate
America.56
2.1.1 The limits of the fiduciary approach to insider trading
Turning to the Saudi Companies Act for a moment, directors and employees are
considered to be trustees of the shareholders. 57 In this view, it is assumed that
they should work for the best interest of their beneficiaries and not for
themselves. The law provides that they must disclose any personal benefits they
gain by virtue of their position to their beneficiaries, otherwise, it will be deemed
to be a breach of their fiduciary duty. 58 In this regard, corporate insiders are under
the obligation to work for the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Hence, it is a breach of their duties as fiduciary to use information that belongs to
another for their own gain.59 Under Saudi law, shareholders are granted the right
to institute a case of action for liability against directors for wrongful acts that
will lead to a personal prejudice, and thus a disadvantage on the part of the
The US Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the misappropriation theory in its
decision in United States v. O'Hagan (117s. ct. 2199 (1997).
56 Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', p. 173.
See S. Al-Bogomi, 'Joint-stock Companies in the Saudi Arabian law', Comparative Study with
the Islamic Law, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah, 1986, P. 425.
58 Ibid., pp. 430-433.
Companies Act 1965, Art. 69, prohibits directors from using their position for personal gain,
except with an authorisation from the regular General Meeting. Directors must declare to the
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shareholders. 6° The crucial question for Saudi law is whether the fiduciary duty
approach should be the basis for the prohibition of insider trading. Although the
fiduciary duty concept provides important reasons for the prohibition of insider
trading, it fails to provide a coherent theoretical rationale for the proscription and
should be viewed only as a partial element in a more general theory. 6 ' It is clear
that prohibiting insider trading on the basis of the concept of fiduciary duty
narrows the scope of the law by limiting the application of insider trading to those
who have a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders. The aim
of insider trading regulations is to deter the trading on the basis of non-public
price-sensitive information by all traders and not only by certain persons. The
question here is whether there is trading based on inside information, not whether
the trader has a fiduciary duty or not.
Unfortunately, we cannot assume that there will be the same room for
interpretation in all jurisdictions. In the case of Saudi Arabia, as previously
discussed in Chapter 3, the role of commercial tribunals is limited to the
application of the existing rules, while judges have very limited interpretative
power to apply the law in such a way that it can be developed in new and
unanticipated directions. 62 We may assume that this restriction with respect to
directions judges may take also restricts the potential benefits of a fiduciary
approach to deter insider trading.
board any personal interest he may have in any transactions of contracts made for the account of
the company.
60 Companies Act 1965, Art. 78, states: "every shareholder shall have the right to institute the
action in liability against directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by
them is of a nature to cause him personal prejudice."
Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', p. 125.
62 Cases related to trade and financial activities in the Kingdom are governed by legislative
enactment, and their disputes must be brought in front of commercial courts where judges are
found to follow them strictly. See K. Al-Tawil, 'The Settlement of Commercial Disputes Through
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia', L.L.M dissertation, Exeter University, 1992.
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In other words, courts with restricted power will apply the regulations
only to insiders who are in a fiduciary relationship. The problem is that courts are
restricted from applying insider-trading provisions to the 'tippee', who is trading
with the use of information obtained from insiders. 63 The main purpose of
enacting insider-trading regulations is to stop anyone from misusing inside
information, not just the insiders. 64 In this regard, the fiduciary duty approach is
inadequate in that it is easily avoided.
This section has shown that insider-trading legislation should avoid an
approach that may limit the scope of the prohibition, whether it is based on the
fiduciary duty or the theory of misappropriation. Insider trading legislation should
be based on a theory which makes the prohibition reach every person who might
trade on the basis of unpublished, price-sensitive information, whether this person
is connected with the corporation or not.
2.2 The efficiency approach
This sub-section critically analyses the efficiency approach to the regulations of
insider trading. Today, the benefits that societies gain from efficient capital
markets are well known. 65 It has been argued that greater information efficiency
increases stock prices and encourages real investments. 66 As referred to in much
academic literature, an efficient capital market is a market in which all available
D. Canton, & D. Fischel, 'The Regulation of Insider Trading'. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 35,
April 1983, pp. 864-866.
64 Ibid.
65 See, for example, D. Bernhardt, B. Hollifield & E. Hughson, 'Investment and Insider Trading',
in Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 8, 1995, pp. 501-543.
Seyhun, Investment Intelligence From Insider Trading, p. 349, states that "Greater information
efficiency increases stock prices by leading to better investment decisions. For instance, prices
provide useful signals for capital issuance, managerial compensation, and business expansion and
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information is fully reflected in the prices of securities. 67
 Commentators have
suggested that, based on the efficient capital market hypothesis (EMH), a
perfectly efficient capital market will exist if the prices of securities traded on the
market reflect all information, whether public or private, at all times. 68 The
market efficiency model has been offered as a basis for regulating insider trading.
Proponents of insider trading regulations have argued that insider trading affects
securities markets' efficiency.69
The early arguments of Professor Henry Manne, in favour of insider
trading, have attracted considerable attention. 70 Manne argued in defence of
insider trading by suggesting that legitimising insider trading would be an
efficient method to compensate managers for their efforts. 7 ' Allowing managers
to trade based on inside information offers incentives for them to be more
creative and innovative. In this regard, insider trading will encourage insiders to
work harder for the corporation and its shareholders' interests. 72 Moreover, he
argued that permitting insider trading enhances market efficiency by providing
the market with necessary information and helping the share prices to be more
contraction decisions. In the case of capital issuance, more accurate stock prices allocate capital
where it is most productive."
Commentators have distinguished between informational efficiency and allocative efficiency.
The first implies that securities prices react immediately to the release of new information,
whereas allocative efficiency implies that the market allocates resources to their most efficient or
productive uses. See Stout, 'The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation', in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 87, 1988, p. 613.
68 Conventionally, Fama has subdivided the EMH into three distinct versions: 'weak' - the
information contained in the past sequence of prices of a security is fully reflected in the current
market price; 'semi-strong' - all public information is fully reflected in a security's current market
price; and 'strong" - all information, whether public or private, is fully reflected in a security's
current price. See F. Fama, 'Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory &Empirical Works',
Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, 1970, pp. 383-417.
69 See Shotland, 'Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market',
in Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, 1425, 1969.
70 Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Markets, pp See, for instance, D. Haddock, & J. Macey,
'A Causation Model of Insider Trading', 80, New U.L. RevI. 1986., p. 1479; W. Carncy,
'Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading', 36, Cath. U.L. Rev., 1987, pp. 863-898
' Ibid., pp. 13 1-145.
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accurate. It was suggested that when insiders use information that is not available
to the public, their trading in a corporation's shares will move the prices of such
shares in the right direction. As a result, the market will be informed of the inside
information that has been used by insiders.73
Yet, allowing insiders to trade on the basis of inside information as
appropriate compensation for their services fails to recognise many points. First,
if corporate managers perceive that they have not received adequate
compensation, they can sell their services to competitive corporations and receive
better compensation. 74
 Secondly, allowing insiders to use inside information to
make profit gives managers the right to make profit from bad news as well as
from good news. We can assume that this will create the problem of a moral
hazard. 75 That is, we can assume there would be a natural conflict between a
shareholder's interest in higher stock prices and insiders' interest in creating
volatile stock prices. In this view, managers, in order to make greater profit,
might be tempted to delay the publication of news, good or bad.76 Moreover,
managers could seek to manipulate corporate press or oral communications with
the press in order to accentuate stock price volatility.77
It would appear that there are more effective incentive reward systems
than insider trading. For example, shareholders can write an incentive contract
that, subject to performance conditions, offers management a percentage of the
72 Ibid.
See, e.g., Canton & Fische!, 'The Regulation of Insider Trading', pp. 857-868.
Loss & Selgiman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, p. 766.
See, Levrmore, 'Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and Law of Contracts' 68 Virginia Law
Review, 1982, p. 149.
76 Loss & Selgiman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, pp. 766-767.
Ibid.
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firm's profits. 78 There are other reasons for rejecting Manne's proposal. For
example, this policy would effectively permit unproductive insiders to have the
same opportunity as productive insiders to trade based on inside information.79
Also, the insider will have an incentive to play with the time and accuracy of the
information disseminated. 80 Finally, corporate insiders will have an incentive to
engage in higher-risk investments, producing wider stock price fluctuations in
order to create more opportunities for trading profits.8'
The argument that insider trading enhances market efficiency by providing
the market with necessary information, consequently giving the market signals to
move in the right direction, can be criticised on a number of empirical grounds as
well. First, many studies have indicated that insider trading does not have a
significant impact on market prices. 82 Usually, insiders trade in quantities that are
too small to affect market prices and also camouflage their activities, making
observation difficult. 83 In the case of information related to the assets or expected
performance of the corporation, the sooner it is known, the more accurately it is
appraised, the more immediately it induces a purchase or a sale, and the more
precisely will the market price of securities correspond to the value of the
enterprise.84
The market will function efficiently ifS. savings are allocated to enterprises
that are more profitable and diverted from enterprises which are less profitable.85
78 j • Bagby, The Evolving Controversy Over Insider Trading, American Business Law Journal,
vol.24. January,1986, pp 579-583.
Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Loss & Selgiman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, p. 766.
Ibid., pp. 766-767.
84 V• Brudney, 'Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities
Laws', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 93, 1979-1980, p. 341.
85 Ibid.
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Hence, the market is likely to be more efficient if insider trading is prohibited.
Information flows to the market as it is produced, rather than as it is manipulated
by inside traders. 86
 It has been observed that information is the heart of the stock
market. Thus, information about a company which portends a promising future,
should result in an increase in the prices of shares. Conversely, information about
the value of companies indicating that these companies have a less promising
future will result in decline of the value of their shares. 87 Changes in share prices
should therefore be based on timing and accuracy of the release of the new
information, and not on signals or rumours. The market tends to become more
efficient as more insiders are restricted from trading.88
On the other hand, it might be argued that insiders who trade while in
possession of inside information will not damage market efficiency, because
market participants will typically buy without knowing the bad news, and sell
without knowing the good news. 89
 Yet, again it can be argued that insider trading
will result in inaccurate share prices, which affects the manner in which resources
are allocated and hence reduce investors' welfare generally by reducing the size
of the aggregate corporate income stream. 90
 Inaccurate share prices damage
economic sufficiency in at least three ways. First, inaccurate share prices reduce
the likelihood that resources will be allocated to the most productive projects,
which will result in depriving the most promising projects from receiving the
necessary funds. 9 ' Second, inaccurate share prices will widen the bid-ask spread,
86 Bagby, The Evolving Controversy Over Insider Trading, pp. 58 1-582.
87 j Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, Butterworths, London, 1989, 79, p. 23.
88 Ibid.
° See, for example, G. Akerlof, 'The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism', Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, 1970, p.844.
° Fox, 'Insider Trading in A Globalising Market: Who Should Regulate What?', pp. 282-283.
' Ibid.
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leading to even greater volatility because the share price has further to go in its
movement toward actual value. 92
 Finally, the inaccuracy of the share prices on the
market will undermine the market for corporate control. Less accurate prices
make investment in the acquisition of a target riskier.93
Although many commentators have argued that insider trading is
beneficial from an economic point of view, these arguments fail to recognise
many difficulties. 94
 First, as we have noted above, the market will be efficient if,
in general, share prices reflect the information available in the market, rather than
rumours or signals. In the case of outsider trading, the uninformed party will pay
higher prices than they would if bad news had been disclosed, and they will sell at
a lower price than if good news had been disclosed. In both cases, outsider
investors will suffer loss because the share prices are lower or higher than the
actual value. 95
 This sub-section has shown that the market will suffer from
inaccurate share prices, which will damage market efficiency, because funds will
go to the less promising projects, leaving the most attractive projects without
enough funds.
2.3 Fairness arguments
Since we can assume that the efficiency approach, which was outlined in the
above sub-section, is not fully convincing to justify insider trading as a means of
92 Ibid.
Ibid.
Although Manne was the first to argue in favour of insider trading, there are other authors who
have shared the same view. See, for example, Carney and B hide.
Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, p. 31.
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enhancing market efficiency, we now turn to consider a competing approach, the
'fairness perspective'.
One of the most common arguments lodged against insider trading is that
it is 'unfair' •96 Before the promulgation of the Insider Trading Sanction Act of
1984, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote "The abuse of
informational advantages, which other investors cannot hope to overcome
through their own efforts, is unfair and inconsistent with the public's legitimate
expectation of an honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by
the same rules."97
For over two decades, legal commentators have argued that insider trading
is not fair. 98
 Typically we hear that all market participants should have equal
access to information about the companies issuing the shares. In this view, it is
assumed that investors, upon entering the market, should receive equal treatment
and equal access to information relevant to the securities they wish to purchase or
sell.99
The sole reason that insiders have access to confidential information is
due to the fact that they conduct the company's business. When directors and
officers acquire inside information, they do so in the interest of the corporation
and its sharelìolders. 10° The unfairness arises when an insider takes advantages of
such information, knowing that it is unavailable to other shareholders. 10 ' Also,
96 Loss & Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, pp. 760-761.
Ibid.
98 See, for example, Barry, ' The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-', in 129
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1307, 1981, pp. 1323-1328.
13. Rider & M. Ashe, Insider Crime, Jordans, London, 1993, p. 5.
100 Brudney, 'Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities
Laws', p. 344.
'o Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, p. 39.
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unfairness can arise when acquiring inside information lawfully if other investors
cannot obtain the same information. 102 The unfairness is not in the fact of
possessing more information - some outsiders may possess more information
than others by reason of their diligence or zeal - but in that it is an advantage that
cannot be competed away, since it depends upon a lawful privilege to which an
outsider cannot have access. 103 It is typically argued that insiders have acquired
inside information as an agent or fiduciaries of the shareholders. On the fairness
story, proponents insist that the latter are equally entitled to the information or, at
any rate, are not to be disadvantaged by lack of that information in dealing with
their agents)°4
Despite the fact that fairness is one of the most traditional rationales as to
why insider trading is undesirable, it has been argued that the fairness concept is a
fuzzy idea that needs to be clarified with the pure logic of economic theory.'°5
More specifically, it is argued that if the existence of insider trading is known,
outsiders will not be disadvantaged because the prices they pay will reflect the
risk of insider trading. Additionally, fairness theory cannot support a
condemnation of all such transactions. 106 According to the fairness approach, the
first party in the transaction must be an insider of the corporation from which the
information is derived, and the other party must be either an existing shareholder
or a person who becomes a shareholder by reason of trade.'° 7 Accordingly, a trade
in a corporation's shares by an outsider who received such information by
102 Ibid., p. 40.
103 Brudney, 'Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities
Laws', p. 346.
'° Ibid., p. 344.
105 Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', p. 125.106 See Fox, 'Insider Trading in A Globalising Market: Who Should Regulate What?', p. 267.
'o Ibid., p. 268.
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accident is not covered.' 08 Clearly, then, it has been shown above that there are
severe limitations to the fairness approach to insider trading.
2.4 Market liquidity
In this section, we consider a new line of theory developed by micro-economists
over the past decade. We have seen that the efficiency perspective cannot support
deregulatory policies, since permitting insider trading is not an effective
mechanism to introduce information into the market. The theory of imperfect
securities markets supports the view that insider trading, because it has
distributional consequences, increases the problems of less liquidity and higher
transaction costs, unless regulators design policies to counter the opportunistic
taking of profits by insiders.
Micro-economists studying securities markets have demonstrated that
under certain conditions the trading by individuals on the basis of superior
information can reduce market liquidity.' 09 Generally, "liquidity in a market relies
on market makers and other speculators. Without their presence, markets quickly
die)'° Yet, too many losses caused by trading with insiders could force market
makers to widen the spreads between their offer and bid prices on all securities
to compensate for the loss of margins.' 1 ' In-this view, wider spreads and the
108 Ibid.
09 O'Hara, Market Microstructure Theory, 13, pp. 234-243.
110 A. Alcock, 'Insider Dealing - How Did We Get Here?', The Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 3,
1994, p. 67.
" Ibid.
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perception that the market is rigged in favour of insiders may in themselves deter
speculators and long-term investors from using the market, which reduces the
market liquidity by narrowing market participants."2
In support of this view, there are many studies that find a positive relation
between insider trading and bid-ask spread." 3
 These studies show that specialists
and other market makers systematically profit from trading with liquidity traders,
but they systematically lose from trading with informed traders." 4 Specialists and
other market makers are assumed to trade with at least two different types of
traders; those trading based on inside information and liquidity traders."5
Specialists and other market makers establish their maximising spread by
balancing the expected total revenues from liquidity traders and the expected total
losses from informed trading." 6 Monopolistic dealers will establish a wider bid-
ask spread than perfectly competitive dealers will. To avoid losing from trading
with insiders, dealers will always set a higher ask price and lower bid price than
what they believe true market prices to be. 117 In any event, it appears that other
investors besides informed traders and market makers always lose out in the stock
market, whether they trade with an insider or a dealer. The insight here is that if
they trade with an insider, they sell or buy without knowing the good or the bad
news and consequently suffer losses. On the other hand, in the case of trading
112 Fox, 'Insider Trading in a Globalising Market: Who Should Regulate What?', p. 275.
" See D. Haddock & J. Macey, 'Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an
Application of Insider Trading Regulation', Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. XXX (1), April
1987, p.331.
" Ibid.
115 T. Copeland & D. Galai, 'Information Effects of the Bid-Ask Spread', Journal of Finance,
Vol. XXXVIII, 5 December 1983, p. 1458.
116 Ibid., p. 1468.
" Ibid.
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with dealers, they lose as well, since the dealer will widen the bid-ask spread just
in case he is dealing with an insider."8
Within this theory, it is clear that insider trading and other market
manipulation may impact the liquidity in a market. Market participants will exit
from the market if they believe that the market is unfair and not everyone is
playing by the same rules." 9 The consequence of a decrease in the number of
market participants could, in the worst case, result in a run on the market. More
specifically, while investors will generally accept a certain level of market and
transaction risk, they will refuse to invest in markets where the winning
percentage is close to zero. 120 Unless regulators seek to curtail the manipulation
of bid-ask spreads, no-one will trade in the stock market. It is thought that in
markets where insider trading has a large effect on prices, market liquidity will be
negatively impacted. This has certainly been the case in the German and Saudi
Arabian markets.
In sum, restricting insider trading will increase market liquidity by
enhancing market participants' confidence. Furthermore, market efficiency will
be positively increased by forcing insiders to disclose private information before
trading.
' Ibid.
119 Seyhun, Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, p. 30. Seyhun argues that a clear winner
from insider-trading regulations is the small, transient investor. Looking at the history of how
insider-trading laws have been enacted also supports this view. He went on to say that small
investors and the securities industry that caters to them want liquidity, which is valuable because it
allows diversification and easy exit for small investors. From the securities industry's perspective,
liquidity generates large trading volumes and higher commission fees. Given that insider trading
penalises liquidity traders, it is not surprising that insider-trading restrictions have increased
simultaneously with the importance of small traders.
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3. Insider Trading in the Saudi Securities Law
Prior to 1997 there were no specific regulations prohibiting insider trading in
Saudi Arabia. Yet the lack of insider trading regulation in the past did not mean
that insider trading did not take place in the market.' 2 ' Indeed, there was little
interest in eliminating the misuse of the non-public, price-sensitive information.
In this regard, Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy of Minster of Finance and National
Economy, Member of the Supervisory Committee, explained that:
"The policy of the government, at the establishment of the Saudi
market, was rather to encourage as much trading as possible and
only later to introduce, step-by-step, more rules to the market. ,,122
The Disclosure Rules 1997 were the first instance in which the country
directly addressed the issue of insider trading. There had been earlier attempts to
reduce insiders from misusing or appropriating material, inside information.
These early attempts, through Articles 72 and 133 of the Companies Act, using a
different theory, tried to limit the dissemination of confidential information
concerning companies by directors or corporate insiders.' 23 This approach failed
to stem the tide of insider trading, because there was no prohibition concerning
120 Copeland & Galai, 'Information Effects of the Bid-Ask Spread', p. 1468.
121 See Alaam A1-Eqtisad, 'The Saudi Stock Market', in proceedings of conference held in Riyadh,
November 1994, pp. 59-59. This conference showed that there has been high demand from
different institutions and investors for reforms in the anti-fraud provisions in general and insider
trading in particular.
122 See interview with Mr. Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and National
Economy, member of the Supervisory Committee, Riyadh, 21 November 1997.
123 Companies Act 1965, Art. 72, states that directors may not disclose to third parties, or to
shareholders outside the General Meeting, any of the company's secrets as may have come to their
knowledge by reason of their directorship; otherwise, they must be removed and held liable for
damages. Art. 133 puts the same restrictions on the company's auditor. However, the Companies
Act rules are inappropriate as a means to limit insider trading since they were promulgated to
regulate the behaviour of directors and auditors, but not including their trading as such. First, the
Act limited the prohibition to directors and auditors and left other persons who may have access to
inside information outside the prohibition. Second, the Act prohibits directors or auditors from
passing confidential information on to other shareholders or third parties prior to the
announcement of such information in the General Meeting.
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the use of confidential information in the context of trading in the market for
securities.
The second attempt to regulate insider trading occurred with the passage
of the Instructions to the Central Trading Units.' 24 The Instructions to CTUs
include a prohibition of insider trading that is highly restrictive and applies only
to bank employees whose jobs are related to buying and selling shares.' 25 Given
its restrictive scope, it is difficult to rely on the Instructions to CTUs to prohibit
insiders from using non-public, price-sensitive information for personal
benefit. 126
 Al-Souage, an investor, expressed the view that:
"I believe that the market rules to stop trading based on inside
information are unsatisfactory. Whether the problem has to do
with the rules themselves or with their enforcement, I think
insider trading is big problem in the market and so far I have
never heard of any case in which action has been taken. I think
that the shortage of valued information forces people to rely on
inside information, as a result of which it may be hard to stop
such practices now. ,,127
After these early attempts at reform, the long-awaited insider-trading
provisions were finally introduced in 1997. The Kingdom's passage of new
legislation followed in the wake of the worldwide trend to deter insider trading.'28
The provisions against insider trading are designed to create confidence in the
market. But while many other jurisdictions have supplied strong bases for the
124 The Electronic Securities Information System Instructions to Central Trading Units. SAMA,
Securities Control Department, 1990.
25 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 8.
126 The language of the insider-trading rules in the instructions are identical to those sections in the
Companies Act. In both pieces of legislation the prohibitions on insider trading are narrow and
limited to certain persons. For example, Article 8 of the instructions states that it shall be restricted
to any employee whose jobs involves selling and buying securities from using information
obtained at work for person gain.
127 Interview with Sami Al-Souage an active investor in the Saudi stock market, Riyadh, 12
December 1997.
128 The Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Ministry of Commerce Circular, Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417.
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prohibition of trading, the Saudi authorities declined to offer reasons for the
prohibition of insider trading. Rather, the Ministerial Committee elected to rely
on the public interest, i.e., general welfare, as the reason for the prohibition of
insider trading) 29 The rules concerning insider trading are contained in Article 4
of the Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules enacted in 1997. The term 'insider
trading' is not defined in the Saudi Disclosure Rules.' 3° Article 4-a of the
Disclosure Rules 1997 provides that "any person shall not trade based on inside
information, information which is not published and freely available to the public,
whether this information is received either directly or indirectly.'3'
3.1 Inside information
Article 4 of the Disclosure Rules defined inside information as
information that is not published and freely available to the public. This language
of Article 4, which limits trading on the basis of non-public information, provides
no criteria for determining which information is not yet public and freely
available. The failure to provide criteria is significant. Yet, it may be assumed
that the definition amounts to information that will be disseminated in such a way
that it is made available to investors generally. In the case of the Saudi market, it
could be argued that information will be -considered public if it has been
announced to the SCD of SAMA, or if it has been published so that it is readily
129 Ibid.
'° The failure to define the term is not limited to Saudi Arabia, the US law makers also refuse to
define insider trading. Wrongful trading is discussed under section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15U.S.0 § 78a ff.,
17 C.F.R 240.10b-5, Federal Securities Law, United States,1995. See, generally, E. Brodsky & R.
Swanson, 'Insider Trading Litigation: The Obstacles to Recovery', Securities Regulation Law
Journal, Vol. 16, 1988, pp. 3 1-53.
131 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a.
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available to investors in the market through, for instance, the release of the
company's accounts. 132 It is therefore very important to have a clear and precise
definition of non-public information in order to determine under which
circumstances it is permissible for investors to employ market information when
investing in securities.133
It is clear that since the concept of public information is crucial to the
definition of insider trading, a more detailed and careful approach is needed. In
this regard, one of the better definitions of when information has been made
public is provided by the UK Criminal Justice Act.' 34
 The CJA sets forth criteria
to determine when inside information will be deemed to have been made public.
These rules go a long way in clarifying the essential considerations involved in
determining when information is public.' 35
 Because information tends to
influence securities markets, access to information is a crucial economic and
policy consideration for regulation. Disclosure rules require, but often prohibit,
the publication of different types of financial information. Unlike the US
disclosure rules, which focus almost exclusively on stock transactions, the rules
of Saudi Arabia require the disclosure of corporate information. More
32 This assumption is based on Art. 2-a of the Disclosure Rules, which require publicly-traded
companies to announce any important information to the Securities Control Department and to the
mass media.
' See Alcock, 'Insider Dealing - How Did We Get Here?', pp. 70-71.
'i" Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V, S 58(2), S 58(3).
Art. S 58 of the CJA states that information is made public if:
a) it is published in accordance with the rules of a regulated market for the purpose of informing
investors and their professional advisers;
b) it is contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open to inspection by the
public;
c) it can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any securities;
d) it is derived from information which has been made public.
Also information may be treated as made public even though:
a) it can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or experience;
b) it is communicated to a section of the public and not to the public at large;
c) it can be acquired only by observation;
d) it is communicated only on payment of a fee; or
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specifically, Article 2 stipulates that a company is required to disclose any
corporate information that may have an effect on share prices, directly or
indirectly. Rules represent an indirect way to curb abuse of securities, especially
when it is difficult to limit insider-trading abuse. Hence, the option of publishing
(or a prohibition to publish) information is required of regulations that would
limit insider trading.' 36 Returning to the question of what constitutes inside
information, it can be seen that the scope of the definition under Article 4 is
especially wide, since it is difficult to ascertain what information will be deemed
to be inside information, and therefore not permitted to be used when trading in
securities. 137 The question concerns whether the regulation was meant to prohibit
the use of any information that is not public, whether it affects the share price or
not. It may be argued that the main goal of rules restricting the use of inside
information is to limit the misuse of the knowledge that will have an effect on
stock market prices.
As with most other insider-trading regimes in Europe and the US, the
information that is subject to the prohibition is the information that may have an
effect on the share prices, which is what the Saudi legislators also intended to
regulate when propounding the Disclosure Rules 1997.138 To be sure, information
might be non-public but may have no effect on share prices. Yet, it is clear that
the Disclosure Act was implemented solely to prohibit the misuse of information
that could have an impact on share prices and therefore offer advantages to
e) it is published only outside the United Kingdom.
' Disclosure Rules 1997, Art 2.
" Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4.
138 Ibid. Art. 2 defines the major information that has to be publicly announced as information
which may affect the company's share prices, not any and all information.
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informed traders over uninformed traders in the market.' 39
 The Saudi Insider
Trading regulation applies to all types of information, whether it was received
directly or indirectly. Any information that has not yet been made public will be
deemed to be inside information, whether this information was obtained directly
by insiders such as directors or officers or whether it was obtained indirectly by
outsiders such as friends or family relations.'4°
In general, insiders are not prohibited from trading in securities. They are
even permitted to trade in the securities of firms in which they are employed as
managers.' 4 ' Efforts to restrict insiders from trading are only made in Saudi
Arabia to try to restrict them from trading based on material non-public, price-
sensitive information. Unlike the Saudi insider trading provision, most
jurisdictions have included another essential condition in order to determine
whether the information falls within the concept of inside information. For
example, US case law defines the term 'inside information' as material, non-
public information. 142 Non-public information is defined as information which
has not been disclosed in reports filed to the SEC or the Exchange, or has not
been published in press releases. There, the test of materiality depends on the
ability of reasonable investors to become accurately informed.' 43 So, for example,
the Supreme Court in TSC Industries v. Norhway, found that 'an omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
' Scheppele, 'It's Just not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading', p. 145.
140 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a.
141 Soderquist, Securities Regulation, p. 420.
142 In the US, the term 'inside information' has nowhcre been defined by statute of regulation; it
has been defined by case law.
R.Clear Jr., 'The Law, Disclosure and the Securities Market', Practising Law Institute, New
York, 1970, p. 195.
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consider it important in deciding how to vote'. 144 In this view, the court would
not require proof that the shareholder's behaviour would be different if the
omitted fact was disclosed.' 45
 Hence, US courts have defined non-public
material information as the information that is not available to the public, which a
reasonable, prudent person would take into account when making investment
decisions. 146 Whilst it may appear that the American definition of the concept
'inside information' is unusually broad in that it employs the test of the
'reasonable investor', the approach nevertheless supplies insiders and other
investors with some leeway to decide the type of inside information that they are
not allowed to base trade on. 147 That is not the case in Saudi law, where the
regulation requires the information to be 'non-public' in order for the information
to be inside information or not, ignoring the question of whether the information
will affect share prices or not.
In contrast to the US approach, the European Directive on insider dealing
and the UK insider dealing rules have chosen to enact specific definitions of
inside information.' 48 Both statutes require that the information have an effect on
the price of the securities for it to constitute inside information. The European
Directive on insider dealing defines inside information as the information which
is (1) of a precise nature, (2) related to one or several issuers of transferable
securities or to one of the several transferable securities, (3) has not been made
'' TSC Industries, Inc. v. Norhway, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1976, 426 US 438.
"i Ibid.
" See J. Naylor, 'The Use of Criminal Sanctions by UK and US Authorities for Insider Trading:
How Can the Two Systems Learn from Each Other? - Part 2', The Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No.
5, 1988.
"v See Standen, 'Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany; Bracing for the Cold Winds of
Change', p. 184.
" See the European Council Directive of 13 November 1989, 'Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing' (89/592/EEC).
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public and (4) is likely to have a significant effect on the price of the securities it
concerns if made public.' 49
 In this regard, the EC and UK definitions of inside
information have gone one step further than the US by supplying insiders and
Other investors with a more precise and clear definition. More specifically, the
European approach set forth three conditions that must be satisfied in order for
information to fall within the scope of inside information.' 50 Besides requiring the
information to be non-public, EC and UK legislators have stated that the
information is to be of a precise nature, and that the information is likely to have
a significant effect on the share prices. Requiring information to be of a precise
nature is very important to give the insiders and any others a clearer, better idea of
how to distinguish rumours or speculation from hard facts.'51
In addition to the requirement that information be precise and non-public,
the EC Directive and UK statutes also require the information to be likely to have
a significant effect on the price of the shares. And this element, as we have seen
earlier in our discussion of the US approach, is what was missing in the Saudi
definition of inside information. Requiring that information have a likely impact
on the price of the shares is essential, since it is clear that not all the information
known to the public can be considered inside information, otherwise managers
and other directors would be prevented from trading at all when they have any
non-public information.' 52 Hence, the main point of prohibiting insider trading is
E. Gaillard, Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan, pp. 6-9.
150 M. Ashe, 'The Directive on Insider Dealing' The Company Lawyer, Vol. 13, No. 1, January
1992, p. 16.
'i" Ibid. The author states that in UK Insider Dealing Act 1985, we used the word 'specific' or
'precise' where in the directive they only use the word 'precise'. It was clearly the UK
Government's view that the word 'specific' is somewhat 'wider' than the word 'precise'.
152 Pingel, The EC Directive 1989', in Gaillard (ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the
United States and Japan, p. 8.
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to prevent insiders from trading based on non-public, price-sensitive information.
if we return to the Disclosure Rules 1997, it is submitted that, in order to be more
precise about the concept of insider information, the Ministerial Committee
would be advised to amend the definition in Article 4 so as to include the
important characteristic of price-sensitivity as an essential feature of inside
information.'53
3.2 Insiders
Prior to the enactment of the Disclosure Rules 1997, the Companies Act and
Instructions to CTUs included certain rules which might have touched upon the
problem of insider trading. However, these rules are unlikely to assist the
regulators, since there are no criteria defining insiders. For example, the
Instructions to CTUs set out the categories of who is exactly prohibited from
trading based on inside information. The Instructions prohibit any trader or
mediator from trading based on inside information that they received while doing
their jobs.' 54 The Instructions also prohibit a trader from trading while in
possession of inside information, which obviously limits this rule to only traders
and no-one else.' 55 Although the sophisticated role played by banks in the Saudi
market makes it very important to stop bank employees from abusing inside
information, it was also very important to try to stop other persons from doing
this as well. As we have seen earlier, the Instruction's rules referring to insiders
' M. White, 'The Implications for Securities Regulation of new Insider Dealing Provisions in the
Criminal Justice Act 1993', The Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1995, PP. 163-65.
's" Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 11-2, prohibit any trader from carrying out any securities
transaction on behalf of his CTU or on behalf of a third party, based on non-public information.
''' The Instructions define 'trader' as any employee who is working for the CTUs. Traders or
mediators play a very important role in the Saudi stock market by being the only persons who are
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are excessively narrow in scope, limiting the prohibition to bank employees who
work for CTUs. The sensitive role played by banks in the Saudi market makes it
necessary to prevent bank employees from strategically using the confidential
information that they have received during the course of their employment.
However, it is, of course, also essential to restrict other persons who, just as much
as CTU employees, might be in a position to profit from information obtained in
the course of their employment. 156 The CTU's rules are too narrow when it comes
to defining insiders, allowing other persons who have greater access to inside
information, such as corporate directors, officers, large shareholders and other
employees to remain out of reach of the definition purview of the Act.
The Saudi Disclosure Rules 1997 may have gone further in overcoming
the excessively narrow definition of an insider under the Instructions to CTUs.
The Disclosure Rules prohibit any person from trading based on inside
information, whether the information is received directly or indirectly.' 57
 Yet, the
Rules do not expressly define the concept of insider. Rather it is assumed that an
insider is any person who is in possession of non-public, inside information on
the basis of which they can trade before such information becomes public. Thus,
unlike certain European countries' insider-trading regimes, which distinguish
between different types of insiders, Saudi-law does not allow for a precise
definition. Saudi law implicitly defines insiders either by proximity to insider
information or by virtue of their employment or profession.
authorised by the law to sell and buy for the market participants, which give them access to all
confidential information about market trading and investors before it goes public.
156 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 8.2.
157 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a.
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3.2.1 Primary insiders
As noted earlier, the Disclosure Rules 1997 prohibit any person from trading
based on inside information, whether the information is received directly or
indirectly. The first category of insiders therefore includes individuals who
receive non-public information directly. Arguably, the main reason behind the
prohibition of insider trading is to prevent the misuse of inside information and,
therefore, it is clear that the main target group of the regulation is the group of
individuals who have an employment relationship with a corporation whose
shares are being traded, such as corporate directors, officers and executive
employees. Although Article 4 does not distinguish between insiders, given the
broad texture of the rules, it must be assumed that by virtue of their positions in a
company, directors, officers and executive employees are the main targets. This
reasoning is supported by Article 3 of the Disclosure Rules which expressly
prohibits directors, officers and executive employees from trade in short swing
(daily, weekly), which means they are not allowed to trade 10 days before or one
day after the announcement of any major events. 158 This provision is crucial,
since it is intended to cover internal insiders, i.e., any person who acquires
information in the exercise of his duties as an employee or officer of the
company. It suffices to say that while Article 3 gives a precise definition of an
insider, we can infer that Article 4 includes not only internal insiders, but also any
158 Article 3 of the Disclosure Rules states that the Board of Directors, managers and executive
employees are prohibited from trading the shares of their company in the short term (daily or
weekly) for speculative purposes or to mislead the market, and they should also not deal or trade
before the company announces any major events likely to affect the prices of the share or buy or
sell for one day following any such announcement. They are also prohibited from buying, selling
or transferring ownership in the 10 days preceding the announcement of quarterly financial
statements.
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insiders who, despite their function, come into contact with, or have access to,
confidential information.
Thus, besides directors, officers and other executive employees of a joint-
stock company, the law implicitly also covers large blockholders or major
shareholders. The presumption is that controlling shareholders, by virtue of their
equity ownership or their position on the board of directors, have access to all
confidential information.' 59
 In addition to directors, officers and major
shareholders, the insider regulation is assumed to extend to cover all persons who
obtain the information directly, such as professional advisers, lawyers,
accountants, counsellors, analysts, stock exchange employees, banks and anyone
else who can get the information directly by virtue of his job.
3.2.2 Secondary insiders
As noted, the main purpose of regulating insider trading is to limit the abuse of
inside information by any person, whether the possession of the information was
directly by virtue of his job or indirectly. To this end, the Disclosure Rules
prohibit any person who possesses inside information from trading on the basis of
it before the information goes public.' 60 It is clear, therefore, that Saudi law must
also cover all secondary insiders who might obtain inside information from
primary insiders. Although the Disclosure Rules in the insider trading provision
did not expressly prohibit primary insiders from passing inside information to
third parties, the rules went on to prohibit any person who is in possession of
inside information from trading in securities. It can be argued that the Disclosure
159 Jennings & Jennings Jr., Securities Regulations, Cases and Materials, p. 1003.
Disclosure Rules 1997, Art 4-a.
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Act extends to encompass secondary insiders'(or so-called 'tippees'), who obtain
information indirectly and insiders who obtain their information directly during
the exercise of their employment, profession or duty. A tippee is anyone who
obtains inside information from someone who he knows is an insider, or whose
source is such an insider.'6'
Hence, it is clear that Saudi insider trading regulations intend, as do those
of most other countries, to prohibit primary insiders, who are in a position to
receive inside information directly, and secondary insiders, who might receive it
indirectly, from passing such information to outsiders, who, at the same time, are
themselves prohibited from trading based on inside information. It should be
pointed out that the Saudi insider regulations, despite this analysis, failed to
include a requirement prohibiting or holding liable tippees for trading based on
inside information. An ammunition of the statute shows that there is complete
disregard for the different types of insiders and the potential liabilities that could
be imposed. It must consequently be argued that for the Saudi Disclosure Rules to
introduce compelling reasons for penalties and punishment, it is recommended
that a distinction between the various categories of insiders be made, so as to
facilitate the development of a perspective on penalties based on a sufficiently
exercised concept of the clarity and motive of their actions.
4. Summary
This chapter has examined the system of Saudi insider-trading regulation. Section
2 was devoted to the theoretical aspects of insider trading, with particular
161 Alcock, 'Insider Dealing - How Did We Get Here?', p. 70.
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attention given to efficiency and liquidity. The section showed that the traditional
fiduciary duty theory fails to provide a coherent theoretical rationale for the
proscription and should be viewed only as a partial element in a more general
theory. We also saw that market efficiency will be enhanced by prohibiting
insider trading and it was shown that permitting insider trading would provide
inaccurate share prices that would damage market efficiency. It was also
suggested that fairness is an elusive concept that needs to be clarified with the
pure logic of economic theory, which led us to consider the new line of micro-
economists who have shown that trading by individuals on the basis of superior
information can reduce market liquidity. Finally, it was shown that the restriction
of insider trading may increase market liquidity by enhancing the confidence of
market participants.
In Section 3 we examined the adequacy of the Saudi insider-trading
regulations elaborated on in the Disclosure Rules 1997. Our analysis revealed that
the Saudi approach to the definition of inside information contained in the Act is
broad and lacks a concern for price-sensitive information. Furthermore, it was
observed that the Saudi approach fails to distinguish for a precise definition of an
insider. By relying on an especially wide definition of insider, it will be difficult
for the Kingdom's regulators to implement xules for enforcement, let alone for
penalties, against the diverse categories of insiders. These limitations in the
drafting of the Disclosure Rules point the way for between different types of
insiders. In this regard, the Disclosure Rules do not allow reform of the insider-
trading rules. In this regard, amendments to the rules, based on clear and concise
definitions of insiders, confidential market information and trading violations,
will lead to more robust enforcement measures.
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Chapter 9
Enforcement of Stock Market Rules
1. Introduction
This chapter will attempt to offer an account of securities market enforcement in
the Kingdom. The policy objectives behind securities regulation are to protect
investors, foster confidence in the integrity of the stock market, and promote
capital market efficiency.' Securities markets appear to be less attractive if there
are no rules to prevent fraud, manipulation and other dishonest practices. 2
 The
enactment of the rules, however, may not alone be sufficient to prevent fraud and
foster public confidence. In order to actually be able to protect market
participants, it is essential that regulations be enforceable. 3
 Commentators such as
Ayres and Braithwaite have argued that enforcement of securities regulation
appears to be stronger if the designated agency responsible for regulating the
securities market is supported by strong and various sanctions. 4 It has been
suggested that regulators are better able to cultivate compliance when they can
See B. Rider, Guide to Financial Services Regulation 3rd Edition, CCH Editions Limited,
Oxfordshire, 1997, PP. 1-9. See also J. Black, Rules and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1997.
2 M. Pagano, 'The Flotation of Companies on the Stok Market: A coordination failure model', in
European Economic Review, Vol. 37, 1993, p. 1102. Pagano argues that stock markets in
Continental Europe are less attractive to ordinary investors because regulators are less resolute in
repressing insider trading and protection of minority shareholders is weaker.
For works investigating the role of a proper enforcement of legal rules in the development of
financial markets see LaPorta, R. Lopez-de-Silanos, F. Shleifer, A & Vishny, R 'Legal
Determinants of External Finance', 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1997; F. Modigliani and E. Ferotti, Security
versus Bank Finance: the Imporanfce of a Proper Enforcement of Legal Rules, Working
Paper,1999; LaPorta, R. Lopez-de-Silanos, F. Shleifer, A & Vishny, R. 'Law and Finance', 106 J.
Pol. Econ. 1113, 1998.
" See I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 40-41. See also J. Scholz, 'Deterrence, Co-operation and
Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement', in Lw and Society Review, Vol. 18, 1984, p. 179.
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resort to a hierarchy of sanctions and are able, if necessary, to invoke strong legal
measures.
The Kingdom's enforcement programme has tended to concentrate on
several areas, including violations by regulated firms, such as market
manipulation and disclosure violations. The regulated firms have adopted the
compliance system established by SAMA. In this regard, the Kingdom has been
slow in introducing rules that are more comprehensive in coverage, although new
initiatives have been introduced over the past two years. For example, SAMA
promulgated new rules devoted to enforcing insider trading, fraud and investment
fraud in the financial industry. 6 Through the expansion of its enforcement
programme, the Kingdom is both responding to old problems and to new market
conditions that have generated complex issues, requiring new enforcement
strategies to deal with unforeseen market circumstances.7
In the Saudi context, a programme of enforcement is necessary to create
an environment that increases the efficiency of the market and provides deterrents
to securities law violations. The Kingdom's enforcement regime takes a relatively
narrow approach to market regulation. 8
 This agency-centered approach allows
For a discussion of this approach in New Zealand and Australia, see C. Dellit & B. Fisse, 'Civil
and Criminal Liability Under Australian Securities Regulation: The Possibility of Strategic
Enforcement', in G. Walker & B. Fisse (eds.), Securities Regulation in Australia and New
Zealand, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 570-572.
6 See Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340 dated 8/11/1417, 1997.
See for example S. Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and
its Policy Implications', dissertation submitted to Michigan State University for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, 1990, p. 19. Malaikah wrote that apart from suspending share trading, no
other penalties are specified, and suspension of trading has never been enforced on non-complying
companies. As a result, although a few firms have complied with the disclosure requirements in
the Executive Rules, the majority has not.
8 See H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul International, London, 1997, p. 156. Azzam wrote that a major
problem of the Saudi stock market is the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement
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market participants to obtain experience of modern market practices within the
relatively narrow and protected confines of close government scrutiny. The
question now is whether the government is prepared to introduce a new system of
enforcement requiring significant industry co-regulation in order to detect,
investigate and prosecute securities fraud.
Correspondingly, the Kingdom could, in close cooperation with SAMA's
SCD, effectively develop a system of securities regulation and enforcement, that
places more emphasis on firms' internal control and compliance. Ideally, the
SCD, as the department responsible for enforcing the stock market rules, could be
supported by a new Securities Act that would authorize a greater range of
flexibility in sanctions and penalties for securities violations.
It is common for stock markets to undertake a degree of responsibility for
self-regulation, under the ultimate authority, control and supervision of an
independent regulatory agency within the government. 9
 Over the past decade,
there has been a development in advanced and developing counties towards a
higher degree of independence and self-regulatory control. There has been a
similar development towards the creation of independent, specialist government
authorities in the securities market (e.g., the United Kingdom).'° This approach
has long been the model for securities regulation in the US, with the SEC charged
mechanisms, which results in poor detection and prosecution of price manipulation and other
unfair practices.
See J. Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, Butterworths, London, 1989, p. 65.
Suter states that the term 'self-regulation' is defined in terms of the statutory functions performed.
An SRO is a body (whether a corporate body or an unincorporated association) which regulates
the carrying on of investment business of any kind by enforcing rules which are binding on
persons carrying on business of that kind, either because they are members of that body or because
they are otherwise subject to its control.
'° See J. Black, Rules and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 55-60.
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with the independent regulation of market participants." It is argued that the
private sector is well placed to take on more responsibility for its own conduct
within the market, given the changed role of investors and institutions within the
market. 12
A starting point for implementing more effective compliance could be the
introduction of a new, independent division of SAMA to carry out an
enforcement programme. This division could be dedicated to articulating a set of
strategies that will oblige regulated firms to comply with the rules, or be subject
to a range of sanctions and enforcement actions. Reform-minded policymakers
have yet to bring about the substantive changes necessary in the legal
infrastructure to create the basis for an enforcement regime that is suited to the
modern securities market practices. It could be expected that such a new agency,
if properly supported by funds and personnel, and able to impose a range of civil
penalties as part of the Kingdom's enforcement regime, could increase market
efficiency considerably. In this respect, In an interview, Fahad Al-Mobarak,
General Manager of RANA Investment Company, noted that:
"I think that the market will be much better off with an
independent regulatory and supervisory body which has only one
mission, i.e., the stock market. Having an independent regulatory
and supervisory body will increase th quality of the rules and
the quality of supervision, and will help in developing the market.
I believe it is time for the Saudi market to have an independent
organization to take care of the market like most of other
countries in the world.
II j • Macey, 'Administrative Agency Obsolesce and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of
the SEC at Sixty', Cardozo Law Review 16, 1994, p. 909.
2 While banks are required under Article 8.3 of the Instructions to CTUs to adopt in-house rules
to prevent any employee or any holder of office in the organisation from using information
obtained at work for personal gain, our interviews with banks employees reveal that most banks
still do not have such rules.
Interview, Fahad Al-Mobarak, General Manager of RANA Investment Company, Riyadh, 2
October 1997.
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In light of this background, the main task of this chapter is to evaluate the
current enforcement regime, determining its effectiveness in ensuring compliance
with the stock market rules and in protecting market investors. Section 2 analyses
the liabilities of regulated firms under the stock market rules. The first part of this
section is devoted to liabilities under the CTUs. The second part discusses the
disclosure and antifraud rules that impose liabilities upon market investors under
the Disclosure Rules. Section 3 offers an analysis of the various enforcement
techniques, looking closely at the supervisory authorities' roles, their
investigative powers, their ability to prosecute those who violate regulations, and
penalties for violations.
2. Liability under Stock Market Rules
As a starting point for considering the Kingdom's enforcement regime, it is
appropriate to review how the programme has changed over the past decade and a
half. During the 1980s, the Kingdom passed the Executive Rules to formalize the
stock market and to design trading and supervision structures. 14
 The Executive
Rules promised to usher in a new era in seQurities market regulation in the
Kingdom. It authorized the buying and selling of shares through banks, and a
system of rules and
regulations concerning the organization of banking mediators, with an emphasis
on the procedures for buying and selling shares and restrictions on the purchase of
14 Executive Rules to Regulated Share Trading in Company Shares through Commercial Banks,
Circular No. 1232 19/m1a276, December 1984, the General Banking Control Department, SAMA.
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shares. The provisions promulgated under the Executive Rules also created the
SCD to provide the necessary monitoring of banks' central units that deal in
shares.' 5 The purpose of the SCD is to restrict unsafe practices in the market. The
Rules tend to focus on reducing market risk, seeing this as being the greatest
threat to investors. For example, Article 1 forbids banks to act in shares for their
own account, and Article 7 forbids investors to work with credit or lOUs when
dealing in shares.' 6
 Whilst the Executive Rules aim primarily to limit market risk
and to develop administrative procedures for supervising share dealings, no
reference is made to any principles or rules proscribing fraud, manipulation or
insider trading. This lacuna is especially remarkable given the persistence of such
practices in the earlier, informal market.
Besides purely technical trading issues concerning the buying and selling
of shares, the Saudi market regulators developed no significant legal basis for
enforcement of trading violations.' 7
 The principal reason that a strong
enforcement regime was not developed is due to the government's priority to
establish factors and conditions necessary to promote the development of the
financial market, rather than directly regulate participation in the market.' 8
 The
Executive Rules succeeded in establishing the conditions for the formal trading
market. The Kingdom's policymakers had assumed that by excluding financial
intermediates from the market, there would be little securities fraud. Such
reasoning is highly problematic since the absence of an effective disclosure
' Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2-f.
16 Executive Rules 1984; Art. 7 states that it is forbidden to deal in shares on credit and that banks
are not allowed to accept payment for shares in the form of post-dated cheques or any other post-
dated instructions; banks are responsible for any violation of this prohibition.
' See A. Al-Dukhiel, 'The Development of the Saudi Stock Market', in Gulf Financial Markets,
Gulf International Bank, Bahrain, January 1988, p. 59.
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regime, which is necessary to limit financial fraud and insider trading, makes it
extremely easy for market actors and firms to pursue illegal strategies. In an
interview, Nasser Al-Salem, an investor, noted that:
"The Saudi market, just as many other markets, has some illegal
practices. I believe that the lack of adequate supervision is the
main reason behind some of the illegal activities. It can also be
observed that some shares suddenly go up sharply and then drop
again in a short time with no reasonable
The more recent initiatives of the Kingdom's policymakers, especially the
Instructions to CTUs, are designed to overcome the regulation shortcomings by
providing rules that impose penalties on dealers that either make false markets or
engage in insider trading. 2° We now turn to an analysis of these new provisions.
2.1 Liability under the Instructions to CTUs
The Instructions to Central Trading Units were promulgated by SAMA to provide
guidance for the CTUs in the execution of transactions through the electronic
trading system ESIS. 2 ' Introduced in1990 for the internal use of banks, the
instructions set forth the procedures that CTU employees are required to follow
when executing orders through ESIS. 22
 The new rules immediately filled the
regulatory gap and became the primary regulations governing the daily operation
of the stock market. The rules apply only to CTUs, linked branches, and their
8 See interview Mr. Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and National Economy,
member of the Supervisory Committee, Riyadh, 21 November 1997.
' Interview with Nasser Al-Salem, an active trader in the Saudi stock market, Riyadh, 22 October
1997.
20 See interview with Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel. Al-Dukhiel states that there were cases of insider
trading against which SAMA was ill-prepared to bring adequate measures, hence the new rules
were targeted to close that gap in market regulation.
21 Instructions to CTUs, Securities Control Department, SAMA, Riyadh, 1990.
22 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 1.
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employees. The applicability of the Instructions to bank employees can only be
found in Article 8 of the Instructions, which states that any trading violation
committed by a bank employee as a result of not following the trading
instructions shall be recorded. 23 Any violation of Article 8 can result in their
suspension. 24
 The aim of this measure is to dissuade bank employees, who may
wish to take advantage of their position by trading in advance of the market, from
doing so. Interestingly, there are no requirements that serious offenders be
required to relinquish their profits or be subject to civil liability for wrongful
actions. 25 Ultimately, the detection and enforcement of these violations will
require significant formative support by compliance officers, as well as the
willingness of bank executives to institute in-house measures that will help thwart
such violations.
2.1.1 False market
A major concern of the policymakers is to prevent intentional interference in the
market forces of supply and demand. SAMA's SCD engages in surveillance to
ensure the integrity of trading on the stock market. An attempt to distort these
forces through scheme, artifice or design constitutes market manipulation.
Manipulation can be attempted in a number of forms, but will involve an attempt
to artificially raise or lower the price of a market security. SAMA's commitment
23 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 8.
24 Instructions to CTUs 1990; Article 8 states that trading violations committed by traders as a
result of not following the trading instructions shall be recorded. Violations can lead to charges
against the concerned traders or their CTU, and can result in their suspension.
25 M. Al-Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and
Integration', thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina, 1994, pp. 45-46. Al-Sheaebi states that the violation rules of the
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to limit fraud and manipulation is reflected in Article 8.1 of the Instructions to
CTUs. 26 This provision prohibits any employee from helping to make a false
market, by which is meant being involved in collusion between a buyer and seller
so as to create a false movement in certain shares that is deceptive to market
participants. Employees are prohibited from making a trade that does not result in
a beneficial change of ownership of the shares. 27 Given the crucial role bank
employees play in the running of market operations, policymakers believed it
essential to establish rules to prevent them from abusing their privileged position.
So far, there has been very little progress made by SAMA in restricting
manipulation by investors. 28 Abuses may, for instance, occur when employees
trade through nominee accounts, collusively driving up the price of a stock, and
later dumping it, which causes harm to investors. Clearly more attention to the
regulation of false statements and stock manipulation by bank employees is
necessary to change the image of a stock market that is highly manipulated.29
Instructions to CTUs are too short and unclear for each violation. The only penalty available for
the SCD is suspension; no criminal or civil sanctions have been provided.
26 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 8.
27 Instructions to CTUs 1990; Art. 8.1 states that it shall be contrary to the Instructions to make a
false market in a security, by which is meant collusion between a buyer and a seller contrived so as
to create a movement in security price which is not justified by the earnings or prospects of a
company.
28 H. Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, Kegan Paul International, London, 1997, p. 156. Azzam provides that for
the price of a stock market to be determined fairly, it is important that no price manipulation be
allowed. Current regulations of the Saudi stock market prohibit price manipulation. However,
unlike other countries where the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are quite effective,
mechanisms to monitor unusual price fluctuations and enforce offences are lacking in the Saudi
stock market.
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2.1.2 Bank's inside information
The new regulations include the specification of violations by regulated banks,
including the use of inside information. More specifically, Article 8.2 makes it
illegal for a CTU or other connected branch to carry out, on behalf of themselves
or third parties, any share transactions based on internal or confidential
information concerning the affairs of a listed company prior to the arranged time
for publication of that information by the company. 3° The central role that bank
employees play in the handling of the transactions, and their consequent access to
inside information, provide ample scope for insider trading. The concern that
employees will obtain information through their employment relationship is at the
heart of the regulations. Given the importance of employees' position in the
market, it is reasonable that the government is concerned about designing
measures which help prevent violations. However, SAMA's insider trading
enforcement programme has just recently been launched and, until now, charges
have never been brought against bank employees allegedly involved in insider
dealing. 3 ' In order to sustain and secure compliance, the legislation could perhaps
be amended to include a range of sanctions (e.g. dismissal, fines, etc.). The
Kingdom might also enact strong measures that compel banks to undertake
significant efforts themselves to detect and limit insider trading. This would not
only be likely to yield positive results for the banking industry, it would also limit
the need for SAMA to intervene in the internal organisational affairs of banks in
its efforts to regulate their employees' trading practices.
29 A. Al-Badrah, 'Calling for the Termination of ESIS and the Establishment of Traditional Floor',
A1-SharqAl-Awsat, Vol.5837,21 November 1994, p. 13.
30 Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 8.2.
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2.2 Liability under the disclosure rules
As noted earlier, the aim of the Executive Rules 1984 was mainly to organize
trading and to structure the market place. Accordingly, the regulations did not
provide for the prohibition of illegal trading practices or other violations that
might occur in the market. 32 The Ministerial Committee, after reviewing reports
of the Supervisory Committee warning of the serious consequences for the market
due to insider trading, fraud and other violations, enacted the Disclosure Rules
1997 to supplement the Executive Rules. 33 The Disclosure Rules were designed
to limit the occurrence of fraud and other market violations that might affect the
interests of investors in the market; they address suspension of trading, the
publishing of false information, insider trading, and short-swing trading. They
also impose liability upon those who violate the rules. We now turn to an
examination of the issues addressed under the Disclosure Rules provisions.
2.2.1 Suspension of trading
The Disclosure Rules prohibit companies from manipulating the market through
voluntary suspension of trading in their company's shares. Article 1 of the
Disclosure Rules imposes liability upon any company and its directors for illegal
suspension of trading in their securities for self-serving reasons (e.g., in
connection with an upcoming Annual General Meeting, dividend payment, etc.)34
31 Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, p. 156.
32 
• Malaikah, 'Saudi Arabia & Kuwait: A Study of Stock Market Behaviour and its Policy
Implications', dissertation submitted to Michigan State University for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, 1990, pp. 19-20.
B Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417, 1997.
Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 1.
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Of course, under exceptional circumstances and for good reasons companies are
permitted to suspend share trading, but only with the express prior approval of the
Ministry of Commerce. 35 The enactment of this rule will hopefully stem earlier
abuse by company insiders through manipulation of their shares and fraudulent
behaviour as investors. It is likely that the rules will need to be amended and
strengthened with penalties in order to provide compelling reasons for company
directors to follow the mandate.
2.2.2 Disclosure
Until recently, the Kingdom operated the stock market without a disclosure
regime. The absence of such a regime led to serious consequences for investors
and other market participants. 36 Accordingly, the Ministerial Committee enacted
legislation designed to stimulate the flow of information to market participants.37
The purpose of disclosure is to limit asymmetrical information in the market,
protecting investors from manipulation and other adverse market activities. It is
intended to close information gaps in the market. The Disclosure Rules impose
liability on those in certain functions in companies that fail to satisfy the terms of
disclosure. More specifically, Article 2-a requires the chairman or managing
director to announce any major events and information which may affect share
Disclosure Rules 1997; Article 1 states that companies cannot suspend trading of securities for
administrative reasons, such as Annual General Meetings or dividend payments. Companies can in
exceptional circumstances, and after coordinating with the Ministry of Commerce, suspend the
trading of securities for one week.
36 See Al-Badrah, 'Calling for the Termination of ESIS and the Establishment of Traditional
Floor', p. 13.
' Disclosure Rules 1997, Art 2.
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prices indirectly or directly. Company directors are obliged to announce any
company news that will affect share prices without delay.38
Furthermore, Article 2-b makes it unlawful for the Board of Directors,
managers and other executive employees to make statements or comments or
offer information, unless the statements or the information truly reflect the current
state of affairs of the company. 39 The Kingdom's policymakers recognize that any
statement or omission by a company may have consequences for investors. The
main purpose of the provision, therefore, is to prevent a company's management
from deceiving the market by making untrue statements of material fact or
omitting to state an important material fact. The legislation will perhaps be
updated eventually to include more intensive coverage of market fraud
perpetrated by companies. In that case, the courts may be required to provide
legal grounds for limiting the extent of the fraud in the market.4°
2.2.3 Short-swing trading
The Disclosure Rules also protect market participants by prohibiting the Board of
Directors, managers and executive employees from trading shares in their
company in the short term for speculative purposes. 4 ' Managers are also restricted
from trading in the company's shares prior to the announcement of any major
38 Disclosure Rules 1997; Art 2-a states that the chairman or managing director must announce
any major events, information or decisions which may affect share prices indirectly or directly to
the SCD of SAMA for dissemination via ESIS and the mass media.
Disclosure Rules 1997, Art 2-b.
40 See Chapter 3, pp. 14-17 for more details about the commercial court system in the Kingdom.
4! Disclosure Rules 1997; Article 3-a prohibits the Board of Directors, managers and executive
employees from short-term trading (daily or weekly) of their company's shares for speculative
purposes, trading these shares to mislead the market, dealing or trading shares before the company
announces any major events likely to affect the price of the shares, or buying and selling one day
following any such announcement.
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event likely to affect the price of shares. Art. 3-b states that it is unlawful for the
board of directors, managers and executive employees to buy, sell or transfer
ownership in the 10 days preceding the announcement of quarterly financial
statement. 42 While the enactment of a provision to limit short-swing trading
signals the new trend to curb manipulation by corporate insiders, it is unlikely to
be enforced by SAMA, due to the limited power and penalties available to the
organisation to tackle this market violation.
2.2.4 Insider trading
In Chapter 8 we noted that the Ministerial Committee enacted insider-trading
rules to limit the misuse of non-public material information by insiders. Article 4-
a of the Disclosure Rules applies to the sale or purchase of shares made by any
person who possesses material information that is not available to the public.43
The law imposes liability upon those with access to insider information, such as
the company's Board of Directors, managers and executive employees. The rules
also impose liability upon those who are not directly connected to the company,
but have the potential to trade based on inside information, such as outsiders and
tippees .
The SCD, which is responsible for surveillance and enforcement of
insider trading regulations, operates under very difficult conditions, due to limited
resources and conflicts with other agencies about prosecutable activities.
42 Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 3-b.
' Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a.
' The Disclosure Rules 1997, Art. 4-a, state that no one may deal on inside information that is not
published and freely available to the public, whether this information is received directly or
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Accordingly, no actions have been announced to date against any alleged insider,
and our fieldwork revealed that few warnings have been issued for alleged cases
involving misappropriation of price-sensitive information which was used in
trading of securities.45 Clearly, the creation of an independent enforcement body
is crucial for effective enforcement.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms of the SCD
It has been argued that no regulatory system can be effective in protecting
investors without a strong and efficient system of discipline and enforcement.46
This section examines the surveillance capabilities and procedures of the SCD.
We turn initially to the question of the investigations of violations by the SCD.
3.1 Investigations
As noted in Chapter 4, The Executive Rules empower SAMA as the body
delegated with the task of regulating the stock market's functioning. Given the
role of banks in the market, it was reasonable for the Executive Rules to establish
the Securities Control Department as a division of the Banking Control
Department within SAMA. 47 The function of the SCD is to supervise the daily
indirectly. In this regard, the Disclosure Rules do not distinguish between insiders and outsiders in
the prohibition of the use of non-public information.
For example, Azzam states that while insider trading is illegal in Saudi Arabia, violators of the
insider trading rules usually just receive a warning from the market authorities, admonishing that it
not happen again.
46 M. Perry, 'Approach to Market Regulation', in The Future of the Global Securities Market:
Legal and RegulatoryAspects, Fidelis Oditah (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 179.
The Executive Rules 1984, Art. 2-f, state that to be able to complete the daily supervisory role,
the banking control department at SAMA has to establish a permanent control division which will
be called the Securities Control department.
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trading in the market.48 The SCD, through the Instructions to CTUs, is mandated
to supervise banks and their employees when conducting securities transactions
through ESIS.49
As noted earlier, neither the Executive Rules nor the Instructions to
CTUs provide the SCD with any power over listed companies, since joint-stock
companies remain under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Commerce.
Whilst SAIVIA is the main agency responsible for stock market operation, its
regulatory role is uncertain and limited by its legislative mandate. 5° It is likely
that regulation of non-banks and other financial companies will need to be
consolidated under a single agency so that effective enforcement can be made
possible. When promulgating the Disclosure Rules in 1997, the Kingdom's
policymakers failed to limit the uncertainty of stock market supervision and re-
allocate responsibility. Instead of clarifying the situation further, the Kingdom's
policymakers suggested that the SCD cooperate with the DoC at the Ministry of
Commerce to ensure compliance with the Disclosure Rules. 5 ' None of the stock
market regulations mentioned how the stock market supervisory authorities
48 According to Art. 2-f of the Executive Rules, the SCD shall perform the following functions:
define the hours of dealing in the stock market; analyse the daily dealings which are returned from
the bank's Central Units; supervise the appointment of employees in the Trading Units of Banks;
receive the complaints of participants; fashion solutions; undertake administrative procedures;
advertise the prices of shares in the local papers; conveyto banks and companies the instructions
issued by the Ministerial Committee and the Supervisory Committee about share dealing; issue
informative publications and notes on share dealings; and provide the necessary secretarial work
for the Supervisory Committee.
u Instructions to CTUs 1990, Art. 2 (4) (3).
50 As argued earlier in Chapter 4, pp. 26-27, regulatory competencies in the Kingdom are dtided
between SAMA and the Ministry of Commerce. In this regard, SAMA's power over the secondary
market is still limited by the law mainly to the operations through ESIS. Market acti ities related
to listed companies are still under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce.
s For example, Article 1 of the Disclosure Rules requires companies that want to suspend iradmg
of their securities to acquire prior approval from the Ministry of Commerce. This Lisk slbo8kl
actually have been given to the SCD, because it is responsible for the secondary nirket. and n
the Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore, the Disclosure Rules clearl y eprcsscd the ptcakes
intention to invite the Ministry of Commerce to share SAMA's responsihihtte in krtick 5. duch
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would handle enforcement of the rules under complex circumstances. It is worth
pointing out that whenever there appears to be a violation of stock market rules,
questions emerge as to which agency has the responsibility of investigation and
enforcement. Until this conflict over regulatory 'turf' is resolved, the difficulties
and high cost of coordination will limit the effectiveness of the Kingdom's
enforcement efforts. In this regard, Abdul Aziz Al-Dukhiel, President of the
Consulting Centre for Finance and Investment said that:
"I think that the market rules failed to provide the market with the
protection needed. The rules are not clear and not effective to
increase the flow of information to the market or to stop insider
trading. The rules are too weak to force large investors to abstain
from manipulating the market or at least require them to report
their ownership. ,,52
In order to assess the present level of enforcement in the Kingdom's
securities market, it may be useful to examine supervision and enforcement
mechanisms of mature markets, as well as those of other emerging markets.
Consider, for example, the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) which is the most well-known body for monitoring the securities industry
in the world. 53 The SEC was created on 1 June 1934 by Section 4-a of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Supported by more than 2,000 employees, the
SEC supervises the US securities market. 54 The Organisation is divided into four
states that the Department of Companies of the Ministry of Commerce and the Securities Control
Department of SAMA will follow up these rules with companies.
52 Interview with Abdul Aziz A1-Dukhiel, President of the Consulting Centre for Finance and
Investment, Riyadh, 12 December 1997.
° Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.0 & 78a ff., Federal Securities Laws, United States,
1995.
The SEC is an independent agency in the executive branch of the Federal government, which
was created by the Exchange Act for the administration of both the Securities Acts. It consists of
five Commissioners appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for
five-year terms; a maximum of three commissioners may be members of the same political party.
See L. Loss, & J. Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1995, p. 50.
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divisions, Corporation Finance, Enforcement, Investment Management and
Market Regulation.55
No law can be effective without someone to enforce it. The SEC is the
federal agency empowered to enforce federal securities laws. In the event of
suspected violations of the federal securities law, the SEC has full responsibility
and power to investigate. 56 It has the authority to take disciplinary action against
brokers, dealers, investment advisers and investment companies, as well as
against the self-regulatory organisations. 57 SEC investigations are conducted by
the Enforcement Division. Although investigations usually start informally, the
division may request the SEC council to authorise a formal investigation,
pursuant to which the SEC has broad remedial powers. 58 After the Enforcement
Division has conducted its investigation, its report may recommend that the SEC
initiate disciplinary proceedings, bring the case before the courts, or drop the
case. 59 Recently, the SEC delegated some of its supervisory powers to self-
regulatory organisations. These self-regulatory bodies, such as the North
American Securities Administrators Association and individual investment
houses, are supposed to monitor the markets on an in-depth, daily basis and report
See W. Werner, 'The SEC as a Market Regulator', Virginia Law Review 70, 1984, pp. 755-756.
P. Coughlin & E. Issacson, 'Securities Class Actions in the United States', in W. Horton & G.
Wegen (eds.), Litigation Issues in the Distribution of Securities: An International Perspective,
Kluwer Law International Ltd, London, 1997, P. 399.
J. Bartos & F. Dangeard, United States Securities Law, Practical Guide, Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, Boston, 1992, p. 105.
58 Ibid.
Historically, the SEC was limited in its powers of enforcement. The enforcement division had
the power to investigate violations pursuant to which it could issue formal orders of investigation
and subpoena the production of documents and witnesses. Its ability to seek and/or impose
sanctions, however, was restricted. It had statutory authority to censure violators of the securities
laws and to revoke broker-dealer's registration. The sweeping legislation of the last decade,
examined in detail in subsequent sections, has served to radically increase the remedies available
to the SEC. McLaughlin & Macfarlane, 'Insider Trading in the United States of America', pp.
300-30 1.
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to the SEC if there is any evidence of fraud or other violations. 60 The SEC
oversees the markets on a broader, national scale. The SEC may negotiate and
impose civil sanctions, ranging from injunctions to fines. 6 ' The SEC has to bring
charges and initiate criminal actions, which it must then refer to the
Department of Justice. Until recently, criminal prosecutions under the securities
laws were rare and available sanctions of minimal deterrent value. Such criminal
actions were more commonly brought under the provisions of the mail and wire
fraud statutes.62
There are two ways in which the SEC can detect violations of the
securities laws. First, a member of the public or another government body may
notify the SEC that they have detected violations. Second, the SEC has its own
monitoring system. 63 For example, the SEC has developed what is called the
'Stock Watch' program; a computerised system that tracks market activities,
looking for abnormalities in stock trading patterns by analysing dozens of
characteristics, such as daily trading volume, daily price, identities of buyers and
sellers and their past, personal trading history. 64 The Self-Regulation
Organisation's (SRO) rules and regulations impose the obligation on member
firms to supervise their own operations for violations. Therefore, both the
° J. Naylor, 'The Use of Criminal Sanctions by UK and US authorities for Insider Trading: How
the Two Systems Learn from Each Other', Part 2, The Company Lawyer, Vol.11, No. 5, 1988, p.
86.
Ibid.
62 McLaughlin & M. Macfarlane, 'Insider Trading in the United States of America', in
Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan, p.
301.
63 The Commission's general investigation powers derive from Section 19 of the Securities Act
and Section 21 of the Exchange Act, which give the Commission broad powers to conduct
investigations into possible statutory violations. L. Sodcrquist, Securities Regulation, 3Id edition,
Foundation Press, Westbury, New York, 1994, p. 577.
64 Naylor, 'The Use of Criminal Sanctions by UK and US authorities for Insider Triding. How the
Two Systems Learn from Each Other', p. 86.
308
American Stock Exchange and the Pacific Stock Exchange required members to
institute supervisory procedures to assure compliance with applicable securities
laws and regulations.65
In the United Kingdom, the operation of financial institutions is
prescribed by the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), the regulatory structure
that was established under the terms of the Financial Services Act 1986.66 The
FSA states that any investment business conducted has to be authorised by, and
placed under the supervision of, the SIB. 67 The SIB is a private company funded
by the authorised firms and received no public finance. 68 Under the FSA Act
1986, SIB may, whenever it appears there is reason to do so, embark upon an
investigation into any aspect of the affairs of a person that are relevant to
investment business which he is, was, or appears to be, carrying on. 69 The SIB is
empowered to call before it anyone necessary to answer questions, provide
information or produce documents relevant to the investigation.70 The
investigative powers of the SIB are also supplemented by its authority to call for
information from any authorised person, SRO, Recognised Professional Body
(RPB) or Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE).7'
65 See, for example, W. McLucans, S. Detore, & A. Colachis, 'SEC Enforcement: A Look at the
Current Programme and Some Thoughts About the 1990s', in The Business Lawyer, Vol. 46, May
1991, PP. 798-848.
66 See S. Sackman, & M. Coltman, 'Legal Aspects of a Global Securities Markets', in Fidelis
Oditah (ed.), The Future of the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 19.
67 Section 105 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
68 Black, Rules and Regulators, 1997, p. 67.
69 Section 105(1) of the Financial Services Act 1986.
70 Section 105(3) of the Financial Services Act 1986.
' M. Crystal & B. Atherton, 'Insider Trading in the United Kingdom', in Emmanuel Gaillard
(ed.), Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan, Kluwer Law Taxation
Publishers, Denver, Boston, 1992, p. 171.
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Until recently, the self-regulatory authorities played a prominent role in
increasing the adequacy of the securities regulations. 72 The regulatory framework
introduced by the FSA 1986, containing self-regulation as an essential and
pervading element, gave back to the revamped self-regulation bodies the primary
responsibility for policing their members. 73 Under the FSA, SIB has the power to
delegate its regulatory responsibilities to a number of authorised agencies, namely
the Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs). The investigative and surveillance role
of SROs in the stock market cannot be ignored. 74 All SRO rule books contain
regulations providing for investigation whenever it appears that a member of the
SRO is not a fit and proper person, that there may have been a contravention of
the rules, or that an investigation is desirable for the protection of investors. 75 The
stock exchange plays a crucial role in the application of the securities regulations.
The Exchange's Surveillance department is in charge of identifying any suspected
cases of trade rule violations and, if necessary, brings charges itself. 76 In the case
of suspicious circumstances, the Exchange will notify the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), which can investigate to establish whether there is a prima
facie case, while inspectors can require a suspect to produce documents, appear
before them, and give statements under oath that can later be used in court.77
72 See M. White, 'The Implications for Securities Regulation of new Insider Dealing Provisions in
the Criminal Justice Act 1993', in The Company Lawyer, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1995, p. 169.
At present there are a number of relevant SROs, including the Association of Futures Brokers
and Dealers (AFBD), the Financial Intermediaries and Brokers Regulatory Association
(FIMBRA), the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), the Life Assurance
and Unit Trust Regulatory Association (LAUTRO), and the Securities Association (TSA).
Suter, The Regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, p. 65.
Gaillard, in Insider Trading, the Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan, p. 191.
White, 'The Implications for Securities Regulation of New Insider Dealing Provisions in the
Criminal Justice Act 1993', p. 168.
Ibid.
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Recent concern with the level and value of enforcement in the market has led to
the introduction of a single market regulator for the functioning of services.78
Improving securities regulation through effective enforcement is an
important step for the orderly development of capital markets in developing
countries. 79 The introduction of an effective enforcement environment, limiting
the instances of fraud, insider trading and manipulation, is of paramount
importance for liberalising and near-liberalising countries in the Middle East
region. A prime example of a jurisdiction that has moved to the forefront in the
area of regulatory regimes is Oman, a country with a small, but quickly
developing capital market. 80 Given the proximity of the Omani market to the
Kingdom, its potential influence on investors in the region, and the similarities
between the Omani and Saudi markets, it is very useful to look at recent reforms
undertaken by their government. The success of these reforms may assist the
Kingdom's policymakers in developing their own new strategy to deal with
supervision and enforcement issues. It is worth pointing out that the Omani stock
market is one of the newest in the area, but is considered one of the most well-
regulated and advanced markets in the Arab region. 8 ' The Omani Muscat
Securities Market Law (1988) is a piece of legislation that covers all the aspects
related to the stock exchange and its operations. In terms of supervision and
enforcement, the Muscat Securities Market Law describes in detail the internal
and external supervision and enforcement mechanisms in the market. It creates
78 For the new approach to regulation of securities markets see, 'The UK Financial Service
Outline', Financial Service Authority, London, 1997.
See World Bank, 'Entering the 2Pt
 Century, World Development Report 1999/2000', pp. 73-
84.
80 See Azzam, The Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Investment Opportunities in Relatively
Underplayed Markets, pp. 169-80.
Ibid.
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the Muscat Securities Market Management as the regulatory and supervisory
body for the Omani stock markets. 82 The Minister of Commerce & Industry is
responsible for appointing the General Director of the Securities Market, who is
the main person in charge of executing the policy, regulations and decisions set
forth by the Market Management. 83 As head of the executive department of the
market, the General Director is responsible for implementing policy that supports
employees, consultants and professionals to carry out their tasks.84
In regard to supervision and enforcement, the Securities Markets Law
delegates full power to the Securities Market Management and its supervisory
body to conduct any investigation or surveillance necessary to ensure the safe and
sound operation of the market. 85 In this regard, the securities regulator is entitled
to conduct any investigations into violations, or suspected violations, of the
securities law at any time deemed necessary. 86 The regulator is entitled to demand
that any necessary persons provide the management with information,
explanations or documents needed. The General Director, as the representative of
the Market Management and as the head of the Executive Department, has the
right to appoint a commission made up of market employees to conduct a formal
investigation and report to the management. 87 This commission is also entitled to
request any documentation or information, and to call anyone before it for
testimony it deems necessary. 88 The Market Management has the right to
82 Muscat Securities Market Law was enacted under Royal Decree No. 88/53, 1988. Article 23
states that the Securities Market Management is the main body in charge of regulating and
supervising the affairs of the market.
83 Muscat Securities Market Law, Art. 25.
Muscat Securities Market Law, Art. 28.
85 Muscat Securities Market Law, Art. 52-b.
Muscat Securities Market Law, Art. 52-a.
Muscat Securities Market Law, Art. 52.
88 Muscat Securities Market Law. Art. 52-b.
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prosecute those who violate the law and can bring legal action against them for
violations of the securities law before the Market Settlement Commission or the
Omani Commercial Court.89
These initiatives and market reforms have led to an environment in which
investors have more confidence in the transparency of the market. The rules for
market operations and enforcement have led to a well-regulated market, where
violations are quickly and clearly penalised, sanctioned by the Muscat Regulatory
and Supervisory Body. A single securities regulator - responsible for an
enforcement programme, directed by highly professional officials and supported
by adequate resources and legal measures - has coalesced into a base for an
efficient market structure, offering foreign investors a secure environment in
which to invest assets.
3.2 Sanctions
There is a wide range of sanctions available to the Ministry of Commerce under
the Saudi Companies Act. 9° Saudi regulations provide for civil, administrative
and criminal sanctions for violation and non-compliance with the Act. 9 ' Although
these elements are in place under the Act, when a sanction or an order is required,
enforcement usually comes down to administrative sanctions under other stock
Muscat Securities Market Law. Art. 43-a, 43-b, 43-c.
90 Companies Act 1965, Articles 76,77,78, 229 and 230.
Companies Act 1965; Article 78 states that every stockholder shall have the right to institute the
action of liability against directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by
them is of a nature to cause personal prejudice. However, stockholders may institute such action
only if the company's right to institute is still valid and after notifying the company of their
intention to do so. If stockholders institutes such action, they shall be compensated only to the
extent of the prejudice caused to them. Article 229 provides for imprisonment for a period of no
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market rules.92 In this regard, the SCD has limited authority under the
secondary market rules and related legislation. The enforcement options included
in the Executive rules and Instructions to CTUs allow only for cancellation of the
transaction, or suspension of traders. 93 There is a potential danger with the latter
penalty, since it is limited to bank employees and the linked CTUs and branches.
It is conceivable that while employees may face proceedings, some investors or
listed companies who have engaged in the same transaction, will be able to avoid
penalty. 94 The Ministerial Committee, recognising this problem, passed the
Disclosure Rules in 1997, which imposes liability upon any person or firm that
violates rules for disclosure, short-swing trading, insider trading, and other fraud
on investors. 95 Creating a wide range of regulations can, and indeed must, entail
an enforcement strategy, otherwise the rules will not be complied with. In this
respect, a problematic feature of the disclosure rules is the absence of specific
penalties to be applied in case of violations. 96 Although the Disclosure Rules are
an improvement over the Executive Rules or the Instructions to CTU, since they
are not backed by penalties other than suspension or cancellation, they still
less than three months and no more than one year and/or a fine of not less than five thousand and
not more than twenty thousand Saudi Riyal for violation of the Companies Act provisions.
92 Al-Sheaebi, 'The Gulf Cooperation Council Stock Markets: Regulations Problems and
Integration', p. 46.
° Instructions to CTUs 1990; Art. 2.4, version 7.0, 1994.
Instructions to CTUs 1990; Art. 2.10, version 7.0, 1994, states that transactions may be
cancelled at the discretion of SAMA for regulatory reasons, which include the following:
- The certificate representing the shares was invalid for any reason.
- The seller did not have the right to transfer the shares or did not own them.
- The buyer did not have the right to buy the shares.
- The transaction was a serious infringement of trading regulations
- The transaction of the share was not valid at the time of trading.
- The transaction was intended to create a false market.
- The transaction concerned inside trading.
- Or for any other reason which, in the view of SAMA, justifies cancellation of the transaction.
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minister of Commerce Circular Reference No.
2222/221/9/3340, dated 8/11/1417, 1997.
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fail to provide specific penalty provisions for violations other than noting that
'violators will be punished'. It is this uncertainty, and the lack of civil and
criminal sanctions, that has led to difficulties in detecting, investigating and
prosecuting securities fraud.
In contrast, most countries have adopted different kinds of sanctions in
order to deter violations of the securities rules. For example, in the US, there are
sanctions for fraud and other violations which fall into three primary categories;
civil sanctions, administrative remedies and criminal sanctions available through
prosecution brought by the Justice Department, as well as remedies available to
private litigants in civil actions. 97 More specifically, section 2 1(d) of the
Exchange Act empowers the commission to take legal action seeking an
injunction against any person who 'is engaged or is about to engage' in a
securities law violation. 98 Courts have held that injunctive relief is available
under this provision upon establishing a past violation and such circumstances
that indicate there is a reasonable likelihood of future violation. 99 The Exchange
Act also provides the SEC with power to issue temporary and permanent cease-
96 Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules; Art. 5 states that the creation of an unfair market
and/or persons acting on inside information, is prohibited. Violations will be punished according
to the regulations within the Kingdom.
In general, criminal prosecutions are those brought by agencies of the State and usually
punished by imprisonment or fines paid to the State. On the other hand, civil action is a private
action brought by someone who claims that he has suffered loss because of the improper action of
someone else. See, for example, Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between
Criminal and Civil Law', in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 101, 1795, 1992.
15 U.S.0 § 78u(d).
See S.E.0 v. Commonwealth Chem. See., 574 F.2d 90 (2nd Cir. 1978); S.E.0 v. Management
Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801 (2nd Cir. 1975). See discussion in McLaughlin and Macfarlane, 'Insider
Trading in the United States of America', p. 304. The injunction may prohibit specified kinds of
illegal conduct with respect to any securities, not merely those involved in the past violation, but it
may not be so broad as to turn any violation of law into a contempt of court. See D. Ratner,
Securities Regulation, West Publishing Co., Minnesota, 5th Edition, 1996, p. 242.
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and-desist orders.'°° The Enforcement Act significantly expanded the SEC's
power to impose sanctions in administrative proceedings further, by authorising it
to impose civil monetary penalties of up to $500,000 and/or to order surrender of
profits against persons found to be violating, or about to violate, securities law.'°'
Moreover, the Enforcement Act additionally empowers the SEC to apply to the
courts for an order to prohibit any person who is found to have violated section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, and/or any of the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, from serving as a director or officer of a company registered under the
Act.102
Over the past decade, the SEC's powers to impose civil sanctions have
been dramatically increased.' 03 Seeking additional remedies to further deter
insider trading, the US Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 (ITSA)'°4
 and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 (ITSFEA)'°5 , while adding new sections 20A and 21A to the 1934 Act.
Section 21A of the Exchange Act permits the SEC to seek civil penalties,
both on inside traders and on persons who control inside traders.'°6 The penalty
for insider trading is at the discretion of the court, but may be as high as three
times the profit gained, or loss avoided, as a result of the inside trading, except in
100 15 U.s.c § 78u-3. A cease-and-desist order is an administrative remedy that orders a person to
refrain form engaging in further violations. See McLaughlin and Macfarlane, 'Insider Trading in
the United States of America', p. 306.
'o Exchange Act § 21B (a), (b), (e), 15 u.s.c 78u-2(a), (b), (e).
102 15 U.S.0 § 77t(e).
103 Soderquist, Securities Regulation, p. 246.
'°' 15 U.S.0 § 78u-1.
'° Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1)(A),(B), 15 u.s.c 78u-1(b),(A),(B).
106 5 u.s.c § 77t(e).
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the case people with controlling function, whose penalties can be as high as $1
million, regardless of the profit gained or loss avoided.'07
In addition to civil sanctions, Section 32 of the Exchange Act renders any
person who 'wilfully violates' any provision of the federal securities laws and
regulations subject to criminal penalties.'°8 In particular, Section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act states that any person who wilfully violates any provision of this
title, or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful
or the observance of which is required under the terms of this title, or any person
who wilfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any
application, report, or document required to be filed under this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder............, which statement was false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined up to $1,000,000, or
imprisoned up to 10 years, or both. However, if the person is a person other than
a natural person, a fine not exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed; but no person
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for such violations.'09
In the UK, civil liabilities are limited to the general law obligations (e.g.,
claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or tort). The common law
provides that any person who has suffered loss due to the improper action of
107 Under § 21A of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, the SEC may impose a civil penalty of up to
three times the trading profit, or losses avoided, upon finding that a defendant violated Rule 10b5,
Rules 14e-3, or any other provisions or rules under the Exchange Act that prohibit insider trading.
Profit or loss is defined as the difference between the purchase or sale price, and the value of the
security at a reasonable period after public dissemination of non-public information.
108 15 U.S.0 § 78ff (a).
109 Prior to the enactment of the ITSA and ITSFEA, the maximum criminal line was $10,000 and
the period of imprisonment was limited to five years. Section 32a was amended by ITSA to
increase the maximum criminal fine to $100,000. Congress further amended section 32a under the
ITSFEA in 1988 to increase the maximum fine for individuals to $1,000,000 and for institutions
for $2,500,000. See McLaughlin & Macfarlane, 'Insider Trading in the United States of America',
pp. 311-3 12.
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someone else, has the right to take legal action to cover the damages. 110 As the
securities markets supervisor, SIB has the power to impose a wide rage of
sanctions. 111 In the event of any breach of SIB regulations, SIB can withdraw or
suspend authorisation to trade, make a disqualification direction, and decree that a
person may no longer be employed in the authorised investment business." 2 The
FSA also provides that the SIB has the power to publicly reprimand an authorised
person" 3 and empowers the SIB to prohibit an authorised person from further
dealing with assets, even if those assets are outside the United Kingdom. The
FSA gives the SIB the authority to require that an authorised person transfer
assets to a trustee and to prescribe that an authorised person maintain sufficient
assets in the jurisdiction in order that all liabilities may be met." 4 The SIB's
power to bring civil action on behalf of investors does not prejudice the right of
investors to sue on their own behalf."5
Criminal penalties can also be imposed upon those who violate the UK
securities law." 6 The criminal provisions of the FSA Act define certain existing
offences, ranging from technical or regulatory offences to serious crimes of
commercial fraud." 7 However, the application of an offence may differ according
to whether or not the person concerned is an authorised person." 8 Any person
found guilty of a criminal offence as stipulated by the FSA faces a penalty of
imprisonment up to a maximum of seven years, and/or a fine of up to the
° Rider's Guide to Financial Services Regulation, 1997,403.
See Financial Services Act 1986.
112 See Section 59 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
Section 60 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
114 See Sections 65-68 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
" See Rider, Guide to Financial Services Regulation, p. 406.
116 Ibid.
" Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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statutory maximum of summary convictions)' 9
 In the case of insider trading
offences, a convicted person will be punished according to the CJA1993.' 2° The
CJA provides that an individual who is convicted after a summary trial of insider
dealing, is liable to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, a term of
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. In the case of conviction on
indictment, there is no maximum limit on the fine and the term of imprisonment
may be up to seven years.' 2 ' It is worth pointing out that the criminalization of
insider trading has not led to successful enforcement.' 22 For the most part in the
UK, Crown prosecutors have been unable to present a compelling enough
combination of evidence so as to persuade judges that criminal guilt is involved.
Accordingly, some legal commentators question the wisdom of allocating scarce
resources to prosecute such complex and difficult criminal charges and have
instead recommended that the Crown seek exclusively civil penalties against
those committing securities fraud.'23
If we look again to the enforcement regimes of developing markets, we
see that, for example, Muscat Securities Market law provides administrative, civil
and criminal sanctions to be imposed upon those who violate the securities law.
First, the Omani securities law empowers the stock market management through
" See Section 47 of the Financial Services Act 1986.
120 The Criminal Justice Act 1993.
121 The Criminal Justice Act 1993, Section 61.
122 See, for example, J. Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of Criminal and Civil Law Models
and What can be Done about It', in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 10, 1992, p. 1875.
123 The criminalization of securities violations raises a number of issues. First, prosecution of
securities fraud must be defined with sufficient clarity to give defendants sufficient awareness of
the illegality of their charges. Secondly, prosecutors should avoid initiating actions on purely
technical reporting requirements. The conduct to be prosecuted should entail criminal liability,
which must be shown to differ from practices that only give rise to civil liability. Critics of
criminal prosecution for securities regulation violations observe that prosecutors have failed in
many cases to define fraud with sufficient clarity, and prosecuted conduct concerning which
observers could seriously question whether criminal liability was called for. See, Rider, Guide to
Financial Services Regulation, pp.4410-416.
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the Muscat Securities Market Settlement Commission to impose administrative
sanctions upon any persons who violate the securities law.' 24 The sanctions range
from a warning to the cancellation of membership from the stock market.' 25 In
addition to administrative sanctions, Omani law gives any person the right to
bring legal action against someone before the Commission for the Settlement of
Commercial Disputes, in order to claim compensation losses caused by the
improper action of that other person.' 26 Finally, the Omani stock market law
imposes criminal sanctions upon those who violate the stock market rules. First,
the law provides that any person who trades based on non-public material
information, or who attempts to affect investors' decisions by spreading rumours,
will be subject to a minimum of three months' imprisonment and/or a fine of up
to OR 5,000.127 Second, the law provides that any person who knowingly engages
in any act or course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression of
the market will be subjected to imprisonment for not less than one month and/or a
fine of maximally OR 3,000.' 28
As the above suggests, the strategy of regulating a trading market requires
significant enforcement. A regulator must have a range of sanctions and remedies
available in order to introduce motivation for compliance. Unlike what is
practised in the Kingdom, most advanced markets and some developing countries
have an effective primary regulator of the stock market that plays a central,
controlling role in measuring compliance, and enforcing stock market standards.
The Kingdom possesses fewer statutory devices for ensuring compliance. Whilst
124 Muscat Securities Market Law 1988, Art. 43.
125 Muscat Securities Market Law 1988, Art. 43-(1)(2)(3)(4)(5).
26 Muscat Securities Market Law 1988, Art. 12.
127 Muscat Securities Market Law 1988, Art. 53.
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SAMA has the powers to regulate the secondary market, there are insufficient
resources for investigation and enforcement. The enforcement problem is
highlighted further by the narrow realm of remedies (i.e., administration)
available to SAMA.'29
4. Summary
This chapter has focused on the effectiveness of the Saudi stock market rules and
their enforcement by SAMA. The primary purpose of the stock market rules is to
limit or prevent fraudulent practices, and to foster public confidence in the stock
market through improvement of the stock market disclosure regime and strong
antifraud provisions. Still, the existing range of rules is not sufficient to guarantee
the protection of market investors' interests. In order to ensure market investors'
protection, the Kingdom needs to promulgate new rules and ensure their
compliance. The harm that fraud and manipulation can do to the market
emphasises the importance of preventing such offences by providing appropriate
supervision and investigation, action and enforcement, deterrents and sanctions.
The present structure of enforcement within the Kingdom is not optimal.
The development of the modern market microstructure means that SAMA has
exclusive regulatory power over the trading activities of banks in the stock
market. The regulatory mandate of SAMA, however, is limited, since only banks
L28 Muscat Securities Market Law 1988, Art. 54.
129 It is worth pointing out that the now-dominant regulation of disclosure for the listing of
companies on the exchange, which is designed to regulate fraud, is not technically employed at
present by the Ministry of Commerce. Amendments to the Companies Act, requiring mandating
disclosure upon listing, could support further the regulations of securities against fraud in the
Kingdom.
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of listed companies and other non-bank investors in the market fall under the
supervision of the secondary market regulator. The Ministry of Commerce
regulates the primary market activities and other joint-stock companies activities,
which is consistent with the early design and development of the market. We
have seen that this hybrid regulatory structure has created some confusion with
respect to the stock market supervision. We have argued that neither supervisory
branch is able to regulate properly due to truncated powers and unclear
arrangements. The upshot is that the adequacy of supervision and investigation of
securities fraud is questionable. Presently, there is a perception that only banks
are obliged to obey SCD orders, while other listed companies are only obliged to
obey the rules promulgated by the Department of Companies under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce.
Improved supervision of market rules could be assisted by the creation of
a single market regulator with full power over all listed companies. This change
in policy would converge with international fraud regulations, as witnessed in the
case of the United Kingdom. Such a structure would naturally require more
resources and further changes in legislation (e.g., the introduction of a Securities
Act) so as to establish its position as the main regulator for the market. Effective
market enforcement requires that the KingdOm take legal action against persons
who violate securities fraud rules or engage in insider trading. The present weak
enforcement structure, in which there is no mention of litigation or procedures for
bringing legal actions against violators, leads to uncertainty about the Kingdom's
commitment to securities regulations. The fact that the stock market rules do not
contain any civil or criminal sanctions weaken the possibility of enforcement.
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Because the only penalty for violations is the suspension of CTUs, employees
andlor transactions, it is unlikely that violators have sufficient deterrence to avoid
engaging in potentially distorting or illegal activities. This chapter has, by
examining the practices and procedures of other markets, provided a basis for the
policymakers in the Kingdom to consider changes to its stock market legal
structure and enforcement regime. The prospect of further market growth in the
financial services sector depends crucially on change being made to the regulatory
system. We have seen that efficient market microstructures must be supported by
rules that promote transparency. Anti-fraud rules and regulation of insider trading
and manipulation are necessary for the Kingdom's modern market infrastructure.
323
Chapter 10
Conclusion and Suggested Reforms
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent finance-driven trouble in East Asia and elsewhere,' and
the scandals concerning minority investors' exposure to unfair self-dealing and other
transactions in England and continental Europe, many commentators have called for
legal and institutional reforms that could strengthen the minority shareholders.2
Recent research on securities markets has found that, despite differences in capital
market development and ownership patterns 3 , the development of minority investors'
rights and their reliance on external finance appears to correlate with the strength of a
country's capital market. This work emphasises the centrality of laws that provide
investors with good information about the value of a company and protect investors
from the self-dealing transactions of the company's insiders. 4
 There is evidence that,
to the extent that a country undertakes to initiate legal and institutional reforms along
these dimensions, a country can expect to enhance the development of its stock
See S. Johnson, P. Boone, A. Breach & B. Friedman, 'Corporate Governance in the Asian Crisis,
1997-98', working paper, 1999.
2 See, generally, B. S. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets:
The Non-triviality of Securities Law', available from the Social Science Research Network Electronic
Library at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract
 id= 182169.
See R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, 'Corporate Ownership Around the
World', 54 J. Fin. 471, 1999; R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, 'Law and
Finance', 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1998; R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanos, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny,
'Legal Determinants of External Finance', 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1997. For a critical assessment, see M.
Pagano and P. Volpin, 'The Political Economy of Corporate Governance', Harvard University
working paper, October 1999.
' J.C. Coffee, Jr., 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure', Columbia University Law School Working Paper, October 1999; W.W. Bratton and J.A.
McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against
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market. 5 As a consequence, because so much evidence is emerging about the benefits
of legal standards for strong stock markets, countries world-wide are attempting to
overcome the weaknesses of their existing regimes by developing supporting
institutions and an enforcement system designed to counter insider trading,
manipulation, self-dealing and other abuses. Given the empirical relationship
between stock market development and a legal regime that supports transparency and
investor protection, this chapter explains why the level of market development in the
Kingdom is unlikely to be stimulated without the introduction of specific legal and
institutional reforms. 6 The main aim of the chapter, therefore, is to argue that there is
an array of legal reforms, discussed in Chapters 4-9, which are needed to
significantly increase the current level of stock market development in the Kingdom.
When studying the regulation of institutions that regulate the listing and
selling of shares on a stock exchange in countries like Saudi Arabia, one must take
into account the fact that the system of legal rules and remedies there is
fundamentally different from that in common law nations and most other major
western nations. 7
 In particular, common law legal systems tend to outperform civil
law in providing investor protection and structures that promote a liquid stock market
and international integration. 8 Quite unlike the Saudi legal regime, the legal regimes
in common law countries have developed quite effective mechanisms for dealing
Global Cross-Reference', in McCahery et al., Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance
Systems and Capital Markets, Oxford: Clarendon Press, forthcoming.
A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 'Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An
Overview', 10 The World Bank Economic Review 223, 1996.
6 For an empirical account of the connection, see, e.g., R. Levine and S. Zervos, 'Capital Control
Liberalization and Stock Market Development', 26 World Development 1169, 1179-89, 1998.
See, LaPorta et al., 'Corporate Ownership Around the World', 54 J. Fin. 471, 475, 1999.
8 LaPorta et al., 'Law and Finance', 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1998.
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with the agency problems that confront investors in securities markets. 9 Despite
differences in legal tradition, the Kingdom's performance in protecting investors and
providing high disclosure rules more closely resembles the practices in civil law
systems than the common law approach.'° The Saudi market is characterised by a
relatively low number of publicly listed companies, a reasonably liquid market and
few initial public offerings. Until recently, the market has been closed to foreign
investors, except via closed-end mutual funds. As in many other concentrated
systems of shareholding, a large portion of the listed companies on the Saudi
exchange are not susceptible to hostile take-overs or interventions by institutional
investors. Deficiencies and gaps in Saudi law tend to inadequately protect investors
from exposure to self-dealing transactions. And if we focus on enforcement, it
becomes clear that private investors have few remedies against firms who may
confiscate their assets. In recent years, the Kingdom has taken steps to develop rules
for insider trading, disclosure of financial information, and general issues which
constitute a move toward developing a regulatory framework that operates to
increase the level of transparency.
This thesis has paid considerable attention to the laws and institutions needed
to support greater monitoring and liquidity. Th analysis presented here suggests that
a strong stock market requires not only well-designed securities laws (and a strong
deterrence environment), but also the involvement of financial intermediaries to
For a discussion of US and UK approaches to dealing with the main agency problems, see B.S. Black
and J. Coffee, 'Hail Britannia: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited Regulation', 92 Mich.
L. Rev. 1994.
'° See OECD Report on Corporate Governance, April 1998, pp. 39-42.
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reduce agency costs and supply much-needed liquidity. In many countries, financial
intermediaries, with special reputational assets, often play a crucial role in
information disclosure by providing investors with credible information about
companies and their future performance possibilities." Furthermore, they exert a
strong presence in the market by limiting securities fraud, since in most cases
intermediaries put their own reputation on the line when they vouch for the
disclosure quality of their clients' statements to the market and government
regulators. It was argued in Chapter 6 that, as long as financial intermediaries are
legally excluded from the Kingdom's stock market, valuable aspects of a modern
securities practice will be absent from the market (i.e., meaningful listings standards,
high levels of disclosure, meaningful ratings, etc.).
Although the thesis has paid particular attention to the legal environment,
Chapters 2 and 3 also provided considerable insight into the historical development
of the market and the environment in which market actors operate. It is worth
pointing out that this is the first legal thesis which addresses not only the Kingdom's
'law on the books' but, in sharp contrast to earlier works in the field, explains how
the regulatory mechanisms actually function in practice. In line with recent research
on comparative corporate governance and scurities law,' 2 the focus on the
performance of the legal rules and institutions themselves is based on detailed field
work and interviews, containing a number of original aspects. This new emphasis on
B.S. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The Non-triviality
of Securities Law', pp. 4-8.
12 See, generally, J.A. McCahery etal., Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes
and Capital Markets, Oxford, Clarendon Press, forthcoming.
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legal rules for securities markets provides a fruitful basis for discussing the
possibilities for developing more efficient practices. From this perspective, this thesis
focused on the adequacy of disclosure and market transparency standards, rules on
insider trading, take-overs and self-dealing transactions.
This chapter will proceed through two stages. Part II focuses on main
elements of the Saudi regulatory regime in order to reveal some of the deficiencies in
the practices and to assess some of the new reforms designed to address the system's
shortcomings. Part ifi will then focus on a series of suggested policy reforms,
emerging from the detailed review of the Saudi regime. This section explains why
the adoption of credible disclosure rules, insider trading and anti-fraud rules, and the
movement toward the establishment of a securities regulator may create the
necessary basis for the establishment of a strong securities market in the Kingdom.
2. Conclusion
Successful securities markets tend to develop a set of rules and institutions that foster
investor knowledge and confidence in the market. Chapter 1 was devoted mainly to
explaining the importance of capital markets for economic growth in the Kingdom.
There are a number of pressures contributing to the demand for a strong stock market
in the Kingdom. Creating a strong capital market is viewed as especially important
because it can facilitate economic growth by providing a more efficient way for
companies to raise capital. It is notable that the family-controlled firms, with few
exceptions, constitute a significant segment of the business community in Saudi
Arabia. These firms, controlled through extensive cross-ownership and holding
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structures, tend to have good government contacts that are crucial for their long-term
performance. Yet many of these companies do not have access to the Saudi capital
markets, due to inadequate disclosure and the absence of intermediaries to give
detailed information to investors, and must rely on internal financing or bank loans.
Thus, a large section of the Saudi business community is not only forced to suffer
higher costs but will remain uncompetitive with respect to foreign firms. To address
this problem, it is submitted that rapid changes are required to create a well-
functioning public stock market that can give more companies access to external
capital, which may help them grow faster. It is suggested that changes in financing
patterns for small and medium-sized companies will force them to select more
concentrated lines of business, allowing them to make more profit in the long run. To
improve the funding of companies is only one reason why the government is
undertaking reforms. Viewed in an international context, the prospect of WTO
membership, which becomes effective in 2003, binds the Kingdom to confirm the
link between a fully effective membership and the liberalisation of the country's
financial system. For this reason, there is general agreement that the government will
have an incentive to proactively develop the regulations required for membership and
to ensure adequate disclosure of information. Whilst it is expected that the rules of
the game will be changed to bring them in line with broad international practice
before entering into the WTO, it is anticipated that increasing foreign participation in
the market will rapidly force changes in capital market practice and regulatory
posture within the Kingdom.'3
13 A similar process is taking place in the United Arab Emirates, see Financial Ti,nes, Tuesday 21
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Chapter 2 was devoted mainly to examining the main aspects of the genesis
and evolution of the Kingdom's stock market. We saw that the market expanded
rapidly over the past three decades. The level of stock market development is
measured typically by the size of the market, market liquidity, market concentration,
market volatility, institutional development and integration in the world capital
markets. 14 Stock market development had been relatively slow until the late 1980s
due to the absence of large institutional investor participation and reliable disclosure
rules to encourage investment and trading in the market. The emergence of domestic
institutional investors, which brought growth in terms of demand for assets, has been
a vital factor in increasing the size and improving the liquidity of the market. The
growth in the market has indeed been significant. For example, between 1985 and
1998, the number of transactions, volume and value of trading increased more than
32-fold. Market capitalisation has increased by more than 160%, making the Saudi
market by far the largest market in the region. Despite the relative success of the
Saudi market, it is acknowledged that this level of development, while notable, is
modest in comparison with other emerging markets in developing countries. 15 In this
regard, the absence of foreign investors and integration within the world capital
markets suggest that the Saudi market is significantly underdeveloped. It is important
that the government facilitate the adoption of specific policies to allow more direct
foreign participation and ownership, rather than hindering or restricting the types of
December 1999, Supplement, p. 3.
14 See A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 'Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries:
Stylized Facts', 10 World BankEconomic Review 291, 1996, p.301.
15 Ibid., pp. 305-307.
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investments and investors permitted to operate in the market. In the longer run, the
adoption of such measures should enhance greater market liquidity, while limiting
damaging volatility.
Chapter 3 provided a framework for understanding the regulatory design of
the stock market rules. The analysis explains why a number of diverse regulatory
processes and institutions are employed to govern the Kingdom's capital market.
Whilst there is extensive variation in the structure and organisation of the Kingdom's
regulatory regime, most rules are designed invariably to regulate the activities of the
market players, rather than the actual stock market. On the whole, this approach
tends to limit flexibility and innovation. In addition to rules that focus on participants
rather than instruments, the regulatory system is not yet unified under the authority of
a regulatory agency which has the mandate to delineate the substance of its
regulatory mandate. Problems with gaps in regulatory authority and the lack of
detailed procedures to regulate securities markets operations undermine any attempt
to establish a credible regulatory system. The evidence presented for the Kingdom is
that recent reforms have attempted to force implementation of credible rules that
provided the required safeguards for investment and growth in a system that can
change along with the changes in the market's activities.'6
Chapter 4 assessed the Kingdom's existing regulatory arrangements for the
primary and secondary markets. The Kingdom was found to have a hybrid
arrangement, with the primary market being regulated by the Ministry of Commerce,
and SAMA monitoring the secondary market. With respect to the performance of
16 B.S. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets', p. 22.
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regulatory institutions, it was found that the fact that the government was able to
coordinate policy and determine the context of agency regulation was, until recently,
largely due to the supervision and management of the agencies' day-to-day decisions
carried out by Ministerial and Supervisory Committees. However, serious problems
are emerging with respect to the institutional division of labour. It is submitted that
the Kingdom's hybrid system, while effective in an earlier stage of the market
evolution, may no longer be sustainable in closely controlling the market's complex
and evolving structure. In the long run, the government may need to amend its
regulatory framework in order to achieve its economic objectives.
Chapter 5 was devoted to examining the supply-side character of the Saudi
stock market. The chapter demonstrated the benefits, both directly and indirectly, of
institutional shareholding. The level of institutional intervention to change or alter
under-performing management structures in Saudi Arabia was found to be very
low.' 7 This reflects the fact that while there may have been increased institutional
ownership, most of the major institutions, such as funds, pensions and closed-end
investment vehicles, play no direct role in the monitoring of companies. Indeed, most
of the institutions employ fund-management firms or have their in-house managers
pursue investment strategies that are commonly employed by external fund
managers. Given the fact that most of the largest funds are dedicated to managing
their long-term investments in shareholdings, it was argued that this behaviour of
these managers actually leads to low levels in the rate of turnover of shares. In this
17 For an account of the growth of institutional shareholding and an analysis of the effect of their
interventions in the UK and Australia, see G.P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
Governance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, esp. Chapter 2.
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regard, the Saudi approach to a longer-term strategy would appear to approach the
style of investment in bank-based systems, such as those in Germany and Japan.18
Undoubtedly, the long-term orientation of Saudi institutional investors stems from
the bank-oriented structure of the market, which means that the funds and institutions
tend to be fairly homogenous. Whilst this type of market has the effect of creating
stability, this may be a two-edged sword, because the very fact that institutions do not
often engage in the sell-side of the market may lead to low turnover and very little in
the way of IPO activity. This insight was supported by the second observation that,
while Saudi market capitalisation is relatively large, it is concentrated in a small
number of companies. It would appear that, given the low annual trading volumes
and daily average, which are unlikely to increase without the stepped-up involvement
of both domestic and foreign intermediaries in institutional fund management.
Furthermore, domestic underwriting services and positive regulatory changes are
needed.
Chapter 6 examined the main aspects of the Kingdom's market infrastructure.
In this chapter we saw that the development of the Kingdom's electronic trading
platform and clearing system signalled a major shift toward the creation of a world-
class market. More specifically, the reliance on advanced technology has been crucial
to the Kingdom's ability to meet and surpass the G-30 international benchmarks in
trading execution and settlement. This chapter also argued that the Kingdom's
Executive Rules, which restrict operation of the Kingdom's share trading to the main
eleven banks within the system, may have been a good thing as a way of developing
18 Ibid., pp. 210-211.
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the infrastructure. However, it was concluded that, in the light of the high trading
fees and the innovations that usually accompany greater competition (e.g., Internet
trading), if anything, the Executive Rules should be amended to allow financial
intermediaries to participate in the area of supplying venues for share trading. The
benefits from increased competition could be enormous. There is even evidence that,
by allowing financial intermediaries to participate in stock exchange trading, such
firms may acquire strong incentives, as in the United States, to create their own
automated trading systems.'9
Chapter 7 evaluated the pattern of the disclosure in Saudi Arabia, questioning
whether the regime enforced a positive disclosure obligation on management. The
basis of the reporting requirement is set forth in the Companies Act and the
Executive Rules, which mandate the release of essential information about
companies in the market. Special attention was given to registration requirements,
particularly for new companies, and whether these offer an adequate basis to inform
investors of the investment risks. It was shown that reporting requirements for annual
reports are not sufficiently comprehensive so as to provide investors with accurate
financial statements of the company in question. The disclosure system, which has no
mandatory listing requirements, was revealed to be of a rather low quality. It was
argued that successful securities markets tend to provide investors with extensive
financial disclosure, good listing rules, liability rules that ensure that companies meet
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40760, 8 December 1998, 63 Fed. Reg. 70843, 22 December
1998, Securities Exchange Rule 3b-16.
334
the minimum quality standards, and sophisticated intermediaries who ensure honest
disclosure. It was suggested that in order to give investors reasonable assurances
about the quality of a firm's shares, the Kingdom could introduce listing rules,
supplemented by enforcement rules, and involve financial intermediaries in the
disclosure process. 2° Hence, extensive disclosure rules can, if adopted and enforced,
reinforce the position of minority investors who have developed few protections to
counter false or misleading disclosures.
In Chapter 8 the regulations with respect to insider trading were examined. In
a country such as Saudi Arabia, with a recent history of stock market organisation,
there is a relatively underdeveloped culture of securities enforcement. Indeed,
enforcement depends on strong institutions with strong backing from the market and
political decision-makers. It was found in Chapter 8 that the Saudi approach to
regulation of insider trading was constrained by a rather broad and imprecise
definition of inside information as contained in the Disclosure Rules 1997.
Moreover, the rules lack sufficient useful analytical features, such a way of
distinguishing between different types of insiders, thus reducing the probability of
successful enforcement. The rules against insider trading (Disclosure Rules) could be
amended so as to provide for a precise definition of an insider.
Chapter 9 focused on the effectiveness of the Kingdom's enforcement
regime, which is controlled by SAMA. It was contended that the regulatory mandate
20 Most modern commentators endorse such an approach for developed and developing countries
alike. See W. Bratton and J. McCahery, 'The Incomplete Contracts Theory of the Firm and
Comparative Corporate Governance', working paper, 2000; B. Black, 'The Legal and Institutional
Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets: The Non-triviality of Securities Law', working paper,
1999.
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of SAMA is unnecessarily truncated because it only covers the activities of banks. It
was argued that the absence of a securities law and regulatory body that monitors the
activities of market participants is a substantial barrier to successful market
enforcement. It was argued that the Kingdom's hybrid regulatory structure, which
creates substantial barriers to enforcement, is responsible for the inadequate system
of stock market supervision. For example, it was not surprising that, given the
limited capacity of the regulatory body, we found that certain unlicensed domestic
intermediaries do not come under the purview of the regulator. A large part of the
problem of enforcement comes down to the fact that there seems to be little in the
way of civil or criminal sanctions. Indeed, because there is no clear penalty for
violators, it is unlikely that violators will be sufficiently deterred from engaging in
activities which distort prices or divert monies from investors. As in the earlier
chapters, it was argued that the Kingdom must alter the regulatory mandate of
SAMA so as to provide a more effective enforcement vehicle.
Taking the above chapters together, it was concluded that, despite its
technical rate of growth, the Saudi stock market has played a relatively unimportant
role in the development of the Kingdom's economy. One of the keys to a successful
economy is the role of the stock market. Not surprisingly, it was discovered that the
Saudi stock market is not as competitive as other regional markets. The absence of
major market players within the financial system has meant that the Saudi market is
less well developed. It would appear that the lack of competition in the market, due
to the absence of domestic and foreign intermediaries, has led to acute financial
problems, because the lack of competition in the market has resulted in higher prices
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and a lower level of liquidity. At the same time, it was argued that there are serious
regulatory problems associated with the governance of the market due to there being
different types of laws and regulators with overlapping areas of competence. The
combination of fragmented regulations and a hybrid regulatory structure are not
sufficient to guarantee the protection of the market investors. Yet it would appear
that pressures are emerging (both domestically and internationally) that might prompt
the Kingdom to take the steps necessary to transform effectively its nascent system of
supervision into a securities and corporate governance regime that can support
further development of the stock market.
3. Recommended Reforms
As we have seen, the Kingdom has established the basis for a world-class securities
market. The development of the Kingdom's electronic trading platform and clearing
system has, due to their effectiveness for investors, signalled a major shift towards
the creation of a securities market which is fully capable of contributing to the
Kingdom's economic growth. However, the existing advanced technology may not
be enough to create a successful securities market. In order to create a successful
securities market, the Kingdom's policymakers must counter the problem of adverse
selection, i.e., the problem that high-quality issuers leave the market because they
cannot obtain fair value for their shares, while low-quality issuers remain. Successful
markets have developed a number of institutions to counter adverse selection
problems. They include (1) securities laws that are backed up by severe sanctions for
false or misleading disclosure and a securities regulator with the staff, equipment and
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budgets to pursue fraudulent players in the market, (2) accounting rules that limit the
opportunities for issuers to fudge their financial results; (3) an accounting profession
with the skills and expertise to expose instances of attempted fraud; and (4)
investment bankers whose reputations depend on not selling fraudulent or overpriced
securities to investors. Such institutions reduce the emergence of fraud and the extent
of adverse selection. As a result, they attract honest issuers into the securities market
and drive out dishonest issuers. Moreover, as the average level of disclosure
increases, investors will have greater faith in disclosure, and will pay more for
securities. This will lead to more high-quality issuers entering the market. But the
participation of accountants, investment bankers, securities lawyers and venture
capitalists is costly.
It is clear that there is ample reason to believe that improvement in the
regulatory regime will enhance the Kingdom's stock market activities. We have
developed some recommendations that we think are necessary for the Saudi
policymakers to undertake in order to create the conditions for a successful securities
market.
3.1 One securities market law
The governance of the market with different types of laws might be suited to the
market and goals of its regulators in the past. However, the protection of market
investors and the potential role that the market could play in the Saudi economy
necessitate the enactment of a single set of coherent and consistent securities
regulations that address all market matters, while avoiding gaps in the regulation.
338
Adoption of a single, comprehensive stock market law could, in the first instance,
provide a short-term solution for the current problems facing the Kingdom's
regulators.
3.1.1 Disclosure regime
International experience tells us that unless disclosure is mandatory, it tends to be
avoided, especially by smaller companies, which do not normally attract institutional
investors. While it may appear that the US requires too much disclosure (although
this is unclear), it seems that other countries require too little and have much too
much room in their accounting rules for fudging. As a consequence, securities
markets suffer. This is certainly the case for the Saudi market. In this regard, it is
recommended that the Kingdom adopt a new Stock Market Law that mandates listing
rules, requiring that publicly traded companies comply with a series of Saudi
exchange disclosure rules. Under the new Law, listed companies would be required
to provide sufficient and comprehensive annual and quarterly reports so as to provide
investors with accurate statements of the company in question.
The central task for securities regulation is to ensure that trading prices are
promptly published, so that each investor knows the prices that others have paid for
publicly traded securities. This gives investors confidence that they are not paying a
higher price for the securities he is buying. Transparency gives investors additional
protection against asymmetric information. The extra protection translates into higher
securities prices, and reinforces the virtuous cycles initiated by good disclosure rules,
where high prices attract more high-quality investors into the market. For our
339
purposes, the Stock Market Law should be formulated so as to create a series of
rules, starting with the general mandate that joint-stock companies shall be required
to make immediately available any relevant, material information that a reasonable
investor would expect to affect the value of the share price of the securities of
relevant entities.
The Kingdom's extant disclosure regime is broad and lacks concern for
demanding sensitive information or information which most likely will have an
effect on share prices of listed companies. Good accounting rules that inform
investors of a company's past performance and restrict a firm's ability to choose
among different accounting techniques should be introduced. Besides writing serious
accounting rules, the disclosure regimes must be supplemented with at least some
liability rules to ensure that companies make honest disclosures. Also, the disclosure
system should be amended to require full and fair reporting of financial information
in a number of change of control contexts. An important part of such reforms is to
introduce a far-ranging financial disclosure obligation for investors or the board of a
company when they have increased their holdings in the shares of the company. This
rule could be supplemented by stating what percentage will be considered a change
in the ownership and therefore constitutes a majot event. Given the sensitive nature
of information, firms should be subject to a clear and precise set of disclosure rules,
to ensure effective compliance. It is submitted that the existing disclosure rules
concerning tender offers require a comprehensive policy review and the introduction
of new rules. This is because there is no attempt to place specific information
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requirements on the company or person acquiring or making a bid for the shares of
the company.
The current insider trading provision relies on a particularly broad definition
of inside information and insider, which will cause difficulties for the Kingdom's
regulators when implementing rules for enforcement. In this regard, the new Stock
Market Law should provide new provisions based on clear and concise definitions of
inside information and insider.
3.1.2 Anti-fraud provision
The single most important job for a securities regulator is chasing off would-be
crooks. The key element here is that there are clear anti-fraud provisions and a
specialised agency with the will and ability to pursue sophisticated fraud (insider
trading, etc.). Certainly, the existence of a wide range of rules is not sufficient to
guarantee the protection of investors' interests. Naturally, the harm that can be
caused to the market by fraud and manipulation underscores the importance of
controlling the offences by providing appropriate suppression and investigation
measures, action and enforcement, deterrence, and a range of sanctions.
In order to ensure that market investors are protected, the government should
consider amending its securities regulation system so as to provide investors with a
comprehensive and coherent set of anti-fraud rules, insider trading regulations and
penalties for non-compliance, including criminal sanctions. The new amendments
should include litigation rules and administrative procedures for bringing actions
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against violators. Such changes are likely to lead to greater certainty about the
Kingdom's commitment to securities regulations.
3.2 An independent agency
In an attempt to ameliorate the gaps in its regulations and limit the weakness of the
current agency structure, it is essential that the Kingdom's policymakers introduce
new legislation, creating a single and independent agency. In many jurisdictions,
policymakers have found it more effective to create an independent agency with
administrative and regulatory responsibility for the securities markets. If supported
with sufficient funding and resources, an independent agency could bring the greatest
benefit to the Kingdom's securities market by effectively modernising the rule-
making process (with changes being subjected to greater industry-wide comment and
discussion). It is anticipated that a single agency will avoid jurisdictional disputes
which have caused agencies to increase their jurisdictional authority without
modernising the rules in light of changes in the market.
The new agency obviously must have jurisdiction over all primary and
secondary securities markets as well as over all over-the-counter and alternative
trading markets. It seems reasonable to expect'that such an agency should have
exclusive power over the disclosure regime which will mandate that all listed
companies are obliged to comply with the disclosure requirements set forth by the
new agency. All listed companies would then be required to comply with new agency
rules and criteria regarding proxy solicitations, mergers and take-over bids. Finally,
the new agency will be responsible for setting forth comprehensive, substantive
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regulations to license the market of securities firms and the securities business and
for providing a system for the registration and overseeing of investment advisors.
An independent stock market regulatory and supervisory body, with as its
main and full responsibility the regulation and supervision of the stock market,
including the responsibility of the IPOs, is perhaps the only reasonable policy option
which could eliminate most of the market's problems and offer coherence in market
regulation. In general, then, the idea of unification in this area should be especially
welcome and important for the following reasons. Creating a unified agency structure
may tend to build a process of regulatory decision-making that responds to changes
in the market, while limiting politicians from intervening in the policymaking
process. The Ministerial and Supervisory Committees would be in the position to
control and monitor the performance of the agency by reliance on notification
procedures. This supervisory role could be supplemented by a set of procedural rules
that place constraints on the decision-making of the agency, allowing the Ministerial
and Supervisory Committees the opportunity to intervene in the bureaucratic
decision-making process. Furthermore, the Committees could create procedural rules
for the agency that causes the agency's administrators to produce policy decisions
that can be reviewed ex post by the Ministerial Committee.
It is submitted that a modest redesign of the existing agencies, their structures
and procedures, if implemented effectively, might offer the Kingdom's policymakers
a regulatory structure that is at once responsive to changes in the interests of the
market, while at the same time creating rules that can benefit the interests of
investors. Moreover, a redesigned agency structure would enable the Kingdom to
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create a mechanism for creating an effective regulatory apparatus to achieve its
regulatory goals for the market, while enabling Ministers to have greater control over
the decisions generated by the agency.
3.3 Trading
Over the past fifteen years, the Kingdom has developed a very sophisticated
electronic trading platform and clearing system which has been crucial to the
Kingdom's ability to meet and surpass the G-30 international benchmarks for
trading, execution and settlement. Yet, by itself, technical improvement of the
operation and management of the existing trading system alone may not be enough to
secure a competitive advantage for the Kingdom's equity market. The restrictive
policy adopted by the government has resulted in only a few listed companies in the
market and a low trading volume and liquidity level in comparison to other emerging
stock markets. A modern stock market must provide the means for investors to have
access to the most efficient modern trading systems. The government should allow
for the introduction of vigorous price competition and remove barriers to innovate
technologically in order to provide the best possible trading system.
3.3.1 Primary market
In the light of the newly emerging market conditions, it can be seen that the Ministry
of Commerce's conservative approach to new issues is one of the main factors
restricting market growth. In this regard, the newly promulgated Stock Market Law
could eliminate the imperfections in the system by introducing a legal framework for
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new offerings, based on the concept of regulation by disclosure rather than on the
merit review approach. The benefits from such a change in approach include lower
costs, since the regulator is concerned only with determining the price of the issue
and whether the information disclosed is relevant to assessing the security on offer.
The upshot is that the move to a new disclosure-based regime means that the new
agency must ensure that all valuations and financial valuations made in the offering
are soundly based and fully explained. This scheme relies on the promoters and
financial intermediaries to ensure that the disclosures made are fair and sound, and
penalties and other incentives should ensure that the parties take all the necessary
actions to ensure compliance. Our approach will fundamentally shift the basic
traditional conservative role of the responsibility of the private sector and its
intermediaries.
3.3.2 Secondary market
Clearly, a number of legal and regulatory changes are required to provide the
Kingdom with a deep, broad and liquid stock market. Securities regulation is
underdeveloped in the Kingdom and the government should be encouraged to
promulgate new regulation concerning brokerag, dealing and the management of
investments by banks. Certainly, reforms in the market architecture, including the
introduction of an alternative trading system, are necessary in order to enhance
liquidity. The benefits of innovation in securities design could be stimulated by the
introduction of financial intermediaries whose presence is needed to further enhance
the competitive position of the stock market. It is important to remember that
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financial intermediaries are essential for reducing market imperfections and
improving the allocation of assets within the financial system. The Kingdom would
benefit from introducing new types of intermediaries who will facilitate transfers,
supply liquidity, monitor loans and manage portfolios. It is suggested that further
liberalisation of foreign non-bank participation in the market could contribute
significantly to the completeness, liquidity and ultimately the efficiency of the
market.
In sum, therefore, introducing reform measures will result ultimately in lower
costs for issuing securities. Moreover, if rules on foreign investment in the stock
market were to be relaxed, the introduction of powerful changes in the securities
regime could serve to attract more investors to the Kingdom. But without these
changes, most firms will invest in only a few of the biggest firms. For most investors,
the information asymmetry costs are simply too large. Sensible government officials,
particularly if they are intent on privatising some of their state-owned enterprises,
will lower the regulatory barriers to stimulate investment in the stock market.
Another attraction of this approach to reform is that it should encourage large
domestic investors (many of whom are active in foreign markets) to become more
active in the equity market. The overriding attraction of this package of reforms is
that, by imposing rigorous disclosure, listing standards and transparency
requirements, the market will succeed in meeting investor confidence, which will in
turn lead to further market development creating a strong, well-developed and
efficient securities market in Saudi Arabia.
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Appendix A
Executive Rules to Regulate Dealings in Company's Shares
Through Local Banks
Art.1. The duty of buying and selling shares of joint stock Saudi companies
are restricted to Saudi banks which are licensed to do so. The banks perform
the role of mediator on behalf of clients (directly) and no share dealings can
take place without their mediation. The banks are forbidden from buying and
selling shares on their own behalf except with Ministerial Committee
permission.
Art.2. A permanent committee is formed to supervise share dealings (which
will be called the Supervisory Committee) which is made up of representatives
of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the Ministry of Commerce
and SAMA, and has the following functions:
a. Supervise share dealings and ensure that the regulations and instructions
from the Ministerial Committee are carried out.
b. Review rules and regulations relating to the organisation of share dealings,
with the purpose of developing and increasing their effectiveness. (In this
situation) it has the right to request all financial information relating to
dealings from commercial banks or companies. The commercial banks and
the companies are obliged to provide all the information that the
Committee requests about share dealings.
c. The Committee has the right to stop dealings in shares of a company or to
put a maximum limit on dealing in its shares if the general welfare so
requires, on a temporary basis that does not exceed on week. For anything
more than one week, the Committee has to obtain the permission of the
Ministerial Committee. Also the Committee has the right to stop any
dealings in the market altogether after obtaining the Ministerial
Committee' s approval.
d. The committee holds at least a monthly meeting and a meeting can be
called at the
	
request of any member. The meeting takes place in the
offices of SAMA, with all the
	 members present; the Committee's
resolutions are issued if approval of 2/3 of the members is obtained.
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e. The Committee has to present a quarterly report on its activities to the
Ministerial Committee and needs the approval of the Ministerial
Committee for any changes in the executive regulations for share dealings.
f. To be able to compete the daily supervisory role the Banking Control
Department at SAMA has to establish a permanent Control Division which
will be called the 'Shares Control Division'. This Division specialises in
the following functions (duties):
Defining the working hours for dealings in shares at the Central Unit.
• Analysing daily dealings which are returned from the Banks' Central Unit.
Supervising the appointment of employees in the dealing units of Banks.
• Registering the complaints of participants, and providing solutions and
undertaking (orderly) procedures.
• Advertising the prices of shares in the local papers and conveying to the
Banks and the companies the instructions issued by the Ministerial
Committee or the Supervisory Committee about share dealings.
• Issuing informative publications and notes on share dealings for the
general welfare.
Providing the necessary secretarial work for the Supervisory Committee.
Art.3. Each Bank designates a separate Central Unit, which will deal in shares
at its head office if it is situated in Riyadh City or in one of its operative
branches in Riyadh City; the Central Unit would receive requests from
Branches and complete the share dealings with other Banks. Operating in it
will be one or more Mediators, which the Bank will appoint after ensuring the
following conditions are satisfied:
a. The Mediator should be a Saudi Arabian.
b. He has to be of good standing and has not had any legal charges against
him.
c. He is suitably educated and has had enough training in share dealings
before taking on the job. The Bank has to obtain the approval of the
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Shares Control Division at SAMA for all those nominated to work as
Mediators; this Division also has the right to request the change of
Mediator whenever the general welfare so requires.
Art.4. All the employees concerned with share dealings are under the direct
supervision of the general management of the Bank, the general management
is responsible for all their actions and behaviour.
Art.5. The Mediator who works in the dealing unit has to ensure that all the
documents and information relating to the share dealings have been completed
and that there are no restrictions on dealing in the shares on offer, also that the
sale does not have any conditions which are against the regulatory rules for
share dealings.
Art.6. The individuals who act as Mediators are forbidden to deal in shares for
their own account or for the account of relatives of the first degree.
Art.7. It is forbidden to deal in shares on credit and the banks are not allowed
to accept payment for the value of shares bought in the form of post-dated
cheques on or any other post-dated instruction. The Bank is responsible for
any violation thereof.
Art.8. Share dealings are restricted to shares of Saudi joint-stock companies
which are owned fully by natural or naturalised Saudis, also to shares of Saudi
joint-stock companies which have foreign share capital providing that the
dealings in the shares do not result in the transfer of their ownership to
foreigners.
Art.18. The shares of a joint-stock company are not to be dealt in before the
Minister of Commerce issues a decree for its establishment; never the less,
temporary share certificates issued after the formation of the company can be
dealt in. The transactions are not recognised as valid vis-a-vis the company or
vis-a-vis third parties except from the date Of registration in the shareholders
registry according to Article 102 of the Companies Regulations.
Art.19. To compete the share dealing procedures, the joint-stock companies
have to comply with the following:
a. Speed in completing the formalities of registering and transferring the
share certificates and ensuring that preparing the registry and issuing of the
certificates does not exceed two months from the date of the ministerial
decree for forming the company.
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To increase a company's share capital, a period of not more than two
months from
the date of subscription should have elapsed before issuing its certificates
and	 allocating the shares to the subscribers.
b. Not completing the registration procedures and transferring of share
ownership unless the Band is a Mediator if it is proven to the company that
it was a direct transaction between the buyer and the seller without
Mediators, and without use of drafts made in favour of other people. The
company has to present daily a report to the Shares Control Division at
SAMA about the transfer of the share ownership.
c. Not registering more than one sale of the same shares at the same time.
d. Publishing quarterly information on the financial position of the company
and its operating activities in two daily papers within a two month period
from the end of the quarter. The punishments mentioned in the Company
Regulations will be carried out on whoever does not comply with this. The
Ministerial Committee has the right to stop dealings in the shares of
Companies in default.
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Appendix B
SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY AGENCY
ELECTRONIC SECURITIES INFORMATION SYSTEM
INSTRUCTIONS TO CTUs 1990
Version 7.0
18 January 1994
INTRODUCTION
1.1	 ABOUT THE INSTRUCTIONS
These Instructions are set out by the SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR SHARE TRADING and shall govern the trading of securities in
ESIS.
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency shall review and update these
instructions as deemed necessary.
Banks and their affiliated CTUs and authorized Bank Branches must
strictly follow these Trading Instructions and their updates.
1.2	 THE TECHNOLOGY
CTUs are responsible for ensuring that their traders receive adequate
training and are supervised when using the ESIS system.
Each CTU is fully responsible for controlling access to its Trading
Workstations and other computer facilities.
2.10 CANCELLATION OF TRADING TRANSACTIONS
Transactions may be cancelled at the discretion of SAMA for regulatory
reasons, which include the following:
The certificate representing the shares was invalid for any reason.
The seller did not have right to transfer the shares or did not own
them.
The buyer does not have the right to buy the shares.
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The transaction was a serious infringement of trading regulations.
A transaction in the share was not valid at the time of trading.
The transaction was intended to create a false market.
The transaction was insider trading.
Or for any other reason which in the view of SAMA justifies
cancellation of the transaction.
If, due to genuine error, a transaction has been reported which does not
represent the investor's instructions, the selling and buying CTUs may
jointly apply, before settlement, to SAMA for cancellation of the
transaction.
Such cancellation is totally at the discretion of SAMA.
2.11	 BUYING IN OF SHARES
2.11.1 If a CTU fails to make good on delivery on Settlement Due Day, the
CTU is notified through the Unsettled Trades Report. The CTU must
follow up on unsettled trades as follows.
The CTU must, as soon as possible, rectify the failure to deliver.
Five days after the due settlement day are allowed for the CTU to
deliver the delayed securities by normal settlement procedure.
charge may be made against the CTU for each day's delay.
If the CTU has not made good delivery by the 5th day, the CTU is
notified that it has defaulted. The original transaction is cancelled
and is replaced by a buy-in transaction as set out in Trading
Instruction 8.1
The buy-in transaction is then settled normally between the original
buyer and the new seller. If the buy-in is unsuccessful on the first
day, it shall be continued, at the percentage increase of price each
day according to a published scale to be agreed between SAMA and
the Banks.
2.11.2 The financial liabilities of the defaulting seller are:
If the shares are bought-in at higher price than the original
transaction, the original seller pays the difference to the original
buyer.
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If the shares are bought-in at lower price that the original
transaction, the original buyer pays the difference to SSRC.
In all cases of buying-in, the defaulting CTU pays the SSRC one
half percent of the value of the defaulted transaction.
All charges arising from buying-in are paid by the CTU and not the
investor.
2.12 SELLING OUT OF SHARES
In the event of a buyer proving ineligible to take up the shares
purchased, SAMA may, at is discretion sell out the shares. The
procedure for this and the financial liabilities incurred are the reverse of
the transactions set out for buying-in.
2.13	 DIVIDEND STRIPPING
No share should be sold with any past unclaimed dividends attached or
with dividend value in the share price. Such past dividends shall, before
sale, be stripped from the certificate (or ishaar if required) by the
following procedure:
The seller signs an authority, in a form approved by SAMA, enabling
the selling CTU to claim the dividend for payment to him.
The selling CTU sends this form with the certificate (if required) to the
paying bank.
The paying banks cancel-stamp the coupon (if required) and transmits
the dividend money and the certificate to the seller's CTU.
2.14 DIVIDEND CLAIMS
Entitlement to a current dividend or benefit is determined by whether the
trade takes place on the dates for 'with' and 'without' trading, as set out
in Trading Instructions Sections 8.2 and 8.3.
The final instructions to the Registrar to register buyers eligible for the
dividend or benefit are those prepared on the Settlement Day for the last
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day of trading 'with' the dividend or benefit.
If, due to late delivery, a 'with' transaction is not settled on the
scheduled Settlement Due Day, and cannot be registered before the
register is closed, the buying CTU claims the dividend from the selling
CTU, which claims it from the selling investor.
Ishaaraat issued from 'without' trades carry a message that the buyer is
not entitled to the current dividend or benefit.
2.15 BANK CUSTODIAN HOLDING OF INVESTOR SECURITIES
To permit immediate response to investor orders and other efficient
customer service, CTUs may act as custodians of their investors'
physical securities, under arrangements agreed between the investor and
the Bank whereby:
The Bank holds the investor's securities, (i.e., ishaaraat or
certificates, in safe-custody). The Bank maintains a record of shares
held in safe custody for investors.
The securities remain in the name of the investor lodging them for
safekeeping until they are sold.
The shares held by the Bank in safe-custody for the investor are not
used in any interest other than that of the investor on the investor's
instructions.
All trades in Saudi shares originating from the Bank Custodian must
continue to go through the ESIS market.
The Nominee function on the Companies' registers is held by SSRC
operating on behalf of all the Banks.
Shares held in safe custody by the Custodian are to be deposited,
where possible, into ESIS as retained ishaaraat to take full
advantage of the automated transfer facilities.
The Custodian Bank, in addition to sending the investor a
confirmation note of all trades executed for him and statements of
money account, sends to the investor regular statement of the
securities held for him in safe-custody.
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7	 BIDS & OFFERS / EXECUTION
7.1	 GENERATING BIDS AND OFFERS
- Bids are generated from buy orders and offers are generated from sell
orders in preparation for trading and execution.
- A generated bid or offer cannot exceed their order's available quantity.
- Bids / offers must be within their orders price step, quantity and price limit.
- Bids/offers can be generated as Firm or on Hold.
7.2	 ON HOLD BIDS/OFFERS
- Bids/offers put on Hold are out of the market thus invisible to other CTUs
and cannot be executed.
- Price fluctuation limits do not apply to on Hold bids/offers.
- Suspension of a security, CTU or Trader does not affect associated on Hold
bids/offers.
7.3	 FIRMS BIDS/OFFERS
- Firm bids/offers are in the market and are liable to be executed at any given
time during the Opening and Trading period.
- Firm bids/offers can be fully or partially executed within their orders' price
limit.
- Suspension of a security or a CTU results in placing all its associated
bids/offers on Hold.
7.4	 BID/OFFER ADJUSTMENTS
- The following will be enforced against order adjustment:
Quantity
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An outstanding (Firm and On Hold) bid/offer's number of shares can be
reduced at any time. This shall automatically increment the available
quantity of the order in question.
An outstanding (Firm and On Hold) bid/offer' s number of shares can be
increased as long as the bid/offer's share increase does not exceed the order's
available quantity. This increase shall automatically deduct the increased
number of shares from the available quantity of the order in question.
Changing a Firm bid or offer's quantity shall result in giving the bid/offer a
new date and time stamp (i.e. it loses its time priority).
Price
An outstanding (Firm and on Hold) bid's price can be decreased at any time.
The bid's price can be increased up to its buy order's limit price.
An outstanding (Firm and on Hold) offer's price can be increased at any
time. The offer's price can be decreased down to its sell order's price.
Changing a Firm bid or offer's price shall result in giving the bid/offer a new
date and time stamp (i.e. it loses its time priority).
Hold/Release Changing
A firm bid/offer can be returned to on Hold at any time.
Releasing an on Hold bid or offer to firm is only accepted for active
securities and from an active trader.
7.5	 BID/OFFER CANCELLATION
- Outstanding (Firm and on Hold) bids and offers can be cancelled at any
time.
- The cancellation of a bid/offer shall automatically increment the available
number of shares of the order in question. The increase equals the number of
shares of the cancelled bid/offer.
7.6	 BID/OFFER EXECUTION
- During the Opening and Trading periods, the system attempts to execute all
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existing firm bids and offers. Traded bids/offers are executed at their limit
price or at a better price.
- In its attempt to execute all firm bids/offers in the market, the system shall
prioritize according to the following criteria:
Price: Best price (highest bid and lowest offer)
Time: Within the same price, bids/offers with the earliest release date
and time have priority.
- A firm bid or offer can be partially executed. The balance (number of
shares not executed) is then automatically placed in a new bid/offer with the
same price limit as the original bid/offer. This newly created bid or offer will
have the same execution priority as the original bid or offer.
7.7	 INACTIVE SECURITIES EXECUTION
- Each potential execution of a bid and an offer of an inactive security shall
be delayed by one trading day. On the following trading day the delayed bid
and offer shall be executed against the best offers/bids in the market.
7.8	 CROSS EXECUTION
- A potential execution of a bid and an offer of the same CTU is to be
delayed by 15 minutes if there are no bids and offers from other CTUs at a
similar or better price.
- If within a cross delay another CTU enters a counter-bid or counter-offer, in
whole or in part at better price, the system shall immediately execute the just
released bid/offer with its counterpart in the cross delay.
8	 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
8.1	 BUYING IN AND SELLING OUT TRANSACTIONS
- When SAMA decides shares should be bought-in to make good a defaulted
delivery, (or should be sold out to make good a defaulted purchase) it shall
on opening of trading the following day inform CTUs that a buying-in (or
selling out) is taking place. The buy-in (or sell out) trade shall be handled as
a put-through between the original buyer and seller.
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- The conditions of these transactions and the liabilities arising are set out in
the Settlement Instructions.
8.2	 DIVIDEND ENTITLEMENT
- Shares purchased through ESIS shall in general carry entitlements to
dividends paid after the purchase.
- To clarify dividend entitlement in purchases close to the date when the
registrar of the company closes his books for payment, listed companies shall
notify SAMA in writing of the date on which they intend to close their
registers for payment of dividend or distribution of any other benefit, as soon
as such date is decided by each company.
- Company registrars shall agree with SAMA a period prior to and up to
books close date, during which the buyer shall not be entitled to receive the
dividend or benefit. The first day of this period shall be the 'without
dividend date'.
- From this date until books close date, shares shall be traded, in ESIS,
without dividend. All trades executed in ESIS during this period shall be
'without-dividend'.
- The 'without-dividend' date of each listed share shall be published and
communicated to CTUs.
8.3	 BENEFITS ENTITLEMENT
Listed companies making an issue of rights, or of bonus shares, or making a
subdivision or consolidation of shares, or making any other arrangement
which affects the form or value of a traded share, shall notify SAMA well in
advance and not later than when the papers for the relevant General Meeting
are sent out. In these situations the company shall
arrange with SAMA the trading schedule for such share situations, similar to
that required for dividends in Instruction 8.2.
agree with SAMA in the case of a rights issue, the treatment of the lapsed
rights.
agree with SAMA, in the case of a new form of shares, the date on which
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trading in the new form shall start and the date on which trading in the old
form shall cease.
If the market requires that a security must be dealt, at the same time, with two
conditions applying, the system will trade the conditioned shares separately.
9	 VIOLATIONS
Trading violations committed by traders as a result of not following the
Trading Instructions shall be recorded. These violations can be taken against
the concerned traders or their CTU and may result in their suspension.
9.1	 FALSE MARKETS
- It shall be contrary to these instructions to make a false market in a security,
by which is meant collusion between a buyer and seller contrived so as to
create a movement in security price which is not justified by the earnings or
prospects of a company.
- It shall be contrary to these Instructions to knowingly make a trade through
the central system which results in no change of beneficial ownership of the
securities.
9.2	 INSIDER INFORMATION
- It shall be contrary to these Instructions for a trader to carry out, on behalf
of his CTU or on behalf of any person, any securities transaction based on
internal or confidential information concerning the affairs of a listed
company prior to the normal or arranged time for publication of that
information by that company.
9.3	 SECURITIES INDUSTRY PERSONNEL
- It shall be the responsibility of the employing Banks to ensure that in-house
rules are written and imposed which prevent any employee or any holder of
office in the organization from using information obtained at work for
personal gain in the share market.
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Appendix C
The Guidelines for Conversion to Joint Stock Companies
Ministry of Commerce Reference Number 495
Date 25/3/1418 H (29/7/1997)
(First) Introduction:
The guidelines for conversion to joint stock companies provide the basis for
regulating the conversion of commercial companies to joint stock ones. The
conversion process, which will involve the provision of information to owners
and investors, will benefit the converted company specially and the national
economy generally. These guidelines aim to clarify the rules governing the
conversion process including conditions required to be met and in particular
the information to be disclosed by a company applying for conversion; also to
specify the relationships and responsibilities of all parties involved in the
conversion process.
It is anticipated that these guidelines will accomplish the following:
1. Provide the necessary information to the present owners and potential
investors on which to base their decisions.
2. Clarify the conversion procedures.
3. Specify the information and figures that must be disclosed.
4. Specify the relationships and responsibilities of all parties involved in the
conversion process.
(Second) Conditions for Conversion:
1. A company applying for conversion must have reached significant
profitability and size in the year preceding the application for conversion;
nevertheless, the company's net assets and shareholders' equity should not
be less than SR 75m on the date of conversion.
2. Return on equity should not be less than 10% in each of the preceding five
years. Furthermore, the feasibility study must confirm that the return will
not be less than 10% in each of the next five years following conversion.
3. A company applying for conversion should have been in existence for at
least 10 years.
4. A company applying for conversion with public offering must offer not
less than 51% of the issued shares.
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5. A company applying for conversion should have in place a proper
management capable of managing the company efficiently and effectively.
Also, it should have effective internal controls to protect its assets. The
company should have the capability to compete in the market.
fThird) Conversion Procedures:
1. Applying for Conversion
1.1. A qualifying company wanting to convert to a joint stock company
should apply to the Department of Companies (DoG) at the Ministry of
Commerce; the application should contain:
1.1.1. Company's name, address and year of formation.
1.1.2. Management's salaries, bonuses and any other benefits allocated to any
of them (including retirement and any other privileges).
1.1.3. Description of any significant shareholding by the Management in other
companies related to the company.
1.1.4. Summary of the selected financial figures of each of the preceding five
years. This should, as a minimum, include sales, profits, working
capital, total assets and long term debts.
1.1.5. Description of any legal proceedings or major law suits filed against the
company that have not been totally resolved.
1.1.6. Explanation of the risks that potential investors, in the company, should
be aware of (this includes any low performance in the past, significant
competition, etc.).
1.1.7. Management plans for the use of the proceeds of the issue (if any).
1.1.8. Methodology of arriving at the proposed share price of the converted
company including the different assumptions used to arrive at that
price. A description of the capital structure of the company post
conversion: i.e. whether it is to be limited to existing shareholders and
to the existing paid in capital or any other structure. In the event of a
public offering, details must be provided of the proposed capital, i.e. of
the part allocated to the present shareholders and that which would be
offered to the public, if any.
1.1.9. List of shares owned by the management or other related people in the
company and their shareholdings in the new company as a result of the
exchange. Any significant changes in shareholdings during the five
years preceding the application, must be disclosed.
1.1.1 0.Description of underwriting arrangement, if not totally subscribed, and
the name(s) of the underwriter(s), number of shares underwritten by
each of the underwriters and the fees for each, if any.
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1.2. The following documents shall be attached to the application:
1.2.1. A copy of the company's Memorandum of Association and
amendments.
1.2.2. A letter confirming the approval of the company's owners to convert.
1.2.3. Audited financial statements for the preceding five years.
1.2.4. Auditor's report for a limited review of the applying company's
financial statements for the period starting the last published financial
statements to the date of the application. The auditor's opinion should
state that the financial statement, reviewed represent, to his knowledge,
the fair position of the company.
1.2.5. A feasibility study for the company's objectives, prepared by an office
licensed to operate in the Kingdom (presumably licensed by the MoC)
to include the office's valuation of the converted company, financial
projections for the new company covering and the valuation
methodology. This should be conducted according to common
standards. The study should also include a comprehensive summary of
the information and data included in the company's application.
2.	 Reviewing the Application:
2.1. The DoC shall review the application and may request any additional
information to enable it to complete its review. The DoC shall ascertain
compliance with conditions stated in (Second) and the completion of
required information stated in (1.1 of Third) above.
2.2. According to the results of the application's preliminary review, the DoC
shall indicate whether it approves, in principle, accepting the application
or filing (rejecting) it. The DoC's decision, in all cases must be justified;
the result of the review shall be submitted to the Minister of Commerce
for authorization.
2.3. If preliminary acceptance for conversiou is granted, the DoC shall
request the company to submit the following documents;
2.3.1. Owners' resolution approving the conversion according to the
company's Articles and bylaws.
2.3.2. Proposed Company's bylaws according to the standards stated in the
Ministerial Directive No. 583 dated 1/5/1385 and its amendments; the
bylaws must include provisions relating to:
One)The appointment of an auditor for the first year, and of the first
company board for a period of no more than three years.
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Two)Converting the existing owners' shares to common shares and
restricting their tradability for two financial years from the date of
approval of the conversion.
Three)Setting a voting limit for the general meetings whereby no
shareholders shall have votes representing more than (5 to 20%
according to the company's position at the time of conversion).
This shall be applied to all General Meeting resolutions according
to article (34) of on the standard bylaws in the Ministerial Directive
No. 583 dated 1/5/1385 and Article (107) of the Companies
Regulations.
2.4. In situations of converting a company and increasing its capital though
public subscription or maintaining its capital and offering part of the
capital for public subscription, the DoC shall appoint one (or more)
expert(s) with the objective of ascertaining the valuation of the
converting company and specifying the fair share price of the proposed
joint stock in accordance with the provisions of Articles (60 & 61) of the
Companies Regulations according to common accounting standards
applicable. As for the situation where the company converts while
maintaining the same shareholders and capital or increase the capital
through closed subscription, the DoC may evaluate (or consider) this
situation according to feasibility study only; in either case the converting
company shall pay for all the expense incurred in employing the third
party expert.
(Fourth) Permission to Convert:
If it becomes clear to the Ministry of Commerce that the requirements above
have been met and the economic benefits of the company' s conversion have
been demonstrated, the Ministry shall conduct the necessary steps to convert
the company to a joint stock one through a Ministerial Directive issued
according to Companies Regulations. The Prospectus should contain a
comprehensive summary of information and figures contained in the original
conversion application; all investors shall have the right to examine the
applicati
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Appendix D
Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules
Minister of Commerce Circular Reference Number 2222/221/9/3340
Date 8/11/1417
We wish to inform you that the Ministerial Committee established by Royal
Decree Number 1230/8 11/07/1403 to supervise share trading in the Kingdom
has met on 17/09/1417 and has decided the following rules:
1. Suspension of Trading
Companies cannot suspend trading of securities for administrative
reasons, for example, Annual General Meetings or dividend payments.
Companies can in exceptional circumstances and after coordinating with
Ministry of Commerce, suspend the trading of securities for 1 week.
2. Disclosure
The Ministerial Committee has developed the share market and to
continue the gradual development with the principles of and
requirements for disclosure and after reviewing the Supervisory
Committee reports regarding disclosure, we approve the following:
a) The Chairman or Managing Director should announce any major
events and information which may affect share prices indirectly or
directly, or if the company has reached a decision which may affect
the share price, the company must announce immediately to the Share
Control Department of SAMA for dissemination via ESIS and to the
mass media details of the announcement. Examples of major events
which may affect share prices are as follows:
• any important information which would help shareholders and
investors to understand the companies status or major developments
in the activities of the company which may lead to major changes in
the assets or liabilities of the company or the financial situation of
the company;
• recommendation concerning cash dividends,
• recommendation concerning the increase or the decrease of the
capital of the company
411
• recommendation concerning the distribution of stock dividends
through capitalisation;
• merger or take-over situations, both companies involved must make
announcements;
• any sudden losses experienced by the company, which may affect
the share price of the company;
Clause 2. a) contd.
• sale of any part of the companies assets which would materially
affect the companies profit or loss;
• new contracts which may materially affect the companies
profitability or the share price of the company; and
• any change in ownership which would affect the management or
policy of the company.
b) The Board of Directors, Managers and Executive Employees must not
make statements or comments or offer information unless the
statement or the information truly reflects the current state of affairs of
the company.
3. Trading Rules for the Board of Directors, Managers and Executive
Employees
a) The Board of Directors, Managers and Executive Employees should
not trade the shares of their company in the short term (daily or
weekly) for speculative purposes and should not trade these shares to
mislead the market and they should not deal or trade before the
• company announces any major events likely to affect the price of the
shares and should not buy or sell, 1 day following any announcement.
b) The Board of Directors, Managers and Executive Employees cannot
buy or sell or transfer ownership during the 10 days preceding the
announcement of quarterly financial statements.
4. Trading Rules for Investors
a) Any person should not deal on inside information, information which
is not published and freely available to the public, whether this
information is received either indirectly or directly.
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b) It is prohibited to manipulate or the create false markets or any action
which would likely mislead the market into thinking there is activity.
It is also prohibited to publish false information.
5. General
The creation of an unfair market andlor persons acting on inside
information, information which is not freely available to the public, is
prohibited. Any violation will be punishable according to the regulations
within the Kingdom.
The Companies Department of the Ministry of Commerce and the Share
Control Department of SAMA will follow up these rules with companies
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Appendix E
Trading by GCC Citizens Rules
Circular to All Companies
Ministry of Commerce Reference Number 222/427/9/572
Date 5/2/1418
We would like to inform you of the issuance of the Council of Ministers
decision number 16 dated 20/1/1418 which approves the resolution of the
GCC 15th meeting (Bahrain) regarding GCC citizens right to own shares of
public corporations in GCC countries and trade shares in accordance with the
amended rules attached to the decision.
And it desired by the Minister of Commerce that all related parties know these
rules which are addressed below and which were attached with the Council of
Ministers Decision.
1. Definitions
Corporation or public company: a company which has the nationality
of one of the GCC countries and is established according to the
companies regulations for that country and it's capital is divided into
negotiable shares of equal value for trading.
GCC Individuals: natural persons who have the nationality of one of the
GCC countries and juristic persons where the majority of it's (the jurisitc
person) capital is owned by GCC citizens or GCC Governments and has
the nationality of one of the GCC countries.
2. It is permitted for GCC citizens to establish new public companies and to
participate in the establishment of and to subscribe for, and own and
trade, the shares of existing public companies which conduct economic
activities allowable for GCC participation, based on the GCC Supreme
Council Resolutions and the provisions of the GCC economic agreement,
and also it is allowed for them (GCC individuals) to own and trade the
shares of GCC joint companies, accordingly the rules applicable are the
rules where the company was established, each country where the
company is established may establish a limit that the majority (5 1%)
should be the citizens of that country.
3. With the exception of insurance companies, money exchangers and
banks, it is allowed for GCC individuals to establish new public
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companies and participate in the establishment and subscribe in it and
own and trade the shares of the existing public companies which conduct
business in other economic activities and this should not exceed 25% of
the capital of these companies, accordingly to the rules applicable where
the company was established.
4. The procedures [rules] for the establishment and trading of shares will be
governed by the rules of the country where the company was established
(and the nationality).
5. a. the shares which are owned by the GCC individuals have the same voting
rights as do the shareholders of the company where the company was
established
b. representation on the Board of Directors of individuals other than
individuals representing the country of establishment should not exceed
the percentage warranted by the ownership of shares. [For example, if
there are 20 Directors and GCC owned 25% of issued shares only 4 GCC
Directors can be appointed (GCC in this instance refers to the other 5
countries not including the country of establishment)]
c. It is permitted for each GCC country to set out a condition that the Board
of Directors must be formed by GCC citizens natural or a representative
of juristic persons.
6. These rules will not affect any previous benefits or rights which may be
have been issued in the GCC in the past
7. These rules will be enacted after 3 months from the date of the Supreme
Council decision.
8.	 These rules will be reviewed after three years from the date of enactment
in order to develop and enhance the rules if required.
